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Since 1978, all countries in Latin America have either replaced or amended their constitutions. What explains the choice between these two substantively different means of constitutional transformation? This article argues that the replacement of constitutions depends on the power-sharing features of constitutional design, the frequency of institutional crises, and the capacity of political actors to transform the constitution by means of amendments or judicial interpretation. It also argues that in a context of party pluralism, amendments can only be used as a means of constitutional change if amendment procedures are relatively flexible. The article provides statistical evidence to support these arguments and discusses the normative implications of the analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political scientists often consider constitutions and their various designs as key variables for explaining a wide range of relevant outcomes, such as the stability and quality of democracy, economic performance, or the rate of policy change across political regimes. The validity of this claim rests on the assumption that constitutions are a stable set of rules that become self-enforcing over time. Constitutional stability, however, is subject to variation across time and space. I argue that this variation depends both on institutional configurations and on the relative stability of the political environment that the constitution is supposed to regulate. Using a duration analysis of constitutions in 18 Latin American countries between 1946 and 2000, this paper shows that while the lifespan of constitutions is negatively affected by political and social instability, some of the institutions that prevent the concentration of power and protect the constitution as a "fundamental law" decrease the risk of constitutional replacement. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]