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In the South Korean society, there are ongoing debates over North Korea¡¯s change. The conservatives and the progressives in South Korean society have conflicting views on this issue. The progressives hold that North Korea has changed significantly, whereas the conservatives argue that it has not changed fundamentally. To end futile and divisive debates over North Korea¡¯s change and to build a national consensus on the Republic of Korea¡¯s engagement policy of national reconciliation and cooperation with the DPRK, it is important to operationally define the concept of North Korea¡¯s change and establish objective criteria for its measurement. The authors of this paper have three specific objectives: (1) to analyze ROK’s engagement policy toward North Korea as a catalyst for North Korea’s change; (2) to set up objective criteria for evaluating North Korea¡¯s change; and (3) to make policy recommendations for constructive inter-Korean relations. The authors attempt to operationalize the concept of North Korea’s change to avoid confusion about North Korea’s change. A clear distinction needs to be made between changes in the North Korean-style socialist system and changes in North Korean leadership¡¯s thinking and policy. We do not expect North Korea will change its socialist system in the short run because North Korean leadership fears a sudden systemic change, which would threaten the very survival of its own system. In this paper we attempt to analyze North Korea’s changes in terms of thinking and policy. We argue that North Korea’s changes in thinking and policy would eventually bring about its systemic change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bioethical issues have become one of the significant policy issues, but there is a general lack of academic studies in political science to approach the issue—especially, addressing how the governance for such issue has been (and is) established. This paper will discuss the process of establishing governance for regulating bioethical issues, and will use South Korea, which passed "Korean Bioethics and Biosafety Act of 2003" in National Assembly, as the primary case study. The case will examine the three conditions that are required in establishing bioethical governance: (1) technological advancement, (2) issue-framing, and (3) political interest. Technological advancement, e.g., cloning, is a precondition to require regulations of technology. This precondition becomes effective in making bioethical governance when non-governmental organizations (NGOs) emphasize particular issues over the technology advancement. The bioethical governance, however, is completed only when it is related to the political interest of legislators and governmental officials. Finally, this paper will show how these conditions can be applied to other biotechnological issues, such as genetically modified (GM) food issues. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the viewpoint of the US, there is an interesting puzzle in the current North Korean nuclear crisis. That is, judging from public reactions, Americans seems to be much more threatened by North Korean nuclear weapons lying thousands of miles away than South Koreans just 20 or 30 miles from them. Indeed, whenever North Korea escalates its brinkmanship, the stark contrast between the alarm it produces in Washington and the cool response in Seoul highlights the ever-changing attitude of South Koreans who increasingly refuse to see North Korea as their enemy. The main goal of this paper is to bring historical dimension to recent changes in the discursive construction of the image of North Korea among South Koreans. The Korean War (1950-1953) left deep scars between the two Koreas along with enormous social costs and human tragedies. Not surprisingly, there was little room for co-existence, let alone reconciliation, between them. As a result, North Korea was often portrayed as "a dangerous wolf" lurking in the darkness. By the early 1990s, however, it was obvious that the North Korean communist experiment had failed. In the meantime, South Korea had achieved dual goals of democratization and economic development. Under such circumstances, South Korea was able to take a more generous attitude towards its northern "half." That is, North Korea was increasingly described not so much as a dangerous threat as a part of the same nation in desperate need of help from its "southern brother." The data for this paper come from official textbooks for the elementary education in South Korea. Elementary education (grades one to six) is mandatory in South Korea where the government author, authorizes and sponsors the contents of the textbooks so that the entire population studies the same textbook. Since the end of the Korean War, there have been seven textbook reforms in South Korea. By analyzing the major characteristics of these different versions of textbooks over time, we will be able to understand how South Koreans have been imagining their northern neighbor differently, from "a dangerous wolf" who is trying to attack at any moment to "our blood brother" who needs to be embraced for the coming unification. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explains why democratization destabilizes some asymmetric alliances more than others. I argue that democratization has the potential to destabilize asymmetric alliances because it unleashes a powerful force of nationalism in the political arena. Nationalist elites who come to power in democratizing states view military dependence and resultant foreign influence as a humiliating encroachment of sovereignty. Therefore, they demand an autonomous, equal partnership often in disregard of power disparity within the alliance. The major ally in turn resents their seemingly ungrateful demands and unreasonable policies, and therefore shows a decreased interest in the alliance. As a result of these frictions, the alliance becomes less stable. Democratization, however, does not evenly affect asymmetric alliances because it occurs in different threat environments and takes divergent paths. These factors mitigate or amplify the destructive potential of nationalist sentiments that democratization unleashes. This paper tests these arguments by analyzing three asymmetric alliances in which a weaker member democratized since the late 1980s: U.S. alignments with South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although in the long term, democratization is expected to exert pacifying effects on international relations, scholars have argued that conflict is more likely during democratic transitions. They argue that politicians in democratizing states are more likely to make jingoistic appeals, and coalitions of political, business, and/or military leaders are likely to form and to ?logroll? for military buildups and other destabilizing policies. This proposition has great significance for East Asia, which faces two potential political transitions: the democratization of China, and Korean unification. This paper tests a theory of democratization and conflict in the cases of three previous East Asian political transitions: Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. I test not only for the occurrence of conflict, but also for the presence of the predicted mechanisms through which conflict occurs (nationalistic appeals and logrolling). I find that although there is some evidence of nationalistic posturing that is consistent with the theory?s predictions, for the most part, evidence from these cases does not support the theory. Leaders did not make jingoistic appeals; they were more likely to preach stability. Furthermore, I find that the public, the military, and the business community do have substantial influence over policy makers, but do not find that these groups advocated military buildups or offensive military strategies. This study casts doubt on the relevance of the ?democratization and war? thesis for future East Asian political transitions; it finds support for theories in the liberal school of international relations, including the beneficial effects of democratization, policies of engagement, and economic integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rising anti-American sentiments in South Korea have recently been at the center of much discussion and analysis by scholars and pundits concerned about the deterioration of bilateral relations between the formerly staunch allies. Although differing in their diagnoses, most analyses agree that the current round of anti-Americanism in Korean politics is relatively new and unprecedented, shaped by a confluence of domestic and external factors. The election of President Roh Moo-hyun and his progressive cabinet has directly challenged all corners of Korean politics and society as well as conservative elites. The result has been the unleashing of fierce domestic debates on the future of Korean security, asking Koreans to choose either "alliance or self-reliance." This shift in Korean attitudes toward the U.S. is also seen as part of a new wave of anti-Americanism throughout the world, a global backlash against the hegemonic influence of the U.S. as the lone superpower with the end of the Cold War. Either attributed to a case of Korean exceptionalism or U.S. exceptionalism, the current trend of anti-Americanism in Korea is treated as a unique moment in history. In this paper, I argue instead that Korea's brand of anti-Americanism is actually a manifestation of anti-Great Power-ism, which is not new in the history of Korean politics. In fact, President Roh's election platform of finding autonomy and self-reliance demonstrates close parallels with the anti-Qing mobilization in turn-of-the-century Korea. Anti-Great Power-ism (anti-sadae) emerged as a potent tool of political mobilization in the late 19th century, when the newly created Reform/Enlightenment Party made their criticism of the existing policy of "revering Great Powers" (sadae) the centerpiece of their attack against the conservative establishment. Even though sadae was originally a pragmatic policy of accommodating the powerful Qing, marking a departure from a cultural-ideological emulation of Ming China, it was stigmatized during 19th century politics as subservient and Great Power-dependent. What we see then is the emergence and recurrence of anti-Great Power-ism as a powerful tool for political challengers in their mobilization against the established regime in Korea. By comparing the progressives' political mobilization processes in the late 19th century and in 2002-2006, I show that today's anti-Americanism is actually a continuation of anti-China-ism seen from a broader historical perspective. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Korean security in the next fifty years will be closely intertwined with the future of two very important bilateral relationships: U.S.-Sino relations and Sino-Japanese relations. In some respects, North and South Korea will be bystanders working to position themselves favorably as these relationships unfold. However, for other aspects, the two Koreas may be important players in the future of these bilateral relationships. This paper will address the following questions. What are the possible directions of big power relations in East Asia in the next fifty years and what impact will these have on Korean security? How can North and South Korea influence these big power relationships to help ensure peace and stability in the region while protecting their interests? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Cold War, the U.S. and South Korea remained trustful and firm allies despite periodic frictions. In the post-Cold War era, U.S.-ROK relations have been undergoing qualitative changes, and mutual distrust, suspicion, and uncertainty now characterize their relationship. The ascendancy of George W. Bush and neo-conservatives in the U.S. and the rise of Roh Moo-Hyun and the so-called "386-generation" in South Korea were immediate contributors to this state of relationship. This paper examines how U.S.-ROK relations deteriorated from trusted allies to uncertain partners and why? It begins with a discussion of the changing nature of U.S.-ROK relations in the 2000s. It then examines the salient issues dividing the two allies. This is followed by an analysis of the two allies' diverging policies toward North Korea's nuclear issue. Finally, it concludes that frictions in U.S.-ROK relations are ascribable to the rise of new leaders, emotionalism and simplistic approaches, and diverging goals and perceptions of the two allies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explores the reasons for the successes of the diplomatic strategy known as nordpolitik in South Korea in the early 1990s. Sanctions and reward power in international politics; Causes of the efficacy of South Korea's nordpolitik toward the Soviet Union; Outcome of South Korea's nordpolitik toward China.

Russia and the Republic of Korea have increasingly worked together since the early 1990's, but the relationship is not nearly so profound as the model of the U.S.-ROK security alliance. To date, both Russia and Korea have cooperated militarily and politically on a basis of mutual cooperation -- with much of the cooperation seen primarily linked to arms sales from Russia as a debt relief mechanism. Paralleling the arms sales, both countries have exchanged leader visits and cooperated bilaterally for regional military issues. This study will examine the potential benefits from increased military cooperation to strengthen regional stability -- with a view toward better drawing on Russia's potential partner role in future regional political and military security fora to complement the already strong relationship between the United States and Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the foreign relation of the U.S. with North and South Korea. North and South Korea have been confronting each other since the Cease Fire Treaty of the Korean War in 1953. China, Japan, Russia and the U.S. collectively constitute an important base for peace and a regional system in the Korean Peninsula.

The article looks at the reconciliation between Japan and the Republic of Korea and France and Germany during the postwar era, 1945 to 2005. It addresses the questions of under what conditions do sets of two former adversary states with deeply rooted historical animosity try to reconcile with each other, and why these countries show significantly different outcomes in the degree of reconciliation when they seek for bilateral reconciliation. It argues that in both cases, the motives for reconciliation were mainly derived from realpolitik concerns.

This research focuses on China's efforts to improve and consolidate relations with South Korea and their limitation. How is China enhancing its soft power in South Korea? Is China charming enough to South Korea as to influence the bilateral relations between South Korea and the United States? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1980s, changing national identities have transformed the China-Taiwan and Korean conflicts. Democratization in Taiwan and South Korea, and liberalization in China, have forced leaders to compete for popular legitimacy by appealing to national identities. Along with the collapse of the Soviet Union, these contested national identities have been the main factors driving change in the conflicts—pushing China and Taiwan inexorably apart and toward a showdown, while helping to sustain what appeared to be a mortally wounded North Korea. This explains why one U.S. ally, Taiwan, has become more hawkish, while the other, South Korea, has turned more dovish. These foreign policy changes, in turn, have reinforced changes in underlying national identities. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The election of President Roh Moo Hyun and South Korea's response to the recent missile test by North Korea clearly indicate the changes in national identity and security perceptions in South Korea. The current discussion about the wartime operation control and the discord between the US and South Korea in dealing with North Korea is another good example of changes in South Korea's national identity. To study the cause of the national identity change, we have analyzed the changes in both the domestic and international political environments. A number of factors seem to be responsible for the changes. First of all, president Kim Dae Jung's 'sunshine' policy and his nationalist approach led the public to believe that reunification is near and North Korea is no longer a military threat. Second, differences in war experiences between older and younger generations led to opposite responses to the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun governments' policies towards the North and the US. Third, the end of the Cold war and the normalization of relations with China led to the end of the traditional perception of an alliance structure based on the Cold War mentality. This, in turn, increased the importance of the Chinese role in regional security issues at the expense of the US. Fourth and finally, South Korea wants to avoid another war on the peninsula at any cost. The US wants to make sure that nuclear material does not get out of the country since the material may end up in wrong hands. To this end, the US government is not ruling out any option including the use of force. In other words, there is a conflict of interest between the two countries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When should we expect economic sanctions to succeed? Previous studies predict that sanctions will be more effective when the issue at stake is important, the sender and target are allied, the target's domestic institutions are more democratized, and the target's economy is more dependent on the sender. I subject these hypotheses to empirical testing using a fully structural estimation that employs a game theoretic model as a statistical model. The theoretical model formalizes a simple crisis bargaining logic with two-sided incomplete information. Findings suggest that the issue salience is positively associated with sanctions' imposition, but not necessarily with sanctions' effectiveness. Moreover, the allied targets tend to comply even when they can win the sanction contest, while the non-allied targets tend to resist when the sender credibly signals that she would continue the sanctions unless the target complies. Finally, I examine these estimated results with four case studies: US vs. South Korea (1973-1977), US vs. Nicaragua (1977-1979), Britain-US vs. Iran (1951-1953), and US vs. Ethiopia (1977-1992). ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using cases of movement episodes from the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea, I present a tentative framework for understanding the role of anti-base movements in overseas base policy decisions. More specifically, I examine the political consequences of anti-base movements against overseas U.S. military bases, exploring how anti-base movements and U.S.-host state security relations interact to influence basing policy outcomes. My central claim is that the degree of security dependence between the U.S. and host state provides an important opportunity structure enabling movements to employ different mechanisms, which in turn, determines the relative success (or failure) of a given movement. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]