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Does religion matter in Taiwanese politics? Our paper rejects a simple answer to it. Both the pros and cons can find statistical support from this paper. In many cases, beliefs, religious commitment, and civic-religious group types have significant impacts on Political Tolerance, Traditional Political Values, Political Participation, and Party Preference. But these impacts are not consistent across different regression models, after controlling for age, sex, income, education, and marriage. However, in most cases, we find civic-religious group type a powerful religious factor affecting political values and behaviors. This supports our social capital thesis that participation in religious groups (particularly, non-traditional religions) enables the believers to learn liberal political values and accumulate their social capital for democratic participation. Although religious leaders might indoctrinate their believers with traditional political values or favor certain political parties, they do not necessarily dictate the political thinking or behavior of the activist believers. After all, the religious behaviors of most Taiwanese believers are very personal, de-institutional, and non-theological. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper primarily examines the social reconstruct of Taiwan?s identity since 2000, when Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party won the presidential election. It will address the Chen Shui-bian regime?s policies of identity reconstruction in a series of political issues (e.g., history text rewriting and language policy) to generate collective action from the public, the resistance from opponents, and the intriguing relationship between identity and ethnicity. Finally, the paper will draw assessments and implications for the future of Taiwan?s political development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes various trade-off effects of the elderly pension policy on other welfare programs and government expenditure at the county-city level in Taiwan. The trade-off effects caused by the elderly pension policy contain full trade-off and partial trade-off effects. Full trade-off effect occurs when the expenditure of elderly pension exclude other welfare policy expenditure. Partial trade-off effect occurs when county-city governments disperse its financial burdens over different administrative branches or search other financial resources to cover its new elderly pension policies, in order to reduce the negative impacts on existing programs. After comparing the welfare expenditure and the total expenditure of five selective cases, this paper finds that in terms of the full trade-off effect, the adoption the elderly pension policy has crowded out the expenditure spending on the weakest in mobilizing interests or expenditure less attractive to the public. In terms of the partial trade-off effect, this paper finds that the elderly pension policy has excluded other administrative expenditure and has created serious debt problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the contemporary policy debate regarding the efficacy of strategic ambiguity as an appropriate policy for today’s Taiwan Straits conflict, there are presently on the table three main proposed policy solutions for the US role in the Taiwan Straits security situation: 1) abandon strategic ambiguity and specify in advance US defense commitment to defend Taiwan; 2) abandon strategic ambiguity and declare that the US will punish whichever player first moves to upset the status quo; or 3) continue to be ambiguous about US commitment to defend Taiwan. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to study the conditions under which an ambiguous security commitment can actually work to preserve the status quo by preventing both China and Taiwan from provoking each other. The game model helps clarify why in dual deterrence cases like the Taiwan Straits conflict, the first two strategy alternatives are less effective than the strategic ambiguity policy option. Check author’s web site for an updated version of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A conference paper about Aborigine constituencies in the Taiwanese Legislature, prepared for the American Political Science Association's Annual Conference to be held on August 28-31, 2014 in Washington D.C., is presented. Topics discussed include role played by representatives from aborigine reserved districts in Taiwan's politics, impact of aborigine reserved seats on aborigine communities, and the aborigine electoral system.

A conference paper about U.S.-China conflict due to Taiwan is presented which was discussed at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, from August 30-September 2, 2012. The paper discusses topics including China's emerging global influence in the post-Cold War era and the U.S. involvement in the Taiwan Strait conflict.

A conference paper about militarized conflict in the cross-strait relations is presented which was prepared for presentation at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, from August 30-September 2, 2012. The paper discusses topics including the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangular relationships and the alliance-like arrangement between Taiwan and the U.S.

Why do some authoritarian elections bring about democratic outcomes and not others? Building on distinctions between hegemonic and competitive electoral authoritarian regimes, this paper makes two arguments. First, elite calculations to liberalize or repress affect the type of election permitted. Second, de-institutionalization of party-state fusion must take place before authoritarian elections can become more competitive. Through a comparative study of two similar cases of hegemonic party regimes with different outcomes, this paper traces the conditions that forced Taiwan's electoral "opening" in the 1980s and the strategies that entrench the hegemonic rule of the People's Action Party (PAP) in Singapore. Despite recent liberalization, elections in Singapore are unlikely to bring about party alternation unless de-institutionalization, as in Taiwan, occurs to level the playing field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades a growing number of women from Southeast Asia and China migrate to Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore through marriage. Between 1987 and 2008, Taiwan alone has received more than 400,000 marriage immigrant women, nearly equivalent to the entire Aboriginal population in the island country. Marriage immigrant women move alone without the company of family members and they are dispersed within local families. The isolation of individual immigrants and the closeness to the local culture means that the fusion of foreign cultures takes place right inside the private sphere between husbands and wives and mothers and children. This conveniently establishes marriage migration as fertile ground for the study of identity. This paper is to explore how marriage immigrant women experience a shift of national identity after residing in the country of residence for a period of time. Embedded in transnationalism, this paper argues that marriage immigrant women are under double pressure from the state and the family to integrate into the national culture of the recipient country. Throughout time, they develop a new identity with the country of residence while keeping their original identity with their native country. Considering the central role played by women in the reproduction and transmission of the national culture, this paper argues that their dual identity is better to be understood as an in-between identity to underpin the tension between the two identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper capitalizes on Taiwan's two survey data sets, collected in the years of 2001 and 2006, to detect the relationship between popular trust in democratic institutions and beliefs in and support for democracy to shed lights on Taiwan's democratic consolidation. Taiwan's 2000 presidential election realized a peaceful power transition from the KMT to the DPP, when the long time ruling party, abounding with sociopolitical resources, was voted down and the newly formed opposition party, with a scarcity of resources, came to power. Some observers have been optimistic, saying that Taiwan's democracy has been consolidating since the year 2000. However, others have been pessimistic, saying that with eight years of the DPP in power, people's trust in democratic institutions has been deteriorating as has the growth of democratic beliefs. The latter contradictory development has posited a puzzle for democratic governance, which is the main theme of this paper. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper attempts to determine what kind of constitutional rule would be preferred in a young democracy if an institutional opportunity for constitutional change were to occur. Since both democracy and constitutional rule are viewed as the most predominant values in modern times, this paper takes a mythical approach. This approach involves three theoretical threads for looking into the transfer between an old and a new constitutional myth. They are: the political elite interest calculation; the masses' comprehension of what democracy is, and the proximity of a given myth to democracy. The case studied is Taiwan's constitutional choice between a direct form of electing the president and a kind of indirect one during the period from 1990 to 1994. By applying the three theoretical threads, the paper first uncovers how the political leaders might have used both power-maximization and power-loss minimization logic to choose their side on the issue. However, their interest calculation cannot be done in a social vacuum. Especially in a young democracy, little formal precedence or experience can be cited as a source of legitimizing the democratic nature of a given institution. Thus, people's comprehension level of democracy at the moment may play a crucial role in defining whether a certain constitutional rule is democratic or not. Therefore, we took the public responses to these two options during that period into account.Survey results indeed showed that respondents more easily understood the direct form of electing the president and, therefore, supported it more than they did the indirect form. This social mood was quite influential in consolidating discrepant ideas between elites on the presidential election format issue and helping the direct form eventually win out. Last but not least, the paper also offers a discussion about the proximity of each option to democracy. The direct option, by all theoretical accounts, is more proximal to democracy than the indirect, though what it can really achieve is uncertain. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper, based on a long term observation of the period from 1996 to 2004, tries to answer the following questions: Why have some issues evolved to be important political cleavages which shaping party competition in Taiwan, while some other issues have not? Why have some issues affected elections at some times, but not others? And finally, has there been any change in issue evolution because of the party turnover in 2000? Unlike most industrial democracies where issues of economy and wealth distribution are salient for party competition, issues of economy and wealth distribution are relatively not so salient for party competition in Taiwan. Some argue that this is so because the Taiwanese government's economic policies had successfully resolved the problems of wealth accumulation and distribution over the decades as economic development heated up. However, the Taiwanese electorate has not punished the ruling party even though the wealth distribution has deteriorated and the economy has declined dramatically since the beginning of 2000. Taiwanese have not chosen the party which is generally thought of as good at handling the economy affairs. This shows that most Taiwanese voters seldom vote according to the economy and welfare distribution even though many parties and candidates do emphasize economy and social welfare policies in their campaign platforms. In contrast, the independence/unification issue shaped by ethnicity and national identity has been considered as the most salient issue since the 1990s. Not only has it dominated political discussions of political elites and the public, but it also has shaped party competition and affected the transfer of political power. This paper tries to explore the reasons for these phenomena through two angles: that of elites, and of the public. This paper examines four issues, reform/stability, independence/unification, social welfare, and environment/economy, and shows how partisan elites frame and develop these issues to attain their political goals, and how Taiwanese voters respond. Research findings show that the independence/unification issue is the most likely to evolve into the most influential issue in Taiwanese politics. This is so because all major parties have a clear and distinct position on the independence/unification issues, and most Taiwanese voters have a clear-cut position on the issue. Furthermore, Taiwanese voters make political decisions based on the issue. After the party turnover in 2000, the parties' positions on the dependence/unification issue became even more polarized. The Pan-green's position on the dimension is moving toward an even more pro-independence stance. In the meantime, the Pan-blue's position is becoming even more pro-unification. The growing polarization between the two blocs has made the independence/unification issue even more salient and has had decisive impacts on Taiwanese voters' political attitudes and behavior. In contrast, because the diversities among parties in other three issues are getting closer since the party turnover, it is more difficult for a party to take all credits from the issues. In the near future, it is quite possible that all parties will still focus most of their efforts on framing and developing positions on the independence/unification issue rather than on other issue dimensions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tries to explore whether a multiple party system demands more diverse information sources and creates more complex information networks than a single party system does and as a result, predicted by theories of democracy, is capable of deepening democratization process and improving democratic quality. Departing from this theoretical framework, this paper chooses to study information seeking and networks during the legislative process of Taiwan's fourth (1999-2002)and fifth term Legislative Yuan(2002-5), which are respectively single party scenario and multi-party competition scenario.After carefully reviewing the different categories of bills and the similar processes of scrutinizing those bills across the fourth and the fifth legislative terms, we select five bills each to cross-analyze the formal information seeking activities and the informal information networks. The technique we employ is data-mining technology, aided by manually recode those of listed information providers and invited personnel by the legislative committees.This paper proposes that the information seeking and networks of the fifth term Legislative Yuan is wider, more complex and more professional oriented than the fourth term. The findings of the paper primarily conform to this expectation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper suggests a theoretical framework to understand the evolving voting patterns in Taiwan. It attempts to link macro cleavage structures in the society with micro voting behavior through the meso-level elite maneuvering. This cleavage linkage viewpoint is certainly not new. As early as four decades ago, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) sought to specify the way in which the parties in the Western European polities emerged and stabilized around basic social cleavages. According to the Lipset-Rokkan model, parties in new electoral democracies will be inherently unstable unless they become linked to deep-rooted sources of cleavages. One major weakness of this macro sociological approach, however, is the missing link between existing social cleavages and individual voting choice. The latter field has been heavily influenced by the Michigan model and its extensions. This paper suggests fill in this gap with the meso-level factors of elite competition for mass support and their mobilization strategies. Political elites, by appealing to the deep-rooted cleavages, justify their power struggle with divisions in ideology and group identity. Such an appeal to group identity sets priorities in political agenda, which in turn shapes voters' preferences and provides the basis of individual choice of party preference and candidate. It is hoped that this perspective will integrate the macro-historical tradition with the micro-behavioral approach and improve our overall understanding of Taiwan's electoral politics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the various impacts of contemporary globalization on national security, with special reference to the migration of the Taiwanese semiconductor industry to China and its security challenges to the United States, Taiwan and China. The paper adheres to a sectoral approach to the study of globalization-security interconnections and adopts a broadly based definition of security pertaining to the case study in question that encompasses economic, technological and defense security. The analysis of the subject matter is grounded in evidence collected in more than 140 interviews with chip industry, defense sector and government insiders in the US and Asia, as well as English-language and Chinese-language secondary data. On sectoral migration, the paper argues that the scope of the migration is extensive, the direction complicated, the cause multiple, and the outcome significant in boosting the development of the indigenous Chinese chip industry. It has been discovered that some Taiwanese non-state chip actors have violated government regulations in the process of spearheading the migration, and some have even forged business ties with their PRC counterparts associated with the PLA. As for the ensuing security ramifications, it is argued that there is no immediate security risk involved, although long-term strategic repercussions are paramount. The depth and scope of the continuous sectoral migration in years to come will determine the level of economic security risks faced by the US and Taiwan. Long-term technological and defense security repercussions need to take into account two important elements at play: technological change in the sector (increasing commercial-to-military spin-on and dual-use nature of the chip technology), and the PRC dual-track (economic and defense) grand strategy behind its resolve to upgrade its indigenous chip capability. Four pertinent aspects are analyzed: (a) concerns over the PRC chip industrial base, its contribution to the PLA modernization and the ensuing shift in the balance of power in Beijing's favour; (b) technology-related misgivings over the trustworthy supplies of chips for the US and Taiwanese military end uses, as well as the shrinking "chip gap"; (c) fear of denial of chip supply due to foreign dependency; (d) dubious implementation of export control policies at the unilateral and the multilateral level that exacerbate some of the above security repercussions. The concluding section elucidates how the case study helps to show the impact of globalization on security as far as the agency and scope of security, the autonomy and capacity of the state, as well as the balance of power are concerned. To sum up, the study offers a fresh look at the complex security repercussions of the globalization of a strategic industry that occurs in a politically sensitive region in world politics today. It not only helps us disentangle an important policy issue, but also advances our theoretical understanding of the globalization-security interconnections in international relations today. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As an emerging approach to explore the dynamics of voter preference, agent-based modeling (ABM) highlights new opportunities for intellectual exchange across political science, communication studies, and computer science. For a political scientist who is interested in applying ABM in future research, it is important to know how and to what extent the results of such laboratory experiment can be associated with the empirical data, if available. This paper is an attempt to deal with this concern by comparing statistical analysis based on datasets generated in a laboratory and analysis based on empirical datasets. The S-RAS model of voter preference is an ABM model I designed to meet the requirement of internal validity. It is closely built upon John Zaller's (1992) Reception-Accept-Sample (RAS) theory about how individuals process political information. In this paper, four parameters in S-RAS are calibrated with empirical information, collected from two waves of telephone surveys to be conducted in Kaohsiung City, Taiwan, in late November 2006 and early January 2007. This paper begins with literature reviews on external validity in this ABM approach. The second section elaborates how S-RAS is designed to meet the requirement of internal validity. The third section describes the procedures of collecting both empirical data and simulation data, while the fourth section compares the descriptive statistics of both empirical data and simulation results. The last section discusses the implications of the similarities and differences given the results of comparisons. There is no perfect matching between what empirical data reveal and what simulation results show. The comparison, however, show some similarities in the increase or decrease of the proportion of different type of agents. Advices to apply S-RASin future research and general challenges ABM modelers need to overcome are discussed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

All democracies have some fundamental constitutional rules based on unwritten conventions rather than codified articles. Extending theories treating convention as the solution to coordination problems, this paper models the formation of constitutional convention as a repeated game and studies the conditions under which a convention of cohabitation can evolve in a semi-presidential regime where the appointment of prime minister requires no parliamentary consent. The model identifies several important conditions: the president's reserve powers, the strong legitimacy of the legislature, a centripetal electoral competition, and a considerably long horizon of the competing political forces. Using France as a successful example, this paper discusses the likelihood for Taiwan to follow a similar path. Many conditions require an overhaul of the current institutional environment but not necessarily another constitutional revision. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Informed by the Kuomintang party's ability to stay in power during Taiwan's relatively peaceful democratic transition, mainstream scholarship considers democratization in Taiwan a "top-down," "transacted" process initiated and managed by the Kuomintang party. The literature that has addressed the international dimensions of Taiwan's democratization has followed this pattern of analysis - President Chiang Ching-kuo initiated reforms in the 1980s in response to growing challenges exerted by a changing geopolitical environment on the Kuomintang's legitimation formula, thereby ensuring the party continued to remain at the apex of power. While the above literature assumed that the Kuomintang had the power to control the democratization process, this paper argues that the geopolitical dynamics surrounding Taiwan in the 1970s and 80s had the effect of gradually shifting power to the political opposition by allowing it the room to mobilize a previously passive cross-section of society - electorally and otherwise - based on the idea of "self-determination." Thus, although the Kuomintang remained the dominant party in the post-breakthrough phase, the political opposition had the ability to effectively challenge the Kuomintang - ultimately forcing it to alter the institutions through which it exercised power. By re-examining the international influences on Taiwan's democratization process, this paper will therefore question the established understanding of its dynamics and the characterization that it has earned over the years. In doing so, the question of power in the dynamics of regime transition on Taiwan will be reconsidered. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of democratization on Taiwan's foreign policy making. For fifty years, the ruling Koumintang determined Taiwan's China policy. The democratization that made possible the election of President Chen Shui-bian, however, complicated foreign policy making by allowing the participation of more voices in Taiwan's politics. For the past five years, the now opposition KMT and other parties have challenged Chen's China policy with a vastly different foreign policy agenda. This paper examines their views, and the influence of party cleavage on Taiwan's China policy. It seeks to answer the following questions: In Taiwan, does "politics stop at the water's edge"? (i.e., is there strong coordination among national officials and politicians), or is the state "disaggregated" with different elements (e.g., political parties) conducting semi-autonomous foreign policies in the service if disparate societal interests? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Taiwan's civil-military relations in the context of democratic consolidation, focusing on how armed forces and security apparatus face dual challenges for their professional autonomy and political neutrality in a young democracy. In contrast to expectations that lingering fear of interventions and questions about political loyalty would provide the military motives and opportunities to consolidate their veto power position, defense and security sectors in Taiwan achieved political neutrality sooner than expected. Taking on the pilot case of the Coast Guard Administration, this paper finds that the military carves their own political niches within the new democratic order by turning to lobbying both political and civil society to influence the defense and security policy agenda, which represents more of progress than challenges for consolidating democratic governance over the military in Taiwan. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the possibility of doing dynamic analysis on the important issue of changing ethnic identities in Taiwan in the absence of genuine panel data. Despite the exploratory nature and methodological emphasis of this paper, we do hope that the pseudo panel approach to repeated cross-sectional (RCS) data explained here can shed some light on the process and determinants of the gradual rising trend of Taiwanese identity in the past decade. We also hope that this approach provides a feasible alternative to studying the dynamic process in the absence of repeated measurements of the same units. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explains why democratization destabilizes some asymmetric alliances more than others. I argue that democratization has the potential to destabilize asymmetric alliances because it unleashes a powerful force of nationalism in the political arena. Nationalist elites who come to power in democratizing states view military dependence and resultant foreign influence as a humiliating encroachment of sovereignty. Therefore, they demand an autonomous, equal partnership often in disregard of power disparity within the alliance. The major ally in turn resents their seemingly ungrateful demands and unreasonable policies, and therefore shows a decreased interest in the alliance. As a result of these frictions, the alliance becomes less stable. Democratization, however, does not evenly affect asymmetric alliances because it occurs in different threat environments and takes divergent paths. These factors mitigate or amplify the destructive potential of nationalist sentiments that democratization unleashes. This paper tests these arguments by analyzing three asymmetric alliances in which a weaker member democratized since the late 1980s: U.S. alignments with South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses how Taiwan's democratization redefined ethnic identity.In this case, an ethnic minority identified with an oppressive regime (thewaishengren - "people from outside the province and who emigrated to Taiwanafter 1945) successfully avoided persecution even though it lost power.Conversely, an ethnic majority (the bendiren - "people from the soil" - ornative Taiwanese) avoided inflicting reprisals against its former oppressor.The paper explains this outcome as an outgrowth of the dynamic ofethno-genesis and ethnic mobilization among minorities: namely, the abilityof waishengren elites to co-opt over the years bendiren, as wellas their claim to be able to represent the interests of the Hakka and theaboriginal people. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper begins with an historical and then topical treatment of environmentalism in Taiwan, focusing on changes to the strategies and objectives of environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) as the Taiwan state underwent democratic consolidation after the 2000 presidential election. Then the paper considers the rise of environmental groups in China, which in 2005 remains under Leninist party- state control. The paper concludes with a comparison of Taiwan and China, surveying the significant differences between the ENGO portfolios of the two states. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to examine the change and continuity of the ethnic cleavage among the Taiwanese voters. Using the data collected by Election Study Center between 1994 and 2003, we sort out the pattern of party realignment in the 1990s. It is found that the Chinese mainlanders switched from the Kuomintang (KMT) to the People First Party (PFP), and that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) maintains its original Minnan social base as it attracts to more Hakka than before. Using Stokes? (1965) variance component model, we uncover the downsizing of the between-district variance across the elections and contend that party nationalization has take place since the late 1990s. The consequence of party nationalization is that the results of the presidential elections are partly driven by the ethnic coalitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2004 presidential election in Taiwan was certainly dramatic with a bitterly contested race that incumbent President Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won by the razor-thin margin of 50.1% to 49.9. In addition, the issue dynamics of the election took a surprising turn, at least from the perspective of political science theory. Chen?s campaign emphasized Taiwanese nationalism directed both at resisting the People?s Republic of China (PRC) who claims sovereignty over Taiwan and promoting ?ethnic justice? for the long-time residents of Taiwan who were marginalized politically under the authoritarian regime of the Nationalist or Kuomintang Party (KMT) from the mid-1940s through the late 1980s. This was clearly a winning strategy, but its success was at least somewhat surprising given the distribution of public opinion in Taiwan and the past electoral history of the country?s democratic era (1991-2000). This paper, hence, explores the ?puzzle? of Chen?s successful appeal to Taiwanese nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although in the long term, democratization is expected to exert pacifying effects on international relations, scholars have argued that conflict is more likely during democratic transitions. They argue that politicians in democratizing states are more likely to make jingoistic appeals, and coalitions of political, business, and/or military leaders are likely to form and to ?logroll? for military buildups and other destabilizing policies. This proposition has great significance for East Asia, which faces two potential political transitions: the democratization of China, and Korean unification. This paper tests a theory of democratization and conflict in the cases of three previous East Asian political transitions: Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. I test not only for the occurrence of conflict, but also for the presence of the predicted mechanisms through which conflict occurs (nationalistic appeals and logrolling). I find that although there is some evidence of nationalistic posturing that is consistent with the theory?s predictions, for the most part, evidence from these cases does not support the theory. Leaders did not make jingoistic appeals; they were more likely to preach stability. Furthermore, I find that the public, the military, and the business community do have substantial influence over policy makers, but do not find that these groups advocated military buildups or offensive military strategies. This study casts doubt on the relevance of the ?democratization and war? thesis for future East Asian political transitions; it finds support for theories in the liberal school of international relations, including the beneficial effects of democratization, policies of engagement, and economic integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that, like fashion, national identity may be influenced by ‘neighbors’ in a broadly defined sense. Inspired by collective choice theories, we hypothesize that, in Taiwan, a subethnically divided society facing a dilemma in its relationship with China, people sample and observe their fellow county/city residents and occupational peers, and they are subject to mutual influence in the formation of their national identity. Methodologically, we suggest that spatial econometrics is suitable for investigating neighborhood effects with survey data. Our empirical findings provide strong evidence that, in both 1996 and 2000, the formation of national identity in Taiwan indeed exhibited such effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the relationship between justice and democratization in a representative newly democratized country (NDC) -- Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The result of the 2000 presidential election ended the KMT’ dominant rule of Taiwan and marked the first regime turnover in more than five decades. Such a drastic power rotation certainly prompted a wave of elite mobility and replacement of a large scale in Taiwanese politics. It is thus interesting to investigate how the first regime turnover affected the mobility of the old regime’s elite and how the new government reshuffled and replaced the personnel in the executive branch. This paper extends Albert Hirshman’s (1978) concepts in "Exit, Voice and Loyalty" to the study of elite mobility after regime turnover. We sort out five attributes at the individual level, including sex, age, ethnicity, as well as one’s ranking and sector in the former regime, as independent variables, whereas exit, voice, and loyalty constitute three dependent variables. We propose a set of hypothesis that is to be tested against the data we collected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An examination of trends in Taiwan's national identity in the recent past reveals that important changes have occurred that seem to point to an increasing Taiwanization of identity on the island. However, there is also evidence that national identity opinions do not break down neatly into well-delineated Taiwanese and Chinese categories and that national identity in Taiwan is a complex affair. This paper is an introduction to the issues that inform national identity questions in Taiwan and an attempt to elucidate questions that often arise when examining this issue area. Over a decade after the end of martial law and the beginning of Taiwan's experiment in democracy, what can be said of the national identity of the people of Taiwan? Is Taiwan the first Chinese democracy, or a budding new nation of its own? What is the state of national identity in Taiwan and what are its implications for the future of the island and its relations with China? Use of historical, structural, and cultural information gleaned from surveys, interviews, and cultural studies leads to the conclusion that extreme opinions in identity debates do not entirely explain the majority of opinion located between the extremes and that the opinions of this middle are often seemingly contradictory. The majority of Taiwanese continue to show elements of both a Chinese and a Taiwanese identity but unevenly, depending on what issue is in question. This perplexity has important repercussions for the political future of Taiwan and its relations with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we employ longitudinal data to explore the change and continuity of political trust among the electorate in Taiwan. After the 2000 presidential election, whether the distribution of political trust will follow the rotation of ruling power is our research interest. We also would like to explore factors affect people?’s political trust, and how political trust might affect people?’s voting behavior. By employing 1992, 1995, and 1998 face-to face interviews after legislative elections, and other 8 telephone interview data during 1997 and 2001, we are able to explore the change and continuity of people?’s political trust in Taiwan. From our findings, we showed that the distribution of people?’s political trust declined during 1992 and 1998. However, as the 1997 and 2001 interview data showed, people?’s political trust rebounded after the 2000 presidential election. Among factors affected people?’s political trust, people?’s partisan preference toward the KMT, voters among the first generation, people with elementary school education were more likely to have higher political trust. However, people with the DPDD or the NP partisan preference were more likely to have lower political trust. After the 2000 presidential election, people with the DPP partisan preference changed their level of political trust, and became more likely to trust the ruling authorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to examine the discourses on TMD in Taiwan from a non-realist perspective. I propose that the popular support of joining in the US-dominated TMD in Taiwan is closely related to the interpretations of the concepts of ‘security? and ?threat? in the society evolved in the process of the island’s political development over the past decade. The rise of a new Taiwanese identity justifies the policies to militarize the island and the strategy of continuous reliance on the US for Taiwan’s security. Therefore, deployment of TMD is considered in Taiwan as a legitimate right to preserve its political system, economic prosperity and core values. On the other hand, Chinese leaders often construct their views on TMD or the Taiwan issue from a pure strategic perspective because they tend to treat Taiwan as simply pawn in the great-power competition between the US and China. In addition, Taiwan’s acquisition of TMD or permanent separation from the mainland will constitute a direct challenge to the security of the Chinese state. Eventually, the dispute over TMD between Taiwan and China is rooted in different understandings of the meanings of security and threat from both sides rather than the military balance across the Taiwan Strait, as advocated by realists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the new left in Taiwan and South Korea and the renewed left in Brazil and Chile. I contend that the left can no longer best understood in terms of antiquated sociological or economic categories. The new left in East Asia and Latin America is a political project and its politics are embedded in the processes of democratic transition. My argument is simple: (i) Democratization, a variable process of change, leads to different patterns of new left organization. (ii) Meanwhile, the introduction of democracy, a form of governance with universally shared features (irrespective of how the transition to democracy took place), promotes the moderation of the new left across all four cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since electoral systems structure how representation works, it is not surprising that changes in electoral rules and their consequences always attract close attention. This paper intends to explore how some differences in less-high-profile rules might have caused divergent speed and extent of reaching some theoretically expected political consequences. We compare two East Asian countries, Japan and Taiwan, because both of them abandoned the decades old single nontransferable vote multimember district (SNTV-MMD) system and endorsed the similar mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system. Focusing on three differences between Japan and Taiwan, including dual candidacy, regional PR constituency, and PR threshold, we tap their possible consequences on macro-level party systems and district-level strategic voting patterns. Further careful comparative studies and rigorous causal analyses are called for to study this topic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan has experienced sweeping social and political changes in the last three decades or so--from a Sino-centric, hard-core authoritarian state to a Taiwan-based, multicultural society on her way of consolidating the fruits of democracy. How might these sociopolitical changes impact the teaching and learning of national identity and citizenship in Taiwan? In this paper, I argue that the development of citizenship education in Taiwan follows changing identity politics. The notions of citizenship and civic/citizenship education in Taiwan as well as the pace and direction of her civic education reform have evolved over time in correspondence to several milestone changes in the social, political, and educational reform context. Scholarship on civic or citizenship education in Taiwan has reported paradigm shifts in curricula and pedagogies from a nationalistic education to one that emphasizes local and global connections, the importance of social science thinking and approaches, values of individualism, social diversity, and minority rights, and the distinctiveness of Taiwan as part of the tripartite framework of national identity education. To judge the extent to which students in democratized Taiwan believe in the basic values of democracy and democratic participation as well as those of diversity and equality for all-or concepts taught in the reformed curriculum, I employ recently released data from a major international survey of citizenship education conducted in 2009 to provide empirical evidence of student learning in Taiwan and in comparison to that in other East Asian countries and the total of 38 countries in the survey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How is government spending used strategically in the emergent Asian democracies of South Korea and Taiwan? As nations generally considered to have weathered democratization, a study of government spending in South Korea and Taiwan is instructive on how allocations may be used strategically without undermining democratization process. This paper evaluates government spending for South Korea and Taiwan and compares pre- and post-democratization patterns. Three interesting results point to the value of longitudinal analyses of individual nations to frame expectations on spending and underpin robust findings: First, defense spending increases in election years in both nations, but not social welfare spending. Second, democratization does not exert an effect independent of elections and legislative fragmentation. Third, government spending is a viable resource for party building; however, this spending has to be targeted at building the nation's or party's strengths rather than aimed at divisive politics. While some of the results appear contrary to the literature, they are consistent with the governing party's efforts to broaden electoral support in emergent democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is a common impression that during the period of divided government, interaction between different parties are confrontational and without possibilities for other types of coalition other than party coalition in the Legislative Yuan. Moreover, under minority governments, conflicts are frequently between the government and the opposition parties, which made it difficult, for example, for the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) or Pan-Green coalition to expect support from rival parties. This paper challenges the accuracy of this impression. In my opinion, different categories of bills lead to diverse coalitions. In other words, except for certain critical political issues, where legislators must align themselves with their own parties, legislators' behavior is affected either by their own backgrounds or by pressure from their geographical constituencies, personal interests or advocacy groups. The major goal of the article is to use the Health, Welfare and Environmental Foundation (HWE) as a case study to highlight the significant, yet underestimated, role the caucus plays as a political actor in the policy realm in the Legislative Yuan. In other words, the purpose of my article is to prove that cross party alliance is possible in a deep and significant manner. Using interviews with legislators and their staffs, I also observed their bill-initiation behavior, on three policy issues, reflected the preferences of the HWE and I demonstrated that the HWE has the potential to influence the agenda-setting of social welfare and health care bills. Ultimately, I argue that policy coalitions can be formed and adhered to by informal legislation bonds. I believe that the legislators' homogeneity on cross-cutting issues was related to the success of cross party alliances. This finding has important implications to better understand the development of party-based institutions in the Legislative Yuan and representative democracy in Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the consequences of electoral reform on Taiwan with regard to two key points of interest. First, how would the move to a mixed majoritarian system, away from the previously semi-proportional SNTV system, impact the likely electoral outcome? Second, given that parties were aware of the likely mechanical effects of the new system, might this induce a change in the traditional pattern of party competition? Based on simulations of possible electoral outcomes, based on patterns of party bargaining and non-bargaining, we provide seat pay-offs that should have directed the strategic choices made by Taiwan's four main parties prior to the January 2008 ballot. Through formal modeling we are then able to assign the optimal strategies for the two largest parties, the Nationalist Party and the Democratic Progressive Party. We find that the eventual strategy of the DPP to not cooperate with its smaller coalition partner, the Taiwan Solidarity Union, was actually the optimal strategy. On the other hand, we find that, despite the framing of the Nationalist Party as the dominant force, the Nationalist optimal strategy was to bargain with its smaller coalition partners and run cooperative nominations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper constructs a theory of endogenous change in electoral institutions and applies it to explain the rise and fall of the single nontransferable vote (SNTV) electoral institution. Electoral institutions constrain voters' choices but the choices voters make also affect the survivability of political parties and prompt them to change the electoral institution. Voters' choices thus produce endogenous dynamics of electoral institutional change. For SNTV, a dominant party existed in Japan and Taiwan to help some politicians consolidate personal votes by allocating private goods among their core supporters. Yet, SNTV is also a proportional system that allows some voters to challenge one-party dominance by voting for minor parties. As a consequence, the seat share of the dominant party declines as the allocation of private goods becomes less efficient. Facing a change in the party system, some politicians are given the incentive to adopt a new electoral institution that may improve their electoral fortune. That is why, in both Japan and Taiwan, SNTV was replaced with a mixed-member system after the dominant-party system collapsed. The same logic can be employed to explain the likelihood of endogenous change in other electoral institutions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the effects of science and technology policies upon information transfers. Such transfers are indicators of greater social returns, particularly when they flow between public and private research entities. The model presented here tests for whether government research and development (R&D) subsidization increases information flows in Korea and Taiwan. Using the unique KORTAI R&D dataset at a number of different specifications, it is shown that, at a general level, transfers are positively affected by the public funding programs in both countries. There are a number of differences between Korea and Taiwan, however, and future analysis on the East Asian developmental state must include institutions related to these funding programs. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the changing nature of China's policy toward Taiwan. Many of the sharpest debates in Taiwan, the US and elsewhere have been over whether recent modifications in policy represent a genuine overhaul in Beijing's approach to Taipei. To simplify, some argue that meaningful change already is happening and that such developments warrant careful study and attention. But skeptics conclude that it isn't happening. As one Taiwanese lawmaker complained, the new strategy is designed to "undermine the power of the [Taiwan] government…it's a poison coated with sugar." After analyzing various indicators, this study shows how theories and/or conceptual frameworks often employed in the fields of international relations and comparative politics might help analysts unravel some parts of the complicated puzzle that constitutes China's policy toward Taiwan. In conclusion, however, the author suggests that it is probable that decision-makers in Taipei will require more facts—not theories—before they agree that there is a genuine "paradigm shift" in Beijing's approach to the thorny Taiwan dispute. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ongoing and interactive processes of democratization, nation building and nationalism in Taiwan have a fundamental influence on the dynamics of cross-Strait relations (Chu 2004, Wu 2004). The combination of electoral competition and an evolving politicized discourse on Taiwanese national identity have rendered Taipei the most dynamic and volatile actor in CSR. However, in the absence of diplomatic communication channels between Taipei and Beijing, high-level interaction between Taiwan and China has predominantly taken the form of unilateral public pronouncements. Since the mid-1990's cross-Strait relations have followed a cyclical pattern of "working silence" punctuated by "provocative statements" issued by Li Deng-hui, and since 2000 Chen Shui-bian. Whether indicative of strategic calculation, deep-seated conviction or electoral contingency, President Chen's propensity to issue statements of the "one country on each side" type have resulted in his being characterized as a "pro-independence President" (Ross 2006). In consequence, conciliatory statements and Chen's insistence on decoupling "democratic reforms" such as referenda and constitution reform and non-confrontational expressions of Taiwanese identity from "Taiwan independence" have fallen on deaf ears. In this paper we investigate the content and strategy of Chen Shui-bian's public utterances by seeking to answer three questions: First, is the characterization of Chen as a "pro-independence president" accurate, or is it possible to distinguish advocacy of "Taiwan independence" broadly defined, from a qualitatively different "national identity" discourse? Second, how much variation in the content of Chen's speeches can be explained by his strategic relationship with the group to whom the speech is addressed? Third, what structure underlies the timing and locations of "pro-independence" proclamations that might help us understand Chen's presidential discourse? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan's peaceful transition from a one-party authoritarian government to a multi-party democracy in less than twenty years has been applauded by many analysts. This change however has not come without serious consequences for cross-strait relations. In particular, the democratization of Taiwan has created greater conflict with mainland China as it has created electoral incentives for politicians to take a more aggressive stance to assert Taiwan's de facto independence, leading China to worry that a formal declaration of independence may not be far behind. In addition, US policy, formulated when neither side of the strait had an incentive to deviate from the status quo, has become a dangerous anachronism under present conditions.This paper proposes a new game theoretic strategic interaction model that captures the core changes in the ROC-PRC-US triangle since Taiwan's democratization. In particular, this model incorporates the uncertainty concerning whether Taiwan will attempt to move towards formal independence or maintain a "dynamic status quo". Furthermore, China's uncertainty of Taiwan's intentions is included, as is America's decision to defend the island if China pushes towards war. Unlike previous models that only focus on Taiwan and China or view Taiwan as a responder to Sino-American politics, this model attempts to show the extent to which Taiwan's domestic politics shapes cross-strait conflict. Furthermore, the model illustrates that neither a policy of strategic ambiguity or strategic certainty on the part of America is enough to maintain peace. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent years have seen a great deal of interest in the extent to which "Asian values," or Confucian ideology, inhibit a country's acceptance of liberal-democratic values. Much of that research, however, focused on the experience of non-democratic states, concentrated on theory rather than empirical analysis, was written before the complete democratization of Taiwan, and/or created a pan-Confucian-values index instead of estimating the effects of the main components of Confucianism (family loyalty, social hierarchies, and social harmony) individually. In this paper we review theoretical arguments for why Confucian values would decrease public support for democratization, women's rights, and freedom of speech. We then use OLS and Logit to estimate models of data from the Taiwan subsamples of the 1995 World Values Study and the 2001 East Asia Barometer. Our results indicate that adherence to Confucian values did not consistently undermine public support for liberal democracy in 1995 and even increased support for some liberal-democratic values in 2001. Our findings thus disconfirm previous empirical research on this question. The article concludes by discussing how Confucian and liberal-democratic values might reinforce rather than undermine each other. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political Parties and Social Movements: An Inverse Relationship? The Case of Korea and TaiwanYoonkyung LeeAssistant professor, Sociology and Political Science, SUNY at BinghamtonThis paper seeks to explain the relationship between the development of political parties and social movements through the examination of the political experiences of Korea and Taiwan. Political parties and social movements are considered to be the central political organizations for the study of democratization and democratic politics. These two entities co-exist in the same political space, often drawing on the same actors, targeting the same political bodies, and seeking similar goals. Although the empirical boundaries between the two are often overlapping and permeable, few studies of democratic politics have analytically examined political parties and social movements in conjunction with each other. Thus this study intends to bring together these two entities on the same analytical front and conducts a comparative study on the conditions that define the development and interactions of the two in the context of democratic development and deepening in Korea and Taiwan. Democratic theorists have long argued that well established political parties and vibrant civil society are key indicators of a well-functioning democracy (Schattschneider 1942, Mainwaring 1999, Diamond 1999, Alagappa 2004). The interaction dynamics between the two spheres, however, has been diverse. Korea and Taiwan, two Asian democracies that share a similar economic and political past, have shown different dynamics in the development of political parties and social movement organizations since their democratic breakthrough in the late 1980s. Political parties in Korea have been feeble and under-institutionalized, in contrast to highly stabilized counterparts in Taiwan (Y.H. Kim 2001, T.J. Cheng 2003). The interaction between political parties and social movements has also varied in the course of democratic deepening. Korea is characterized by vocal social movement actors in contrast to under-developed political parties (Jang-jip Choi 2002). Political parties and social movement groups in Taiwan have more cooperated than competed against each other in the process of democratic reforms (Rigger 2001, Fan 2004). Then what are the conditions that define such different patterns of development and dynamics of political parties and social movement actors? Under what conditions do political parties take precedence over social movements or vice versa? Is the nature of the relationship competitive or complementary for democratic representation? Existing literatures have highlighted patterns of socioeconomic development and state actions as critically shaping the paths of political party and civil society development (Thomas 2001). Particularly in East Asia, where the developmental state had set the course of economic as well as political trajectories, it was argued that strong (and often authoritarian) governments distorted and retarded the growth of democratic opposition forces and civil society actors (Pekkanen 2004). However, it is questionable why equally effective states in pre-democratization Korea and Taiwan were followed by such different dynamics of political parties and social movement organizations. As an alternative and extension to the state action explanation, I suggest investigating the government's specific strategies in containing political opposition space and the institutional rules that governed the political space in the early years of democratic politics. Although the authoritarian elites in each country dominated political and economic arenas, they faced different constraints in containing political opposition... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the late 1980s, when many manufacturers relocated overseas, there seemed to be little breath left in the footwear industry for Korea and Taiwan. Contrary to expectations, recent evidence suggests that the Korean and Taiwanese footwear manufacturers have fared quite well. These manufacturers have stayed competitive and expanded their production in China, Vietnam and Indonesia. How did the Korean and Taiwanese footwear firms succeed in their relocation and escape the expected decline? Using Nike and its suppliers as the main example, this paper aims to argue that the two countries' footwear manufactures survive the competition from low wage countries by its ability of managing flexible production networks. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the Taiwanese and South Korean samples of the 2000-2004 Asian Barometer dataset, this paper confirms the Christian democracy hypothesis that Christianity (including Catholicism) contributes to democratization by indoctrinating democratic values and behaviors to their believers. However, the statistical analyses also support the religious market hypothesis that the logic of competition in pluralistic religious markets compels various religions to converge on dominant democratic values and behaviors within each country, although different religions and different countries continue to vary in the degrees and aspects of democratic commitment. These findings offer a more optimistic view for the prospect of non-Christian "religious democracies" than what the current scholarship proposes. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the tension between the provision of accessible health care and health industry development in Korea and Taiwan. Since the late 1990s, Korea and Taiwan have looked to develop their domestic biotechnology sector and health technology industries more generally. Through a mix of public policy reforms in capital markets, upstream science and technology development, intellectual property rights, industrial promotion, education and labor up-skilling, government actors and domestic firms (both start-ups and conglomerates) have attempted to grow domestic health technology industries. With a strong base in technological innovation, pharmaceutical manufacturing and medical care provision, health technology industrial development appears to be promising in both places. To be sure, the universalization of health care provision (through public/private social insurance) in Korea and Taiwan during the late 1980s and into the 1990s effectively means that domestic market size for new medical care products and services is significant. For instance, the purchasing of pharmaceuticals and diagnostic technology accounts for over 25% of each country's total health care expenditures. From industry's perspective, market demand for domestically developed products exists.Yet, this demand-supply relationship is not without friction; indeed, this relationship captures what I see to be the inherent tension between (i) social policy objectives for accessible health care (the 'public health' perspective) and (ii) industrial and economic objectives for health industries development (the 'industrial growth' perspective). As a result, two lines of conflict have begun to emerge in Korea and Taiwan. First, social policymakers interested in containing health care costs for the purposes of maintaining accessible health care provision favor strict price controls over the introduction of new health technologies (pharmaceuticals, diagnostics, medical devices); cost-effectiveness, in this respect, poses a severe demand-side constraint. Health industries, on the other hand, argue that price de-regulation - the lifting of price controls - is absolutely necessary for effective health technology industrial innovation. Second, public health officials in government and progressive civic groups are primarily concerned about the efficacy and safety of new health technologies, particularly among those products and services looking to list as insured benefits in the national health insurance schemes. While firms are also concerned about efficacy and safety issues, they predominantly favor quicker and less stringent regulatory measures for new product approval. In other words, industry seeks streamlined regulation.These two emergent lines of conflict are not trivial when it comes to promoting both population health and economic prosperity. First, they draw attention to the inherent conflict between public health policymakers on the one hand (i.e. MOHW, DOH), and industry and industry promoting government ministries on the other (i.e. MOCIE, MOEA). Second, these lines of conflict underscore the inherent institutional friction - or the lack of institutional complementarity - among both government actors and industry. I contend that this friction is particularly significant in the East Asian context given the stylized characterization of the postwar developmental state as being institutionally coherent and the coordinative partner to industry. Third, the tension between the provision of accessible health and the promotion of health industries points to the need for both health and industrial policymakers, along with firms in the health technology sector, to seek out new modes of coordination, inevitably involving new accommodative strategies and institutional re-configuration... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite almost two decades of democratic deepening in Korea, the streets of Seoul are still filled with unionists chanting slogans while the evening news programs rarely go a day without some story on a labor strike. In contrast, union mobilization has become a seasonal event in Taiwan and labor issues seem to have become integrated into the formal political process. This variation of union activism in post-democratized Korea and Taiwan is the main question this paper seeks to explain. This research asserts that political institutions created during the democratization process create incentives for the inclusion of unions into formal political channels. Greater institutional permissiveness combined with opportunities of union-party alliances moderate the mode of union mobilization by guiding unions to address the labor agenda through existing political channels (as in the case of Taiwanese unions). Unions alienated from political institutions, including electoral politics, are more likely to sustain radical mobilization strategies (as in the case of Korean unions). ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]