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Throughout history, control over the movement of citizens has been a central source of autocratic power. Yet modern autocracies vary considerably in how much they limit the freedom to emigrate. Although mass exit can threaten autocratic leaders, emigration can also stabilize regimes by expelling dissidents and encouraging remittances. We disentangle these effects by analyzing the interaction between migration flows, democratic change, and regimes' strategic choices of emigration policy, something that has been neglected in the literature. Despite globalization, we show that emigration freedom has been steadily declining in autocracies since 1980. Using a half-century of bilateral migration data, we calculate the level and targets of expected emigration given exogenous geographic and socioeconomic characteristics. We find that when citizens are more likely to emigrate to democracies, autocracies lower emigration freedom in response. Nevertheless, these countries remain more likely to democratize. Surprisingly, total expected emigration, which tracks the feasibility of exit, predicts autocratic stability and greater emigration freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the strongest claims of the resource curse argument is that oil wealth underwrites a "rentier bargain," a combination of low taxes and high welfare benefits that buys off would-be political opponents and leads to increased authoritarian durability. Yet two assumptions underlying this tacit wealth-for-silence agreement--that economic satisfaction increases with the amount of state-distributed benefits, and that inequalities in this distribution are not politically relevant--remain theoretically and empirically underspecified. Using original survey data from Qatar, the most affluent rentier economy in the world, we demonstrate that perceptions of inequality in status--measured by perceived purchasing power, relative access to benefits, and expectations of socioeconomic mobility--have significant negative effects on individual-level satisfaction with welfare benefits. We conclude that positional status is as important as material wealth in the successful functioning of the rentier bargain, suggesting an increased vulnerability to disruption than pure wealth-based models would indicate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Politicians and pundits are quick to say that the 'Arab Spring' has been caused by everything from an ominous 'youth bulge' in the region's population to the spread of social media like Facebook and Twitter. Other observers blame the recent unrest on high levels of unemployment or on the government corruption endemic to the region. While there is a certain logic or intuitive sense to any or all of these explanations, they have yet to be rigorously tested. Moreover, we do not know if these same factors explain intra-regional variation in levels of unrest, or if, instead, factors specific to each particular country have caused some regimes to succumb to the violence while others have emerged unscathed. This paper tests the conventional wisdom of the Arab Spring. We start by identifying a number of 'likely suspects' for the region's unrest, oft-discussed potential factors such as economic hardship, income inequality, population pressure, government corruption, and the use of social media. We find that, while some of these factors (such as government corruption and inequality) sometimes correlate with higher levels of unrest, none of them does so consistently. Moreover, despite being touted as the "Twitter Revolution", the intensity of Arab Spring does not seem to correlate with higher levels of internet connectivity or the use of social media. While things like inflation, unemployment, social media, and the relative youth of a population may contribute to a general propensity for instability in the region as a whole, they don't reliably explain the level of unrest in any given country. These findings, such as they are, invite political observers and social scientists to search for other, case-specific causes of civil unrest and regime instability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the human rights and economic rights that overlooked by the U.S. government. It states that the government spend billion of dollars in 2000 to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).It further discusses the human rights models that explain the trajectories of economic and social rights campaigns.

A unique dataset is used to separately analyze the social origins of left-wing and nationalist-separatist terrorism in 17 Western European countries between 1970 and 2007. We argue that the differences in the historic roots, ultimate goals as well as their negotiability, levels of domestic and international support, and politico-military strategies of these types of ideologically or ethnically motivated terrorism make it plausible that they respond differently to specific social conditions and changes. We show that there are indeed factors that matter either to left-wing (e.g., the Cold War, leftist party strength) or nationalist-separatist terrorism (e.g., ethnic polarization, non-violent protest). However, both types of terrorism are robustly associated with larger populations and higher unemployment rates. This suggests that both may be ameliorated through social progress, even though ethnic terrorism seems to respond more strongly to socio-economic and political incentives (e.g., economic progress, political participation). Finally, we show that a 'pooling' of terrorism data-which disregards motivational bonds, but is nevertheless common in empirical analyses-may mask the role of otherwise relevant terrorism correlates in distinct types of terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we explore the electoral effects of conditional cash transfer (CCT) and other social programs in the context of economic crisis, using data from the 2010 round of the Americas Barometer. A debate has arisen over social assistance and presidential electoral outcomes, particularly in Mexico and Brazil. Using a pooled cross-national analysis, we show that the electoral impact of social assistance is conditional on economic evaluations more generally. While social assistance matters for all citizens, it is especially important in the context of economic crisis, attenuating the negative effect of perceptions of economic crisis on the vote for the incumbent. We argue that social assistance and economic crisis perceptions have both direct and indirect impacts on individual presidential vote choice, because they are partially mediated by perceptions of government performance. These results confirm that social assistance significantly alters the economic calculations of voters and is an important component of economic voting, particularly in countries that employ such counter-cyclical policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Technology is central to several major debates within political science. However, political scientists still do not have a general theory of how, and under what conditions, technological change drives domestic and international politics. Instead, current research tends to take a piecemeal approach, focusing on individual technologies or particular periods of technological crisis, development, or modernization. In general theoretical discussions, technology has been relegated to that long list of "and also" independent variables regularly used to flesh out causal explanations of political outcomes. But if we are to understand the political consequences of, and the political obstacles to, technological change, then scholars need a more comprehensive framework. We need to move technological change to the center of political analysis and theorizing. This paper lays the foundation for such a framework by explaining how technology generates international political conflicts, and by identifying the conditions under which these technological politics will become more or less severe. Specifically, this paper will show that technological change is most likely to generate significant political conflicts in three specific circumstances: when it creates, alters, or eliminates 1) market failures; 2) political or economic redistribution; or 3) social constructions of value. This paper will further argue that international technological politics will be most severe when the costs (benefits) of technological change are concentrated on well-defined interest groups whose specific assets are threatened with a loss of relative value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the tremendous destruction wrought by catastrophes, social science holds few quantitative assessments of explanations for the rate of recovery. This article illuminates four factors - damage, population density, human capital, and economic capital - thought to explain the variation in the pace of population recovery following disaster along with the popular but relatively untested factor of social capital. Using time-series cross-sectional models and propensity score matching, I test these approaches using new data from the rebuilding of 39 neighborhoods in Tokyo after its 1923 earthquake. Social capital, more than earthquake damage, population density, human capital, or economic capital, best predicts population recovery in post-quake Tokyo. These findings suggest new approaches for research on social capital and disasters along with public policy avenues for handling catastrophe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution offers a comprehensive empirical analysis of the effects of education on terrorism for 118 countries for the period 1984 to 2007. We find that education and terrorism are not directly linked, so that education neither fosters nor retards terrorism on its own. Rather, our results suggest that education may fuel terrorist activity in the presence of poor political and socio-economic conditions, whereas better education in combination with favorable conditions decreases terrorism. Thus, the precise effect of education on terrorism depends on country-specific conditions. A successful anti-terrorism strategy should therefore focus on a country's political and socio-economic development, in addition to educational attainment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Civil wars are the most common form of warfare in the world, yet the question of their causes remains not only under-researched, but in a state of confusion. The authors of the "greed-grievance" dichotomy have since written that this dichotomy should be abandoned, joining a long list of scholars calling for a theory which specifies the interaction of economic and social-psychological factors. This paper offers such a theory, but also delineates two questions in the causes of civil war onset, distinguishing the social-structural question of what creates the potential for war along a particular identity fault line from the temporal question of why war breaks out at a particular point in time. The former is addressed by applying the sociological concept of overlapping vs. cross-cutting cleavages to the relationship between identity divisions and economic and political divisions, with the potential for civil war arising from a situation of overlapping social cleavages. The temporal question focuses on the role of catalysts such as economic decline and regime change in escalating that potential in the buildup to civil war. Then, a third causal stage is discussed, focusing on whether the extent of violence meets definitional casualty thresholds to qualify as a civil war, as a function of government response to the outbreak of violence. Evidence is provided from four cases. Ivory Coast and Yugoslavia both represent clear examples of overlapping social cleavages, yet both were heralded for their stability and relative prosperity for decades before they were torn apart, thus demonstrating that overlapping cleavages are necessary but not sufficient without the temporal role of catalysts such as economic decline. Haiti illustrates a near-total lack of social cleavages, thus its abundance of negative catalysts has never resulted in a civil war, demonstrating that negative catalysts are not sufficient without an underlying social structure of overlapping social cleavages. The case of India's Hindu-Muslim cleavage illustrates the structure of cross-cutting cleavages and its ability to mitigate conflict which has been to the brink of civil war many times. Finally, the implications of this theory for further research and for policy are discussed. It is emphasized that existing measures of inequality tell us nothing about how inequality is distributed among identity groups, thus quantifying this process cannot be achieved through reduced measurement error, nor through an interaction term combining gini coefficients with measures of ethnic fractionalization. New measures will be required. Further, this theory supports criticism of power-sharing agreements, as such arrangements entrench the structure of overlapping social cleavages, giving permanence to the potential for civil war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Declining participation in conventional forms of politics has become a central theme for academics and policy-makers, and has often been viewed as marking a crisis in citizenship. It has been highlighted by falling voter turnout and the dramatic decline (and ageing) of political party memberships - trends which are particularly marked amongst younger citizens. Yet there is overwhelming evidence to show that young people are not politically apathetic. They have their own views and engage in democratic politics in a wide variety of ways appropriate to their own understandings of democracy and citizenship (developed within diverse political and socioeconomic contexts). A few previous studies have examined the changing nature of politics and citizenship for young people across countries and identified a number of common trends. The following paper compares and contrasts youth, citizenship and politics both within and between the United States, Britain and Germany. The first section explores young people's changing civic and political engagement. The paper then proceeds to investigate the evolving socio-economics contexts of young people's lives, and the impact they have on participation. The paper finally turns to the relationship between young citizens and the state, examining changing conceptions of citizenship. The core argument is that the newer forms of civic engagement practiced by young people are highly structured in favour of (highly-educated and well-off) 'expert citizens'; and, that young people as a group have been increasingly been marginalized from the process of electoral politics. However, the different experiences of younger cohorts in the United States, Britain and Germany, gives us a clearer idea of how these problems might be overcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite generations of research on local public goods and city power structures, there is little recent research that identifies super-local intra-city variations in public goods quality and the causes of this variation. Using geocoded data from New York City's 311-complaint program, this research examines whether the distribution of public goods conditions are socio-economically equitable and whether they can be tied to representation on the City Council. Census tractlevel panel time-series models with serial and spatial controls are estimated for 2004 to 2013. Results do not support the hypothesis of a socio-economic service underclass but do suggest a more political cause: neighborhoods that are represented by city council members who have served longer tend to improve in condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The political stability of neoliberal projects is usually seen as generated by factors external to the project itself. This article suggests that there are also internal features that assist that stability. Increased market discipline promoted by neoliberalism opens the way for potential political instability. Yet, neoliberalism provides the employed masses with one major tool to mitigate disciplinary effects and improve their wellbeing - education. Acquiring education functions as a promise according to which its possessor would advance socio-economically within the (labor-) market and gain a 'safety net' against falling back. Politically, promise acts to offset possible destabilizing effects of discipline. The article argues that problems in the realization of promise contributed to and shaped the eruption of protest in Chile and Israel in 2011. In Chile, realization problems were created by the operation of the higher education system. In Israel, problems developed at the passing point from higher education graduation to improvements in income. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do autocratic institutions matter for the welfare of average citizens? Despite the large literature comparing democracies and autocracies, we know little about how human development outcomes differ among autocratic types. Using an instrumental variables setup, this paper shows that the presence and history of multiparty autocratic elections predict significantly better outcomes on health, education, gender equality, and basic freedoms relative to non-electoral autocracy. In fact, the effects on health and education often exceed the effects of democracy. Even when they are manipulated, contested autocratic elections promote state accountability and capacity. In contrast, legislatures and parties without multiparty elections produce slightly negative outcomes, as these institutions chiefly concern elite cooptation. The results have major implications for the study of autocracy, the political economy of development, and the welfare effects of international election promotion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our aim in this essay is to offer a provisional critique of the current trajectory of work on the 'deliberative system' and to propose a more cogent approach to thinking through the relationship between deliberative practices and the broader social, political and economic systems focused on the cultivation of what we term a 'deliberative stance'. To this end, we engage primarily with two essays authored by Jane Mansbridge generally considered the cornerstone of the development of the deliberative system approach: the 1999 essay 'Everyday talk and the deliberative system' and the more recent 2012 piece 'A systemic approach to deliberative democracy', which can be reasonably seen as a manifesto for the deliberative system approach given its wide range of co-authors well-known within deliberative circles: James Bohman, Simone Chambers, Thomas Christiano, Archon Fung, John Parkinson, Dennis Thompson and Mark Warren. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that democratic institutions become more effective as conflict-reducing mechanisms in the presence of elements of socio-economic development. An empirical analysis confirms that there is a strong interactive effect between development and democracy. Low-income democracies are at least as conflict-prone as low-income non-democracies, but high-income democracies have the lowest risk of war. Increasing without democratization, on the other hand, does little to reduce risk of internal armed conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eastern enlargement has been celebrated as the success story of the "transformative power of Europe". Indeed, accession to the EU significantly reinforced the processes of democratic transition and socio-economic modernization in Central and Eastern Europe. So it had for Spain and Portugal 20 years before. At the same time, accession posed a formidable challenge to transition countries. Policy overload and tremendous implementation costs met with weak state capacities largely tied up in managing the political and economic transition process. This paper examines how Spain and Portugal have coped with the adoption of and adaptation to European environmental policy when they joined the EC in 1986. We explore to what extent the governments of the two Southern European accession countries sought to enlist the help of business and civil society in taking on the environmental acquis communautaire giving rise to the emergence of so called new modes of governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1936, while Sweden gave birth to one of the most peaceful solutions to class conflict (i.e. the Neo-Corporatist Welfare State) with the iconic signature of the Saltsjöbaden Accord, Spain gave birth to the most violent results: the Spanish Civil War. Why did the political, social and economic elites choose collaboration in Sweden and violent confrontation in Spain? Building on recent findings by economic historians, this paper shows the notable socio-economic similarities between the two countries before these events. Both had European-record levels of social conflict, both were also late industrialist economies enjoying remarkable growth rates as well as decreasing levels of economic inequalities. The paper underlines an overlooked factor: the public bureaucracy. In the key decades of state expansion (late 19th-early 20th century), the semi- authoritarian Sweden - where executive and administrative positions, firmly in hands of the Crown, were unaccountable to the parliament - created and consolidated a meritocratic autonomous bureaucracy which promoted impartiality and the rule of law. On the contrary, the instable and, on average, more democratic Spain - where executive and administrative positions were frequently accountable to parliamentary dynamics - built a patronage-based administration which allowed successive political incumbents to implement their most preferred policies above the rule of law. This made that in 1936, facing a leftist government extensively violating property rights, civil rights and the rule of law, the Spanish capitalist and middle-classes, until then the least supportive of fascism in Europe, actively supported Franco's military rebellion, which ended up becoming one of the longest fascist regimes in the history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The end of the U.S. military draft in 1973 re-established the all-volunteer Armed Forces. Some have argued that this change caused a shift in the racial/ethnic and economic composition of the USAF. Much of this work has focused on the motivation of an all-volunteer force and whether military service is viewed more as a job or one's patriotic duty (Moskos 1977). Scholars have paid little attention to the methods by which the military targets and recruits potential enlistees. The conventional wisdom is that the military has created a "poverty draft" (Mariscal 2007) by targeting low-income African-Americans and Latinos/as. While a great deal of anecdotal evidence exists documenting this phenomena, little empirical analysis has been undertaken to address the reality of the "poverty draft." We attempt to identify military recruitment strategies in the Rio Grande Valley in Deep South Texas by questioning current high school juniors and seniors regarding their experiences with military recruiters. We intend to assess whether military recruiters are more active in recruiting students from economically disadvantaged backgrounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While political science research on immigration attitudes among the American public has traditionally focused on such factors as economic threat, social context, socioeconomic status, and racial prejudice, relatively few studies have examined the psychological determinants of immigration- and immigrant-related policy preferences. Furthermore, the role of nativism, the attitude that a distinctly American way of life needs to be protected against foreigners and foreign influence, is largely understudied in this context. Thus, this paper examines a novel psychological method of measuring nativism and its relationship to immigration policy attitudes. A computer-administered "implicit association test" (IAT) procedure (Greenwald, et al., 1998; Greenwald, et al. 2002; Greenwald and Banaji 2005) is used to measure automatic preferences for American culture verses Latino-American culture among approximately 800 undergraduate and graduate students at the University of Iowa. These automatic nativist preference measures are then compared to explicit nativism measures and incorporated into a multivariate model to predict immigration policy attitudes. Finally, this paper also discusses the implications of these findings for the "social desirability" problem in measuring racial attitudes and also for the symbolic racism theory of racial policy preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The world has adopted democratization as the prescription for peace in intrastate conflicts, but democratization often leads to more war instead. One reason might be difficulty in developing a politically engaged constituency for peace that is ready to guide and pressure political leaders towards a consolidated peace. In less democratic and less developed societies, peace-oriented civil society may take considerable time to develop the capacity for political influence. How does political engagement for peace develop in democratizing societies? Is its speed or nature affected by the level of democratization? Supposing political engagement in private is less risky than in public, is it more likely to begin in private in less democratic societies? And do peace groups use private political engagement as a stepping stone to public political engagement, or does public political engagement require a different set of peace groups to develop? How do political opportunity structure, societal and organizational resources, and organizational legitimacy and ideology affect private and public political engagement in democratizing societies? This paper uses original longitudinal data on the private and public political engagement of peacebuilding NGOs in Bosnia and Northern Ireland before and after the peace agreements. It finds strong differences in the prevalence and timing of private and public political engagement that are explainable by the societal differences in political culture and civil society development. It also finds that, contrary to earlier study, peacebuilding NGOs commonly do combine private and public political engagement. Furthermore, these cases suggest that political engagement tends to happen in private first when the conflict is still violent, if civil society is sufficiently developed to be politically engaged at all before there is a peace agreement. While it is difficult to separate the effects of contextual variables, development seems to be generally very important, while democratization may be more important for public PE in less democratic societies. There is also reason to believe that elections and which party is in power have little effect on political engagement by peacebuilding NGOs if they perceive little difference among the significant parties. Synergetic improvement in many contextual variables at once (particularly societal democracy, socioeconomic development, violence and official peace negotiations) might matter more than any one variable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within the health literature it is a well accepted proposition that, paradoxically, the two biggest threats to overall population health are poverty AND affluence. Each of these socio-economic extremes is associated with a well-defined list of health risks and diseases. Given this, population health researchers and advocates ought to be playing a greater role in the climate change debate than they have up to the present. There has been a deep hesitancy by political leaders to deal with climate change. This hesitancy is rooted, at least in part, in a belief that tackling the issue will require governments to impose a reduction in living standards on their electorates. This concern can only have been magnified even further given the present fragile state of the global economy. This paper argues that the climate change debate can be beneficially re-framed by taking population health impacts into account when we discuss changing living standards. A well-structured package of climate change policies has the potential to combat some of the most prevalent diseases of poverty and affluence that impact the developed industrial democracies. However, if poorly structured, a country's climate change policies might inadvertently increase illnesses associated with poverty, while having little or no impact on illnesses associated with affluence. Evidence to support this latter point is drawn from published research on policies to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the health impacts of transportation in the developed industrial democracies. The paper shows that climate change represents something of a cross-roads for population health researchers and advocates. It undoubtedly presents serious challenges. However, it also offers members of the population health community an opportunity to see their concerns addressed as part of the central debates of society rather than as a marginal issue. Further research is required to ascertain why the population health community has been slow to take up this challenge and explore why the research they do produce has failed to have a greater impact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use original survey data and administrative data from post-war Liberia to test a theory of the micro-level impacts of peacekeeping. The theory proposes that through the creation of local security bubbles and also through direct assistance, peacekeeping deployments contribute to economic and social revitalization that may contribute to more durable peace. This theory guides the design of current United Nations peacekeeping operations, and has been proposed as one of the explanations for peacekeeping's well-documented association with more durable peace. We identify local impacts of deployment bases by exploiting the fact that peacekeepers had limited information when selecting base localities, using coarsened exact matching to identify sets of communities that should have been equally likely to receive bases, and then using regression to clean up residual imbalances. Our evidence paint a complex picture that deviates substantially from the theory. We do not find evidence for local security bubbles around deployment base areas, and we do not find that deployments were substantial contributors to local social infrastructure. In addition, we find a negative relationship between deployment basing locations and NGO contributions to social infrastructure. Nonetheless, we find that deployments do seem to stimulate local markets, leading to better employment possibilities and substantially higher incomes. The result is something of a puzzle, suggesting that more work needs to be done on other types of direct assistance by peacekeeping contingents-e.g. the impact of mission procurement and routine spending by those associated with the mission. Also, the findings with respect to NGO activities suggest that this is an important factor that past case studies and cross-national studies have not taken into account sufficiently. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our paper is motivated by the rationalism / constructivism contrast in the International Relations (IR) field. By reinterpreting this contrast we seek to redirect reflection about theoretical synthesis in the field. Our argument has four steps. First, we introduce a broader intellectual setting for the rationalism / constructivism contrast by situating it as a contemporary iteration of the economic / sociological contrast classically articulated throughout the history of the modern social sciences. Second, we pragmatically give concrete content to each side of this contrast in relation to recent IR. Engagement with Weber and Parsons helps us to subdivide the economic side into parametric vs. strategic variants, and the sociological in terms of traditional vs. value-rational action. Third, we argue that synthesis of economic and sociological approaches is both viable and desirable in concrete studies of strategic interaction. Fourth, to conclude, we compare our argument to recent efforts to promote analytic eclecticism in political science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the economic issues surrounding the Oeconomicus concerning on household and agriculture management, towards the social status of men. It explores the topics concerning on the modern economic discipline and the concepts of economic growth. It reviews the issues for the economics to be an autonomous subject as seemingly paradoxical role of economic development. It also highlights the developments of political economy.

This paper considers the effects of institutional variations in religion-state arrangements by reflecting on their relationship to national averages of religiosity. Drawing on an analytical narrative of the modern history of religiosity in Italy and France, I argue that states which promote a predominant, society-wide religion as a public good during moments of economic growth help that religion mediate the downward effects which modernization and religious monopoly are expected to have on national rates of religious participation. In other words, certain types of state subsidies to an official religion can have a positive impact on rates of religiosity. While the paper does not call into question the theoretical usefulness of either secularization or religious market explanations of religiosity, it argues that variations in religionstate arrangements offer an important conditioning element to either theory. In particular, these variations can help demystify what seem to be the abnormally high religious rates associated with the "Catholic effect," which both secularization and religious market theories have had difficulty affronting [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the role of domestic legitimacy between two states as a major factors for the evolution of rivalry in the international system. It discusses time series analysis of India-Pakistan rivalry which investigates link between legitimacy and interstate conflict, international conflicts for domestic legitimacy concerns and impact of legitimacy on political, economic and social components of countries.

This paper examines why some party systems collapse, while similar systems confronting what seem to be equally insurmountable obstacles survive. I argue that when party systems neglect their central task of linking society and the state, they lose their reason for existence and fail. Parties may provide linkage through any combination of three major strategies: programmatic representation, group-based incorporation, and clientelism. But if the major parties in the system are unable to satisfy mounting or changing demands for linkage and therefore fail to capture voter support, the party system collapses. When new demands challenge the core representational profile of a party system and the system's context undermines appropriate adaptation, linkage deteriorates and the party system fails. Using Boolean algebra and comparative historical analysis of eight cases of party system collapse and survival in Latin America, Europe and Asia, I detail how linkage disintegrates, account for party system failure in some contexts, and explain how other threatened systems have endured. I find that programmatic representation deteriorates when economic crisis occurs in a context of international policy constraints and inter-party agreements, that group-based incorporation decays when the structure or type of politically salient social cleavages transform and threaten powerful, entrenched interests, and that clientelism suffers when political reforms increase demand at the same time that parties face economic crisis and reforms cut that them off from benefits to distribute. When all types of linkage deteriorate, the entire system collapses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The timing and magnitude of economic openness exhibit considerable variation across authoritarian regimes and lead to vastly different political outcomes. Some autocracies liberalized their economy in early post-war period while others started to open their doors just in the last decade. Some were eventually transformed into democracy following economic liberalization while others remain autocratic until now. To explain the variation, this paper develops a set of infinite time horizon stochastic models to study the dynamic interaction between economic liberalization, transaction cost, political instability and social unrest. It shows formally that political instability does not necessarily impede economic liberalization and growth. The timing and magnitude of liberalization are determined by the stage of economic development and the timing of political instability. High frequency of intermediately high political instability may force the autocratic elite to liberalize the economy in order to maintain his rule. Paradoxically, the elite in an autocracy with low frequency of high political instability may fail to liberalize the economy and eventually be overthrown by the citizens. Meanwhile, although economic liberalization may be initialized by economic development, it is accelerated by the political instability under certain conditions. The logic of the causal mechanism developed in the formal model is tested on a number of case histories, including the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, China, Singapore and Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many Latin American countries the military remains an influential economic actor despite the shift to democratic regimes and market-based economies. Yet while critics have targeted the region's military entrepreneurs - the military owners, managers or stakeholders of economic enterprises - as a challenge for the development of liberal democracies, they have not paid sufficient attention to distinguishing different types of military entrepreneurship that reflect distinct historical patterns and political implications. This paper identifies three major types of military entrepreneurs in Latin America: industrializers determined to build national defense capabilities and compete for international prestige, nation-builders seeking to promote economic development that can foster social development and cohesion, and rentier capitalists pursuing financial gain for members of the military through investment ventures. Through short narrative histories, it reviews important differences among the three types in terms of their origins, paths and political consequences. The conclusion considers how we should assess these patterns to better understand the implications of military entrepreneurship.In many Latin American countries the military remains an influential economic actor despite the shift to democratic regimes and market-based economies. Yet while critics have targeted the region's military entrepreneurs - the military owners, managers or stakeholders of economic enterprises - as a challenge for the development of liberal democracies, they have not paid sufficient attention to distinguishing different types of military entrepreneurship that reflect distinct historical patterns and political implications. This paper identifies three major types of military entrepreneurs in Latin America: industrializers determined to build national defense capabilities and compete for international prestige, nation-builders seeking to promote economic development that can foster social development and cohesion, and rentier capitalists pursuing financial gain for members of the military through investment ventures. Through short narrative histories, it reviews important differences among the three types in terms of their origins, paths and political consequences. The conclusion considers how we should assess these patterns to better understand the implications of military entrepreneurship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Voting and other aspects of civic engagement have declined over the last half-century while economic inequality and residential economic segregation have increased. Possible relationships between these phenomena have received little scholarly attention. This paper examines how increasing economic inequality and residential segregation combined to reduce voter turnout among low-income American citizens. I find that increasing economic inequality and segregation since 1970 have led to a decline of voter participation in segregated, low-income neighborhoods while voter turnout remained high and in some cases increased, in segregated, affluent neighborhoods. This suggests that the commonly accepted notion that low-income citizens do not vote because of their individual economic status misses a significant point: low-income citizens increasingly found themselves living more exclusively with other low-income citizens, which means that individual disincentives for voting due to economic status were enhanced by an impoverished neighborhood context and social interactions with similarly disempowered citizens. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights raises several questions about the legitimacy of the judicial function. Judicial legitimacy, in the words of James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira, "means that people accept judicial decisions, even those they bitterly oppose, because they view courts as appropriate institutions for making such decisions." The traditional view has been that the enforcement of socio-economic rights are decisions inappropriate for courts to be making because they exceed the capacity of courts, compel governments to take actions not authorized by the people's representatives, and redistribute resources to pay for them. Whether courts can perform these tasks competently and give meaning to social welfare rights without undermining the principles of separation of powers and representative democracy will have consequences on the legitimacy of the judicial function. This paper examines how courts and quasi-judicial institutions, such as human rights commissions, at the international, regional, and national levels of governance have given meaning to the socio-economic rights that are entrenched in various treaties, charters, and constitutions for which they are responsible. My aim is twofold: 1) to compare the approaches to these rights employed by courts and other institutions at the international, regional, and national levels of governance, and 2) to contribute to the debate over the legitimacy of judicial action in this area of law. Special emphasis is devoted to the trend toward the increased reliance on "weak form judicial review" by courts and more forceful recommendations by regional human rights commissions to protect social welfare rights, what I call convergence toward hybrid approaches employing hard law and soft law measures. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inequalities in health and health care across subnational territories have received far less attention in Europe than have socioeconomic inequalities in health. Yet the (increasingly) regionalized nature of many European healthcare systems, and the increasing fiscal strains caused by rising health care expenditures, suggest that territorial inequalities may be worthy of more attention than they have previously been paid. This paper examines the size of territorial health inequalities across the countries of Western and Eastern Europe, and suggests a strategy for conceptualizing and measuring political debates about territorial inequalities. It concludes with an agenda for future research on the politics of territorial health inequalities in Europe and beyond. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

BOOK EXPLAINS SUPREME COURT'S VRA LAW AS RESULT OF 2 IDEAS:(1) JUDICIAL RATIONALISMBased on Hayek's idea of "constructivist rationalism," which Hayek used to critique the planned economy: that the political branches did not have the knowledge necessary to regulate social and economic life. What Hayek said about the political branches of government is equally true of the judicial branch. What distinguished Supreme Court jurisprudence through the last half of the twentieth century as much as anything was its assumption that it could rationally reconstruct American republicanism from the top down in accordance with a preconceived vision of "fairness"-began with reapportionment cases of 1960s.(2) POLITICS OF MULTICULTURALISMI define the politics of multiculturalism as a vision of America that considers race and ethnicity not merely as sources of identity and of mutual interest but as legally determinative categories that afford legitimate foundations for claims to representation and political rule.MADISONIAN v. MULTICULTURAL REPUBLICANISM. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aspirations for greater international solidarity must be grounded in transnational movements that have sufficient presence in particular states to compel these polities to adopt foreign economic and diplomatic policies that enhance global labor, environmental, and human rights conditions. Just as the moral horizons of democratic polities have expanded only through the struggles of formerly excluded social groups, so will the transition from national to regional to international solidarity occur more through political contestation than by means of abstract philosophical argument. First World citizens are more likely to support policies that will enhance global justice when motivated by enlightened self-interest than by altruism. Philosophical arguments can inform the ideology of movements for social justice; but it will be the particular politics of democratic polities that determine whether a more equitable world emerges. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the United States electorate has become noticeably more Republican in the late twentieth century, one subgroup that has obviously resisted this new partisan trend is African Americans. Why does macropartisanship for whites oscillate over time? Why does macropartisanship for blacks remain fairly stable? This paper will examine the potential causal forces of partisanship at the aggregate level for both whites and blacks from 1992 to 2007, using seemingly unrelated regression estimation. To test the hypotheses, I model the dynamics of the macropartisanship by race and ask how the political, social, and economic spheres influence the obvious differences for whites and blacks. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: While government support is often a function of its economic record, this is not always the case. We look at the forces that lead some citizens to focus on economic issues while other citizens are more interested in foreign policy, corruption, social policy, or some other issue. Data compiled from 32 countries participating in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project demonstrate that while the economy is generally viewed as important, the economy's place on the issue agenda varies across individuals and also electoral contexts. If the economy is not perceived as important, its effect on government approval is strongly mitigated. Our data suggest that the economy is more likely to dominate other issue concerns when the economy is in a recession, in countries with volatile economies, if the citizen in unemployed, or if the citizen is economically vulnerable. Governance crises related to corruption and human rights reduce attention to the economy, though we do not find clear evidence that terrorist attacks or participation in wars do the same. Thus variations in the economy's salience need to be further incorporated into studies of economic voting. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A great many scholars have explored the relationship noted by modernization theorists between socioeconomic development and the moment of democratization. But few have examined what we suggest is another testable hypothesis of modernization theory -- that socioeconomic development should be positively associated with what we call democratic development, or the changes in the level of democracy over time within a democratic polity. We test for the presence of such a relationship using a two-stage model that distinguishes between the processes of democratization and democratic development. In doing so, we link the hypothesis derived from modernization theory with more recent studies of democratic consolidation and deepening. While our study joins a long list of works that substantiate Lipset's claim of a positive association between socioeconomic development and democratization, we find only weak support for the effect of socioeconomic variables on democratic development. These results underscore the need for closer examination of specific causal mechanisms underlying democratic development and democratic transitions. They also strongly support the argument that democratization and democratic development should be treated as analytically distinct. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractFollowing insights from Höpner, we argue that the political economies of the advanced industrial countries may be usefully conceptualized as "coordinated" (or uncoordinated) across two analytically distinct dimensions: The first is economic cooperation by economic agents designed to overcome coordination and collective action problems. The second, what we call the solidarity dimension, is the degree of cooperation among economic agents and the state to protect and sustain wages and employment, and to promote an egalitarian distribution of market incomes. We seek to explain variations in solidarism generally, and to explain why solidarism has declined modestly in the typical coordinated market economy (CME) and significantly in some CME's specifically. We argue that politics and political institutions fundamentally matter. The size of the public sector, especially the relative magnitude of public sector employees as leaders of pro-solidaristic coalitions, should be important. High coordination, inclusive electoral institutions as well as social and Christian democratic party governments should also contribute to the maintenance of solidarism. In addition, institutional and partisan veto points should be negatively associated with solidaristic income and employment outcomes. To assess our arguments, we develop and estimate empirical models of 1980s-2000s temporal and cross-national variation in solidarism in 18 developed capitalist democracies. We also look at the determinants of irregular employment and the component parts of solidarism: coverage of risks to income; "good jobs;" and the distribution of economic product among working-age households. Our models also account for the causal roles of deindustrialization, globalization, and economic growth. We find strong support for a political interpretation of variations in solidarism: public sector employee-led coalitions, coordination, social democratic governments, and, with qualification, Christian democratic governments all promote or expand solidarism. Deindustrializaion (but not globalization) and institutional veto points negatively affect solidaristic income and employment outcomes. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Neighbourhood' is a long standing concept in public policy and one that re-emerged in the UK from 1997 under the New Labour administration. This paper builds on the work of Lowndes and Sullivan (2008) which identified four distinct rationales for neighbourhoodworking - civic, social, political and economic. The framework is tested through primary research in the city of Manchester, and in the context of significant shifts in UK urban policy since 2006. The research shows that different rationales are held by actors at different locations within the complex system of multi-level governance within which neighbourhood policy is made and implemented. National policy makers and neighbourhood based actors have been effectively allied around neighbourhood based working as a means of empowering citizens, particularly those in deprived neighbourhoods. Actors at the city level, however, have focused on a more diffuse concept of 'place', which aims to reflect wider market dynamics and facilitate 'entrepreneurial' urban strategies. Neighbourhood working is linked to service improvement and regarded primarily in instrumental terms. As central government policy moves away from 'top down' interventions in deprived neighbourhoods towards narratives around city-wide 'place shaping', rationales for a neighbourhood approach to regeneration are coming under further challenge. The paper concludes by suggesting that 'neighbourhood' may be best seen as an 'empty signifier' within urban policy, the meaning of which is contested among policy actors, and only temporarily fixed in specific temporal and spatial contexts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will draw upon the interdisciplinary study of complex organizations in fields such as organizational sociology and transaction cost economics to analyze existing practices for interorganizational coordination in post-conflict peacebuilding. The need for effective coordination in peacebuilding is indicated by the recent establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. However, little theoretically informed research has been conducted on the subject. Existing studies of coordination problems in complex humanitarian emergencies have derived recommendations for improved coordination inductively from previous experience. But this research has been largely atheoretical, and has for the most part neglected models in organization theory developed for similar problems in other settings. Organization theorists have developed a diverse set of theories analyzing coordination among organizations in terms of transaction costs, structural arrangements, and the development of common standards within shared networks. This paper will employ theoretical models of interorganizational coordination developed by organization theorists to assess their potential contribution to improved coordination between organizational actors participating in peace operations. Drawing on case studies of peace operations in Cambodia, the Balkans, and Afghanistan, I will analyze the consistency of coordination efforts with predictions—regarding transaction cost effects, organizational structures, and procedural standardization within organizational fields—derived from models of interorganizational coordination. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an attempt to counter changes in family structures, a number of nation states are designing policies to make men fit into families. In the case of the USA, decision makers view fatherhood and marriage as the cure for poverty among African Americans. To assert that training these men to be better fathers and husbands will help them improve other dimensions of their lives (particularly poverty) is a good idea, but it is also simplistic. Decision makers rely on an intra-group, which privileges an individualistic and cultural approach, in their development of policies. This approach tends to ignore that other subsystems, such as previously existing policies, can have an impact on the effectiveness of marriage and fatherhood promotion. Using the USA as a case study, I hypothesise that the effectiveness of fatherhood and marriage promotion is limited because of their interaction with other policies. Fatherhood and marriage promotion initiatives will be negatively affected by the absence of a progressive national urban policy, particularly in the area of economic development and in the context of current crime policies. The socio-economic and cultural reality faced by African American men must be incorporated into the decision-making processes in order to identify the most effective policies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If we want to understand how successful democratic citizenship evolves, it is essential to look at the beginning of political socialization. It is argued that value orientations play an important role in these early developments. Since it can be shown that even young children hold clearly structured value orientations but differ with regard to the achieved level of support for these orientations, the paper wants to examine the determinants on the level of value orientations concerning citizenship, support for rules and norms, and gender equality at two different time points. Family is considered an important factor for value socialization processes at a young age. Thus, (direct and indirect) family influences next to "classic" background and communication variables, are analyzed with regression models in this paper. Standard determinants like gender, socioeconomic status and nationality can account for some of the variation. It can also be shown that young children's social integration within and without the immediate family circle favour support levels. Parental value orientations display significant effects as well, although it seems that paternal and maternal influences do not act in concert in this respect. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on theory and research from political science, psychology, and sociology, I argue that social groups shape the normative beliefs and actions of individuals who subjectively identify with the group, but that the role played by identification is largely mediated by individuals' emotions. When our peers judge us, they arouse the emotions pride (when judgments are positive) and embarrassment and shame (when judgments are negative), and together these emotions motivate individuals to conform their own normative beliefs and actions to those of their peers. The "social-emotional influence" model is tested with data from an Internet survey-experiment conducted with a representative sample of Americans. The effects of experimentally induced emotions (pride and shame), in combination with pro-economic equality letters to the editor, were examined. The evidence for the hypotheses was mixed. Only conservatives were persuaded by the opinion stimuli in the absence of an induced emotion; however, when pride or shame was induced, persuasion among conservatives decreased whereas persuasion among younger moderates and liberals increased. This suggests that more attention must be paid to the context in which these self-conscious emotions are aroused. In addition, a direct, liberalizing effect for shame was discovered, suggesting that the importance of pride and shame to public opinion goes beyond their role in social-emotional influence. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To signal a commitment to individual rights, democratic states create legal institutions that constrain their authority. We argue that the effectiveness of these institutions on increasing citizen support for democracy is conditional upon a citizen's susceptibility to state predation. Our model suggests that legal institutions are substitutes for personal or societal characteristics that protect a citizen from predation, characteristics we call socioeconomic insulation. The effect of commitment institutions is highest when socioeconomic insulation is low, but attenuates as insulation increases. We test the argument with individual-level data on personal income, trust in the legal system and support for democracy from the 1995 World Values Survey. We find that the effect of legal system trust on democratic support is strongest among the poor but declines as wealth increases. Similarly, the effect of wealth is strongest among those individuals with no trust in the legal system, but declines as trust increases. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is consensus that socioeconomic distribution will threaten the survival of democracies when it provokes popular pressures for redistribution and elite resistance to such demands. Despite this consensus, the evidence in support of this claim is inconsistent. We believe these inconsistencies derive from the literature's assumption that relative forms of distribution, like income inequality, adequately reflect this combination of pressure and resistance. We disagree with this assumption, arguing instead that when developmental context is taken into consideration, absolute forms of distribution, like basic needs deprivation, are better indicators of these conditions. Specifically, we argue that when needs deprivation exists in the face of enhanced economic development, a pattern we refer to as regressive socioeconomic distribution, conditions are most ripe for crisis. Using event history analysis on a sample composed of all democracies from 1961-1995, we confirm that regressive socioeconomic distribution increases the risk of breakdown. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study builds on the prior national research by using a random-sample telephone survey conducted in three Northeast Ohio communities in 2005: East Cleveland, which is majority African-American and characterized by concentrated poverty throughout the city; Youngstown, which is a larger, poor, and racially-mixed city; and Shaker Heights, which is an affluent Cleveland suburb that is racially diverse. This sample allows us to explore race and other community characteristics for their influence on respondent attitudes and behavior, including residents' perceptions and use of public institutions. By focusing on the community level, we can explore various contextual factors for each individual - including distance to the neighborhood library, and socio-economic and demographic factors within a half-mile radius of each respondent.We find that individuals in majority African-American neighborhoods who lack Internet access at home or at work are more likely than other respondents without access to go online - at schools, at libraries, and the homes of friends or relatives. Segregated areas of concentrated poverty are different in this regard from other low-income neighborhoods. There is clear effort and motivation to go online on the part of these individuals, but the infrequent use that results may be a barrier to gaining familiarity and skill with technology. The availability of public access is therefore an institutional element that is critical in these communities. Drawing on our survey and interviews with library officials, we also present some evidence on the availability of technology and2support services libraries and schools in these three communities. The educational attainment of a community has an even greater influence on technology use than the racial composition of a neighborhood, and poor communities are clearly still at a disadvantage, despite some of the optimistic results we discover. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior theories of civil conflict have identified ethnic fragmentation, development status, lack of democracy, and weak governments as central causes of armed conflict within nations. Against these views, we draw on exchange norms theory to show how the level of economic dependency on the supply and demand of a market can explain the intensity of sub-national group identities and the risk of armed conflict within nations. Using data from the International Country Risk Guide on a sample of most nations from 1982 to 1997, robust support is found for this view. A measure of the intensity of market economy emerges as the most powerful variable in predicting the annual risk of armed conflict in nations, reducing the risk from 59% for nations with very weak markets, such as Guinea-Bissau and Somalia, to 1.5% for nations with highly market oriented economies, such as the United States and Sweden. Prior reports of the pacifying impacts of development and democracy are shown to be spurious and likely accounted for by market norms. Only ethnic fragmentation and extreme levels of autocracy continue to have significant, albeit less robust, impacts on armed conflict. The policy implications are straightforward: to meaningfully reduce the risk of armed conflict without resorting to extreme levels of autocracy, a state should enforce equal law and promote the condition of widespread economic opportunity on the market. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper investigates the 'extension' of market liberalism into the private sphere, with special attention to the sexual domain. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Skeptics of school choice are concerned that parents, especially low-income ones, will not choose schools based on sound academic reasoning. Many fear that, given choice, parents will sort themselves into different schools along class lines. However, most surveys find that parents of all socioeconomic groups cite academic aspects as important when choosing a school. Moreover, almost no parents refer to the social composition of the student body. Many advocates of choice hold up these results as proof that choice will produce desirable outcomes. However, these results may not be reliable since they may simply be verbal responses to survey items rather than indicators of actual behavior. In this research, we report on the search behavior of parents in the Metropolitan Region of Santiago, Chile, examining how they construct their school choice sets and comparing this to what they say they are seeking in choosing schools. The data indicate that parental decisions are influenced by demographics. Based on this evidence, we argue that unfettered choice may reduce the pressure on schools to improve their performance and could potentially increase stratification. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]