For Hobbes, the entirety of that which exists is body, and this body is, I contend, dynamic, generative, affective and emotional. In investigating any phenomenon, one must, to follow Hobbes, proceed from the body and its motions. I argue that Hobbes's persistent materialism ought to direct us toward connecting Hobbes to recent theorizing on affect and emotion. This paper explores Hobbes's account of the body and its corporeal processes, arguing that we can read multiple points at which Hobbes's articulations open onto connections with contemporary thinking on affect and emotion; I illustrate this mode of interpretation these connections through a close reading of Hobbes's account of the state of nature. As I read Hobbes, I theorize these resonances between affect theory and Hobbes, focusing on Hobbes's conceptualization of philosophy, its methodology, and its objective, his rendering of the body, his elaboration of the embodied processes of motion, sensation, and thought, and his theory of the passions. As such, this paper is situated at a conjunction of scholarship on Hobbes and affect theory, and I argue that our engagement with Hobbes benefits from this sort of entanglement. I read across academic disciplines and theoretical traditions to demonstrate the way that emotion and affect are central to understanding politics as such and to engaging with a canonical thinker such as Hobbes, expressing the emotional stakes and intricacies of his theoretical concerns. This essay opens with a reading of Hobbes in relation to Spinoza vis-à-vis embodiment and affect, arguing that they share some philosophical commitments and objectives that connect them to contemporary affect theory and that this generates some affinities in their respective ethical projects. From there, I engage Hobbes's materialist account of motion, sensation, and thought from the perspective of affect and emotion. I contend that not only does Hobbes's philosophy of the body in motion resonate with affect theory at multiple points, but that they share the project of upsetting Cartesian dualism. The subsequent section directly takes up Hobbesian emotion, which I theorize in terms of Sara Ahmed's work on emotion, particularly her concept of an affective economy. Finally, I provide an affective reading of Hobbes's state of nature that uses the preceding sections to trace the material, affective processes - motions, sensations, thoughts, etc. - at work there; this section argues that the state of nature should itself be read as an affective economy. Ultimately, I demonstrate that the entire Hobbesian project proceeds from the body, and that this body ought to be read affectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]