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This paper analyzes how citizens of two countries that underwent democratization during the past twenty years--Russia and Indonesia--understand "democracy." Evaluating both large-N public opinion surveys and open- and closed-ended questions from interviews with a quota sample of the population in Russia and Indonesia, this paper provides a comprehensive picture of popular conceptualizations of democracy in these two distinct societies. I find that while both Russians and Indonesians view democracy through the lens of freedom, Russians have expressed their freedom by not participating in politics, while Indonesians have increased their engagement in contentious activities. These differences may help explain Russians' general indifference to Russia's authoritarian backsliding and low levels of political participation, as well as Indonesians' unusually high levels of political activism. This paper further finds that measures of popular understandings of "democracy" depend heavily on how the question is worded and the scope of possible responses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes how citizens of two countries that underwent democratization during the past twenty years-Russia and Indonesia-understand "democracy." Evaluating both large-N public opinion surveys and open- and closed-ended questions from interviews with a quota sample of the population in Russia and Indonesia, this paper provides a comprehensive picture of popular conceptualizations of democracy in these two distinct societies. I find that while both Russians and Indonesians view democracy through the lens of freedom, Russians have expressed their freedom by not participating in politics, while Indonesians have increased their engagement in contentious activities. These differences may help explain Russians' general indifference to Russia's authoritarian backsliding and low levels of political participation, as well as Indonesians' unusually high levels of political activism. This paper further finds that measures of popular understandings of "democracy" depend heavily on how the question is worded and the scope of possible responses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will look at the direct elections of regents and governors in Indonesia and ask weather the dynamics discovered are expression for a rise of subnational authoritarianism or for a deepening democratization. Concretely, the paper will look at two families that have become powerful at the local level in recent years in the context of democratization and decentralization, the Chasan Sochib family in Banten province and the Yasin Limpo family in South Sulawesi province. The accounts of the two families' rise to power confirm that there is a real possibility for local strongmen to emerge in Indonesia. However, the fact that the two families' power has different roots shows that the dynamics around subnational authoritarianism in post-New Order politics are complex. Current local political dynamics are characterized by the interplay of both authoritarian and democratizing forces. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What role do moderate Islamic organizations play in promoting democratization in Malaysia and Indonesia? What is the difference between large, grassroots organizations and newer more urban-based NGO's? Is one type of organization more effective than the other? This paper looks at the changing dynamics of moderate or progressive Islamic organizations in Malaysia and Indonesia. Some of these groups receive funding and assistance from US sources like the Asia Foundation or USAID. Moderate, progressive, or "liberal" Islamic groups suffer from being perceived as "good" Muslims by US policy makers. Given this inadvertent association, can these organizations effectively promote democracy and human rights to the larger population when that population is so critical and angry at the United States? In other words, are Indonesians and Malaysians more likely to turn away from moderate and progressive Islamic ideas because they may seem to be linked to a US agenda of building liberalism? This paper looks at organizations such as the Liberal Islam Network in Indonesia and Sisters in Islam in Malaysia, as well as others to try and understand the conflict between moderate or progressive Islamic groups and more conservative Islamic forces and to evaluate the role such moderate organizations play in advocating for greater protection of rights and liberties. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a theoretical framework for the comparative study of the causes and effects of pursuing rights through legal strategies. It then tests that framework on the results of a two-year, five-country empirical analysis of the determinants and impact of judicial interventions in health and education policy. The data gathering effort was carried out by in-country teams of up to five people in each country, using both archival research to build a database of judicial decisions and interviews to explore the implementation and impact of these judicial decisions. The paper first presents extensive original data on the nature and extent of economic and social (ES) rights litigation in Brazil, India, Indonesia, Nigeria and South Africa. It then presents comparative data suggesting the conditions that promote the extensive and successful use of legal strategies. Finally, the paper presents preliminary findings on the direct effects of a law-based strategy, as well as the indirect, aggregate social policy impact of the widespread use of legal approaches to extending ES rights. We argue that three elements combine to produce a wave of judicial demands: a) demand side factors (social organization and resources to pursue a legal strategy) must coincide with b) supply side factors (judicial support and a credible judicial system), in c) a policy context that is propitious for judicial intervention because it is prone to policy-making or bureaucratic failures. We further argue that, with significant exceptions, the direct effects of judicial strategies tends to reinforce redistributive inequities, but the indirect effect often extends the benefits far beyond the initial claimants, with positive, equity-enhancing results.The five countries were chosen so as to include common law countries with aggressive ES rights litigation (India, South Africa) and weak or incipient ES rights litigation (Nigeria), and civil law countries with aggressive (Brazil) and weak (Indonesia) litigation. Similarly, two specific issue areas have been selected for analysis in order to provide within-country variation in the effectiveness of litigation as a means of enforcement: although the findings will, we believe, generalize to the entire range of ES rights, the empirical sections will emphasize the rights to health care and education. A key element in the project is the creation of a cross-nationally comparable database detailing the characteristics and outcomes of ES rights court cases (number of cases, likelihood that plaintiffs succeed, individual or collective action, level of court), and an investigation of impact on the ground in a random sample of up to 100 cases in each country. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous analyses have shown that the success of ethics reforms such as the adoption of codes of ethics and codes of conduct depends on whether legislators have homogeneous ethical standards. In the present paper, after discussing why the DPD (upper chamber) and the DPR (lower chamber) of the Indonesia legislature have decided to enact a code of conduct, by discussing the results of a survey that we conducted in the Indonesian legislature we show that the ethical standards of Indonesian legislators are far from being homogenous. In the final section of the paper we suggest that, if previous studies were correct in positing a link between homogeneity of ethical standards and the success of conduct codes, then Indonesian legislators should take some steps to homogenize their ethical views before drafting and implementing the Code of Conduct. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: From horrific accounts of men decapitated and "disataykan" to "ordinary" accounts of stolen motorcycles, the routine beating and killing of alleged criminals by mobs or massa has become common in Indonesia. This paper examines the patterns of keroyokan - or mobbing - from 1995 through 2004 in four provinces and highlights the temporal, spatial and substantive variation of this phenomenon. Drawing from a database of provincial news clippings in Bali, Bengkulu, West Java and South Kalimantan, in-depth case studies and interviews this paper shows that keroyokan varies considerably and as such an understanding of the causes of this phenomenon must be nuanced and locally-rooted. The paper assesses whether the 1998 regime transition, 1997/1998 economic crisis and subsequent democratization affected the frequency of keroyokan and suggests that these explanations do not account for change over time in mobbing levels or form. Rather the decentralization process that created local vacuums of state power, effectiveness of local conflict-resolution mechanisms and locally established patterns of violence account for patterns of keroyokan between 1995 and 2004. This paper draws attention to the need to incorporate local data into an analysis of violence in Indonesia and appreciate daily rituals of violence as reservoirs of conflict. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers sources of developmenatal variation among countries with a similar structural inheritance, focusing on the cases of Indonesia dna Nigeria. The paper concludes that a departure from the prevailing resource syndrome will entail three dimensions of change: first, institutional changes affecting macroeconomic management and policy credibility, second, the formation of new support coalitions to bolster reform; and third, a dispersal of assets away from state elites and toward a more diversified set of capital holders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much research, both within the field of globalization and democratization studies, have highlighted how these processes challenge the state, especially in post-colonial and post-communist countries. The point of departure for this paper is twofold. First, the observation that despite the challenges of globalization and regime transition the state often seems remarkably resilient. Second, the relative lack of integration and cross-fertilization between democratization and globalization studies. Hence, the aim of this paper is to indicate one way of integrating globalization and democratization research through a discussion of the puzzle of relative state resilience in the face of globalization and regime transition. This is done through a thick description of the Indonesian case. Starting with an argument about the importance of ?path-dependency? when analysing state transformation, the paper first considers the specific history of state formation from colonial time to New Order authoritarianism. The impact on Indonesia of different aspects of globalization is examined. I pay special attention to the impact of the global economy ? especially the economic crisis that began in 1997 ? the end of the Cold War, and the activities of global civil society actors. Hence, the paper offers an analysis of the contemporary Indonesian state in a time of globalization and regime transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I argue that an inverted U-shaped relationship exists between political openness and the potential for transnational activism targeting practices within nation states. The location on the U-shaped curve also affects the quality of the activism--the types of activism and the range of tactics deployed shift as polities move along the curve. In particular, as polities move toward the right side of the curve, transnationalism becomes more internationalized--in other words, rather than primarily being a target for transnational activists from abroad, local activists more frequently enter transnational space to support other actors on issues that have little to do with the domestic political situation. Thus, a country’s location on the curve delimits a set of expectations about the potential for transnational activism, the types of activism most likely to emerge, and the range of tactics. The paper therefore provides a view not only of how domestic political change affects the quantity of transnational activism but also the types of political activism that are deployed in different regimes. This argument is developed through an exploration of transnational labor activism in Indonesia before and after the fall of the Suharto regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democratization has often gone hand in hand with decentralization, but how do the two processes relate to each other? To answer such questions one needs fine-grained data on decentralization, and these have been hard to come by in South East Asia. This paper provides a careful estimation of the formal authority of regional governments in five Southeast Asian countries - Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand - on an annual basis from 1950 to 2010. We estimate nine dimensions of subnational authority and find wide variation both across countries and across time. We detect a close temporal relationship between democratization and decentralization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the variation in village head selection rules across Indonesia using a panel over 1997-2007. I find evidence that heterogeneity across Indonesian villages can explain variation in local level institutions. In particular, ethnically diverse Indonesian villages are more likely to have appointed village heads, whereas homogenous villages are more likely to directly elect their leaders and thus, retain political power. Moreover, using a lagged measure of ethnic diversity as an instrument provides evidence that the ethnic diversity caused the change in a village's institutions following the fall of Suharto. That ethnically diverse villages have no de jure political power of selecting their village head suggests the costs of retaining political power in ethnically fragmented villages are high. These results hold whilst controlling for urban-rural location, hitherto thought of as determining local institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Indonesia, the transition from a party- to a candidate-centred electoral system is to a large extent part of the comprehensive decentralization: Since 2004 the president and vice-president have been elected directly, and as of 2005, local direct elections (pilkada) include mayors, district chiefs and governors. The paper analyses the impact of pilkada on party organization. The professionalized, commercialized, and candidate-centred campaigning during pilkada enhances the fragmentation of party organization and the autonomy of candidates from political parties. Political parties do not have a decisive impact on the financing and the contents of the campaigns. Nevertheless, local and regional party branches demand a say in candidate selection. The whole configuration has become much more intricate than before, with growing tensions within party apparatuses. They were forced to allow a more decentralized organization, but some of them have (re)centralized internal decision-making in recent years. The party central office and the party in public office are often hardly distinguishable from one another, and the party on the ground is relatively weak. The organization of parties has become more complex because consultancy and candidacies are increasingly outsourced. Moreover, all these results have to be put into perspective against the backdrop of parties' different organizational legacies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When do armed groups choose to engage in or disengage from ethnic conflicts? In this paper, I argue that variation in sources of funding (from donation or taxation) can help to explain the strategic decisions by armed groups to fight or not fight in ethnic conflicts. I also argue that the inability of armed groups to distinguish among multiple opponent groups can allow groups that have an interest in greater violence to trigger spirals of ethnic violence. I develop a formal model to develop the theory and examine case evidence from a Christian-Muslim conflict in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia to determine its plausibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is little question whether politicians at times use public goods services for political gains. The driving political factors -- and the subsequent pattern of allocation -- of public goods distribution are less certain, however. This paper examines the factors that influenced the provision of public goods in post-Soeharto Indonesia (1999-2005). Using an original district-level dataset, I find that the practical effect of electoral competition on public goods allocation is at best miniscule. Instead, a district's threat to separate from the country appears to determine its portion of public goods. Separatism increases a district's public goods funds by 27%. Compared to the meager almost-zero percent increase in funds that electoral competition adds to a district, this effect is remarkably large. This finding suggests that in countries such as Indonesia where the imperative of holding the country together dominates government concerns and priorities, the central government focuses and distributes their resources primarily to ensure national unity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite enjoying a relatively high level of economic development and other apparent advantages, democratization was quickly reversed in Russia. In contrast, in Indonesia, which has a much lower level of economic development as well as myriad other liabilities, open government is surviving and even thriving. This paper will investigate the causes for this divergence in Russia and Indonesia, which, along with Brazil, are the largest and most socially heterogeneous of all countries that participated in the "third wave" of democratization. We hypothesize that high levels of public support for democracy, confidence in state institutions, and the strength of autonomous political associations in Indonesia, and the weakness of these variables in Russia, help explain the success of democratization in the former and the failure of it in the latter. This argument is formed by comparing several indicators in Indonesia, Russia, and other third-wave democratizers using data from the World Values Survey as well as published results from Keio University's Research Survey of Political Society in a Multi-cultural and Pluri-generational World, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) National Public Opinion Surveys in Indonesia, the Asian Barometer, and the Russian National Election Study (RNES). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some people who are displaced return to their homes of origin after conflict when others do not? More specifically, what role do security issues play in this process, and how can we understand what exactly security means in the post-war context? This paper explore these issues using new data collected between February and April 2007 during interviews of more than 1,500 households who were displaced from their homes during the civil war in Aceh, Indonesia. A framework is proposed for thinking about security issues in more detail, the applicability of this framework in post-civil war Aceh is tested. I find a weak and inconsistent relationship between personal and household characteristics and return status. The relationship between a series of micro-level security related factors is more consistent and statistically significant, while the strongest relationships appear to be between macro-level security related factors. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper accounts for the origins and persistence of different models of coercive military organizations among developing states. Using a case study of Indonesia, it argues that the experience of decolonization wars embedded a model of decentralized control over local militias, giving the state mediated and uncertain power over the application of violence in its territory. This model became path dependent as the state was able to stabilize its relationship with local violence wielders by increasing the coercive and fiscal power located at the center and isolating local actors from potentially competing sources of central patronage, allowing the state to become militia's sole sponsor. This system, however, was only sustainable as long as the international environment remained benign, since the militias were still difficult to control and coordinate centrally. Indonesia's democratic opening broke the isolation of militias fromalternative sources of patronage, leading to a break down in internal order, but as long the international system permits them, such weak states can remain brokers for local violence without outright collapse. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous analyses have shown that the success of ethics reforms such as the adoption of codes of ethics and codes of conduct depends on whether legislators have homogeneous ethical standards. By discussing the results of a survey that we conducted in the Indonesian legislature we show that the ethical standards of Indonesian legislators are far from being homogenous and they are not applied consistently across issues. In the paper we suggest that, if previous studies were correct in positing a link between homogeneity of ethical standards and the success of conduct codes, a code of conduct is not likely to be adopted and successfully enforced. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Particular political and public policy issues may be perceived and experienced through the lens of religion and ethnicity, especially in the context of a religious and ethnicized society such as Indonesia. Members of ethno-religious groups often feel that certain state or policy issues, whether domestic or international in nature, are directly applicable to themselves and other followers, and thus necessitate some kind of (re)action. Oftentimes there is a "conflict" with the state and contestation ensues. Actions include a range of activities such as joining elections, supporting certain political parties or candidates, demonstrations, research or writings, organizational involvement, meetings, and discussions or seminars. This paper will examine the significance, variance, and frequency of issue-based participation by different Muslim ethnic groups in contemporary Indonesia (post-1998 period). Supporting data comes from a mixed-method approach, which was mainly conducted by the researcher during dissertation fieldwork in 2006. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper outlines the contours of an ongoing research project on the politics of banking-sector opening in Mexico, Brazil, and Indonesia. The project tries to understand why these three countries opened their domestic banking sectors to foreign participation in the 1990s and early 2000s after decades of financial protectionism, and why their governments countries exercised different degrees of control over the opening process. I find that international pressure by itself did not generate significant opening; only when external pressure converged with banking shocks, and sometimes also with domestically-driven ideational change, did significant opening follow. I also find that although the shocks forced major de jure opening in all three countries, in practice, policymakers gradually reasserted control over the opening process and were able to harness foreign capital to advance domestic political priorities. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the impact of Muslim organizations and Muslim political parties in Indonesia and Malaysia. Questions addressed are as follows: How does the political system (broadly described) facilitate or constrain the goals of various Muslim organizations (both groups in society and political parties)? What roles do these Muslim organizations play in impacting politics and where (or in what areas of) in the political process are they most effective? Under what circumstances have Muslim associations and/or parties been a force for (or antagonistic to) democratization? Given the ethnic and regional diversity in Malaysia and Indonesia, the initial hypotheses for these questions are as follows: under authoritarian and semi-authoritarian rule Muslim organizations actually have greater opportunities to polarize rhetoric as they appeal to citizens based on claims of moral legitimacy, fulfillment of social welfare needs, and some level of criticism of a restricted or corrupted political order. As a result, PAS, the lead Muslim party (and the dominant opposition party) has limited appeal to voters. Under more democratic conditions, Islamic groups or parties may need to moderate their appeals, and/or build coalitions with secular or non-Islamic groups in order to win power and influence in the larger political system. Muslim political parties exist in both Malaysia and Indonesia; their power and influence has varied over time. This project aims to explain why these parties have had more support at some times than others and under what conditions they may moderate their demands and policy choices to accommodate pluralist leanings. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a model of social movement emergence and political change that is not critically dependent on either active elite support or limited rationality. Social movements involve, rather, strategic interactions among movement actors as they are impacted by exogenous shocks---such as those experienced during a financial crisis---and moderated by the social relationship effects that exist in participating groups. We introduce two separate mechanisms involved in driving social change: Social movement emergence premised on inter-group formation under a political entrepreneur, and intra-group dynamics based on a system of endogenous contract enforcement. Our framework is also flexible enough to incorporate multiple contracting mechanisms, informational imperfections, as well as potential interactions with elites.We then consider the historical validity of the model with case studies of Indonesia during the crisis and conflict in the Congo. These studies suggest that features that we highlight in our model, such as strategic interaction among movement actors, the importance of exogenous shocks, as well as the existence of political entrepreneurs, were both necessary and important in the genesis and perpetuation of these social movements. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do certain militaries comply with government orders to use force on demonstrators during political crises while others do not? This is the central question of this paper which seeks to explain the conditions under which armed forces are likely to be subordinate or insubordinate to orders to shoot protestors. I test three propositions in this study. The first applies principal-agent models and suggests that militaries are likely to be subordinate to orders to use force on domestic opposition if governments possess the institutional capacity to monitor and deter errant behavior within the armed forces. The second contends that the degree of military subordination is contingent on the existence of an organizational culture that prescribes such actions. The third proposition suggests that inter-factional conflict within a military organization leads to the insubordination of government orders to use force against demonstrators. I test these propositions by examining military actions in Thailand 1973 and Indonesia 1998. I argue, that of the three propositions, the inter-factional competition hypothesis best explains the extent of military compliance with orders to shoot on domestic political opposition. The inter-factional conflict hypothesis consistently explains the variance on the dependent variable (the level of military subordination) in the cases while the other two models fared less well. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparative scholarship suggests that democracy in ethnically-diverse societies is likely to be fostered by the development of broad-based, aggregative and multi-ethnic political parties, rather than fragmented, personalised or ethnically-based party systems. However surprisingly little attention has been given to how party fragmentation can be addressed or how broad-based parties can be sustained, despite institutional experiments in conflict prone societies including Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Fiji and Papua New Guinea aimed at influencing party system development. Drawing on these various cases, this paper identifies four strategies of political engineering that have been used to promote broad-based, cross-regional or multi-ethnic political parties in new democracies around the world. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to understand why Islamic groups may mobilize violently in certain countries and peacefully in others. In this study, I analyze how the strategies and policies of state leaders shape Islamic organizations? mobilization tactics. I hypothesize that a state?s decision to choose policies of inclusion vs. exclusion, targeted vs. indiscriminate repression, and ideological reinforcement vs. ideological diffusion will influence whether Islamic groups choose to mobilize vs. demobilize, engage the system vs. withdraw, or resort to violence vs. peaceful means to achieve their goals. Employing the comparative case study methodology, I examine how state strategies affect Islamic mobilization in Malaysia, Indonesia and Turkey. My results indicate a robust relationship exists between state policies of inclusion and ideological reinforcement and peaceful and engaged mobilization. In addition, a strong relationship exists between the state policy of arming radical Islamic groups to carry out actions against foreign and domestic enemies and violent mobilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indonesia, the world’s fourth most populous country, has embarked on a perilous democratization, precipitated by the resignation of the country’s long-time authoritarian ruler, Suharto, in May 1998. Competitive elections have been held; media licenses have been liberalized; the army’s visibility in politics has been curtailed; decentralization has taken place and human rights talk has flourished. Yet, these very same processes have engendered dynamics antithetical to democratization: a politicization of ascriptive and territorial-based identities; extensive regional violence, and a concomitant crisis of some one million internally displaced persons. For one, these contradictory yet arguably complimentary processes illustrate the limitations of the democratic transition literature that overly focuses on national level processes, formal institutions and overt political actors. Analyses restricted to the strategic bargaining among the capital-situated elite crucially overlook the ways in which power is distributed throughout the polity. Consider decentralization. While correctly theorized as an imperative to the democratic empowerment of regional government and local populations, decentralization is often cast in an idealized light. There is little acknowledgment of its dark side--for instance, pernicious nativism. Seen as the means to arrest coercive New Order centralization, decentralization has nonetheless engendered several instances of ethnic and/or religious cleansing. My paper, which provides a grass-roots analysis of five cases of such cleansings, depicts decentralization, at best, as a double-edged sword that has progressive and injurious consequences. I then briefly interrogate post-cleansing environments, where an evident politics of coercion and intimidation has gained momentum. Local ethnic elites, backed by the organizations and/or native son militias that were instrumental in the expulsion of the non-indigenous migrants, have taken control. Their men now sit in the lucrative district executive position and staff district bureaucracies. Companies, international and national alike, are urged to pay substantial ‘district’ fees to operate and local journalists who have reported the corruption have been beaten or in some cases, have disappeared. Murderers from the proper ethnic group either walk out the police station’s back door or corruptible judges set defendants free. Quasi-illegal smuggling of goods and natural resources have skyrocketed. These multi-functional patronage networks have taken their cue from the infamous networks that Suharto culled over three decades, through which he ran the country. In the incipient post-Suharto state, Indonesia is experiencing a decentralization of authoritarianism, belying the façade of democratic strides made at the national level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzes political party systems(or the effective number of parties)in terms of votes at the basic unit of competition in the first democratic elections before and after authoritarian interlude in South Korea and Indonesia. Specifically, it deals with the 1960 and 1988 Korean parliamentary elections, and the 1955 and 1999 Indonesian parliamentary elections. This historical comparative and cross-sectional analysis intends to test the key hypotheses in the comparative literature on political party systems:Duverger’s law and hypothesis, Taagepera and Shugart’s generalized Duverger’s rule, Cox’s M+1 rule and interaction hypothesis. I find, first, that bipartism is the exception rather than the rule even under simple and pure plurality rule, which implies that the thesis of strategic voting is misleading. Second, the interaction of high social diversity and weak electoral structure does not necessarily increase the effective number of parties(or candidates). Third, the immediate and most crucial determinant of political party systems is the winner’s(leading political party’s) vote share, regardless of electoral systems or district magnitude. More precisely, the effective number of parties is an inverse function of the winner’s vote share. Check author’s web site for an updated version of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democracy assistance programs have always been notoriously difficult to measure in terms of outcome, but the need to show their impact (or lack of it) remains critical, even as the Managing for Results era of the 1990s has passed. This paper continues an effort to develop a tool for measuring civil society program impact in the form of an advocacy ladder encompassing democracy’s critical components of participation, accountability and contestation. The ladder is tested in the context of USAID-assisted initiatives in the Philippines and Indonesia, where it demonstrates a capacity both to monitor donor assistance outcomes and to suggest future program initiatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tries to explain the role of the Nahdlatul Ulama during Indonesia’s democratic transition. It argues for a greater conceptualization of the relationship between state and society in the period prior to the democratic transition in order to better understand the effectiveness, or in this case ineffectiveness,of the organization in 1998. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the factors that support for moderate Islamic parties with an individual level quantitative analysis of Indonesia, Iran, Morocco and Turkey. It compares the attitudes and other socio-economic characteristics of people who support moderate Islamic parties with other population.

The article presents information on Islam, ethnicity, and global engagement. It focuses on revival of Islam as well as its implications on how Muslims engage with the world. It discusses in context of Indonesia as it is an ideal laboratory for Islamic revivalism study and global engagement. It offers an overview of the multidimensionality in the context of political identity.

An excerpt from the dissertation "Tolerance Without Liberalism: Islamic Institutions and Political Violence in Twentieth Century Indonesia," which is prepared for presentation at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Seattle, Washington, is presented.

The article focuses on the campaign advertisement focused on the politics of identity in Indonesia. It mentions that competitive election leads to the politicization of ethnic identity and instability or conflict. It states that the Indonesian literature is focused on the trend towards secularism by parties, candidates, and voters.

The article discusses the study on the factors that influence choices of voters in the political party politics in Indonesia. It states that regional and ethnic difference have significant impact on the voting behavior of voters. It notes that the social changes in the country caused by rapid economic development are less important on voting behavior than traditional and historical factors. It mentions that structure of political cleavage can change with social changes and strategic actions.

In the past decade, there has been significant increase on the incidents of inter-religious violence in numerous Muslim-majority countries. The increased incidents of inter-religious conflicts in both societies received plenty of attention from scholars and policymakers alike. What are the underlying causes of these conflicts? How does past political alignment and alliances of different religious groups contribute to these conflicts? The rise of inter-religious violence in the Islamic World has often been attributed to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and revivalist Islamic social movements in the political realm of these countries. However, this study argues that Islamic fundamentalism is not sufficient in explaining the rise of inter-religious conflict in Muslim-majority countries. Instead, they occurred due to the coalitional pacts and alliances between Christian minorities to support authoritarian rulers that suppressed Muslim political activists in these countries. A new theoretical framework to analyze the cause of inter-religious violence in the Islamic World is introduced in this essay. The theory proposes that religious minorities are making alliances with authoritarian regimes because they believe the regime could better protect its interests than a regime dominated by members of the dominant religion. However, their decision to ally with the ruling authoritarian regime will worsened its relations with the dominant majority religion in this society. As the authoritarian regime collapses, the likelihood of inter-religious conflict between religious minorities and the majority religion in this society will also increase as well. This study uses a comparative historical analysis of two Muslim-majority countries, Indonesia and Egypt, to find the empirical data to support the above theoretical arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethnic grievances, socio-economic cleavages, past conflicts, and other macro-level factors associated frequently with political violence cannot explain subnational and cross-national variation in geographic and temporal paterns of coercive campaigning and post-election violence. Why do so many democracies-old and new, diverse and homogenous-experience election violence, often long after founding elections? Why does it occur in some electoral districts and not others? I develop a common set of explanations for this unique form of political violence, proposing why, where, how, and when parties and candidates risk reprisals, punishment, and reputational costs to influence elections through "undue influence." Considering the array of available non-coercive strategies, such as negative campaigning, vote buying, and boycotting available to politicians, to name a few, the choice to use violence or to allow supporters to do so is a rare and, often, conscious choice. I aim to expand understanding of this phenomenon. First, drawing on historical case studies of particularly acute eruptions of election violence, I describe the enigmatic historical and contemporary paterns of election violence that contemporary explanations, which focus primarily on recent episodes, tend to overlook. It is study of these cases, as well as preliminary, theory-building research trips to observe both rounds of Indonesia's 2004 presidential elections, on which I base my theory, while the collection of data and tests of this theory will be carried out independently and separately from this presentation of theory, hypotheses, and empirical expectations to minimize bias and report transparently and honestly when the empirical results are inconsistent with my initial propositions. While the theory shaped the research design and data collection, no data has been analyzed before full articulation of the theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indonesia's 1999 decentralization law gave local governments in Indonesia an unprecedented opportunity to adopt pro-development policies. We estimate the effect of decentralization (enacted in 2001) on national economic performance using a synthetic case control methodology. Our results indicate that decentralization has had no discernable effect on Indonesia's economic output as measured by gross domestic product. To explain this finding, we use subnational data to probe two mechanisms-interjurisdictional competition and democratic accountability-that underlie all theories linking decentralization to better economic outcomes. Our findings suggest that extreme heterogeneity in endowments, factor immobility, and the endogenous deterioration of local institutions can each undermine the supposed development-enhancing promises of decentralized government in developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia and the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) in Malaysia, noting the roots of the respective parties. The extent of the parties' moderation are analyzed, highlighting the strategic choice to form alliances, the political incentives for moderation, and the learning process parties have experienced, focusing particularly on changes in opportunities for women and non-Muslims.

In 1967 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created primarily as a security alliance to function as a bulwark against communism. The founding members were Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. Today ASEAN has grown into a comprehensive regional organization whose functions include not only security issue but also political, social, economic, and cultural matters. In the subsequent years Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar have joined. As a result, the ten-nation ASEAN contains a population of about 500 million. The characteristics of ASEAN as a regional organization are that it is a highly state-centric organization stressing state sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs of member states. This article, first, briefly explores theoretical framework of regional organizations. Secondly, the examination is made on regional integration in Asia in the area of human rights. Thirdly, an assessment is made on ASEAN region's efforts to create a regional human rights ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the implications of the promotion of the standards of freedom of association and collective bargaining in international organizations that regulate the international economy. It highlights the evolving consultations between the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Labor Organization. It focuses on the interpretation of freedom of association, illustrating the resulting policy recommendations in Indonesia and Argentina.

Under Suharto, the state demobilized labor and only permitted one state-backed union, the All-Indonesia Workers Unions (SPSI, Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia) to exist. Since SPSI was an ineffective advocate for workers, organized only a small percentage of the labor force, showed few signs of reforming, lost much of its financial support from the government, and was shunned by international funders, most labor activists wrote off SPSI following the transition to democracy, surmising that members would abandon SPSI and join new unions in droves. Yet seven years later, SPSI, while not flourishing, remains the largest confederation in Indonesia. I explore the resilience of SPSI as a way to both understand their continued dominance in Indonesia to reflect on the broader theoretical issue of legacy unions. I argue that SPSI has maintained its ascendancy primarily through preventing exit rather than as a result of fundamental reforms. It has been able to prevent exit through collaboration with management, intimidation of opponents, continued government favoritism, and through conceding autonomy to lower levels of the organization. In addition, since few unions have offered dynamic alternatives to SPSI and labor legislation has facilitated the fragmentation of these unions, many SPSI affiliates are not tempted to exit and the new independent unions are divided into dozens of federations and thousands of unaffiliated plant-level unions. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines a number of contemporary debates concerning gender, democracy and civil society in Indonesia and the relative significance of both gender and civil society for an emerging democratic state. Issues raised regarding the dangdut dancing of a young entertainer called Inul Daratista; Role of women's organizations before and after the transition to democracy in Indonesia; Reason for the fall of the dictatorial New Order on May 21, 1998.

Organizations established by dakwah activists in their effort to reshape Islam in Indonesia include the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia or KAMMI), HAMMAS, a more radical Association of Inter-Campus Muslim Student Activists, the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan or PK) and Hizbut Tahrir, a movement to establish a global Islamic state or khilafa (caliphate) to rule all Muslims. These organizations represent a younger generation of Islamist activists disillusioned with the promise of the secular nation state to bring prosperity and greater social and economic justice. Their slogan, derived from the Muslim Brotherhood is ‘Islam is the solution.’ [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although a series of labor law reforms that strengthened basic labor rights were passed in Indonesia soon after the fall of Suharto, attempts to pass comprehensive reforms affecting issues related to labor flexibility have for the most part failed. While labor has secured stronger political rights, employers have been unable to roll back the majority of provisions that defend labor protection. Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the politics of labor reform is that while labor played little role in bringing down Suharto and is still quite weak and fragmented, it managed to secure many gains in labor law. I argue that labor success in the immediate post-Suharto years can be explained by international pressure to restore basic labor rights and the early remobilization of labor, in contrast to employers, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. Although unions were weak they managed to organize large and disruptive protests whenever changes that promised to increase flexibility were enacted. In contrast, employers were caught off-guard and showed few signs of acting as a coherent interest group. By the end of 2000, however, employers had counter-mobilized, and they made rolling back some of these early gains for workers a primary goal. This reactivation of the peak business association boded poorly for labor. However, the strenuous opposition of both employers and unions to two draft bills in the latter half of 2002 led the committee overseeing the bills in the legislature to institute a bipartite process to revise them, and both business and many unions chose to participate in this process. This bipartite structure of negotiations leveled the playing field between unions and employers, and labor was thus able to defend its political gains, while employers were only partially successful in achieving their goal of increased labor flexibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Compares the strategies adopted by South Korea and Indonesia toward decolonization. Characterization of decolonization in both countries; Records of economic development and state-society relations in both countries; History of state building during decolonization in both countries.

Ethnonationalist violence constitutes a particularly difficult challenge for democratic consolidation. Groups mobilized along ethnic lines contest an existing state and its political institutions. Once mobilized, ethnonationalist movements are unlikely to yield on their objectives. This problem raises two sets of questions. First, what are the processes by which ethnonationalist violence impedes democratic consolidation? Second, what are the conditions under which ethnonationalist movements accept a new set of democratic institutions and abandon their objective of a separate state? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to a survey of 178 states' internet accessibility by the United Nations' International Telecommunication Union (ITU), South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan ranked in the top ten, but China, the Philippines, and Indonesia placed outside the top fifty. Despite efforts to reduce this chasm by governments and international organizations, the digital gap between those who have and those don't have continues to widen particularly in Asia. In an attempt to smooth out differentials of the Digital Access Index among Asian nations, the ITU and other international organizations encouraged government-sponsored initiatives to broaden accessibility. Thus the South Korean government, NGOs, and major electronics companies such as Samsung and LG have been supporting the digital have-nots within the region to construct basic IT infrastructures. Two questions arise: why are South Korea's grants centralized around Asia, and do the efforts focus on hardware? A hypothesis to the first question is that the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 made the general public in South Korea realize that Asian countries are closely related in their history, geography, culture, politics, and economy. Moreover, policy makers comprehended that narrowing the digital divide is essential for the sustainable development of South Korea. Secondly, there are two aspects of the contributions of South Korea's Official Development Assistance (ODA.) The material aspect is supporting of infrastructures to increase access for rural or remote areas and human resources development. The South Korean government and companies are helping to build a digital network; NGOs and volunteer ICT experts educate government officers in underdeveloped countries using software, and develop localized content. Many of them share the basic assumption that their efforts will bring to Korea political and economic advantages someday. For example, the ICT Hub that links regional key players and major institutions can be regional influence. The ethical aspect comes from the special experience of the Korean economy. As late as the early 1960s, Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world; South Korea was an ODA recipient until 1991. However, in 2005, South Korea became the 11th biggest contributor due to rapid economic development, especially in the information technology field. South Korea's experience, therefore, can be a good lesson for today's developing Asian nations. This argument is supported by documentation from the 1990's, governmental websites, newspapers/periodicals, and journals from Asian communities, and should be compared with prior works including Hans-Dieter Evers (2005) and Robert Hunter Wade (2002). South Korean annual assistance would be analyzed by regional and sectoral priorities before and after 1997. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Close examination of cross-national data on single-party rule and breakdown reveals no clear pattern of longevity, leaving open the question of whether single parties themselves create any strengthening effect. In this essay, I argue that single-party organizations only strengthen regimes given certain antecedent conditions to their establishment. I develop a dynamic model of single-party regime consolidation to explain the dramatic variation in longevity among these regimes. The strength of the opposition and level of access to rent patronage revenues during consolidation, I argue, structure the choices available to rulers early in the regime consolidation process. A weak opposition and ready access to rent revenues makes a low-cost consolidation possible, but also provides little incentive to build a robust coalition or strong party organization; this trajectory generates weak single-party rule that is likely to collapse under crisis. Conversely, rulers who face a powerful opposition and have little or no access to rent revenues have no choice but to offer potential allies access to policy making and have powerful incentives to build a strong party organization. Regimes such as these, even though their consolidation is more difficult, prove more resilient over the long run. I conduct an initial plausibility test of the argument against paired comparisons of Guinea-Bissau and Tanzania and of Indonesia and the Philippines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]