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: This paper seeks to understand the dilemmas and constraints facing leaders as they seek to manage their military's participation in multilateral operations. The problem of caveats—national restrictions—has been a central concern in Afghanistan, limiting the ability of various countries to contribute to the effort. We develop some implications from principal-agent theory to understand the challenges facing civilian and military leaders. We then focus primarily on the case of Canada in Afghanistan since it has participated in both the unilateral ad hoc Operation Enduring Freedom and the multilateral, NATO International Security Assistance Force. We consider how command and control have evolved over time with commanders on the ground having varying levels of discretion and authority. We find that the key influence on any military officer is the home country, even if the troop contributing nation has the most robust rules of engagement and delegates the most authority to the operational commanders. All coalitions are, ultimately, of the willing. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, policy makers have shown renewed interest in the effect of declaring a national security doctrine. Conventional analysis holds that establishing the Bush Doctrine against global terrorism or a promise to retaliate against WMD attacks with nuclear weapons engages audience costs. Should US leaders not possess the reslove to follow through on these doctrines in Afghanistan or elsewhere, they supposedly will pay in terms of lost votes at home or in terms of more demanding challenges from abroad. This does not explain why leaders sometimes violate their doctrine, nor does it explain their capacity for spinning the circumstances of a crisis to escape damage to their credibility. Alternatively, special observable conditions relating to limited war capability occasionally enable declared doctrine to serve as a powerful coordinating device, almost like a traffic light, for states involved in a series of crises. The coordinating function of doctrine may be tested empirically. It also supports a more cautious declaratory policy for the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the "Divide and COIN" strategy to achieve stability in Afghanistan and the region. The "Divide and COIN" strategy constructively employs the Afghan traditional society's existing divisions and dynamics rooted in ethno-tribal allegiances and geopolitics that span the Afghan borders. Afghanistan's traditional society is a complex patchwork of multiple ethno-linguistic groups, tribes and various factions.

The U.S. failed to establish security in the aftermath of major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This marked a significant departure from U.S. state-building after World War II, such as Germany, Japan, and Korea, where the U.S. successfully established security. Consequently, this article asks: Under what conditions are state-building successful in establishing security? To answer this question, it examines the universe of state-building since 1945. I argue that success requires the use of overwhelming force and resources. Specifically, state-building is more successful the greater the number of troops and police in the immediate aftermath of combat, the greater the amount of financial assistance, and the longer the duration. Current arguments fail to explain this variation. Some contend that state-building is never effective. Others contend that effectiveness is largely a function of structural factors that foreign powers cannot control. Still others contend that effectiveness is correlated with multilateral participation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]