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Over a century after the first description of a polymorphism controlled by a supergene, these genetic architectures still puzzle biologists. Supergenes are groups of tightly linked loci facilitating the co-segregation of combinations of alleles underlying alternative, complex adaptive strategies. The suppression of recombination at supergenes is generally caused by polymorphic chromosomal rearrangements, such as inversions. The existence of inversion polymorphisms and supergene raises theoretical and empirical questions. Why do these architectures evolve? How can alternative combinations of alleles be formed? How and why is polymorphism maintained? The purpose of this paper is to provide answers to these questions by reviewing recent advances in the study of Heliconius numata, an Amazonian butterfly displaying a striking diversity of wing color patterns. In a broad context, this review highlightsmechanisms that play an important role in the evolution of new genomic architecture and in the adaptation of species. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most bacterial ribonucleases (RNases) known to date have been identified in either Escherichia coli or Bacillus subtilis. These two organisms lie on opposite poles of the phylogenetic spectrum, separated by 1-3 billion years of evolution. As a result, the RNA maturation and degradation machineries of these two organisms have little overlap, with each having a distinct set of RNases in addition to a core set of enzymes that is highly conserved across the bacterial spectrum. In this paper, we describe what the functions performed by major RNases in these two bacteria, and how the evolutionary space between them can be described by two opposing gradients of enzymes that fade out and fade in, respectively, as one walks across the phylogenetic tree from E. coli to B. subtilis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his famous book Le hasard et la nécessité (1970), Monod claims that natural evolution is based on the interplay between chance and necessity bringing about adaptive evolutionary change. This article addresses a set of related questions about Monod's conception of chance: what does he mean when he uses the term “chance”? Does he invoke one or many different concepts of chance? What are the implications of his conception about the issue of the deterministic or indeterministic nature of the biological world? Is Monod's view of what chance is relevant in contemporary biology? This paper, structured by these four questions, aims at providing a synthetic study of the way Monod conceptualizes chance, particularly highlighting the metaphysical and epistemological implications of his conception and its value in biology today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]