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Numeracy is individuals' capacity to understand and process basic probability and numerical information required to make decisions. We conducted a Replication Registered Report of Peters et al. (2006) examining numeracy as a predictor of positive-negative framing effect (Study 1), frequency-percentage effect (Study 2), ratio effect (Study 3), and bets effect (Study 4). With an online US American Amazon Mechanical Turk sample (N = 860), our replication using the target's dichotomizing of the numeracy measure found support for the original findings regarding interactions between numeracy and three decision-making effects. Numeracy was associated with weaker framing effect (χ2 p = 0.01, 90% CI [0.00, 0.02]), weaker ratio bias (Cramer's V = 0.17, 95% CI [0.10, 0.24]), and stronger bets effect (χ2 p = 0.02, 90% CI [0.01, 0.04]), yet we found no support for the frequency-percentage effect (χ2 p = 0.00, 90% CI [0.00, 0.01]). However, we found support for associations with all four studies when treating numeracy as a continuous variable. We extended the replication to examine confidence, yet the results were mixed with support found for only three conditions (Study 1 positive framing condition: r = -0.11, 95% CI [-0.20, -0.02]; Study 3: r = 0.15, 95% CI [0.08, 0.21]; Study 4 no-loss bet condition: r = 0.10, 95% CI [0.01, 0.20]), suggesting a much weaker and more complex relationship than anticipated. Materials, data, and code are available on: https://osf.io/4hjck/. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We conducted a preregistered close replication and extension of Studies 1, 2, and 4 in Hsee (1998). Hsee found that when evaluating choices jointly, people compare and judge the option higher on desirable attributes as better ("more is better"). However, when people evaluate options separately, they rely on contextual cues and reference points, sometimes resulting in evaluating the option with less as being better ("less is better"). We found support for "less is better" across all studies (N = 403; Study 1 original d = 0.70 [0.24,1.15], replication d = 0.99 [0.72,1.26]; Study 2 original d = 0.74 [0.12,1.35], replication d = 0.32 [0.07,0.56]; Study 4 original d = 0.97 [0.43,1.50], replication d = 0.76 [0.50,1.02]), with weaker support for "more is better" (Study 2 original d = 0.92 [0.42,1.40], replication dz = 0.33 [.23,.43]; Study 4 original d = 0.37 [0.02,0.72], replication dz = 0.09 [-0.05,0.23]). Some results of our exploratory extensions were surprising, leading to open questions. We discuss remaining implications and directions for theory and measurement relating to economic rationality and the evaluability hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shame and guilt are unpleasant self-conscious emotions associated with negative evaluations of oneself or one's behavior. Smith et al. (2002) demonstrated that shame and guilt are distinct and are impacted differently by public exposure, that is, the (potential) exposure to disapproving appraisals of one's misdeeds by others. The impact of public exposure (compared to no exposure) was greater for feelings of shame than for feelings of guilt. We conducted a direct replication (N = 1272) of Smith et al. (2002)'s Study 1 and found that exposure increased both feelings of shame (p 2 = .14, 95%, CI [.11, .17]) and guilt (p 2 = .13, 95% CI [.10, .16]) compared with the private condition. Moreover, people who were in the high moral conditions reported both higher shame (p 2 = .33, 95% CI [.29, .37]) and guilt (p 2 = .36, 95% CI [.32, .39]). Shame and guilt both had moderate-to-high correlations with the shame-related and guilt-related reactions and both exposure and moral belief manipulations had effects on shame-related and guilt-related reactions. Our results suggest a failed replication: public exposure and moral belief influence both shame and guilt, so we cannot conclude that shame and guilt can be distinguished from each other solely based on public exposure, which diverges from the target article's main theory and findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Carter and Gilovich (2012) investigated the centrality of experiential and material purchases to the self and concluded people have stronger associations with their experiential than their material purchases. In a pre-registered experiment with a US American Amazon Mechanical Turk sample, (N=743), we successfully replicated their Studies 3A, 3B, 3C, and 5. Experiential purchases were perceived as more reflective of true-self than material purchases for both self (d=0.65[0.57,0.73]) and for strangers (d=0.88[0.80,0.96]), and that when meeting a new person, information about experiential purchases was considered to be more insightful (d=1.13[1.04,1.22]), useful (d=1.14[1.05,1.23]), and fun to talk about (d=1.96[1.83,2.08]) than material purchases. Self-concept was more strongly associated with experiential purchases than with material purchases (d=0.39[0.25,0.54]), and that there was a negative association between experiential purchase satisfaction and the willingness to exchange memory (r=-.34[-.43,-.24]) (all effects above were p<.001). We added an extension examining change in evaluations of material and experiential purchases over time and found that current evaluations were more negative than past evaluations, yet to a lesser extent for experiential compared to material purchases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]