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The article provides analysis on the political dimensions of the interdisciplinary debate about the occurrence of an axial age in human history during the first millennium BCE. The debate focuses on the two individuals who are pioneers of the axial age thesis. The pioneers were Karl Jaspers and Eric Voegeli.

The article explores the discourse of minority rights in the European Union member states. The author introduces the minority rights norm as an example of a norm characterized by high levels of government support but low societal internalization. She also provides detail analysis of the norm, outlining its various versions and their interaction in the EU policy space.

The article discusses political science which deployed various theoretical perspectives and methodologies, both rationalist and constructivist, in the study of business and government relations. It cites a considerable body of empirical material on the variety of forms of business interaction across countries and at the European Union and international level. The lacking part, given the evident importance of the firm as an actor, is a political theory of the firm.

Islamophobia is an emerging comparative concept in the social sciences. Yet most writers have an impressionistic understanding of the term at best. There is no widely-accepted, usable definition of Islamophobia that permits systematic comparative and causal analysis. In this essay, I analyze how the term Islamophobia has been deployed in public and scholarly debates in order to reveal how these discussions have taken place on multiple registers. I then draw on theoretical work on concept formation to offer a systematic definition of Islamophobia that is useful for social scientific purposes. I discuss the types of indicators that are most appropriate for measuring Islamophobia as well as the benefits of concept development for enabling comparative and causal analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the selection of the speakers during the 2010 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association that was held on September 2 to 5, 2010. It states the similarity of the speakerships of the British House of Commons and the Indian Lok Sabha (lower house, House of the People) on the derivation from the Westminster model. It also mentions the presiding of legislatures' proceedings and debates from the speakers enforcing the legislature's rules.

The article presents a case study on the socio-political consequences of social network sites (SNS). It states the significant segment of Turkish youth who uses social network Facebook to maintain and manage networks as the nature of the communication. It also mentions the significance of such activity for the political socialization and political crisis process of the country's political culture.

Both political science and science studies are studies of the common, of efforts to come together, to discuss, deliberate, and decide. The most exciting work in the human sciences in the last thirty years is in the sociology of science and in closely allied fields, yet this work has been ignored by practicing political scientists. I explore three lessons that we political scientists need to learn from the sociology of science. First, that there are no data, only facts: the truth is not out there, we have to make it. Second, facts are made somewhere: policy is locally produced, that is to say, it is produced in places located within a network of people and things. Third, to understand how and where policy is produced we need to follow the actors into the sites where they produce it. This third lesson has been followed in political science, almost uniquely, by Richard Fenno, in his masterful studies of American congressional representatives and senators. Yet by reading Latour, we can learn to take Fenno's approach into every area of political research. In particular, we need to follow the actors in international relations, since the study of international institutions succeeds only inasmuch as it produces microstudies of how and where particular international norms and institutions are constructed. Certainly, we political scientists do not need to read science studies in order to become more scientific: we need primarily to learn from the methods that are practiced in science studies, not from the science that is the object of those practices. One thing we can learn from recent sociology of science is that we need to become less "scientific," that is, less wedded to the goal of general theory, and thus better able understand how particular political choices are made, executed, and revisited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses increasing use of the multi-method research (MMR) as a quantitative and qualitative method in the social science. As mentioned, MMR presents results in the form of causality and explanation because of regularities detected by the method in the data. It further discusses connection between cross case method and MMR as it helps in describing general patterns between macro-variables.

Interdependent duration processes are common in politics and other strategic settings. The time to one type of political event frequently depends on the time to another related event, and the time to an event for one actor often depends on the time to that same event for others. Put in a slightly different way, politics and strategic behavior generate interdependence across durations and duration interdependence across actors. We present a generalized parametric simultaneous equations model that incorporates these two kinds of interdependent duration processes and derive the corresponding full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimator based on the Weibull distribution. We show with Monte Carlo experiments that our estimator outperforms the alternatives available to those doing applied empirical research. Naive estimators that either ignore the interdependence among duration processes or treat one as exogenous to the others are badly biased when the true relationships are simultaneous ones. Two stage least squares, while consistent, is highly inefficient relative to the FIML. We illustrate these findings in a study of the determinants of government formation duration and survival in European parliamentary democracies and an analysis of the timing of position taking in the US Congress. The interdependence in these durations is substantively important and suggests strategic bargaining over governments in Europe and free-riding behavior among members of Congress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author argues that power is a family of resemblance concept, which entails that there is no single best definition of power. He claims that these family members can legitimately change their meaning depending upon which language games are being played. This dual perception of power, the author maintains, moves people out of problematic situation of both claiming that there will always be different definitions of power, while stressing that there is a best one, upon which the people will never agree.

The article aims to add formalization of the Garbage Can Model (GCM) of Organizational Choice as an intermediate step between the verbal theory and the simulation. The GCM social science model, developed by Michael D. Cohen, James D. March and Johan P. Olsen, offered a new approach to organizational decision theory and was an important stage in the rise of neo-institutionalism in political and social sciences. The challenge of modeling and simulating social phenomena is addressed. The formalization framework is discussed in detail.

The article discusses the questions posed by Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and other scholars regarding the use of widely accepted analytical categories in the social sciences. Rudolph critiques research approaches that posit universal categories into which social scientists claim to classify diverse people and culture.

The article considers the argument of philosopher John Stuart Mill regarding methods of difference and agreement, as well as its impact on methodological discourse about the social sciences. It discusses debates on the use of the comparative method in social sciences research, which started in the 1970s. Mill's methods of experimental and deduction investigations are described.

We present a dynamic model of legislative bargaining in which policy making proceeds until the proposer has no more incentive to make a new proposal to replace the previously approved policy. We characterize stationary Markov perfect equilibria for the game and show that in all pure-strategy equilibria, a majority of voters without proposal power have an incentive to protect each others' benefits to secure their own long-term bargaining positions in the legislature. As a consequence, the value of proposal power is constrained. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a formal model of government control of the media to illuminate variation in media freedom across countries and over time, with particular application to less democratic states. The extent of media freedom depends critically on two variables: the mobilizing character of the government and the size of the advertising market. Media bias is greater and state ownership of the media more likely when the need for social mobilization is large; however, the distinction between state and private media is smaller. Large advertising markets reduce media bias in both state and private media, but increase the incentive for the government to nationalize private media. We illustrate these arguments with a case study of media freedom in postcommunist Russia, where media bias has responded to the mobilizing needs of the Kremlin and government control over the media has grown in tandem with the size of the advertising market. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose and test a formal model of war and domestic politics, consistent with recent evidence on the relationship between regime type, the outcome of war and the probability and consequences of losing office. Our model builds on two fundamental and hitherto neglected differences between regime types: the cost of replacing leaders and the post-tenure fate of leaders. We show that war is less likely as 1) the cost of replacement depends less on the outcome of war and 2) the consequences of losing office are less punitive for leaders. Compared to non-democratic leaders, the cost of replacing a democratic leader depends relatively little on the war outcome and democratic leaders fare relatively well after losing office. Our model therefore offers an intuitive explanation for the democratic peace. To examine the scope of our theory, we test and find support for it within the sample of non-democratic regimes. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We employ the political market framework to explain differences in local government land use decisions. This framework conceptualizes policy choices as resulting from the interplay between the aggregate policy demand by residents, developers and environmental interests and the aggregate supply by government authorities. The framework emphasizes the role of local legislative and executive institutions as mediators of local policy change. Intergovernmental variation in the level of delay imposed through the processes of development approval by city and county governments are investigated. Because county governments make land use decisions in unincorporated areas, we model these areas, as well as cities, as nested within the structure of counties. Hierarchical linear analysis of data collected in a 2007 survey of Florida city and county planners finds strong support for institutional effects and moderate support for multilevel relationships. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We address theoretical and empirical aspects of interest mobilization following disruptions that affect multiple areas of policymaking. Our theorizing about different mobilization processes leads us to consider the effects of widespread disruptions in mobilizing interests, in affecting differences in the interests that are mobilized, and in affecting the diversity and spillover of interest involvement across policy areas. We consider these mobilization effects for eight different policy subsystems that were disrupted after the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001. Our findings suggest policymakers sought to reduce policy uncertainty by calling upon interests that were best equipped to help craft and implement policy solutions. We find limited evidence of interest upheaval or cross-subsystem spillovers in interest involvement. These findings are more consistent with a demand-driven than a supply based perspective concerning interest mobilization. Taken together, these patterns of interaction between issues attention, interest involvement, and policymaking institutions illustrate the stabilizing influence of policy subsystems in buffering against the effects of widespread disruptions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We construct a typology of modern political regimes, and then a parallel and deductively-linked typology of national capitalisms. Both frameworks embrace not only advanced industrial countries but also developing countries and historical cases back to the late 18th C. We hypothesize that: 1) All modern polities may be conceived of as having either a right or left partisan orientation, which predicts the likelihood of state intervention; and 2) Over the medium term, increases in substantive political inclusion, culminating in mass democracy, generate heightened political pressures for incumbents to pursue economic policies providing consistent, although moderate, material benefits to the majority. Financial systems are central to modern capitalist economies. Our model generates predictions about major financial policy choices under each political-regime-cum-variety-of-capitalism. We propose comparisons of national financial policy histories under diverse political regimes to assess the model, and then sketch the main components of our qualitative research design. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study presents a survey-based method for conducting inference into the determinants of sensitive political behavior. The approach combines two well established literatures in statistical methods in the social sciences: the randomized response (RR) methodology utilized to reduce evasive answer bias and the generalized propensity score (GPS) methodology utilized to draw inferences about the causal effects in observational studies. The approach permits one to correctly estimate the causal impact of a multi-valued predictor variable of interest on a given sensitive behavior in the face of unknown interaction effects between the predictor and confounders as well as non-linearities in the relationship between the confounders and the sensitive behavior. Simulation results point to the superior performance of the RR relative to direct survey questioning using this method for samples of moderate to large size (N=1,000 or above). The utility of the approach is illustrated through an application to corruption in the public bureaucracy in three countries in South America. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are many different theories of where to place Sade's political-moral works such as Justine, or the Misfortunes of Virtue; Juliette, or Vice Amply Rewarded; and Philosophy in the Bedroom within the broader Western literary and philosophic tradition. I argue that while the diverse amount of views available probably do possess a grain of truth, they do not fully consider the feelings and motivations Sade must have had from his incarceration due to the Jacobin purgings, his labeling as a counter-revolutionary, the condemnation of his work by the political left, and his complete disgust with state-concentrated power and capital punishment in the name of vertu and liberté. I believe they miss the insight, philosophically radical critique, and authenticity-based style of liberalism that a political theory-focused interpretation of Sade's work can provide. In addition to the importance of political thought in Sade's writings, we cannot ignore that he chose to write his most political work in the form of a play. With these two essential characteristics in mind, I contend that Philosophy in the Bedroom is a type of satirical allegory of the French Revolution and the theories that so heavily informed it. My interpretation attempts to be faithful to the conviction that this play possesses an implicit discourse with the canon of Western political thought, while being sensitive to his stylistic choice and the various, creative, polemical readings that only theater can invite. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research tests a curvilinear relationship between party polazization and policy productivity. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea of the people as conforming masses has played a role in encouraging Nietzsche and Heidegger, and in this tradition of thought Michel Foucault as well, to reach extraordinary and transformative levels of criticism and alternative perspectives on the condition of modern western society. And while these accomplishments may have come at the expense of philosophies that acknowledge and address the positive aspects of the relational dimension of the self, they have been central to a deeper and more thoroughgoing understanding of the construction of knowledge, identity, and power. I use Jerrold Seigel's argument in his book The Idea of the Self as a way to explore this point. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The general will has traditionally been associated with the early modern Platonists, such as Malebranche and Leibniz. Yet careful examination of Benedict Spinoza's works reveals a proto-type of the general will before his famous successors. This is significant not only in re-ordering the narrative of the general will's history, but also in revealing an entirely different and original strain that anticipates twentieth-century attempts to forge a post-metaphysical general will. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The comparative study of corruption frequently relies upon corruption rankings, compiled in various ways, which rank whole countries in terms of "higher" or "lower" levels of corruption. But these indices not only have a number of methodological problems; they also reflect assumptions that impede comparative analysis. Examples include implicit assumptions that corruption is a national-level property, that it is essentially the same thing everywhere, and that countries vary only in terms of more versus less of it, among other things. I suggest that rather than ranking whole societies on league-table style lists we should focus upon positive values of integrity and accountability, using indicators of government performance gathered with as much citizen involvement as is safe and practical. Such indicators can measure corruption in ways that are far more detailed, and more sensitive to social values and actually changes in corruption, than any national level index can be. Gathering, analyzing, and acting upon the indicators can also be a good-governance activity in its own right, linking the comparative study of corruption to the concerns that make it important to begin with—namely, freedom, accountability, and justice. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Students of mass behavior typically assume that what people think and believe about politics originates from fixed mental processes. This study argues that updating is a function of moving parts. A model of updating dynamics is developed, and tests of the model make two general contributions to scholars' understanding of political inference. First, the findings elucidate motivation's dual roles in perception formation---inclining people to update beliefs using actual-world information, on the one hand, and draw inferences that are consistent with preferred-world states, on the other. Second, they show that contextual conditions direct the balance of accuracy- and partisan-motivated thinking, which has implications for both individual- and collective-level citizen performance. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Simone Weil, social critic and activist of early 20th century France, was first encountered in the U.S. through volumes edited and introduced by men who thought her brilliant but immature, saintly but heretical, and in need of great patience from the reader. Weil's English-speaking biographers and commentators, including Leslie Fiedler, Robert Coles, and Mary Dietz, have often despite themselves followed that trend by emphasizing the pathos of Weil's traumatic biography and her apparently troubled race and gender identities to the detriment of her rich contributions to moral and political philosophy. This pattern of interpretation at once inherits the paternalism of Weil's contemporaries and insists that Weil should have aligned herself neatly with categories salient to contemporary readers. It also tends to diminish the importance of Weil's published political essays and to ignore the centrality of anti-colonialism to her thought.Against such readings, I argue that Weil's philosophical insights - deeply informed by her engagements in labor movements, anti-colonialism, the Spanish Civil War, and the French Resistance - amount to a radical questioning of dominant social and political categories - including race, party, ideology, and class. Particularly important to Weil's political understanding was the question of French colonialism, her opposition to which influenced her later "hesitations regarding baptism" as well as the critical and nuanced conception of patriotism evident in L'Enracinement, her treatise written for the Free French Government in exile. Responding to both French and German imperial conquests, Weil's patriotism for occupied France challenged the conventional privileging of government and the nation-state as the sites of political activity par excellence. The simultaneous defense of a vulnerable body politic and criticism of its oppressive practices is exemplary of Weil's prudence and judgment, although she is often characterized as frustratingly self-contradictory.It is sadly ironic that dominant readings of Weil have interpreted her in terms of the sorts of absolute and dichotomous categories she resisted. To read Weil well, and to study politics with her, requires a suspension of the urge to diagnose and a willingness to challenge the most commonly assumed categories of politics and political theory. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rousseau consigns revolution and rebellion to minor status in his text, Of the Social Contract. I want to argue, however, that in spite of this superficial subordination the theme is nevertheless quite significant because it provides a model for understanding how legitimate dependence—which is, after all, the projected goal of Rousseau's theoretical researches—might be gained by all those peoples who do not find themselves well disposed, who are impure, who have been improperly subject to others, in short, all those who do not hail from Rousseau's Corsica. So while I could not in good faith claim that revolution and rebellion occupy more than a minor place in Of the Social Contract, I do want to make a case for a reading of Rousseau's oeuvre that foregrounds them and offers criteria for reconstructing the texts around their haunting presence. Especially since I have in prior work discredited the autarkic-purist tendency that instills in Rousseau a debilitating anxiety about encounters between alien persons or peoples, it is important to reconstruct the alternative tendency in Rousseau, as it takes for granted peoples' subjection and impurity, their dispossession and especially their slavery.Refiguring Of the Social Contract around rebellion thus requires an exploration of the text through its figurations of slavery and marronnage. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Roads appear neutral, simply a way to get from A to B, but they create both literal and metaphorical maps of power and mask an underlying ideology. Perhaps the best-known example of this is the way that road subsidies, by encouraging travel in private cars rather than on public transportation, promote liberalism's private self over more collective conceptions of the self. Another aspect of roads' ideological content is the way that roads not only alter settlement patterns more or less naturally, but are also used to produce segregation, to cut off functional contact between neighboring areas. In other words, the very fact of the road is an ideological statement, and the surrounding politics of roads - funding, placement, and so on - is also ideologically charged. This is of concern to democratic theory because once in place, roads - and the built environment more generally - present themselves as inevitable and eternal, as something that could not be otherwise. This seeming inevitability coupled with the masking of ideology make roads appear politically paralyzing. Political action is possible on both the grassroots and state levels until the road is built, but once there, once the map has been redrawn, the democratic moment has passed - even though the road continues to shape political possibility. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research has found that party gender quotas for electoral candidates increase the level of women's representation in legislatures Kittilson (2006); Caul(2001). This finding begs the question: what factors cause parties to adopt gender quotas? Building on the vast literature on the relationship between women's legislative representation and electoral institutions, we argue that gender quota adoption is, in fact, more likely in electoral systems that are “party-centered" as opposed to “candidate-centered" systems. Using a dataset of 171 political parties primarily in the OECD, we find strong empirical evidence to support our argument. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent criticisms of the International Monetary Fund focus on its inattention to the role of political institutions in shaping the ability of states to meet the conditions required in austerity programs. To what extent are these criticisms, which I term the information hypothesis, valid? As an initial pass at this question, I assess the Fund‟s response to the approach of elections in countries under its programs. The conventional wisdom is that elections lead to program suspension, though this raises the question of whether the IMF responds proactively to the approach of elections by altering conditionality. The problem with using conventional discrete choice models to answer this question is that they force the variance across cases to be a constant. The variance surrounding program suspensions, however, is a proxy for the countries "margin of error" between economic performance and program suspension. As a result, models that force the variance to be constant across cases limit what we can learn about the Fund‟s response to political shocks. Using a heteroskedastic probit model, I find that the approach of elections alters the variance surrounding program suspensions, providing another piece of evidence to counter the information hypothesis. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rawls's "law of peoples" (as described in both the essay and the later book) extends his political liberalism from the domestic to the international sphere. Does political liberalism provide a solid foundation, however, for global-justice claims? I argue here that it does not, because its approach to moral justification is impoverished. Specifically, international political liberalism envisions an overlapping consensus of liberal and decent-hierarchical peoples on a law of peoples that guards human rights and global peace, but it cannot offer principled reasons why the scope of toleration should not be further extended to include indecent peoples (e.g., those that fail to respect human rights) and the content of the law of peoples correspondingly weakened. A political liberal might counter that any such extension/weakening would be "unreasonable," but this response would be vacuous because political liberalism has no independent criterion of reasonableness: Rawls in his essay says that "whenever the scope of toleration is extended…the criteria of reasonableness are relaxed"—in other words, reasonableness is relative to the scope of toleration and the width and content of overlapping consensus—and political liberalism gives no compelling reasons why a narrower scope should be preferred to a broader one. I go on to consider two further responses that political liberals might offer, showing that they are also inadequate and point to the profound poverty of political liberalism and "Reformation liberalism" (Galston) more broadly, whether in the domestic or international political context. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political thought is rich in Asia. The West has jut not recognized it. An encounter with this political thought permits us to comparatively examine the development of such core Western concepts as democracy, freedom, and equality. In this essay, we find that Asian political thought emerged from a different historical context than in the West. This context was one of the three chronological waves of classic Asia's "galactic polities," its agonizing subjugation to Western colonialism, and its modern search for an authentic, independent political voice. Plied through these three contextual waves, such Western developed concepts as democracy, freedom, and equality undergo a reframing and even a re-naming in an examination of their evolution in Asia in enriching ways for both the East and the West. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

BOOK EXPLAINS SUPREME COURT'S VRA LAW AS RESULT OF 2 IDEAS:(1) JUDICIAL RATIONALISMBased on Hayek's idea of "constructivist rationalism," which Hayek used to critique the planned economy: that the political branches did not have the knowledge necessary to regulate social and economic life. What Hayek said about the political branches of government is equally true of the judicial branch. What distinguished Supreme Court jurisprudence through the last half of the twentieth century as much as anything was its assumption that it could rationally reconstruct American republicanism from the top down in accordance with a preconceived vision of "fairness"-began with reapportionment cases of 1960s.(2) POLITICS OF MULTICULTURALISMI define the politics of multiculturalism as a vision of America that considers race and ethnicity not merely as sources of identity and of mutual interest but as legally determinative categories that afford legitimate foundations for claims to representation and political rule.MADISONIAN v. MULTICULTURAL REPUBLICANISM. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding the underlying assumptions behind the implementation process requires social scientists to identify the group of implementers who inevitably make decisions. These implementers are entrusted with the power to bring a program to fruition after it is approved by a legislature or executive. In this study I focus on what scholars have labeled "discretionary experimenters." These actors can be found at the cabinet, agency, and local levels of government.Although these discretionary experimenters come from a variety of backgrounds and education levels, they are entrusted with broad decision making authority. When a discretionary experimenter is developing a program, what variables does he assume will lead to successful policy implementation? What expectations for successful implementation does he take with him into the process? This study addresses the aforementioned questions by identifying a group of discretionary experimenters who implement policy at the state level. I conduct a simultaneous interview and survey meant to test common variables associated with prevailing theories. This research builds on data collected in a pilot study focusing on discretionary experimenters in the Commonwealth of Virginia. I concentrate on the state level as a technique for comparing trends in implementation by region. This study identifies variables that are commonly put into practice in the modern implementation process. This research also makes an applied contribution by considering other variables that may not have been applicable in earlier research. For example, the roles of the private sector and social networks in successful policy implementation. The most important contribution is to provide a starting point from which future research can build. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The status of case study research has generated a vigorous debate among social scientists. Some have claimed that case studies are an important, if not invaluable, part of the theory building process while others have challenged the assertion that case study research can contribute to the goal of evaluating general theories. This has been a fruitful debate inasmuch as it has encouraged us to think more carefully about our methodological choices. However, I argue that the debate surrounding case study methods is often informed by an overly narrow definition of science and causal inference—namely that science is reducible to the pursuit of general theory and establishing patterns of covariance. Instead of this narrow definition of social science, I suggest that we expand our definition to include explaining individual historical events, a practice I define as a "case study." Toward this end, I suggest that we think of the case study in social science in much the same way a medical examiner would think of an autopsy. The goal of the medical examiner is not to test a "general theory of death," but to use her knowledge about the causes of death to explain a particular instance of it. Making the explanation of single outcomes a legitimate goal of social research enables us to appreciate the inferential technique of retroduction, which is not only common in autopsies, but is also common in natural sciences like geology. It also helps us clarify the fact that we can only test hypotheses that purport to explain an individual outcome when we are using case study methods. I conclude by suggesting that the explanation of individual events is what makes case studies such indispensable tools for searching out new information that might improve our general knowledge of the social world. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The assessment of undergraduate political science students is predictable and stagnant. A missing, yet valuable assessment tool that can contribute to repertoire of political science is the oral examination. Borrowing this assessment tool largely from foreign language departments, oral exams require students to "think on their feet" in order to critically assess and appropriately respond to questions. The ability to engage in this type of activity is a valuable skill that will further prepare students for "real world" situations in which they are asked to participate in exchanges demonstrating their verbal and critical assessment skills in possible impromptu situations. The use of oral examinations in the social sciences, particularly in political science, is virtually absent. It is the goal of this research project to explore the merits and pitfalls of utilizing oral examinations as an integral assessment tool in political science. The authors draw upon their experiences using oral exams in the classroom, the reaction of their students towards the examination process, and how oral examinations are a beneficial assessment tool in other disciplines. We conclude with a discussion regarding the appropriateness of oral examination in the discipline, as well as provide recommendations for the implementation of such assessment tools that seek to better the educational experience of our undergraduates. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the publication of Charles Beitz's Political Theory and International Relations in 1979, debates on "global" or "cosmopolitan" justice have not ceased to attract the attention of writers in the social sciences. Yet only a minority has engaged in a discussion of what an agenda should be for the reform of existing world economic institutions. In this work we explore a recent argument on the extent to which global justice principles may shape the workings of the World Trade Organization and Bretton Woods lending institutions. After a summary introduction to cosmopolitan ideas and the "statist" critique, we define the rationale for global economic redistribution presented by Charles Beitz in his early work. We then tackle the evaluation of the world economic organizations as interpreted by Robert Hockett, suggesting that his "new institutionalist" defense of actual trade and financial regimes as potential "cosmopolitan" agents misses an important part of their reality. In particular, absent in his legalistic scrutiny is an apprehension of the role powerful states have played in shaping structures and policies of the organizations over time. We argue that a "cosmopolitan" critique, if it is to be politically effective, needs to engage in a discussion of basic flaws in Bretton Woods and WTO's democratic governance that conspire against the realization of moderate egalitarian values. We finally discuss what democratizing reform proposals could realistically be implemented to reduce this deficit. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some scholars have attempted to make Hobbes safer for democratic political theory by arguing that he has much in common with natural law theory. I argue, by contrast, that the effort to make Hobbes a natural law theorist fails to consider adequately his nominalist metaphysics. Perhaps more importantly, such an approach neglects to pay adequate attention to the human passions, which play a critical role in Hobbes's political theory. I conclude that the revisionist reading of Hobbes is one which cannot be sustained. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I examine and extend Hannah Arendt's "communicative" model of power with the help of insights derived from Foucault's very different "technological" model of power. On this "Arcaultian" model of power, power is generated by the (not necessarily voluntary and always uncertain) acceptance of the rules of particular "social games" which organize human beings for joint action. The particular "ecology" of social games (the existing set of constantly changing social games) in the world, the differential visibility of their participants (the modes of their "appearance" for each other), and the ability of participants to generate genuinely common commitments through speech determine the kind and degree of power that a particular game will generate, as well as the normative judgments appropriate to it. This "hybrid" model of power, I argue, is able to deal with some well-known objections to the Arendtian model of power - namely, that it fails to provide any account of the "strategic" dimension of power and that it fails to examine the possibility that violence already enters into the constitution of any agreement - while retaining some of its most attractive normative features. I also sketch briefly some of the descriptive and normative implications of this model for an account of the power of the modern state and modern society. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anne Coulter and the Problem of Pluralism: From Values to Politics ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A large and growing literature links high levels of ethnic diversity to low levels of public goods provision. Yet while the empirical connection between ethnic heterogeneity and the underprovision of public goods is widely accepted, there is little consensus on the specific mechanisms through which this relationship operates. To gain analytic leverage on the question of why ethnicity matters, we identify three families of mechanisms- what we term preference, technology, and strategy mechanisms. Our empirical strategy is to identify and run a series of experimental games that permit us to examine these mechanisms in isolation and then to compare the importance of ethnicity in each. Results from experimental games conducted with a random sample of 300 subjects inKampala's slums reveal that successful collective action among homogenous ethnic communities in urban Uganda is attributable to the existence of norms and institutions that facilitate the sanctioning of non-contributors. We find no evidence for a commonality of tastes within ethnic groups, for greater degrees of altruism toward co-ethnics, or for an impact of shared ethnicity on the productivity of teams. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors offer an original typology of power exploring ways to teach power to undergraduates. Their conception of power is multifaceted. They conceive of power in five ways: 1) power over others, 2) the power to realize desires or needs, 3) cooperative power, 4) power of being and 5) impersonal power relations. All five faces of power are pervasive. People exercise power over others. People seek to attain what they desire and need. People freely work together to improve their common lot or fuse themselves into an ecstatic whole. People strive to develop and sustain identities in the face of threats to them. Impersonal forces constrain and enable us.For the authors, the college classroom is an unusually valuable place in which to teach power. All five faces of power are present there. We have choices in how to comport ourselves to power, and we can teach comportment to our students. We can use, resist, avoid, create, maintain and destroy power. The authors identify five roles a political scientist can assume in teaching power: 1) Curious Enquirers, 2) Technicians of Power, 3) Ethical Universialists, 4) Civic Educators and 5) Political Bastards. A Political Bastard would seek to combine two or more of the first four roles even if combination entailed tension. The authors identify themselves as Pure Political Bastards who combine all four roles. The authors elaborate their preferred role by outlining pedagogies appropriate to it. They first describe their experiences in teaching the five faces of power as concepts. Second, they describe how they taught application of the concepts by assigning an empirical exercise called "the power walk" wherestudents identify all types of power in the surrounding community. Third, the authors explain their plan to improve their teaching by accompanying groups of students on the power walks and giving them prompts to help them with discussion and writing of their applications. After describing the actual and planned uses of the power walk, the authors discuss strategies for teaching "comportment." The authors argue that we can cultivate the imagination required for comportment by asking our students to play "power games" that build a sense of consequence into the study of power. The power games will include both simulations and "real world" efforts by students to comport themselves well to power.Finally, the authors address the challenges and promise of assessment. In assessment, there are two polar errors to be avoided: 1) dismissing assessment and 2) allowing assessment to guide teaching and pedagogical innovation. The authors discuss approaches to innovations in teaching power in the classroom (and beyond) that would apply rigorous techniques of qualitative research. Beyond the rather easy problems of measuring conceptual knowledge and a student's ability to apply it, the authors propose using rubrics to longitudinally assess teaching and learning comportment to power. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political science is usually defined as the study of power. Unfortunately, however, there is no agreement about how to define power. At the theoretical level, there is a cacophony of competing concepts of power; at the empirical level, studies of political power proceed from incompatible assumptions leading to an absence of cumulative knowledge. Worse, the vast and inconclusive literature on power fails to illuminate pressing practical questions such as: What is the point of exercising power? Is power a good or just a necessary evil? How can I avoid abusing the power I have? How can I avoid being wrongly subjected to the power of others? These failures stem from the fact that existing definitions of power reflect, not the language of those who use power, but the language of third-person observers. Actual executives, whether in politics or business, do not think of their activities in terms of power but in terms of ability to accomplish various kinds of goals. Power, expecially "power-over" others, is the language of cynical third-person observers of those executives. I develop a new account of "power as ability," which captures the perspective of those agents who exercise power. I show that the most ethically and politically salient contrast is not between "power-to" and "power-over" but between my use of my own capacities and my use of other people's capacities. We would have little ability to accomplish anything good or evil without enlisting the capacities of other people to achieve our goals; but this use of other people is always fraught with moral hazards, since we are all prone to value our own capacities more than those of other people. I develop my account of power in relation to various concepts of freedom and of justice. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Basic considerations on 'power' and rhetoric as a mode of inquiry. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analytic Narratives wed traditional game theoretic modeling to hermeneutic social science methods. I argue that reliance on these traditional modeling techniques undermines this hermeneutic approach and, further, that insights on social cognition, reward, emotion, beliefs, altruistic behavior, trust, and others generated by neuroscience can improve analytic narrative modeling and sustain its hermeneutic program. I illustrate these claims in a neuroscientifically informed, behavioral analytic narrative of ethnic mobilization by ethnic Serbs in Croatia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the ubiquity of framing effects found in the social sciences, researchers have now begun examining the contextual and individual-level factors that influence when framing effects occur. Drawing on previous literature concerning the role that source cues play in political information processing, we examine whether an identity match (or mismatch) between the source of a framed message and respondent moderates framing effects. In Experiment 1 (n=199), we employ a 2 (Message Source: liberal/ conservative speaker) x 2 (Frame: free speech/ public order) x 2 (Participant Ideology: liberal/ conservative) experiment and expect that when the identity of the source matches that of the participant, framing effects should be heightened (relative to participants in a mismatch condition). We also examine whether constructs such as the Need for Cognition, the Need to Evaluate, or ideological ambivalence will influence this "matching effect." In Experiment 2 (n=119), we examine whether source cues resonate with individuals exposed to competing frames. Ultimately, we find strong evidence for the moderating role of source cues on framing effects, and we suggest that identity matching is an important factor to consider in future framing research. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of the European Union (EU) provides an important case where the causal impact of ideas is unusually easy to demonstrate for several reasons. The EU project very explicitly featured what were perceived as new ideas. It altered major institutions in a relatively short period of time. It also centered on a relatively small number of political elites. Most importantly, elite patterns of support for the EU project turns up fortuitously clear foundations for an argument about the autonomy of ideas. Political debates over supranationality have cross-cut the main organizing lines of European politics to a striking degree. This pattern undercuts attempts to explain the EU project as any sort of straightforward, rational responses to salient patterns of an objective environment. Whether we consider how Europeans were collectively positioned in states, classes, parties, bureaucracies, sectors, or regions, we find that people in the same positions tended to disagree as much as they agreed about how supranational institution-building would harm or benefit them. They have fought a battle of ideas that their objective "interests"-by which non-ideational scholars really mean their position in some sort of unambiguous obstacle course-were unable to decide for them.The unusual clarity of the role of ideas in EU history points to opportunities for ideational scholarship more broadly. It highlights how attention to fairly concrete positional patterns of political action (or the lack thereof) can complement more common ideational methods of process tracing and interpretation, even in situations without such dramatically cross-cutting constellations. It also showcases rather starkly some problems with non-ideational scholarship that extend well beyond EU studies. In a case where divided elites perennially shouted at each other about explicitly new ideas, non-ideational social scientists did their best to boil the politics down to straightforward reactions to positions in an evolving obstacle course. They managed to hold to such accounts by relying mainly on fairly narrow and selective process tracing of events rather than systematic research on the positional patterns implied by their theories, and by filling in the resultant gaps in their accounts with post hoc functionalism. I suggest that these errors were made possible by a pursuit of non-ideational hypotheses without serious consideration of ideational alternatives. In EU history, like in many other settings, non-ideational theorists have held a debate only between positional arguments. They asked only what kind of positional pattern lay behind political outcomes, seeing little reason to look for debates or mobilization that cross-cut material and organizational positioning. Ideational explanation, by contrast, is built on the notion that action can vary independently from objective positioning. Its logic instructs us to investigate closely the relationship between positioning, ideas, and action, since there may well be multiple viable ways to interpret any position. This is certainly not to say that ideas always strongly cross-cut objective positioning. But this case where they did displays dramatically why non-ideational theorists too must entertain the possibility of idea-caused variation to test their own claims seriously. Moreover, it suggests that if traditional theorists overlooked the role of ideas here, where it is unusually easy to see, they have probably missed ideational causes in many other places as well. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social science has yet to reliably explain the patternof ratification and compliance with human rights treaties.Hathaway(2002) argues that states ratify international humanrights treaties in order to send a signal of political position onthe matter, though ratification does not reliably signal an intentto comply. I argue that states do in fact send a signal of thissort when both ratifying and complying with human rights treaties.A state signals to the domestic populations of other states thatit is an economic or military partner that respects human rights.The domestic population uses this signal to support or opposeinteraction with the ratifying state. I present a formal model ofratification, compliance, and sanctions that captures this dynamicand find theoretical support for the ideas that domesticpopulations can make a difference in human rights records abroadand states act not for the purpose of supporting human rights butfor the purpose of economic gain or security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion that important elements of political action may be "socially constructed" has received growing attention in political science since the 1980s. Meta-theorizing and empirical work on culture, ideas, norms, and identity has garnered increasing space in top journals. "Constructivist" theorists of various types have won book contracts from university presses and faculty positions at prestigious universities. Despite rising recognition of ideational or constructivist scholarship, however, its status in the discipline remains ambiguous. Instances where empirical claims by non-ideational theorists entertain ideational alternative explanations are the tiny exception rather than the rule. Empirical ideational arguments, by contrast, still achieve high-level mainstream publication only given elaborate and explicit competition with non-ideational claims. Much of their apparent rise has also come not in old mainstream venues, but in the emergence of newer journals which are less insistent that constructivists engage elaborate contests with non-ideational theories along orthodox methodological lines. This is probably a typical pattern for new schools of thought that attempt over decades to be admitted to central disciplinary debates (at least in the post-1945 world of proliferating journals). But if we turn from publication patterns to the internal logic of competition between ideational and non-ideational scholarship, it becomes clear that we are not just looking at the slow movement of a new approach into mainstream debates. On both sides of this line-and especially amongst constructivists themselves-we find scholars arguing that the appropriate end-result will not be engagement and competition but the consolidation of separate-but-equal realms of inquiry.Two related notions suggest that constructivists and non-constructivists are most interested in distinct discussions. The first traces most famously to Max Weber, who taught that arguments that invoke meaning engage something other than explanation. Weber posited a difference between an argument's "adequacy on a causal level"-its explanatory force-and the kind of understanding, or "adequacy on the level of meaning," to which ideational scholarship aspires. He thought we could capture causality in action (being confident that under certain conditions, certain people would do certain things) without understanding the significance of what people were doing as they saw it. Later scholars expanded on Weber to put ideational work in its own interpretive or "hermeneutic" category, setting it off from the causal dynamics that non-ideational explanations of action ostensibly share with the natural sciences.This move is tied to the notion that much ideational scholarship asks "how" or "what" questions in a "constitutive" mode, creating a division of labor with the "why" questions posed by explanatory work. Culture, norms, ideas, identities, and other socially-constructed elements define certain realities and imbue them with meaning in inseparably constitutive ways. Explanatory scholarship plays out the more mechanistic causal workings within that context. We need constitutive scholarship, for example, to see how the norm of sovereignty constitutes the state. In constructivist claims this is not a separable, temporally-sequential, causal-explanatory relationship. The very minute that people accepted norms of sovereignty they looked around and saw states. Explanatory approaches can analyze cause and effect dynamics within that socially-constructed reality.This article argues that neither rationale for separate realms of inquiry stands up to scrutiny. Weber created the "understanding" category by defining explanation as a purely correlational exercise... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]