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A conference paper about the partisanship of independent voters in Japan is presented which was prepared for presentation at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, in New Orleans, Louisiana. The paper discusses topics including the decision-making of independents, a comparison of the determinants of vote swings before and after electoral reform, and the electoral dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party during 1955-1993.

Most literature on national identity stresses the enduring, distinctive aspects of such identities. Nowhere is this tendency more pronounced than in the case of studies of Japanese identity. This paper questions the literature?s tendency to portray Japanese identity as a function of longstanding, homegrown Japanese ideas and values. Through a study of the evolution of images printed on Japanese banknotes, and of the political processes behind that evolution, the paper shows Japanese state elites consciously following international models of identity content. Japanese banknote iconography shifted dramatically in the early 1980s in the direction of conformity with that of most advanced countries? currencies, and the new yen banknotes issued in 2004 continue in that direction. The state has been the main protagonist in this story, but for a full accounting of the magnitude and pace of iconographic change it is necessary to unpack the ?black box? of the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International cooperation can take a variety of forms and one of them is early settlement in a dispute: reaching a compromise before escalating the dispute to a higher stage. This paper looks at trade disputes that Japan has been involved in at the World Trade Organization (WTO) to see what factors influence the behavior of states to reach early settlement. Two existing hypotheses, one by Priest and Klein (1984) and the other by Guzman and Simmons (2002) are examined. Both are insufficient to explain dispute outcomes as far as cases from Japan are concerned. Therefore, this paper offers an alternative explanation, which focuses on domestic constraints within the disputing countries. When law as such is contested, when the legislature is independent, when a local government under a federal system is a focus of the dispute, and when the affected industries are in financial difficulties; early settlement is found to be extremely difficult, if not impossible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how political leaders of weak states confront imperial aggressors. In particular, it investigates Chiang Kaishek?s response in 1931 to Japanese aggression and eventual occupation of Manchuria, an action that some have called the true beginning to World War II. Japanese military superiority considerably constrained Chiang?s choices as a leader. The indisputable military inequality between Japan and China may lead one to conclude that Chiang could not exercise leadership in a way that mattered. This paper argues that by examining agency as a process, however, we open up new avenues for examining Chiang?s agency. By process, I mean given Chiang?s unfavorable structural situation, how did he selectively apply history (i.e. draw from strategies of past political leaders or from their past political decisions) and envision the future direction of history to solve day-to-day political problems? Through this approach, we are able to depict more faithfully Chiang?s agency, and in addition, better evaluate the strengths and shortcomings of his agency. This paper demonstrates that even as the stakes were much higher in Chiang?s second confrontation with the Japanese (the first being in 1928), and his structural context had simultaneously worsened, Chiang diversified his uses of shame to confront these greater challenges. These included noncooperation and nondirect negotiations to guard against further humiliation from the Japanese and nonmilitary resistance to establish China?s innocence in the international arena. In addition, by defining shame as China?s disunity on the macro-level and by highlighting the undeserved humiliation he was receiving from fellow party members, Chiang further emphasized the difficult contextual situation he was in. And by portraying himself as valiantly struggling within this context, he aimed to guarantee his place in history regardless of the results. I rely on the ?diaries? of Chiang that the Taiwanese government recently opened to the public in 1997. In painstaking brushwork calligraphy, Chiang?s secretaries had copied quotations from Chiang?s diaries and portions of his speeches and telegrams, among other writings by Chiang. The presentation and content of this source, properly called the working [shilue] manuscripts, give us a unique window to understand Chiang?s agency in the face of Japanese aggression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will use the mass media theory of framing to assess three major Japanese newspapers-Yomiuri, Asahi and Mainichi -editorials (694) concerning Japan’s homeland security from 9/11/01-2/29/04. Based on the kinds of topics addressed by the editorials surveyed, I utilized five frames - national interest, cost/consequence, threat, responsibility and human interest. This period was selected because it includes 9/11, the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, new Japanese legislation related to homeland security and anti-terrorism, PM Koizumi’s historic visit to North Korea, the killing of two Japanese diplomats in Iraq and finally the dispatch of more than 1000 ground, air, maritime SDF forces to Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. The paper concludes by discussing the significance of this data for future Japanese homeland security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ideas matter, but not always, and often not in the ways we expect. This paper is designed to provide a framework for understanding when and how international ideational trends have influenced the process of financial reform in Japan during the past three decades. Drawing on an existing model of three interrelated political economy dynamics of reform, this paper argues that the explanatory role and weight of ideational trends varies depending on the type of constraint a government is facing when a policy choice is made. Specifically, reforms are influenced by international ideational trends differently when the government is facing a policy crisis than during periods of ordinary politics, and differently still when the state actors perceive there is a strong imperative to improve financial market competitiveness. Although this project is in only the hypothesis-generating stage, an early review of case study evidence suggests that the most common channel through which international ideational trends influence the domestic politics of reform is when state or market actors strategically shop for and then employ them in pursuit of pre-existing goals. Thus, it is common for actors to highlight international practices or ideational trends that justify policy preferences that have alternative, but less readily justifiable, domestic political motivations. In such cases, however, it is the political resources of the actors, rather than the content of the ideas that best explain at least initial reform outcomes. In short, the ideas themselves do not really matter. On the other hand, international ideational trends do have a greater impact on the actual content of reforms but only in the relatively rare cases in which there is both a near consensus on best practices, and the government is strongly motivated by a perceived competitiveness imperative. Under these circumstances governments face strong incentives to adopt dominant international standards and embrace the associated ideational trends even if doing so runs quite counter to traditional patterns of policy and policymaking. This tradeoff between internationally dominant and domestically-generated policies exists because, paraphrasing Marx, the ideational trends available for employment are not necessarily those of the actor?s choosing. Given the relative increase in the perceived competitiveness imperative in Japan over the past decade, as well as the narrowness of international ideational debate around neoliberalism as the preferred market-organizing principle, I conclude that the impact of international ideational trends on the politics of financial reform in Japan has become somewhat more significant than it was prior to the 1990. Finally, evidence of ideational trends influencing financial market reforms through learning, ideational conversion, or their impact on identities is quite rare, although one can build a case for why this transmission mechanism might strengthen over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Second World War killed approximately fifty million people, while it led policies and institutions to improve people’s health. This paper will ask why and how these events occur ironically at the same time, and rethink the development of health insurance policies. Scholars explain welfare state development by focusing on industrialization, labor power, culture, and policy and institutional path dependence. When they do study the impact of war, they tend to treat war as a simple and identical exogenous shock and do not address how variations in war experiences affect policies and institutions. This paper contrasts ‘Japanese’ war with ‘American’ war in terms of a war’s duration, depth of mobilization, casualties, battle sequence, and war-fighting regime. It also examines how war mobilization formed and consolidated the Japanese national health insurance policies in the 1930s and the 1940s. This paper has three contributions. First, theoretically, it shows the difficulties of existing studies to take variations in war experiences into their analyses, and suggests a necessity of further studies to understand the relationship between war and health insurance policy. Second, empirically, it examines origins and development of the Japanese health insurance that political scientists have not sufficiently addressed. Third, it sheds a new light on a frequently asked question: Why does the United States not have the comprehensive national health insurance system? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do opposition parties propose votes of no-confidence they know will not pass? Although there is an extensive literature on the confidence relationship between parliament and the executive, it tends to focus solely on the vote of no-confidence as a mechanism for the parliamentary majority control of the executive. This paper fills a gap in the literature by exploring the vote of no-confidence as a tool of the opposition, focusing on its use in the Japanese Diet. We suggest two possible reasons for the vote of no-confidence to have utility to the opposition, even when they know it will not pass. The opposition might use the no-confidence vote for legislative gains, using the no-confidence vote as a delay tactic or filibuster. Or the opposition might use it for electoral gains, using the no-confidence vote as an opportunity to publicize unpopular government policies or actions. Although the traditional literature on the Japanese Diet has suggested that the opposition uses the no-confidence vote for legislative gains, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that electoral gains hypothesis better explains no-confidence votes in postwar Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the question for political trust and the question for political satisfaction frequently asked in Japanese election surveys. While people?fs responses to these questions seem stable, they are also very strongly related to partisanship. In fact, the connection with partisanship is stronger than the connection with the other questions of political trust. I suggest that these two questions are too abstractly phrased, and as a consequence, people have no clue to assess their trust and satisfaction other than using their own partisanship as a criterion. The paper concludes with a suggestion for more research on the theoretical validity of trust and efficacy questions used in Japanese election surveys. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of litigation in citizens' campaigns to hold the government accountable for the harmful consequences of its decisions. Legal mobilization, because it involves coordinating litigation with publicity-oriented activities, bolsters the credibility and salience of plaintiffs and their cause in a variety of ways. The lawsuits, and the public outrage against the government, and victims' lobbying efforts alert politicians to problems that need attention, from among the multitude of potential issues to tackle. By enhancing the credibility and salience of their cause through legal mobilization campaigns, plaintiffs can simultaneously mobilize public sympathy to shame the government and recruit political allies who can engineer redress legislation. Drawing evidence from four health-related victim redress movements in Japan, this paper demonstrates that the 1994 electoral reforms facilitated the use of legal mobilization as one way for redress claimants to recruit political allies. This paper highlights three developments. First, each politician must now appeal to broader, more diverse set of constituents. Second, more centrist and more viable alternative parties now compete for support from the median voter. Third, the prime minister and party leaders now bear more responsibility for decision-making and the party image. Together these effects of the electoral reforms have increased the likelihood that politicians will champion plaintiffs' causes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent scholarship analyzing Japanese defense policy has been sensationalistic. Challenging the constructivist argument that an antimilitarism norm has constrained Japanese militarization, realists have called attention to Japan's technologically advanced military, procurement of sophisticated weaponry, increased public support for the Japan Self-Defense Force, and a strategy of buck-passing as evidence of "normalization," "militarization," and the emergence of a "great power." However, is this really the case? Has Japan embarked on a new aggressive path, negating decades of pacifism? In this paper, I propose a cross-paradigmatic approach for analyzing Japan's military strength by combining constructivist, liberal, and realist arguments. First, this paper provides a systematic comparison of militaries in East Asia to measure relative power. In context of a rapidly militarizing East Asia and the emergence of new threats, Japan's military policy has been moderate modernization, not militarization. Second, this paper offers a typology of constraints on the Japanese military. Social, technical, normative, and political factors limit Japanese power projection capabilities in the present, and will become more debilitating in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explores immigrants' rights activism by non-state actors in assisting immigrants and xenophobic activism by ultra-nationalist groups at the local and national level. Three classes of non-state pro-immigration organizations that are concerned with immigrants exist throughout industrialized societies: immigrant ethnic associations, faith-based institutions, and immigrant advocacy groups. Through seven years of fieldwork, I have found that different kinds of non-state organizations predominate in different locations. Immigrant ethnic associations predominate in Sweden, faith-based organizations in the United States, and immigrant advocacy groups in Japan. Less dominant immigrant organizations exist in each country, but are much rarer. The target of activism by non-state actors also differs in these three countries. In Sweden, activists target state elites at all levels, including politicians, bureaucrats, and the European Court. In the United States, faith-based groups partner with local labor unions to target both local and national politicians. In Japan, immigrant advocacy NGOs work with local government officials to target the national bureaucracy and the Supreme Court to influence policy outcomes on immigration. I also observed more xenophobic activisms in both the United States and Japan but less in Sweden. However, xenophobic activism involving armed vigilante groups are larger in membership size in the United States than in Japan. My paper argues that the type of electoral system explains the presence/absence of certain political groups on immigration issues. Political opportunity structure helps identify specific political conditions and associational strategies under which a political and/or social group emerges to mobilize public opinion and influence policymakers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes a new trend in recent reforms of Bismarckian pension systems in Europe and Japan. It aims at revising the conventional argument that emphasizes the concertation between business and labor and at shedding a new light on the role of party politics in welfare states. In advanced democracies, the overhaul of pension system is one of the principle agendas of welfare and economic reforms. However, according to existing researches, fundamental reform is rare, if any, in Bismarckian pension systems because the very characteristics of the system (a pay-as-you-go scheme, highly occupational segmentation, and a high-replacement rate) create costly financial barriers and generate strong veto players against reform. Under such a condition in the era of "welfare state retrenchment", the only possiblity is step-by-step reform based on the blame-avoidance approach to gain consensus from many veto players. The result is piecemeal amendaments in pension finance and institutions, conducted through concertation among key interest groups, especially business and labor. Recent reforms in several countries (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Japan), however, do not fit into this line of argument. These countries have recently experienced large-scale, comprehensive reforms by unifying fragmented schemes into integrated, fully-funded schemes. Strikingly, these reforms were mostly government-led, and carried out without the consensus among major societal actors. The conventional argument on concertation cannot explain this change. To explain this development of pension reforms, this paper presents a new theoretical framework that focuses on a two-dimensinal consensus-gaining strategies for policymakers. Policymakers simultaneously try to obtain support from major interest groups ("corporatist arena"), on the one hand, and from political parties ("electoral arena"), on the other. The core of this argument is that policy makers in Bismarckian pension countries need not necesarrily compromise with interest groups to fend off their vetoes. They can also rely on the support from political parties to overcome their vetoes. They count on either of these two types of support, or sometimes mix them to implement pension reforms. This analysis clearly depicts the changing nature of recent reforms of Bismarckian pension system. The similarities and the differences found in case studies in terms of the mix of the two types of consensus-building have implications on the literature on varieties of capitalism in these countries. It also sheds a new light on the importancce party politics plays in institutional reform in a political system with multiple vetoes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A conference paper about the policy transformation of pension regimes is presented which is prepared for presentation at the American Political Science Association Conference, in Toronto, Ontario, on September 2-6, 2009. The paper discusses topics including the recent pension reforms in the U.S., Great Britain, Sweden and Japan, and the relationship between income inequality and pension regimes.

In its landmark 1993 report funded by the Japanese government, the World Bank argued that Japan and seven other high performance Asian economies (HPAEs) had managed a hitherto impossible formula: high speed growth with equity. Over the last decade, this picture suddenly changed. By the spring of 2006, a furious debate raged among academics, in the media, and on the floor of the Diet over the issue of rising inequalities and the emergence of an unequal society (fubyoudou shakai). At its most aggregate level, the Gini coefficient based on the national survey of household incomes reached 30 in 2003. In 2006, politicians began to scramble for explanations and policy responses, as the political legitimacy of the regime centered on the Liberal Democratic Party began to be affected. This period has correlated with an unprecedented defeat of the LDP in July 2007 and with a period of political instability and transition. This paper reviews the data on inequality in Japan and its immediate political causes. It focuses on one key research question: in what ways does rising inequality impact the political calculus of structural reforms? The paper argues that entrepreneurial reform processes in response to global incentives have played a major role in facilitating structural reforms. In turn, the emerging backlash against inequality is leading to a possible political transition that may see the rise of a new party or coalition of actors in defense of the vanishing middle class. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A conference paper about the politics of everyday exclusion of Koreans in Japan is presented. It details in-depth interviews of Koreans in Japan from March to June 2005. It discusses the origin of the Korean minority in Japan. It examines the change in the institutional treatment of Koreans in Japan at the macro level.

A conference paper about the re-posturing of U.S. forward presence in Japan is presented. It asserts the possibility of mismatches between the U.S. global strategy and the local re-posturing process. It addresses existing theoretical works on U.S. forward presence. It discusses the Cold War origins of U.S. military bases in Japan. It examines the strategic implications of the re-posturing strategy for Japan.

A conference paper about party switching by subnational legislators in Japan is presented. It discusses the strong incentive of Japanese subnational politicians to develop close ties to national politicians who work with the national government. It analyzes subnational politicians' party affiliation decisions in 1993-1994. Examples of subnational party switching and non-switching are presented.

When the negotiations for trade liberalization in global and regional levels bogged down, Singapore swiftly engaged in planning for and forging a vast array of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), culminating in the creation of an FTA grounds well in East Asia and beyond. On the role played by Singapore, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, confidently stated that 'to say it is because of us may be too strong, but we set an example and we set people thinking. And I think that's also the reason why ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] itself is discussing FTAs. There is a demonstration effect' (cited in Straits Times, 1 December 2004). Singapore's interest in signing bilateral FTAs consecutively was partly born out of a fear of its survival as a nation that heavily relies on trade for its growth, and FTAs are expected to help Singapore overcome its innate inability to call effectively for diplomatic and economic changes in Southeast Asia to promote trade liberalization in the region and beyond. 　There are two layers of FTA movements in Southeast Asia: 1) bilateral FTAs between ASEAN members and extra regional countries, and 2) FTAs between ASEAN as a single unit and extra regional countries. This chapter initially focuses on the first layer of bilateral FTA diffusion by exploring the impetus behind Singapore's active engagement in FTA negotiations by examining three pressures (economic, security and legal), set out by Solis and Katada, to establish whether Singapore has contributed to the growth of FTAs involving both Southeast and Northeast Asian countries, and if so, how. The paper also examines the nature of trade policy-making system in Singapore to analyze the alleged little involvement of the business sector in trade policymaking as a common feature in Southeast Asia, demonstrating the predominant role of the state in the FTA making process. The chapter finally analyses another level of FTA proliferation as ASEAN has served as a hub in the ASEAN+1 FTA networks with five major powers. The origins of this approach can be traced back to China's FTA proposal to ASEAN in 2000, as a result of its concern to be isolated after the bilateral FTA initiative started by Japan and South Korea in 1998. Given the subsequent reaction taken by Japan, Korea and India, China's aggressive diplomacy in Southeast Asia including the FTA proposal can be seen as an independent variable against FTA diffusion in this layer, and, symbolically, the ASEAN+1 FTA movement has been a site for the competitions where two types of FTAs - China-led traditional FTA with gradual implementation and Japan-led new-age FTA with single undertaking approach - have prevailed, creating further complicated situations for multilateral companies' possible use of the FTAs. This paper argues that the impact of bilateral FTAs on Southeast Asia is limited, as only Singapore and Thailand have virtually signed multiple bilateral FTAs and, moreover, those FTA and ASEAN's integration schemes such as ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) are not well utilized by ASEAN's and multinational companies either, representing the perception gap between keener FTA creator in the governments and indifferent users in the business sectors. FTA diffusion certainly occurred in Southeast Asia, but it is Japan-centered as most of ASEAN members chose it as their first and, in some cases, only bilateral FTA partner, and thus the concern about trade diversion effect as a valid explanatory variable is mainly attributed to Japan's larger economic presence as the largest trading partner and investment source to those countries... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focusing on the experiences of Japan, the United States, and Sweden, the paper examines how differing conceptions of citizenship and moral personhood shape policy outcomes. The paper employs this analytic framework to interpret institutional variations in immigration politics, and to then show how these political factors affect each country's welfare policy. It argues that different kinds of policy assumptions are based on distinct political mythologies and their often-implicit philosophical traditions, and that these "moral parables of citizenship and personhood" provoke different kinds of immigrant activism. In Japan, this concept is framed in terms of purity and hierarchy. In the United States, the relevant terms involve civic features of citizens, and the abiding importance of freedom. Finally, in Sweden the abiding terms are a more substantive conception of equality, and again a concern with freedom. Thus Japan's "control policy," which treats immigrants as workers (rather than persons with equal moral standing to citizens) provides the greatest impetus for local activism through informal democratic institutions. In contrast, the United States' "assimilationist policy" and Sweden's "multicultural policy," both of which treat immigrants as potential citizens (albeit in very different ways), provide greater national activism through both formal and informal democratic organizations and processes. As a member of the European Union, Sweden is also witnessing activism at the supranational, multilateral level. As a result, Japan has a greater proportion of immigrant rights NGOs, the United States has more faith-based organizations, while Sweden has focused on immigrant ethnic associations. The paper then addresses how the institutional variations in immigration policies and activism have impacted each country's social welfare policies, particularly for immigrants. Japan's system of universal healthcare covers all except for "polluted" illegal foreigners while Sweden's universal healthcare treats everyone equally. The United States private healthcare system offers excellent services and choices to those who can pay while the government subsidizes faith-based organizations and other private institutions to provide free/low-cost health and welfare services to the needy, including the newly arrived and poor immigrants. These social welfare policies are consistent with each country's interpretation on the concept of the person and its immigration policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will historically and theoretically study conditions under which states develop bilateral versus multilateral security alliances. Specifically, the paper will discuss a question on why the United States built mainly bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region while it established a multilateral alliance, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the early Cold War period.Understanding security alliances have been the subject of major research in international relations studies. However, there has been so far insufficient scholarly attention and rigorous archival research focusing on the question I proposed above. The findings of the proposed paper will not only be historical and theoretical, but will also attempt to provide insights on how future Asia-Pacific alliance policy can be managed.This paper argues that the difference between the German rearmament and the Japanese rearmament is a key for solving the puzzle. The nature of the German rearmament is very much different from that of the Japanese counterpart, because the Japanese rearmament was far modest and limited in its nature and scope. The large-scale German rearmament generated more complex interdependent interactions among the United States and its European allies, while the limited Japanese rearmament created less interdependent relations in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, the Atlantic alliance developed into NATO with multilateralism, while alliances in the Asia-Pacific remained bilateral in nature. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many scholars have highlighted Japan and South Korea as distinctive models of the 'developmental state', which can share common features in terms of the condensed economic development. The close strategic relationship between the bureaucratic government and big business has been often cited as one of many similarities in the way the two countries pursued rapid economic growth. Another trend in comparing modern economies of Korea and Japan calls attention to the state's embedded autonomy in directing industrial transformation. Overall, scholarly interest in the comparison of modernization in the two Asian countries have been, hitherto, limited to economic and political development, rather than social relations laid behind the political economy of the postwar development. Indeed, comparative analysis of the similarities and differences in the historical patterns of the emergence of 'systems of interest intermediation' in dealing with labor across Japan and Korea is a relatively unexploited topic. Little discussion of the comparison of national bargaining arrangements among major interest groups and the government in these two countries has flowed into print. Although some Japanese pioneering works introduce a corporatist account for its postwar labor relations and a historical analysis of negotiation characteristics of social contracts, they all simply classify the Japanese case as an anomaly with the emphasis on the state's deliberate management of weak labor forces. Likewise, the literature related to Korea's labor politics and civil society tends to emphasize the uniqueness embedded in its social and industrial relations - the confrontation between 'strong state and contentious society'. Thus, the poverty of comparative perspective in this area is bound to create the uniqueness as an exclusive dimension to delineate the political and social landscape of Korean and Japanese industrial relations.Joining a comparative study of corporatist governance in Japan and Korea to a review of archival data on recent changes in their industrial relations, this paper will assess different paths of labor's role in the corporatist negotiation of adjustment in their changing societies, and expand the comparative utility of the corporatist thesis to its East Asian variants. To this end, a profile of state-society relations will be advanced as a parameter to determine the degree of organized labor, ranging from confrontation to cooperation, in relation to the state and capital. A shift in the magnitude of organized labor results in transforming the tripartite pattern of interest negotiation, and the state, in turn, would design new institutional incentives to neutralize labor in civil society or embrace capital in big business. What must be explained in this paper is the two distinctive modes of Asian corporatism varying according to organized power of labor unions, under the assumption that the tripartite negotiation in Korea, in which the state faced strong challenges from organized labor, can be conceptualized as 'corporatism without capital', whereas Japan's industrial relations have been widely known as 'corporatism without labor'. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan and South Korea have historically been considered strong and rather autonomous states, particularly in the realms of foreign and defense policy. Recently, however, both governments have faced varying degrees of public criticism concerning the kidnappings of their citizens by North Korea (DPRK) and their policies toward the North. Theories of state autonomy in decision-making predict that the groups articulating such public demands should have minimal influence over policy-making. Yet, particularly since September 2002 when Kim Jong-Il admitted that the DPRK had abducted thirteen Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s, the organization of Japanese abductees' families has gained significant political influence. Though the analogous association in South Korea represents the bereaved of a much larger group of abductees, that group has not been able to gain equivalent access to and influence over policy-making processes in the South. Why have these groups had such different degrees of success in influencing their governments' policies concerning the abductees and toward the DPRK? This paper uses the lens of the abductions issue to shed light on the nature of state-society relations and interest mediation in these two countries. This project analyzes the variations in success among advocacy groups by focusing on a subcategory advocacy groups: victims' organizations. These are groups of individuals who explicitly blame the deliberate actions or the negligence of their own government or another state for the physical harm they have suffered. By focusing on how changes in domestic political structures have altered the opportunity structure that victims' family associations face, this paper analyzes what the unusual case of the abductee saga reveals about broader questions of institutional change, victims' advocacy, and civil society's role at the intersection of domestic and international politics in Japan and South Korea. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a theory of incentives to align with the governing coalition and tests its observable implications against empirical data drawn from the Japanese House of Repreenatives. The governing party premium is larger for legislators elected from underdeveloped constituencies especially when the re-selection probability of the incumbent government coalition is high. When the political environment is stable, legislators elected from infrastructure-poor regions are more strictly restrained from leaving the governing party. Under the same circumstances, opposition party incumbents are lured to revert to the governing coalition. When the political environment is fluid and reselection of the incumbent government is unpredictable, legislators behave sincerely and switch parties to match their preferences. The empirical part of the paper shows that the behavior of Japanese legislators in this period was consistent with these predictions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper advances a theory of political entrepreneurship under conditions of externally-induced uncertainty. When interest group coalitions are finely balanced, political entrepreneurs have the capacity to tilt a policy outcome toward reform and to transform the status quo. The paper illustrates this process through the analysis of gradual corporate governance reforms in Japan from 1993 to 2006. The variation of outcome in nearly twenty individual battles underscores the existence of structural conditions that are necessary for political entrepreneurs to get their way in policy-making. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I tackle two puzzles in this paper: why did Japan and the United States begin to develop health insurance policies almost from scratch during WWII; and why did they adopt different systems by the end of postwar reconstruction? For the first question, I argue that the health insurance systems in both countries were developed for making war mobilization more efficient. For the second question, I argue that the differences in each country's wartime experience-the state's projection about the duration and depth of mobilization, the eventual length of the war, the sequence of war planning, and the result of the war-influenced how, and to what degree, the Japanese and American states intervened in health insurance. The goal of this paper is to construct a framework for understanding the relationship between war and health insurance by examining the cases of Japan and the United States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reconsiders the prevalent Western view that comparative political theory should primarily engage in comparisons of universal political concepts of different authors. Within Western political discourse at least, it is often believed that liberal political theorizing should proceed with a systematic statement of how the author defines the concept of liberty or freedom. However, this paper highlights the fact that postwar Japanese liberal arguments without abstract political concepts. Rejecting to present a systematic and abstract account of the concept of political liberties, postwar Japanese liberals attempted to theorize what concrete political conduct or behavior in a specific historical context will best realize such political ideals as liberty or freedom. This paper labels this non-Western way of liberal theorizing as indigenous liberalism and compares it with the regular Western theorizing which can be labeled as implantation model. It then shows that the postwar Japanese liberal have succeeded in shifting its focus from mere individualization to a deeper aim of autonomous determination. The upshot of this paper is to provide alternative possibilities to the methodological questions of comparative political theory. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper applies the framework of comparative institutional analysis and identifies one causal mechanism for institutional change. The paper argues that, under certain conditions, the mobilization of civil society can destabilize the existing status quo and act as a trigger for institutional change. Emerging NGO coalitions in Japan have used the relay of local governments to build momentum for change and force a central government response. I present evidence drawn from two important recent cases: the shift in biotechnology (GMO) regulations and the politics of ratification and implementation of the Kyoto protocol in Japan. Such an analysis breaks new ground in the analysis of Japanese politics by bringing the study of civil society into the center of policy-making and integrating Japan within comparative models. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to discuss how the women?s movement in Japan works as ?an agency of democracy? which changes Japanese politics toward more openness and vitality. The Japanese women?s movement can be categorized into three groups: elite-initiated, feminist and non-feminist participatory. Despite differences in their outlook and attitudes, they share common grounds for their collective activities. Their identities, for example, tend to be centered around motherhood. The language of motherhood has been a crucial idea behind Japanese women?s mobilization. The male-dominated Japanese politics has not only taken little account of women?s issues but it has also excluded women from the established political institutions. Thus their campaigns link women?s demands with politics from below. The women?s movements provide Japanese women with an alternative channel for political participation. They effectively use two channels inside and outside the formal political institutions. In the former case, the traditional style of Japan?s policymaking makes political influence possible for the women. The institutional channel means sending many more women to legislative bodies. The organizations provide female candidates with support for election campaigns. While these women apply direct action to incorporate their demands in public policies, they do not ignore the representative institutions but they rather try to participate in legislative bodies. In doing so, women?s political involvement at the grassroots level has contributed not only to improving women?s social conditions but also to developing more democratic political system in Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to show applying William J. Wilson?s proposition in The Declining Significance of Race (1978) to Japanese context that the basis of minority inequality has been changing in contemporary Japan from ?ethnicity? to ?class.? The development of a capitalist social stratification system, combined with the legal/institutional reformations of the past decades, has made class more significant than ethnicity in determining the life chances of minority individuals in Japan. So much so that the general social status of minority individuals has now more to do with their socioeconomic class background than with their ethnic origin. In this respect, the persistent inequality between mainstream ?Japanese? and ?non-Japanese? minorities should be understood more as a function of class than of ethnicity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Why have regional banks in Japan accumulated non-performing loans (NPLs) that far outweigh their ratio of economic activity (measured by economic output)? A simple answer lies in the political importance of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that comprise 70-80% of the revenue source for Japan?s regional banks. In 2002, over 65% of total loans outstanding in Japan went to SMEs (BOJ data). Furthermore, SMEs employ roughly 80% of Japan?s workers, and thus represent the majority of voters. Outside of Tokyo and other large metropolitan areas, regional economies, local governments, and politicians are highly dependent on the support and well-being of SMEs. Therefore, ensuring access to adequate loans for SMEs continues to be a high priority for both the central and local governments. Unfortunately, this preferential treatment of SMEs lies in direct conflict with the need for market-oriented financial reforms which are a critical component of Japan?s economic future. One of the consequences of regional economies? high dependence on SMEs is the centralization of banking policies that are blindly applied nationwide. During the process of financial liberalization and the dismantling of interest rate regulation, replacement banking policies sought to ensure sources of funding for SMEs. These policies distorted market mechanisms by dampening the need for adequate risk evaluation and monitoring of bank loans to SMEs. Government backed loan programs which favor SMEs have slowed down the pace of financial reform, diminished the competitiveness of regional banks, and ultimately created incentives to accumulate NPLs. This paper shows that the continuation of centralized banking policies that favor SMEs, in combination with the need for local governments and politicians to support local SMEs, is distorting loan risk evaluation and slowing down financial reform. First, the lack of an adequate welfare system and fear of rising unemployment force the government to protect SMEs, thereby creating an environment where regional banks must extend loans at low interest rates that do not reflect the high level of risk associated with loans to SMEs. Second, government policies giving special status and treatment to regional banks and SMEs have allowed numerous regional banks to exploit government policies aimed at protecting SMEs, thereby placing the burden of high risk associated with loans to SMEs on taxpayers. A vicious cycle continues to fuel a system that avoids the risk evaluation necessary for the emergence of a market-oriented financial system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the impact of the Basic Law for Gender Equal Society passed in Japan in 1999. Specifically, the research will examine the degree to which this law has created significant change, and in particular, examine the instances of ?backlash? that have developed despite the relatively limited scope of reform that the law has engendered to date. Hopefully, the information and analysis presented here contributes to the growing literature examining the relationship between gender policy making and transnational feminism, the role of state feminism {as the law establishes ?national machinery? for women?s issues} (Stetson and Mazur) and finally, the reasons for intense conservative reaction against gender equality concepts, all in comparative perspective. The extent to which reactions to gender equality policy are the product of the history, political opportunity structure and political culture of a particular nation , in this instance, Japan, will be evaluated. The connections between framing of issues (Ferree et al , 289), the relationship of parties and interest groups to the state , the impact and role of mass media controversy and opposition (Ibid., 295), in contributing to controversy and opposition will also be assessed. The analysis argues for the importance of the nation state in policy making, while acknowledging the significance of anti feminist forces with possible international dimensions as well as a transnational women?s movement with a significant infrastructure ( Ibid, 301) To what extent has the notion of expanded citizenship for Japanese women been threatened by the new opposition to many of their goals (see Mackie, 2003, although she gives only cursory treatment to the Basic Law) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although in the long term, democratization is expected to exert pacifying effects on international relations, scholars have argued that conflict is more likely during democratic transitions. They argue that politicians in democratizing states are more likely to make jingoistic appeals, and coalitions of political, business, and/or military leaders are likely to form and to ?logroll? for military buildups and other destabilizing policies. This proposition has great significance for East Asia, which faces two potential political transitions: the democratization of China, and Korean unification. This paper tests a theory of democratization and conflict in the cases of three previous East Asian political transitions: Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. I test not only for the occurrence of conflict, but also for the presence of the predicted mechanisms through which conflict occurs (nationalistic appeals and logrolling). I find that although there is some evidence of nationalistic posturing that is consistent with the theory?s predictions, for the most part, evidence from these cases does not support the theory. Leaders did not make jingoistic appeals; they were more likely to preach stability. Furthermore, I find that the public, the military, and the business community do have substantial influence over policy makers, but do not find that these groups advocated military buildups or offensive military strategies. This study casts doubt on the relevance of the ?democratization and war? thesis for future East Asian political transitions; it finds support for theories in the liberal school of international relations, including the beneficial effects of democratization, policies of engagement, and economic integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How and why do Korea and Japan, two prototypal developmental states, differ in responding to the challenges of informatization? By using the case of two countries’ IT venture nurturing policies, this paper argues that (1) variations in venture-nurturing policy between Japan and Korea stem from those in the preexisting developmental institutions and strategies that each pursued in their industrialization processes, and that (2) variations are also affected by the way in which historically evolved structures limit the options of political actors (decision-makers) at critical choice points or the points of disjuncture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I examine the Japanese financial policy between 1990 and 1998 to address the following two questions. The first question is on why the Japanese government was delayed in developing institutions to secure stability in the financial system after the Japanese financial system has begun to be unstable following the collapse of the bubble economy in early 1990s. The second question is on why it was delayed in dissolving financial institutions that were virtually bankrupt. To address these questions, I focus on preferences of the relevant actors in formulating financial policy, namely, the politicians of the ruling parties, the leaders of the ruling parties, and the Ministry of Finance. The government was delayed in developing such institutions to secure financial system as the ruling parties politicians tried to free ride other politicians’ efforts and as the leaders of the ruling parties, in particular, the LDP, and the Ministry of Finance were reluctant to admit past policy failures. Likewise, the government was delayed in dissolving virtually bankrupt financial institutions mainly because the leaders of the ruling parties, in particular, the LDP, and the Ministry of Finance were reluctant to admit past policy failures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The bubble economy of the late 1980’s is generally thought to be a main cause of the stagnation of Japanese economy in the 1990’s. Many economists, political scientists, and journalists insist that the Bank of Japan’s extremely low level of independence was the main reason behind the inflation of the bubble economy. Their explanation goes as follows. The US administration demanded that the Japanese government expand domestic demand to reduce its huge current account surplus with the US. However, the Ministry of Finance resisted increases in fiscal expenditures, instead prioritizing fiscal reconstruction. So, the Ministry demanded that the Bank of Japan loosen monetary policy. The Bank of Japan complied, unable to reject the Finance Ministry’s demand due to its lack of independence from the Ministry. In February 1987, the Bank of Japan lowered the official discount rate to 2.5 0x1.e115d00000001p-895nd kept it at that level until May 1989. This excessively loose monetary policy drastically increased financial liquidity, stimulating a rapid increase in the price of land and stocks. I argue, however, that the independence of Japan’s central bank was much higher than such explanations suggest. Central bank independence is generally judged by reference to the legal provisions concerning the relationship between the government and the central bank. But, I argue that this method of assessment of independence is sometimes misleading. I argue that the Bank of Japan was able to decide monetary policy by itself to some extent against the pressures from the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance. In fact, the Bank of Japan tightened monetary policy in an earlier period, against Ministry of Finance wishes, and in doing so succeeded in controlling inflation after the second oil shock. Why then did the Bank of Japan loosen monetary policy from January 1986 to February 1987 and keep an easy money policy in place until May 1989? I argue that there were three reasons. First, the Bank of Japan worried excessively about a possible recession caused by the appreciation of the yen. Second, the central bank was concerned about a sudden depreciation of the dollar. Because it was thought that one of the causes of Black Monday was the raising of the short-term interest rate by West Germany, the central bank could not help but to adopt a prudent stance toward raising the interest rate. Third, and most critically, I argue that there were no signs of an increase in inflationary pressures. To be sure, the value of assets continued to rise extraordinarily. But, it was common knowledge that central banks should not use monetary policy to deal with asset price inflation. Therefore, the Bank of Japan had no positive reasons to tighten monetary policy. The paper traces the process through which monetary policy was formulated and demonstrates that the Bank of Japan was independent from the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance to an extent that was important and that it ultimately decided to loosen monetary policy on its own volition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An important ingredient in democratic politics is the realization of political disagreement through patterns of social communication and political discussion. If people fail to encounter contrary viewpoints, their own political views are never challenged, they are never forced to reconsider initially held preferences or opinions, and they are effectively excluded from democratic deliberation. This paper examines patterns of agreement and disagreement within the political communication networks of citizens in Germany, Japan, and the United States. Several questions are addressed. Are there cross-national differences in the patterns of agreement and disagreement that occur among citizens? To what extent are these patterns subject to individual characteristics, opinions, and attitudes? Are they dependent on the structure of citizens’ communication networks? Finally, to what extent are patterns of political agreement and disagreement affected by the levels of aggregate support for a citizen’s political preferences and opinions? The empirical analysis is based on cooperative election surveys conducted in each of the countries during the early 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is the military and economic rise of China a threat to powers such as Japan and the United States? This paper examines this question using the theoretical predictions of realist theories (classical realism, neo-realism, and power transition theory), liberal theories (classical liberalism and neo-liberalism), and constructivist theory. While the qualitative analysis of Chinese, American, and Japanese behavior indicates some support for each theory, classical liberalism and constructivism are most strongly supported by the data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Declining voter turnout remains to be an -unresolved dilemma’ of democracy (Lijphart 1997), and Japan is not an exception. During the 1990s, voter turnout in Japanese national and subnational elections dramatically dropped by about ten percent points. Japanese journalists and commentators often claim that this sharp turnout decline is a result of Japanese voters losing their interests and faith in politics. This paper examines this claim using -cross-type’ aggregate data: merged municipality-level electoral data from Japan’s Lower House and prefectural assembly elections. Voters’ psychological constructs cannot be observed using aggregate data, but I argue that with the cross-type electoral data, voter turnout in a different type of election can be used as a proxy variable for some unobservable factors and some variables specific to the different type of election as a valid set of instrumental variables. The two-stage least square estimates suggest that some unobservable changes, most likely psychological changes, indeed affected the turnout decline at the lower-level prefecture elections, but the turnout decline in the most salient Lower House elections is more a function of changes in incentive structures associated with the 1994 electoral reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do developed countries have such different financial systems? Some nations, such as Germany, France and Japan rely extensively upon bank lending for mobilizing new capital, while others, such as the US and UK, rely heavily on capital markets?why? At the beginning of the 20th century, however, Japan and France relied far more heavily on their capital markets?why did they change? Answering these questions has implications for understanding globalization’s varying effects on national economies, corporate governance, the nature of technological innovation, and for illustrating linkages among law, politics, and macroeconomics. Existing arguments focusing on legal systems and electoral systems fail to adequately answer this puzzle. I argue that the structure of a country’s financial system depends on the political power of farmers and labor relative to that of large firms, where farmers and labor prefer banks, while big firms prefer capital markets. I test the argument with data for 14 OECD countries from 1976 -1990. I also present evidence spanning the twentieth century for France and Japan. Check author’s web site for an updated version of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Earlier studies on issue voting in Europe and North America have found that the relative performance of two competing models, the proximity model and the directional model, depends on the different methodologies used, the nature of the party systems, the issue being examined, incumbent-challenger distinctions, and voter sophistication. The purpose of this paper is to test these two models in the Japanese electoral context. Empirical tests, using the survey data from Japan?fs 1995 Upper House election, demonstrates that the proximity model best explains the behavior of centrist parties, and the directional model best explains the behavior of extreme parties. I also show the advantages of the directional model for predicting vote choice when voters have particular issues that they care about intensely. Finally, I suggest the possibility that the number of issue-dimensions may be of crucial importance when evaluating the performance of the models.?@ [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how electoral systems affect the likelihood of women winning seats in the Japanese national legislature, the Diet, by comparing the proportion of women in Japan’s two legislative chambers as a function of the electoral rules they faced. Since 1947, there have been four different methods for electing members to the upper house and three in the lower house. These variations in the electoral rules, which occur between and within chambers, provide a series of "natural tests." The low level of women in the Diet is often attributed to the status of women in Japanese society, but culture alone cannot explain the observable variations in the levels of female representatives in the Diet. Women in Japan closed the gender gap in voter turnout, so what explains the persistence of the gender gap in representation? The evidence from Japan suggests an institutional effect because the variations in electoral systems correspond with the expected variation in the proportion of women elected to the Diet. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to examine the current state of Japanese Public Administration and its adaptation to New Public Managemnt. JPA is in transition yet still showing the strong ability of the Japanese bureaucracy to preserve itself. However, is JPA really converging with the standards of administrative management in North America and Western Europe for the foreseeable future? In my opinion, yes, it is. Nonetheless, the substantial progress is painfully slow in spite of the current movement of bureaucrat-led reform. The gradual emergence of popular public pressures that thoroughly permeate the state administration will hold politicians responsive to the need of citizens, and in turn for their electoral success, politicians will hold bureaucrats accountable for citizens. The accountability of JPA will provide Japanese civil society with a strong foundation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Utilizing Baumgartner and Jones (1993) theory of punctuated equilibrium, we examine several terrorist attacks that occurred in the U.S. and Japan during the past decade: the World Trade Center Bombing of 1993; the Sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995; the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995; and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The analysis demonstrates that earlier incidents failed to mobilize sufficient public interest to bring about major change. Only in the aftermath of September 11, was sufficient public attention focused on homeland security to bring about significant change. We also examine the institutional evolution of homeland defense in the U.S. and the creation and missions of the Office of Homeland Security and proposed Department of Homeland Security. The paper concludes with a critical assessment as to whether the new organizations have been given the necessary tools to adequately confront the threat posed by terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are the two houses in a bicameral legislature really different? I probe this question in two ways, using the database of all government bills in postwar Japan. First, do the two houses coincide? Yes. Why? Different committees, different chairs, and different majorities cause different deliberation of bills in both houses, though fewer bills have any of these three conditions. Second, which house is more active and why is it? Those bills submitted to the House of Representatives are more active than others because they are more important and more opposition parties are against them. The house to deliberate first is more active than the other because it has ample time for consideration. Check author’s web site for an updated version of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some international negotiations bring major policy changes while others end in deadlock? This paper explains how the institutional context of international negotiations influences their outcomes. I argue that issue linkage counteracts domestic obstacles to liberalization by broadening the negotiation stakes. Institutions bolster the credibility of the linkage to make it more effective. I test the argument in the sensitive area of agricultural trade policy, where it has been difficult to achieve liberalization compared to other sectors. Statistical analysis of U.S. negotiations with Japan and the EU from 1970 to 1999 indicates that an institutionalized linkage between agricultural and industrial issues increases agricultural liberalization in both Japan and Europe. Through case studies of several key negotiations, I first explain why countries choose to link issues. Then, I show how the linkage changes interest group mobilization and shifts the policy process to encourage liberalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explains the three major traits of Japan?fs social safety net for the unemployed: (1) the low level of generosity in unemployment benefits, (2) the extensive use of employment maintenance programs, and (3) the reform pattern of retrenchment, rationalization, and activation. I argue that the risk of unemployment can be addressed either by cost externalization or risk sharing. In Japan, risk sharing took root partly because the kind of social safety net necessary for cost externalization was not available when the problem of labor redundancy became acute after the oil crises and partly because the widespread practice of mandatory corporate retirement at an relatively early age alleviated firms?f need for governmental early retirement programs. The mechanism of risk sharing became institutionalized through the establishment of the Employment Stability Fund, which shaped preferences of the government, unions and employers to converge on the extensive use of employment maintenance programs and lean unemployment benefits for many years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The human consequences of the 3.11 tsunami were not distributed equally across the municipalities of the Tohoku region of northeastern Japan. Instead, the mortality rate from the massive wave varied tremendously from zero to close to ten percent of the local residential population. What accounts for this variation remains a critical question for researchers and policy makers alike. This paper uses a new, sui generis data set including all villages, towns, and cities on the Pacific Ocean side of the Tohoku region to untangle the factors connected to mortality during the disaster. With data on demographic, geophysical, infrastructure, social capital, and political conditions for 133 municipalities, we find that tsunami height, stocks of social capital, and demographic conditions strongly influenced mortality rates. Given the high probability of future large scale catastrophes, these findings have important policy implications for disaster mitigation policies in Japan and abroad. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Japanese government recently proclaimed its aspiration to increase the percentages of female candidates for the national Diet assuming that having more female legislators can lead to better representation of women's needs and wants. The existing studies have shown that a feminist way is not the only way to represent women's needs and wants and called for more analyses of conservative women's claims for women. This paper examines how the ideology of female political representatives influence the ways in which they represent women by focusing on Japanese conservative female politicians. The Japanese conservative female politicians, while being anti-feminist, do speak as and speak for women's needs and wants. Their choices of which women and what needs and wants of these women to represent reflect the conservative ideological normative view of what Japanese women should be, their anti-feminism, and their own experiences as working women and working mothers. Given these findings, I suggest that having more female legislators might increase the visibility of women's concerns, needs, and wants in the national political arena while it can also create more debates regarding which women's which concerns deserve more political attention and which political measures should be provided for these women. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study compares the American and Canadian television coverage of the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan with that of the Chernobyl (Chornobyl) accident in Ukraine. These two disasters were the biggest accidents involving nuclear plants in the world. The first research question is whether political factors, such as Japan, in contrast to Ukraine, being an ally of the United States and Canada, affected the coverage of these accidents by American and Canadian television networks. The second question is whether the U.S.-Canada differences in the coverage of the Fukushima and Chernobyl disasters reflected differences in the American and Canadian political cultures. Previous studies generally have focused on the media coverage of a single nuclear accident, and they typically were limited to the media reporting in one country. This paper uses content analysis of television news reports concerning the Fukushima and Chernobyl disasters for more than one year since the beginning of the nuclear accident in Japan in March 2011. It analyzes more than 250 references, comparing the two disasters in news programs of the most popular TV networks in the U.S. (ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox) and Canada (CBC and CTV). Specific news reports are identified with the help of keyword searches of transcripts of the television programs in the LexisNexis database. The content analysis involves both a general comparison of the Fukushima and Chernobyl nuclear accidents and a comparison of specific aspects, such as causes of the accidents, radiation release, liquidation of disasters, and health consequences. The study shows the importance of political factors in the media coverage of the nuclear disasters. It offers support for the indexing model and finds significant differences in the coverage by ideological orientation in the U.S. and public versus private networks in Canada. Convergence in the coverage outweighs political culture differences between the U.S. and Canada. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]