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In 2002 and 2003 in the run-up to the war in Iraq, the U.S. and Europe experienced the most jarring deterioration in the transatlantic partnership since the Suez crisis of 1956. When attempting to diagnose the causes for the recent spate of ill will, the temptation is to look to the current inhabitants of elective office. For those who followed disputes over landmines, climate change, the International Criminal Court and other issues, it is clear problems go beyond George W. Bush, Jacques Chirac, and Gerhard Schroeder. The first section of the paper, through illustrative counter-factuals (What if Al Gore won the election? What if Europe had been bombed on September 11th?), examines the extent to which present difficulties are a product of contingent developments. The second section examines the deeper reasons for the divide. A number of authors have identified deeper sources by looking to differences in underlying material conditions and cultural values. However, these explanations typically are far too deterministic. Neither the end of the Cold War nor material differences in military capabilities determine a country?s choice of foreign policy approaches. Similarly, while values differences between the U.S. and Europe may be real, these should not obscure the commonalities of culture and interest that remain strong, particularly in light of vast differences between the democratic West and the authoritarian rest of the world. Section three makes the case that materialist and cultural arguments miss or minimize the the ways in which political distance itself may be the main cause of difficulties in the post-Cold War era. Political distance between governing elites is ultimately derived from differences in ?domestic? decision-making processes shape which interests and values exercise influence in political life. These internal institutions establish constraints on European and American decision-makers in international fora that may exacerbate differences between the two. The paper concludes by emphasizing that recent difficulties are as much a product of choice as they are driven by structural constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]