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Although in the long term, democratization is expected to exert pacifying effects on international relations, scholars have argued that conflict is more likely during democratic transitions. They argue that politicians in democratizing states are more likely to make jingoistic appeals, and coalitions of political, business, and/or military leaders are likely to form and to ?logroll? for military buildups and other destabilizing policies. This proposition has great significance for East Asia, which faces two potential political transitions: the democratization of China, and Korean unification. This paper tests a theory of democratization and conflict in the cases of three previous East Asian political transitions: Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. I test not only for the occurrence of conflict, but also for the presence of the predicted mechanisms through which conflict occurs (nationalistic appeals and logrolling). I find that although there is some evidence of nationalistic posturing that is consistent with the theory?s predictions, for the most part, evidence from these cases does not support the theory. Leaders did not make jingoistic appeals; they were more likely to preach stability. Furthermore, I find that the public, the military, and the business community do have substantial influence over policy makers, but do not find that these groups advocated military buildups or offensive military strategies. This study casts doubt on the relevance of the ?democratization and war? thesis for future East Asian political transitions; it finds support for theories in the liberal school of international relations, including the beneficial effects of democratization, policies of engagement, and economic integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An examination of trends in Taiwan's national identity in the recent past reveals that important changes have occurred that seem to point to an increasing Taiwanization of identity on the island. However, there is also evidence that national identity opinions do not break down neatly into well-delineated Taiwanese and Chinese categories and that national identity in Taiwan is a complex affair. This paper is an introduction to the issues that inform national identity questions in Taiwan and an attempt to elucidate questions that often arise when examining this issue area. Over a decade after the end of martial law and the beginning of Taiwan's experiment in democracy, what can be said of the national identity of the people of Taiwan? Is Taiwan the first Chinese democracy, or a budding new nation of its own? What is the state of national identity in Taiwan and what are its implications for the future of the island and its relations with China? Use of historical, structural, and cultural information gleaned from surveys, interviews, and cultural studies leads to the conclusion that extreme opinions in identity debates do not entirely explain the majority of opinion located between the extremes and that the opinions of this middle are often seemingly contradictory. The majority of Taiwanese continue to show elements of both a Chinese and a Taiwanese identity but unevenly, depending on what issue is in question. This perplexity has important repercussions for the political future of Taiwan and its relations with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Definitions of public diplomacy are presented and compared, and essential elements are extracted. The effects on modern public diplomacy of advanced communications technology, the growth of civil society, and the proliferation of democracy and the expansion of free markets are examined. These explain how the field is evolving in the current globalized era from policy-oriented approach to include a limits focus.In light of these changes, Taiwan's approach to public diplomacy is reviewed. Past programs are discussed, and new initiatives are suggested to take advantage of a limits focused approach. This has particular relevance given the recent elections in Taiwan and the consolidation of democracy following two successful, peaceful regime changes. Recommendations include centralizing public diplomacy activities in one non-partisan office, focusing more directly on generating international goodwill towards Taiwan, and limiting the options of others regarding Taiwanese issues. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]