Search

Since 1978, all countries in Latin America have either replaced or amended their constitutions. What explains the choice between these two substantively different means of constitutional transformation? This article argues that the replacement of constitutions depends on the power-sharing features of constitutional design, the frequency of institutional crises, and the capacity of political actors to transform the constitution by means of amendments or judicial interpretation. It also argues that in a context of party pluralism, amendments can only be used as a means of constitutional change if amendment procedures are relatively flexible. The article provides statistical evidence to support these arguments and discusses the normative implications of the analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political scientists often consider constitutions and their various designs as key variables for explaining a wide range of relevant outcomes, such as the stability and quality of democracy, economic performance, or the rate of policy change across political regimes. The validity of this claim rests on the assumption that constitutions are a stable set of rules that become self-enforcing over time. Constitutional stability, however, is subject to variation across time and space. I argue that this variation depends both on institutional configurations and on the relative stability of the political environment that the constitution is supposed to regulate. Using a duration analysis of constitutions in 18 Latin American countries between 1946 and 2000, this paper shows that while the lifespan of constitutions is negatively affected by political and social instability, some of the institutions that prevent the concentration of power and protect the constitution as a "fundamental law" decrease the risk of constitutional replacement. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A widely accepted argument among students of presidential regimes is that inter-branch cooperation is impaired when the president’s party does not control a majority of seats in congress. This argument, however, fails to take into account three variables that should affect the performance of minority presidential governments: the location of the president’s party in the policy space, the strength of the executive veto and the formation of executive coalitions. Based on a new typology of presidential regimes, I propose the hypothesis that the most conflictive form of minority government is that in which the president’s party does not control the median legislator, the president lacks effective veto power, and no majority or median minority executive coalition is formed. This hypothesis is supported by data on executive-legislative conflicts and on interrupted presidencies in Latin America during the period 1979-2002. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the recent shift from plurality to more inclusive rules of presidential elections in Latin America is the outcome of constitution-making processes in which no single party, particularly those with a large electoral base, is able to impose its preferred electoral rules. Being themselves the result of a competitive and pluralistic party system, it also proposes that the new rules of presidential elections are likely to produce less arbitrary and more socially acceptable outcomes than simple plurality rule would under the same circumstances. To illustrate the logic behind these propositions this work analyzes the origins and consequences of a recently created qualified plurality system of presidential elections in Argentina. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We discuss a new set of institutional formulas oriented to strenghtening the Congress with the aim of promoting good governance in a regime of separation of powers between the Congress and the President. We adopt the criterion that policy outcomes coinciding with the median voter’s preference can produce highest satisfaction or social utility. Proportional representation in Congress tends to establish a close correspondence between the median legislator’s and the median voter’s preferences. Cooperation between the median party in Congress and the President for both legislative decisions and Cabinet formation can reduce the ‘gridlock interval’ and favor socially efficient outcomes. A survey of some recent institutional reforms in democratic presidential regimes in Latin America shows that these formulas are gaining acceptance. Check author’s web site for an updated version of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]