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From the viewpoint of the US, there is an interesting puzzle in the current North Korean nuclear crisis. That is, judging from public reactions, Americans seems to be much more threatened by North Korean nuclear weapons lying thousands of miles away than South Koreans just 20 or 30 miles from them. Indeed, whenever North Korea escalates its brinkmanship, the stark contrast between the alarm it produces in Washington and the cool response in Seoul highlights the ever-changing attitude of South Koreans who increasingly refuse to see North Korea as their enemy. The main goal of this paper is to bring historical dimension to recent changes in the discursive construction of the image of North Korea among South Koreans. The Korean War (1950-1953) left deep scars between the two Koreas along with enormous social costs and human tragedies. Not surprisingly, there was little room for co-existence, let alone reconciliation, between them. As a result, North Korea was often portrayed as "a dangerous wolf" lurking in the darkness. By the early 1990s, however, it was obvious that the North Korean communist experiment had failed. In the meantime, South Korea had achieved dual goals of democratization and economic development. Under such circumstances, South Korea was able to take a more generous attitude towards its northern "half." That is, North Korea was increasingly described not so much as a dangerous threat as a part of the same nation in desperate need of help from its "southern brother." The data for this paper come from official textbooks for the elementary education in South Korea. Elementary education (grades one to six) is mandatory in South Korea where the government author, authorizes and sponsors the contents of the textbooks so that the entire population studies the same textbook. Since the end of the Korean War, there have been seven textbook reforms in South Korea. By analyzing the major characteristics of these different versions of textbooks over time, we will be able to understand how South Koreans have been imagining their northern neighbor differently, from "a dangerous wolf" who is trying to attack at any moment to "our blood brother" who needs to be embraced for the coming unification. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explains why democratization destabilizes some asymmetric alliances more than others. I argue that democratization has the potential to destabilize asymmetric alliances because it unleashes a powerful force of nationalism in the political arena. Nationalist elites who come to power in democratizing states view military dependence and resultant foreign influence as a humiliating encroachment of sovereignty. Therefore, they demand an autonomous, equal partnership often in disregard of power disparity within the alliance. The major ally in turn resents their seemingly ungrateful demands and unreasonable policies, and therefore shows a decreased interest in the alliance. As a result of these frictions, the alliance becomes less stable. Democratization, however, does not evenly affect asymmetric alliances because it occurs in different threat environments and takes divergent paths. These factors mitigate or amplify the destructive potential of nationalist sentiments that democratization unleashes. This paper tests these arguments by analyzing three asymmetric alliances in which a weaker member democratized since the late 1980s: U.S. alignments with South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rising anti-American sentiments in South Korea have recently been at the center of much discussion and analysis by scholars and pundits concerned about the deterioration of bilateral relations between the formerly staunch allies. Although differing in their diagnoses, most analyses agree that the current round of anti-Americanism in Korean politics is relatively new and unprecedented, shaped by a confluence of domestic and external factors. The election of President Roh Moo-hyun and his progressive cabinet has directly challenged all corners of Korean politics and society as well as conservative elites. The result has been the unleashing of fierce domestic debates on the future of Korean security, asking Koreans to choose either "alliance or self-reliance." This shift in Korean attitudes toward the U.S. is also seen as part of a new wave of anti-Americanism throughout the world, a global backlash against the hegemonic influence of the U.S. as the lone superpower with the end of the Cold War. Either attributed to a case of Korean exceptionalism or U.S. exceptionalism, the current trend of anti-Americanism in Korea is treated as a unique moment in history. In this paper, I argue instead that Korea's brand of anti-Americanism is actually a manifestation of anti-Great Power-ism, which is not new in the history of Korean politics. In fact, President Roh's election platform of finding autonomy and self-reliance demonstrates close parallels with the anti-Qing mobilization in turn-of-the-century Korea. Anti-Great Power-ism (anti-sadae) emerged as a potent tool of political mobilization in the late 19th century, when the newly created Reform/Enlightenment Party made their criticism of the existing policy of "revering Great Powers" (sadae) the centerpiece of their attack against the conservative establishment. Even though sadae was originally a pragmatic policy of accommodating the powerful Qing, marking a departure from a cultural-ideological emulation of Ming China, it was stigmatized during 19th century politics as subservient and Great Power-dependent. What we see then is the emergence and recurrence of anti-Great Power-ism as a powerful tool for political challengers in their mobilization against the established regime in Korea. By comparing the progressives' political mobilization processes in the late 19th century and in 2002-2006, I show that today's anti-Americanism is actually a continuation of anti-China-ism seen from a broader historical perspective. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on nationalism and sentiments against the U.S. in South Korea post-cold war. It states that before the cold war South Korea was pro American as there was a threat from North Korea but the relationship changed after cold war ended. It mentions that anti-American sentiment increased in South Korea after two school girls from the country were killed by military vehicles of the U.S.

Since the 1980s, changing national identities have transformed the China-Taiwan and Korean conflicts. Democratization in Taiwan and South Korea, and liberalization in China, have forced leaders to compete for popular legitimacy by appealing to national identities. Along with the collapse of the Soviet Union, these contested national identities have been the main factors driving change in the conflicts—pushing China and Taiwan inexorably apart and toward a showdown, while helping to sustain what appeared to be a mortally wounded North Korea. This explains why one U.S. ally, Taiwan, has become more hawkish, while the other, South Korea, has turned more dovish. These foreign policy changes, in turn, have reinforced changes in underlying national identities. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The election of President Roh Moo Hyun and South Korea's response to the recent missile test by North Korea clearly indicate the changes in national identity and security perceptions in South Korea. The current discussion about the wartime operation control and the discord between the US and South Korea in dealing with North Korea is another good example of changes in South Korea's national identity. To study the cause of the national identity change, we have analyzed the changes in both the domestic and international political environments. A number of factors seem to be responsible for the changes. First of all, president Kim Dae Jung's 'sunshine' policy and his nationalist approach led the public to believe that reunification is near and North Korea is no longer a military threat. Second, differences in war experiences between older and younger generations led to opposite responses to the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun governments' policies towards the North and the US. Third, the end of the Cold war and the normalization of relations with China led to the end of the traditional perception of an alliance structure based on the Cold War mentality. This, in turn, increased the importance of the Chinese role in regional security issues at the expense of the US. Fourth and finally, South Korea wants to avoid another war on the peninsula at any cost. The US wants to make sure that nuclear material does not get out of the country since the material may end up in wrong hands. To this end, the US government is not ruling out any option including the use of force. In other words, there is a conflict of interest between the two countries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]