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The key missile defense questions facing policymakers today are what kind of systems should be fielded and to what extent should investments be made in future missile defense technologies. In recent years, some have argued that more investments are needed to counter theater-range missile threats, even if such investments come at the expense of developing future capabilities. On the surface, this approach seems reasonable given the sizable increase in the number of short-range ballistic missiles around the world. However, such an approach could undermine the U.S.' ability to defend against an adversary that might not be deterred by offensive forces alone. Moreover, it would not provide a meaningful capability in the long term that could dissuade an adversary from investing in ballistic missiles in the first place. This paper argues that the United States can achieve the deterrence and defense objectives set out for its missile defense forces only by sustaining a program that is balanced between the deployment of nearterm defenses and the development of advanced technologies, and between the fielding of defenses against theater-range threats and long-range threats to the American homeland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to determine why the United States chose to bypass NATO after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the relative strengths and weaknesses of alliance and coalition operations, through an examination of NATO's missions in Bosnia and Kosovo and U.S.-led coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the United States emerged from NATO's two Balkans missions with a belief that its operational freedom and flexibility had been hampered by operating within alliance constraints, coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq raised key questions about whether ad hoc coalitions are the most appropriate mechanisms for conducting such operations. NATO's contributions to postcombat reconstruction and stabilization also highlighted some of the core advantages to be derived from working through the alliance. If NATO can follow through on the transformation agenda it has undertaken since the 2002 Prague Summit, the indications are that the United States is more likely to turn to NATO for future operations and that NATO's days as a "toolbox" may well be numbered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that it was the flawed design of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) rather than the conventionally ascribed reasons of security, international status, or domestic imperatives that provided the necessary incentive for India to conduct nuclear tests in 1998 before the treaty foreclosed such an option altogether. The mandatory nature of the entry-into-force (EIF) clause of the CTBT was a departure from other international agreements in that membership was not voluntary. This suggests that any regime that impinges on a state's sovereign right to make security decisions on behalf of its people is likely to meet failure by formal or informal defections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At heart, Colin was a simple soul, kind, honest, generous-spirited and with a great sense of humor - it was his saving grace when he followed unwaveringly the path that his formidable intellect indicated. As Dr Keith Payne has noted in his paper in honor of Colin, there was frequently much controversy because he "ran afoul" of received wisdom in many of his writings.[1] In the course of his career he went from being known as "the Hawk's Hawk" in 1982[2] to one of the "Peacemakers" in 2020.[3] Colin was always in pursuit of the truth as he perceived it. I wish with all my heart that Colin could have heard the many tributes which have been made publicly and which our daughter and I have received privately since he died on February 27 SP th sp , 2020. [Extracted from the article]

Putin developed Russia's nuclear strategy, which allows for the first use of nuclear weapons in conventional war, when he was secretary of the Russian National Security Council Staff. Russian nuclear doctrine allows for the first use of nuclear weapons in "regional or even a local" war. Starting in 1999, Russia began to simulate the first use of nuclear weapons in large, theater-war exercises. Since 2000, all large-scale Russian military exercises have reportedly featured simulations of limited Russian nuclear strikes. Russia characterizes the first use of nuclear weapons as "de-escalation" of aggression. There is an impressive body of evidence going back decades indicating that Soviet/Russia's threshold of nuclear weapons first use is lower than what was publicly announced. Indeed, in 2014, General of the Army (ret.) Yuri Baluyevskiy, who managed the development of Russia's nuclear doctrine, said that the "conditions for pre-emptive nuclear strikes...is contained in classified policy documents." Since 2007, Russia has made numerous high-level overt nuclear threats, including, since 2014, nuclear threats relating to Ukraine and the Baltics. Putin is preparing for a major war with the U.S. and NATO. He clearly hopes the West will capitulate without one. If he miscalculates and a war results, the threat of nuclear strikes, and possibly the strikes themselves, will be a major part of his strategy for victory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Only Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Ukraine have completely surrendered nuclear weapons and then signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Although a declining security threat marks the decision-making process in all four countries, it is not clear advocates of disarmament understand the factors that caused the perception of a more cooperative security environment, and whether the lessons from those cases are applicable to the non-NPT nuclear weapons states. The literature lacks an analysis of the lessons learned from previous disarmament cases, but this study argues that the analysis cannot provide actionable, policy-relevant knowledge to further the cause of global disarmament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The threat of losing control of nuclear weapons during political crises is not sufficiently prepared for by either individual nuclear powers or the international community. The relative success of securing the Soviet nuclear arsenal after the collapse of the USSR has lulled the world into a false sense of security, but the threat is real and may be increasing. Drawing upon historical case studies in which the government of a nuclear weapon state failed, the author recommends policy options for future scenarios in the hope of preventing potential nuclear disasters in newly proliferating states such as North Korea and Iran. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An examination of President Clinton's decision to launch military actions against Iraq in June 1993 is largely absent in professional defense literature. This article represents an attempt to test the descriptive accuracy and further develop the diversionary theory of war. The analysis employs a qualitative framework for diversionary use of force developed by another researcher, Ryan C. Hendrickson. This article finds that empirical support for the diversionary argument in this case is mixed. Two proposals to further develop qualitative tests for diversionary use of force are advanced. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The question of how to measure a state's rationality and compatibility with deterrence must be confronted in order to address the broader theoretical discussion concerning the credibility and effectiveness of deterrence. This article broadens Janice Stein's three-condition model of potential constraints of deterrence as a theory and a strategy. It then applies this revised model as a means of identifying potential obstacles to a future nonconventional deterrence regime with Iran, concluding with an assessment as to whether this analysis can support the argument that such a future deterrence regime would be stable. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article reviews national security decision-making in the Iranian context by focusing on institutions, formal process and individuals. It specifically examines the Supreme National Security Council, which formalizes and embodies the decision-making process, as well as the Revolutionary Guards, which epitomize both the influence of institutions as well as the centrality of the agent-individual. Despite the plurality of formal institutions and the existence of process, decision-making remains heavily centered on a small group of largely unelected individuals driven as much by ‘regime expediency’ as by mutual give-and-take along informal, microfactional lines. While he may have the last word, even Iran's current Supreme Leader is constrained by these ideological, negotiational and structural factors. These key figures are closely affiliated either with the politico-clerical founding kernel of the 1979 Revolution, or the powerful Revolutionary Guards—mainly the hardliners in any case—and are instrumental in determining the discursive boundaries of national security, the scope of which this article confines to defense and foreign policy. Finally, how all this coheres in the realm of strategy has as much to do with regime survival as with the art of reconciling ends and means. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article is a first attempt to systematically assess the impact of leaks on Israeli decision-making. Five major cases were studied on three levels: whether leaks affected the process, policies adopted, and outcomes. Leaks had a strong impact in two cases, but not on the policies adopted, or outcomes, in any of the cases analyzed. As a tentative conclusion, most leaks are about Israel's broad strategic thinking and the politics thereof, rather than hard information. The primary impact is on process, important in itself, not substance. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the claims of Minimum Deterrence proposals of the U.S. that a relatively small number of nuclear weapons is considered an adequate nuclear force for all pertinent deterrence missions of the U.S., including its nuclear deterrence coverage to its allies. Topics include the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama and his policy positions on the topic, General Kevin Chilton of the U.S. Strategic Command, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism.

How effective are parliamentary democracies at sending coercive signals and orchestrating them into coherent messages? Are parliamentary democracies any better at doing this than presidential democracies? In order to answer these questions, the research project uses an in-depth analysis of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War as a case study. This article seeks to determine how effective the United Kingdom was at sending coercive signals and orchestrating them into coherent messages. In general we observe that the United Kingdom suffered from many of the same problems in executing a coercive strategy as presidential governments do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Obama administration's reset policy with Russia focuses on certain key issues in the Russo-American relationship: arms control, as embodied in the new Prague treaty called New Start, gaining Russian support for U.S. pressure on Iran, and gaining Russian support for the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. This article closely examines the arms control and Iranian issues as well as the broader issue of Russo-American rivalry over Eurasian security, perhaps the core issue in the relationship and certainly the most contentious one there. The analysis suggests that there are numerous problems with the treaty that go beyond the issue of whether or not it allows the U.S. to build missile defenses. It also suggests that there are unproven and even unjustified assumptions about Russian policy regarding Iran and regional security that reduce the real value and prospective gains of this policy for the U.S. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nuclear weapons and strategic strike capability are the highest priority of the Russian Federation. Russia is deploying both advanced new strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and new types of nuclear weapons. Russian military leaders have openly stated that Russia has deliberately lowered the nuclear use threshold and talk about the use of nuclear weapons in regional and local wars. This is attributed to weakness in conventional forces. However, a number of respected Russian military analysts argue that the real motive is to increase political clout against the United States and NATO. Russia has formally adopted a nuclear escalation doctrine in which the introduction of nuclear weapons into a conventional conflict is characterized as “deescalation” of the conflict. Unlike NATO's “flexible response” doctrine of the 1960s—the nearest parallel to current Russian thinking—there is a dangerous assumption that the use of few nuclear weapons will end a conflict with a Russian victory. Failure to view Russia realistically could endanger U.S. national security in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japanese political and military leaders are allowing a gap between policy and maritime strategy to open, endangering the operational effectiveness of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. Tokyo has come to recognize the diplomatic value of nontraditional military missions such as disaster response and humanitarian relief - witness its robust response to the 2004 tsunami. Such missions now represent a core task of the JMSDF. At the same time, Tokyo has left the full range of traditional missions in place without supplying additional resources. Japanese maritime strategy urgently needs to be clarified, keeping ends in balance with means. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While there is some uncertainty about the direction of the U.S. missile defense program, there can be little question that the threats posed by ballistic missiles and the availability of nuclear weapons to potential adversaries will continue to grow well into this century. We will need new capabilities, because, over the long term, the currently configured and planned terrestrial-based missile defense system will be unable to deal with increasingly sophisticated countermeasures and shifting threats. Maximizing protection of the United States and its allies against new threats in the decades ahead can be achieved by supplementing fixed ground-based defenses with mobile defenses, using platforms on land, at sea, or in space. Space seems to have the most to offer if we are striving for global and timely protection. It will be critical to future security strategy to continue efforts to integrate offensive and defensive capabilities in order to bring the full power of our armed forces to bear on the dangers we will face in the years ahead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In achieving their own political goals, states—including great powers—have looked to political exiles (people residing outside of their home country who harbor political grievances with those who are currently in power “back home”) and their respective organizations as instruments of grand strategy. Historically, states have used exiles in three ways: (1) intelligence collection, (2) recruitment and execution of paramilitary operations, and (3) information operations. The article details how internal organizational splits, differences of strategic culture, and competing thoughts about overall political goals can make the grand-strategic use of exiles a complex endeavor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Addresses issues related to United States (US) nuclear deterrence policy in the post-Cold War period, including requirements for both major-power deterrence and regional deterrence. Literature on US deterrence policy during the Cold War; Checklist of information on how leaders can establish the basis of deterring an opponent; Deterrence policies and institutions developed during the Cold War; Requirements for future US deterrence policy.