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In this paper I argue that, contrary to early claims about the Internet in authoritarian regimes, this technology does not represent an inherently liberal sphere of communication. Rather, authoritarian governments can exert quite effective control over use of the Internet by manipulating the architecture of this flexible technology and by leveraging laws, social norms, and market conditions in ways that significantly raise the cost of unfettered Internet access. However, while diffusion of the Internet in authoritarian regimes does not constitute an automatic extension of civil liberties, this technology may well prove to be an important tool for promoting another type of political reform: bureaucratization. In countries where rampant corruption threatens the effectiveness of public administration and the legitimacy of authoritarian rule, leaders who prevent use of the Internet to challenge their monopoly on power may nonetheless use the technology to promote greater accountability in the exercise of power. Throughout the paper I illustrate these conceptual and theoretical arguments with evidence from the cases of China and Saudi Arabia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of democratization on Taiwan's foreign policy making. For fifty years, the ruling Koumintang determined Taiwan's China policy. The democratization that made possible the election of President Chen Shui-bian, however, complicated foreign policy making by allowing the participation of more voices in Taiwan's politics. For the past five years, the now opposition KMT and other parties have challenged Chen's China policy with a vastly different foreign policy agenda. This paper examines their views, and the influence of party cleavage on Taiwan's China policy. It seeks to answer the following questions: In Taiwan, does "politics stop at the water's edge"? (i.e., is there strong coordination among national officials and politicians), or is the state "disaggregated" with different elements (e.g., political parties) conducting semi-autonomous foreign policies in the service if disparate societal interests? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to contextualize the internet as a tool for democratization in China. Scholars have argued both for and against the prospect of the internet serving as a vehicle for political change in China, and authoritarian regimes more broadly, without reaching a consensus. We argue that part of the reason for the lack of consensus is that the internet's potential should be seen in more nuanced terms. The internet has served to open up the Chinese public sphere and democratize discussion. For reasons of demographics, history, and state control, however, the internet has not been the center of political mobilization against the regime. We begin by reviewing the literature on democratization and the internet in China. We find that much of the discussion focuses on the overly general and binary question of whether the internet leads to democratization, which is often too broadly defined. Instead, we suggest that the term democratization generally encompasses two concepts that should be analytically separate. The first aspect of democratization is the democratization of public discourse and the development of a Habermasian public sphere, through which the state loses its agenda setting ability. This is distinct from explicitly political democratization, in which the internet serves as a tool to achieve specific policy outcomes. We argue that the history of the internet in China has strongly influenced disparate outcomes in these separate spheres. Early on, China's history of dissent emerging from universities and its legacy of state controlled media led leaders to be suspicious of the mobilization potential of the internet. At the same time, the marketization of China coupled with the limitations of state media, has allowed for relatively more open discussion online. Next, we review more recent evidence of how the internet contributes to a public discourse in China but how it has not had a similar impact on political mobilization. We find that, outside of certain sensitive topics, the internet has allowed netizens to set the agenda for public discussion. This is innovative relative to the previous status quo: the state set the framework for public discourse via state media vehicles, with citizens maintaining little power to change the direction of conversation. Yet, at the same time, we also show that a number of factors and tactics mean the state has been able to limit and channel the internet's potential for political mobilization. As previous research has found, any attempt to use the internet for policy advocacy elicited swift and decisive action by the authorities. Overall, the Chinese experience suggests that the term democratization, when used in relation to the potentiality of the internet, has been used in an overly broad way. We thus end with a call for more attention to be paid to the specific mechanisms and circumstances through which the internet can lead to (limited) democratization in specific contexts. Research in this direction is more likely to lead to productive advances in our understanding of how technology shapes and is utilized by authoritarian societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Will China become democratic? This is a critical question highly debated among scholars and pundits. While optimistic proponents suggest that China is experiencing a gradual or inevitable democratic transition, pessimists argue that China is either stagnating in its "trapped transition" or becoming a "resilient authoritarian regime." One of the key issues of the debate focuses on different perceptions of the role of Chinese leaders in China's democratization. This paper intends to shed some light on this widely debated question by exploring the belief systems of Hu/Wen. Using operational code analysis from political psychology, I examine public speeches and statements delivered by Hu and Wen especially regarding domestic issues from 2005-2007. I suggest that Hu and Wen as the fourth generation of China's leadership share a similar belief system especially regarding domestic issues. Both of them have democratic-oriented beliefs perceiving a tolerant and cooperative political universe. In addition, both Hu and Wen are inclined to use cooperative and democratic means to achieve their political beliefs. However, both of them are weak in terms of implementing their political goals. China's future as a democracy depends on whether Hu and Wen can consolidate their political power and strengthen their beliefs in order to lead the political transition. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ongoing and interactive processes of democratization, nation building and nationalism in Taiwan have a fundamental influence on the dynamics of cross-Strait relations (Chu 2004, Wu 2004). The combination of electoral competition and an evolving politicized discourse on Taiwanese national identity have rendered Taipei the most dynamic and volatile actor in CSR. However, in the absence of diplomatic communication channels between Taipei and Beijing, high-level interaction between Taiwan and China has predominantly taken the form of unilateral public pronouncements. Since the mid-1990's cross-Strait relations have followed a cyclical pattern of "working silence" punctuated by "provocative statements" issued by Li Deng-hui, and since 2000 Chen Shui-bian. Whether indicative of strategic calculation, deep-seated conviction or electoral contingency, President Chen's propensity to issue statements of the "one country on each side" type have resulted in his being characterized as a "pro-independence President" (Ross 2006). In consequence, conciliatory statements and Chen's insistence on decoupling "democratic reforms" such as referenda and constitution reform and non-confrontational expressions of Taiwanese identity from "Taiwan independence" have fallen on deaf ears. In this paper we investigate the content and strategy of Chen Shui-bian's public utterances by seeking to answer three questions: First, is the characterization of Chen as a "pro-independence president" accurate, or is it possible to distinguish advocacy of "Taiwan independence" broadly defined, from a qualitatively different "national identity" discourse? Second, how much variation in the content of Chen's speeches can be explained by his strategic relationship with the group to whom the speech is addressed? Third, what structure underlies the timing and locations of "pro-independence" proclamations that might help us understand Chen's presidential discourse? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When an authoritarian regime reforms the state media, how does it affect the ability of the state to manipulate public opinion? A number of authoritarian regimes have deregulated local media markets since the late 1970s. This paper studies the relationship between newspaper deregulation, political news content, and public opinion in China. Interviews with Chinese media experts and content analysis show that media deregulation is associated with greater variation of news content, but alternative mechanisms of control keep diversity within narrow boundaries. At the same time, however, media deregulation makes a great difference to audiences. Data from the Beijing Area Study reveal that readers are more susceptible to news messages when newspapers are deregulated. If news content can be synchronized through alternative mechanisms of control, media deregulation is conducive to regime stability. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explores the demographic trends in China since the Communist takeover of power during the 1970s. Benefits of the global economy for the Chinese labor market; Rate of crime in the country; Role of implementing a population control policy in the region's sex imbalance.

Examines the factors that contribute to the different policy positions of Taiwan residents toward either unification or independence. Association of the citizens' perception of threats on their position regarding the island's future relations with China; Linkage between identity and policy preferences as mediated by levels of security/insecurity; Effect of democratization on the citizens' policy preferences.

The article examines the role of Confucianism in Singapore, South Korea, People's Republic of China and Taiwan. It explores the widespread attachment to Confucian values in each of the countries and examines the ideology played in the four societies. It highlights the difference in democratization where Singapore and China are authoritarian regimes, while South Korea and Taiwan have made transition to democracy with authoritarian past.

Since the 1980s, changing national identities have transformed the China-Taiwan and Korean conflicts. Democratization in Taiwan and South Korea, and liberalization in China, have forced leaders to compete for popular legitimacy by appealing to national identities. Along with the collapse of the Soviet Union, these contested national identities have been the main factors driving change in the conflicts—pushing China and Taiwan inexorably apart and toward a showdown, while helping to sustain what appeared to be a mortally wounded North Korea. This explains why one U.S. ally, Taiwan, has become more hawkish, while the other, South Korea, has turned more dovish. These foreign policy changes, in turn, have reinforced changes in underlying national identities. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies have produced a considerable amount of scholarship which significantly contributes to our understanding of how individual votes. What is under-explored in this scholarship is an analysis of the effects of external threats on vote decisions. Utilizing survey data collected by the Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) Project, this study examine the hypothesis that Taiwanese citizens' vote choices in the 2004 presidential election are conditional on their perceptions of threats, i.e., the possibility of military attacks from China and the likelihood of armed interventions by the United States on Taiwan's behalf. When respondents perceive a high level of threats, they are less likely to vote for candidates who proposed policies that would result in cross-Strait conflicts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]