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In this paper I first demonstrate that varying assumptions about estimating the ideological positions of minority governments have significant consequences for inferences about ideological congruence in parliamentary systems, especially for comparing majority and minority governments and consequences of PR and SMD electoral systems. Minority governments whose ideological position is estimated in the now standard way, from the positions of parties in the cabinet weighted by their legislative seat proportions or portfolios, are on average significantly more distant from the median voter than are majority governments. This descriptive fact holds across different estimation methods (manifesto-based or voter perception based) and times. Then, I draw on the previous literature on legislative bargaining and government formation (in general and in various contexts) to develop specific hypotheses about the influence of various legislative parties on the ideological position of governments. My analysis and various previous studies show evidence for all four bargaining hypotheses, but especially the weighted coalition parties, in the cases of majority governments. My analysis shows that minority governments are much less shaped by the median party and more by the largest party (where these are not the same) than are majority governments. However, research by Warwick 2011 on government program announcements and by Martin and Vanberg 2011, 2014 on committee modification of bills show no extra impact of the median party and nothing exceptional about minority situations. My analysis of the influence of formal support parties creating "formal" or "pseudo" minority governments that can count on formal outside parties for legislative majorities shows that these parties' influence pushes the governments toward and away from the median voter about equally often. Literature on minority governments from Strom 1990 and after emphasizes the wide range of different arrangements that can connect governments and the parties that enable them to sustain themselves and pass budgets and policies in minority situations. At least until we have more research or theory, the evidence better supports using the standard portfolio-weighted approach for "true" minority governments than any adjustment favoring a particular direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ideological congruence between the median citizen and the government is shaped by various institutional features, especially the party system. The polarization of the party system has large and robust effects on ideological (in)congruence across a variety of political systems. As captured by several approaches to measuring congruence, and across a substantial span of time, more polarization makes it more difficult to form congruent governments in parliamentary democracies. This paper focuses on the process of parliamentary government formation as the causal linkage between polarization and congruence. The analysis supports our expectation that polarization works somewhat differently under the different election rules. In the PR systems we find polarization shaping congruence through its association with greater distances of the plurality or preelection coalition plurality vote winner, but also through the distances of the legislative median party, the previous government, and even the runner-up plurality party. In the SMD systems the effects are entirely through the plurality (or pre-election coalition plurality) vote winner. New data from CSES Module 3 and from the Manifesto project make it possible to analyze the two data sources in parallel and compare similarities and differences in polarization and its processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ideological congruence between the median citizen and the government is shaped by various institutional features, especially the party system. The polarization of the party system has large and robust effects on ideological (in)congruence across a variety of political systems. As captured by several approaches to measuring congruence, and across a substantial span of time, more polarization makes it more difficult to form congruent governments in parliamentary democracies. This paper focuses on the process of parliamentary government formation as the causal linkage between polarization and congruence. The analysis supports our expectation that polarization works somewhat differently under the different election rules. In the PR systems we find polarization shaping congruence through its association with greater distances of the plurality or preelection coalition plurality vote winner, but also through the distances of the legislative median party, the previous government, and even the runner-up plurality party. In the SMD systems the effects are entirely through the plurality (or pre-election coalition plurality) vote winner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ideological congruence between median voter and the government changes substantially from one decade to the next, especially in the SMD systems of Western democracies. These changes are closely linked to changing levels of party system polarization. When the large parties are close to the median voter, any outcome creates congruent governments. When they diverge, governments are usually much further away. In the PR systems, too, depolarization of the party system contributes to greater ideological congruence, although the connections are more complex, and cross-system differences are more diverse than in the SMD systems. This paper describes the changing levels of party system polarization from 1946 through 2003, explicating the positions of political party families and tracing the implications for ideological congruence. Under conditions of relative ideological consensus, such as the social democratic orientation of 1956-65 or today's center-right orientation, there is little difference in the ideological congruence levels of SMD and PR electoral systems. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing body of literature has emerged that investigates the effects of election rules on the representation of voters' ideological preferences in the legislatures and governments of parliamentary systems, primarily in developed democracies. Focusing on the left-right scale as a summary measure of citizens' and representatives' preferences, these works have used a variety of approaches and data in measuring positions of citizens and representatives. Some of the differences reflect alternative data types (citizen survey studies, elite expert surveys, party manifesto statements, and outcomes of elections and government formation in various combinations,) and availability in various countries and time periods. Other differences reflect different conceptualizations of representative correspondence itself. The most recent studies, contrary to previous ones, show no significant difference between ideological congruence in SMD and PR electoral systems. This paper examines the major alternative measurement approaches and data sets, replicating previous findings and extending previous data sets to compare with more recent ones. It finds that the general associations between election rules and ideological congruence are relatively robust to various measurement approaches, as are estimations of the causal processes shaping ideological congruence. The association between election rules and congruence has declined in the last decade, as shown by all three major approaches, due primarily to convergence toward the median of plurality parties in the small number of SMD elections. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay is organized around three main linkages of democratic responsiveness: (1) structuring choices, which is the connection between citizens? preferences and their electoral choices, (2) institutional aggregation, which is the connection between citizens? electoral choices and the selection of policymakers, and (3) policymaking, which is the connection between the selection of policymakers and the policies that are chosen and implemented. I first elucidate the major conceptual and theoretical difficulties at each linkage. I then sketch principal ?subversions? that have been found to jeopardize each linkage, identifying them conceptually and noting institutions or behavioral patterns that raise warning flags. This discussion is followed by consideration of facilitating conditions, which encourage or help sustain each linkage of democratic responsiveness. Finally, I draw on the previous analysis to offer some suggestions about measurement of democratic responsiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empirical studies show that in modern societies political systems with multi-member PR electoral rules tend to have larger governments, more welfare spending, and more equality in income distribution than systems with single-member district (SMD) election rules. If the two types of systems have voters with similar preferences, these economic policies and outcomes would imply that voters in PR systems have more ?welfare? than the median citizen prefers, or that voters in SMD systems receive less ?welfare? than the median prefers, or both. An empirical investigation of cross-national survey results suggests that although citizens in the two kinds of systems have similar left-right self-placements, the medians seem substantively more welfare-oriented in the PR systems. The causal status of preference and policy is not determined. Investigation of the competitive discourse in the two types of systems shows on average rather similar party alternatives confronting voters in each. Analysis of government formation, however, suggests that left governments are somewhat encouraged under PR, but substantially disadvantaged under SMD. It is unclear if the welfare bias in the preferences of citizens is sufficient to account for the bias in electoral systems? creation of leftist governments and policies, or if party coordination problems contribute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]