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The Arab League and the Gulf-Cooperation Council have been surprisingly prominent in the media and political debates since 2011. Far from being paralysed in times of regional crisis, they have actively engaged in the domestic affairs of several of their member states. Tracing the role of regional organizations in the 'Arab Spring', this paper seeks to account for their varying responses to political protest in their member states since January 2011 and asks for their impact on regime dynamics and domestic institutional change. In order to account for the significant variation in their responses in the 'Arab Spring', the analysis needs to take into account the role of preferences, power, and persuasion in the process of negotiating collective action in the framework of regional institutions. Powerful member states are still deemed to steer regional organizations in accordance with their national interests. At the same time, we see a normative shift towards a regional norm of greater respect for human rights that might open new venues for persuasion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article asks under which conditions the state-building efforts of external actors in areas of limited statehood are likely to be effective. We argue that the legitimacy of the specific norms promoted by external actors among local actors is crucial for their success in strengthening state capacities. International efforts need to resonate with prevalent social norms. To substantiate this argument, we focus on the European Union's (EU) anti-corruption programs and their implementation in one of the most corrupt regions in the world, the Southern Caucasus. We show that legitimacy can explain why the EU's fight against corruption helped reduce corruption in Georgia but not in Armenia. In both countries, political elites could selectively use anti-corruption programs as an instrument against political opponents using enhanced state capacities to stabilize the incumbent regime. Only in Georgia, however, the fight against corruption was facilitated by sustained domestic mobilization for anti-corruption policies that added pressure on political elites 'from below.' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the role of domestic, country-specific conditions in the target countries for the conception and implementation of democracy promotion strategies by the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (US). First, an analytical framework is outlined to allow the identification of 'differentiated strategies'. We build upon the assumption that the 'grey zone' of semi-authoritarian regimes presents the greatest challenge to external democracy promotion. Empirically, we look for conceptual differentiation at the global level and analyze differentiation in implementation in four country case-studies (Morocco, Tunisia, Belarus, and Ukraine). In general, we find a surprising similarity between the two actors' democracy promotion efforts. Even though the EU highlights a cooperative approach whereas the US openly pursue a two-track approach, democracy promotion efforts of the two actors are similarly adapted to a country's context and its development in our four case-studies. Our findings suggest that both actors only choose a truly conflictive approach in reaction to a dramatic worsening of the political situation. In contrast, undemocratic but stable semi-authoritarian regimes are not the focal point of democracy promotion efforts: the scope for cooperative action is significantly limited and not backed up by a conflictive approach. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]