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Changes in social policy in Singapore do to some degree reflect changing sociopolitical realities and popular attitudes. Probably just as significant to these changes, though, is Singapore?s concerted effort to craft itself as a transnational hub, center for international business, and ready home-away-from-home for the skilled, moneyed cosmopolitans who drive the contemporary global political economy. Social policy, then, may drive societal attitudes as much as it follows them, with economic considerations trumping cultural and political ones in the eyes of policymakers. Shifts in the de jure and de facto treatment of gays and lesbians provide a stark demonstration of these dynamics. This paper explores first, the extent of official and unofficial discrimination against gays and lesbians in Singapore and the significance of recent policy changes. Second, I examine the roots of change: what induces the Singapore government to adopt a more tolerant attitude toward gays and lesbians, despite potential backlash and previous statements about the inappropriateness of ?Western? moral codes for comparatively socially conservative Singapore? Finally, the paper considers how far the transnational environment and forces of economic globalization are likely to go in diminishing states? sovereignty in setting social policy ? and how conversely empowering this diminution may be to marginalized groups, who may find their appeals to transnational discourses, networks, and less culturally-relative identities increasingly validated as a result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the negotiations for trade liberalization in global and regional levels bogged down, Singapore swiftly engaged in planning for and forging a vast array of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), culminating in the creation of an FTA grounds well in East Asia and beyond. On the role played by Singapore, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, confidently stated that 'to say it is because of us may be too strong, but we set an example and we set people thinking. And I think that's also the reason why ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] itself is discussing FTAs. There is a demonstration effect' (cited in Straits Times, 1 December 2004). Singapore's interest in signing bilateral FTAs consecutively was partly born out of a fear of its survival as a nation that heavily relies on trade for its growth, and FTAs are expected to help Singapore overcome its innate inability to call effectively for diplomatic and economic changes in Southeast Asia to promote trade liberalization in the region and beyond. 　There are two layers of FTA movements in Southeast Asia: 1) bilateral FTAs between ASEAN members and extra regional countries, and 2) FTAs between ASEAN as a single unit and extra regional countries. This chapter initially focuses on the first layer of bilateral FTA diffusion by exploring the impetus behind Singapore's active engagement in FTA negotiations by examining three pressures (economic, security and legal), set out by Solis and Katada, to establish whether Singapore has contributed to the growth of FTAs involving both Southeast and Northeast Asian countries, and if so, how. The paper also examines the nature of trade policy-making system in Singapore to analyze the alleged little involvement of the business sector in trade policymaking as a common feature in Southeast Asia, demonstrating the predominant role of the state in the FTA making process. The chapter finally analyses another level of FTA proliferation as ASEAN has served as a hub in the ASEAN+1 FTA networks with five major powers. The origins of this approach can be traced back to China's FTA proposal to ASEAN in 2000, as a result of its concern to be isolated after the bilateral FTA initiative started by Japan and South Korea in 1998. Given the subsequent reaction taken by Japan, Korea and India, China's aggressive diplomacy in Southeast Asia including the FTA proposal can be seen as an independent variable against FTA diffusion in this layer, and, symbolically, the ASEAN+1 FTA movement has been a site for the competitions where two types of FTAs - China-led traditional FTA with gradual implementation and Japan-led new-age FTA with single undertaking approach - have prevailed, creating further complicated situations for multilateral companies' possible use of the FTAs. This paper argues that the impact of bilateral FTAs on Southeast Asia is limited, as only Singapore and Thailand have virtually signed multiple bilateral FTAs and, moreover, those FTA and ASEAN's integration schemes such as ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) are not well utilized by ASEAN's and multinational companies either, representing the perception gap between keener FTA creator in the governments and indifferent users in the business sectors. FTA diffusion certainly occurred in Southeast Asia, but it is Japan-centered as most of ASEAN members chose it as their first and, in some cases, only bilateral FTA partner, and thus the concern about trade diversion effect as a valid explanatory variable is mainly attributed to Japan's larger economic presence as the largest trading partner and investment source to those countries... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often contended that the expansion of freedom of expression and the decline of censorship and control over society is associated with the general political development in favor of liberalization and democracy. When Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) were introduced to East Asian countries in the early 1990s, there was hope, or even hype that claimed ICTs would help carve out a public space free from the intervention and censorship of one-party governments' where local authorities for decades had usually kept gate and set the agenda for socio-political discourses in the fundamental interests of national security and economic prosperity. China and Singapore are classic examples of this. Typically , one-party states rein in horizontal flow of information among the public and keeps a tight control of social and political expressions out of fear that the seemingly unfettered Internet may foster the expansion of freedom of speech and perceived liberty , and in turn result in the undesired socio- and political instability that the ruling Chinese Communist Party and Singapore's People's Action Party have long strived to fight against.While one-party states like China and Singapore embrace ICTs for boosting economic growth, they tend to contain this new medium for mostly political concerns. This paper will address this issue in the contexts of these two countries. The paper is written in the hope that it will eventually contribute to an important basis for further comparative research on ICT-driven political developments against the backdrop of other like -minded one-party states in Asia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some developing states develop 'good' institutions and some do not? One school of thought focuses on colonial legacies, arguing that the institutions established under colonialism have long lasting implications for countries after independence. Another approach emphasizes sectoral endowments and argues that countries with similar export structures will have similar institutions. This paper uses the cases of Singapore, Mauritius, and Jamaica to challenge both of these views as incomplete. All three were small, island economies with what seemed to be similar British institutions at independence. Before independence, Mauritius and Jamaica were both plantation sugar exporters. After independence, Mauritius and Singapore were both exporters of manufactured goods. Yet the quality of their institutions has diverged sharply over the decades. The paper explains the origins of 'good' institutions in the post-colonial period as a function of coalition-building by political and economic elites. Three factors explain much of the variance of the post-colonial coalitions: (1) social structure; (2) the 'earned' or 'unearned' nature of rents and revenues; and (3) transnational networks. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the role of Confucianism in Singapore, South Korea, People's Republic of China and Taiwan. It explores the widespread attachment to Confucian values in each of the countries and examines the ideology played in the four societies. It highlights the difference in democratization where Singapore and China are authoritarian regimes, while South Korea and Taiwan have made transition to democracy with authoritarian past.

The article examines the management of uncertainties of first order innovation in Asia, particularly in science-based industries such as biotechnology. In an effort to industrially upgrade into new technology sectors, the relatively advanced industrial states of Korea, Taiwan and Singapore initiated a transformative shift from imitative technology development towards aspirations in first-order innovation. The article specifically looks inside the state and examines specifically the ways in which stakeholders there have allocated public resources.

The article explores the impact of democratic governments on the formation and implementation of information technology (IT) policy. It provides an overview of technology-related discussion, legislation and other forms of policy expression in Brazil, Estonia, Singapore and the U.S. It discusses the role of legislatures in shaping IT policy. It describes executive leadership as a factor in the formation and implementation of IT policy.

The article analyzes the success of Singapore's authoritarian rule and state transformation. The capacity of the country's People's Action Party (PAP) to continually reproduce an authoritarian regime stands in sharp contrast with the situation in Taiwan and South Korea. Yet there is nothing exceptional to this case because the country's political institutions, as elsewhere, are the product of dynamic social and political interests, conflicts and coalitions.