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The article presents a discussion of the voting model for American Muslims, adapted from "Muslim and American? How Islam Shapes Political Incorporation Among American Muslims," by Matt A. Barreto and Karam Dana. It analyzes the low levels of campaign outreach and the resulting low levels of efficacy that are taken for granted in most studies of turnout. The authors think that their model could be applicable to other groups of voters including other religious and ethnic minorities.

In the 2008 national election, a Latino race narrative suggesting that racial prejudice among Latino citizens shape their electoral choices. Specifically, racial views were offered as an explanation for high levels of Hispanic support of Hillary Clinton and as a rationale for the superiority of a Clinton general election campaign rather than an Obama one. The implication was that racial sentiment would undermine support for Obama. In this effort, we examine each of these contentions. We argue, first, that examination of polling data from the pre-primary season through the early months of the Obama administration offers no support for the Latino race narrative. Second, we show that, while Latino voters often express racial sentiments indistinguishable from whites, these sentiments played little role in creating a preference for Clinton. Rather, racial sentiments-while important to white voters-are unrelated to the differentiation of Clinton from Obama among Latino citizens. Finally, we demonstrate a significant disconnect between those racial sentiments and Latinos' vote choice in the general election. In so doing, we explore the relative explanatory power of explicit, indirect and implicit measures of racial sentiment and find that an indirect measurement, specifically the Racial Resentment Index, retains the greatest predictive validity. Taken together, our results suggest that, Latino racial views notwithstanding, there is no evidence for racial attitudes affecting Latino preferences in either the primary or general election processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout the 2008 election critics and fans alike pointed to Barack Obama's race as a Black American and speculated over whether or not this would impact the outcome of the presidential election. Indeed the historic nature of his candidacy and primary victory put much attention on the issue of race. However, perceptions of race and blackness did not seem to be the major point of tension that many predicted. Instead, a second story developed about Obama's "Muslim-ness" that was potentially more damaging to his chances as a presidential candidate. To test the competing effects of race and religion, we devised a survey experiment that framed Obama in three different ways to assess how voters reacted to his association with the Black community, the Muslim community, and the Christian community. We allowed respondents to actively engage the frame we presented them with by stating how much they accept or reject the frame presented. Most political psychology studies present frames and move on to test the effects on the dependent variable. However, we argue that in some cases a frame can spur contradicting effects when some respondents accept the frame while others reject the frame. We assess how the overall frame impacted voter attitudes, and also break down results for those who agreed with, or disagreed with each frame. We find two interesting results. First, our racial frame did not have a negative effect on evaluations of Obama, contrary to research from previous decades. Second, we find respondents react to the frames presented in experiments quite differently, and that these differences lead to statistically significant changes in attitudes. To this end, we find that acceptance of the Muslim frame results in a significant decline in support for Obama while rejection of the Muslim frame results in a significant increase in support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The state of Indiana has the most stringent voting requirements in the nation, as voters are presently required to present a photo identification issued by the federal or state government in order to cast a ballot. Similar laws have been proposed and pursued in many other states, typically related to charges of vote fraud, and often times tied into the divisive debates on undocumented immigrants or African American felons. However, very little empirical evidence exists about the effects of voter identification laws. Although a theoretical and Constitutional debate has developed, few studies have empirically tested the real world consequences of voter identification laws on the disenfranchisement of various subgroups in the electorate. In this study, we assess whether all eligible voters have equal access to valid photo identification, or if some segments of the population are being uniquely harmed by Indiana voter ID laws. To answer this question we fielded a unique public opinion survey in 2007 in the state of Indiana to determine the impact of voter identification laws on several demographic groups of voters; African Americans, the elderly, the less educated, and the poor. Specifically, we asked registered voters and eligible non-registered adults whether or not they had a current and up to date ID card issued by the state of Indiana containing their full name. Examining a variety of demographic variables, we find consistent and statistically significant evidence that White, college educated, upper income, and middle-aged voters in Indiana are more likely to have valid ID. Because we present data for actual registered voters, the findings go far to suggest that voter identification laws in Indiana disenfranchise many citizens who are entitled to full voting rights. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis both argue that Islam as a religion and a culture is incompatible with liberal, democratic and American values. Not only is Islam inconsistent with the West, but it poses a direct and significant conflict according to these scholars. This viewpoint has been popularized in American and European media and by government officials who declare fundamentalist Muslims as enemies of freedom and liberalism. However, it is not clear that the grounds of conflict are based on religious ideology. Are the most devout Muslims really opposed to political incorporation in the United States, or are other traditional non-religious factors such as socioeconomic status and acculturation more important in understanding political alienation? To date, nearly every study of Islam and Western values has been qualitative, anecdotal or philosophical in nature, leaving most questions unanswered, at least empirically. To answer these questions, we fielded a public opinion survey of Muslim Americans to ask whether or not the teachings of Islam were compatible with participation in American democracy. In contrast to prevailing judgments, we find that more religiously devout Muslims are significantly more likely to support political participation in America We argue there is nothing inconsistent with Islam and American democracy, and to the contrary, the most religiously devoted Muslims are the most likely to support American democratic and participatory values because of their knowledge of and adherence to the teachings of Islam. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For many years, it was thought that transnational ties blocked immigrants frombecoming Americans and participating in American politics. Following news about thehomeland and investing in homeland politics provided both a psychological barrier and aresource deficit to getting involved in American political processes. However political engagement may not be a zero-sum game for immigrants in whichthey choose whether to engage the politics of their homeland, or the politics of their newhome. Rather, continued transnational engagement through actively following news andpolitical events in the homeland might stimulate civic engagement in America.In this paper we examine data from the 2007 Muslim American Public Opinion Survey (MAPOS)to determine whether or not transnational ties encourages or discourages participationin American politics. We find that Muslim Americans who follow news and politics in theMiddle East very closely, are actually more likely to participate in U.S. politics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we argue that a government enforced shift to mandatory mail voting could lead to lower levels of efficacy and perhaps lower levels of participation, despite the promise of lower costs making it easier to vote. Contrary to previous theories about the costs of voting, specifically related to absentee voting, we argue that when voters are forced to switch to vote-by-mail, as opposed to simply having it as an option, the possibility exists for a backlash against the political system. Indeed, our results suggest that many polling place voters were opposed to the transition to mail balloting and many voters raised questions about government accountability under such a system. Through multivariate regression analysis, we model political efficacy and likelihood of turnout, to determine what impact, if any, a mandatory vote-by-mail system has on the voting public. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2004 Arizona voters approved Proposition 200, which among other things, required various forms of identification to be shown at the polling place before a citizen could vote. Similar laws have been proposed and passed in many other states, typically related to charges of vote fraud, and often times tied into the divisive debates on undocumented immigrants or African American felons. However, very little empirical evidence exists about the effects of voter identification laws. Although a theoretical and Constitutional debate has developed, few studies have empirically tested the real world consequences of voter identification laws on minority disenfranchisement. Using a unique dataset from the 2006 elections, we model the impact of voter identification laws on several demographic groups of voters, including immigrants, minorities, the elderly, and the poor. Specifically, exit polls in California, New Mexico and Washington asked voters to check which forms of identification they would be able to provide if new voter identification laws were passed or more strictly enforced in their state. Controlling for a variety of demographic variables, we find that lower income, immigrant and minority voters were significantly less likely to be able to provide multiple forms of identification, such as a copy of their birth certificate, a driver's license or a current bank statement. In full, we asked about eight different forms of identification and across all eight types, lower income, immigrant and minority voters were less likely to have each one. Because our data are among actual voters, not just adult citizens, the findings go far to suggest that voter identification laws could immediately disenfranchise many Latino, Asian and African American citizens. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In November 2001, Orlando Sanchez came within 10,000 votes of being elected the first Latino mayor in the history of Houston. Sanchez, a registered Republican, ran against incumbent Mayor Lee Brown, a registered Democrat. Exactly one year before the Sanchez-Brown election, voters in Houston cast ballots in the contentious 2000 Presidential election. Overwhelmingly, Latino precincts throughout Houston voted in favor of Al Gore, the Democrat and in 2001, President George W. Bush played a prominent role in the Sanchez ad campaign. Despite considerable ties to the Democratic Party, Latinos in Houston crossed-over and voted for the Republican Sanchez. Although city elections are often non-partisan, they are more likely to feature a variety of ethnic candidates and thus provides the ideal setting to weigh in on a growing debate in American ethnic politics, does ethnicity trump partisanship? This paper uses precinct level data from five elections in Houston, Texas to compare ethnic and partisan voting patterns for Latinos, Blacks, and Whites. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2004 presidential election raised a number of questions about how military service is used in political campaigns and how it affects individual-level engagement in politics. Most of this discussion consisted of journalistic accounts, however, and few social scientists have tested theories about the military and politics with survey data or electoral returns. This is especially the case for the political role of military service for minority electorates. This paper therefore examines whether military service and opinions about the war in Iraq are associated with the vote for Bush and Kerry in 2004. The dataset is a pre-election national survey of Latinos that includes questions about political engagement, partisanship, and previous military service. The results indicate that Latino veterans were more likely to support Kerry than were Latino non-veterans. In addition, Latinos who opposed the war in Iraq were less supportive of Bush, and Latino veterans who opposed the war were particularly opposed to Bush. These results help to understand not only the Latino vote in the 2004 presidential election but also the role of veteran status in electoral politics. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2001 Republican Latino candidate for mayor Orlando Sanchez won 73% of the heavily Democratic Latino vote in Houston while in Miami, Cuban Democrat Manny Diaz won 70% of the staunch Republican Latino vote. In 2003, Green Party candidate for mayor Matt Gonzalez captured 66% of the Latino vote in San Francisco while in Colorado Springs a majority of Latinos voted for Republican Lionel Rivera. These elections renew the debate over Latino vote preference, and call into question whether Latinos follow partisan cues or ethnic cues when casting a ballot. I argue that while party is still an important predictor of vote choice, for Latinos with a high degree of shared ethnicity, party ties are less significant than ethnic attachment. Using a unique survey fielded by the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute in 2002, I model crossover vote preference for Latino candidates in California and New York using probit and ordered probit regression. While strong partisans were significantly less likely to crossover and vote for the ethnic candidate of the opposing party, Latino voters who scored high on ethnic attachment were significantly more likely to ditch their party for the Latino candidate. By incorporating more flexible measures of ethnicity (as opposed to a dichotomous measure), this paper finds that, in addition to SES and party, ethnicity can be an important predictor of candidate preference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effect of ethnicity upon political participation presents an interesting paradox to political scientists. No consensus exists on the extent to which the interaction between contextual factors and individual level characteristics allow individuals to overcome barriers to participation, or how this relates to patterns of mobilization. While it is well documented that contacts and mobilization are effective in turning out the vote, few scholars have asked the question of who gets mobilized, and why? In this paper, we use a modified model of the effects of group size and group empowerment for Latinos in the United States to predict which Latinos reported being mobilized prior to the 2000 Presidential election. The modifications include a departure from an emphasis on the presence of Black or Latino mayors as a measurement of empowerment. Instead, we propose using a multiple-level Latino representation model of empowerment. Using a five state survey of registered Latino voters collected after the 2000 elections, we test this alternative model of empowerment to determine if Latino registered voters, living in districts with Latino representatives, are more likely to be contacted and asked to vote. Further modifications include making a distinction between type of contact and the addition of other characteristics that have been found to significantly impact Latino participation. The strategic nature of party contacting leads organizations to contact those individuals who are already the individuals most predisposed to participate. Probit regression analysis finds that Latinos represented by co-ethnics are more likely to be mobilized than Latinos represented by White or Black elected officials, providing additional support for the notion that descriptive representation empowers minority communities. However, the relationship is not linear. Latinos with only one Latino representative are the most likely to receive mobilization while those with two or three representatives are less likely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors recently approved a plan for redistricting that essentially maintains the existing districts and constituencies, only one of which (the First District) is predominantly Latino and has a Latino representative. A challenge to this plan with the US Attorney General's Civil Rights Division is currently pending, wherein the Los Angeles County Chicano Employees Association (LACCEA) has offered its own plan for redistricting. In the alternative plan, districts are drawn in a way intended to preserve communities of interest, and to facilitate the election of a second Latino candidate of interest from the San Gabriel Valley (the Third District). We evaluate both plans on the dimension of how each will influence individual Latino voter turnout, and hence the ability of Latinos to influence electoral outcomes. Using Registrar of Voters data for the universe of registered voters in Los Angeles County, we offer several summary statistics and probit analyses that show that the alternate plan proposed by the LACCEA is superior to the Status Quo plan approved by the County. Specifically, Latinos will be able to affect electoral outcomes in District 3 under the LACCEA plan, and maintain their ability to influence electoral outcomes in District 1. Under the Status Quo plan, Latinos will be limited to affecting outcomes in the First District only. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explore the linkage between religion, or church, and political participation in a way to address the question of low levels of political participation among Latinos. We specifically focus on three distinct but complementary roles the church may play-as an incubator for civic skills, as an agent for mobilization, and as an information provider-in stimulating Latinos to take part in politics. Church-based mobilization goes directly to the heart of our answer to the question of Latino political inactivity. To the extent Latino participation depends on mobilization, whether or not church leaders have asked parishioners to get involved in politics is expected to have an immediate consequence. Drawing on data from a recent national survey of 2,060 Latino adults, we show that church-based skills and church-based mobilization are directly responsible for Latino political participation, while the effects of other typical religious factors are largely muted. Having ascertained the relative importance of different religious factors in accounting for political participation, we confirm that Latino churches serve as a vehicle of political participation. We maintain, however, that Latino churches have not fully capitalized on their potential to play a greater role in boosting rates of Latino participation, which in part explains a relative political inactivity among Latinos. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]