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The objective of the present paper is to analyze if policies of the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA) - applied to the borderline region between Brazil/Bolivia - include social participation in the decisions about environmental resources exploitation. It was used the followed methods: textual analysis of public policies of IIRSA, photography, maps and interview analysis with experts in the subject of regional integration. The research is based mainly in the theories of David Harvey, Neil Smith, David Held and Bertha Becker. The current paper discusses about: 1) how policies have a "lacunar discurse2" conduced by Brazil. 2) how laws are planed exclusively by the decision makers, often without the vote of the citizens. Consequently, there is a loss of autonomy in the management of natural resources done by the people, and decisions are taken according to the international economic demands. The physical consequence of the policies on the environment is an increase of fragmentation not only ecological but also cultural, both reflecting negatively on the economy of the region involved in integrative policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Never has humanity had so many instruments and mechanisms at its reach to protect human rights. Yet, the passage from a defensive attitude of negation of the state’s responsibilities for gross human rights violations to one of transparency and acceptance of monitoring by international multilateral bodies and civil society organizations has not come easily. Despite persistent high levels of human rights violations, Brazil enters the twenty-first century with an institutional structure that will promote the advance of a society more respectful of human rights. Indeed, the official recognition of the gravity and centrality of human rights for national development has broken the hegemony of the state in the realm of justice and engaged the participation of non-state actors in the construction of a more just and democratic Brazil. In a new context of shared responsibilities, the Brazilian government has argued that human rights norms are not against but rather complementary to sovereignty, reinforcing the idea that there is an effective gain in legitimacy attached to the norm. This paper will argue that there are concrete gains in following a human rights agenda, even in a country like Brazil. In this perspective, I suggest that there is now a political economy of human rights in the sense that a mosaic of actors have entwined norms and interests in promoting the cause. In Brazil, perhaps as in the case of other developing, emerging democracies, the interests are gains in international legitimacy (imported legitimacy), as well as the desire for development at home. The process is neither evident nor self-assuming, and this paper is aimed at retracing the sociology of power embedded in the construction of a human rights discourse and regime in Brazil during the 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explains how Brazil answered the competing alternatives of regional integration (FTAA and ALBA), focusing in representative critical junctures for Brazilian strategy in the period as a contextual analytical strategy. The paper sheds light especially in the critical moments such as the rise of unilateralism by the Bush administration and the breakup of Mar del Plata Summit, analyzing the consequences for the regional political scenario. The research used the theoretical background of the theories of regionalism and regional integration, influenced by international insertion studies. The explanation logic starts with the assumption that MERCOSUR, as core of the South American regional integration, is the main base for the Brazilian project of consolidating itself as a regional power and global player, overcoming its status of middle power. Paper uses combined new institutionalisms and foreign policy analyses techniques, supported by methods of single case studies and historical series. We conclude that Brazil seeks to reinforce its South American integration axis in a broader agenda of power projection in the regional and international scenarios. This is done by a progressive adoption of a deeper integration agenda and through the creation of arrangements and interdependences that favors the Brazilian leading position in the process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the problems of teaching Security Studies to undergraduate in Brazil due to the very nature of International Relations courses in Brazil and its perspective on security. While situates the dynamics of Brazilian IR courses, this paper proposes guidelines to create a syllabus on Security Studies that would engage students on the discipline by combining both theoretical debates and empirical issues with active learning exercises and multimedia resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the broader context of globalization as politics, this paper adopts the following assumption: cities through their transnational cooperation networks and economic projects are the expression of a new political actor having shifted their operation scale, and partly emancipated themselves from the monopoly of the nation-state in the deployment of transborder public action. As the world's population became increasingly urban and complex globalization-fragmentation processes advanced, cities have challenged the Westphalian imaginary and the exclusive role of the nation-state as "the" bounded political community with a capacity to frame and control a fixed and vertical national territory. In pursuance of developing this assumption, this paper approaches the discussion in two general parts: firstly, it looks into the empirical reality of 72 Brazilian municipalities and their paradiplomatic actions in the international arena; secondly, it presents a series of critical questions for analyzing cities and their transnational networks as new political actors in the global arena. Empirically authors intend to analyze the multiple ways through which these 72 municipalities across Brazil develop paradiplomatic activities, but also to better understand the soft-border approach, the economic strategies that they deploy, whether or not they build a political identity, thus questioning unconditioned national sovereignty as a fundamental tenet of the international system. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper has two parts. The first one "Brazil in the Global System" summarizes the most important dynamics in the Brazilian society in the last two decades. The second part "The evolving Brazilian role in the global politics of climate" analyses the Brazilian standing in the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol (1996-2001) showing how Amazonian deforestation shaped deeply alliances of Brazil and finish analyzing the progress toward a more responsible regional and global position in the recent period. The paper argue there is a good possibility of a change in Brazilian position after a moving in the American position with the next president. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Latin American countries do not define their security agenda. In fact the regional presence of the United States conditions the security agendas of the countries in the region and their capacity to establish autonomous national policies on the global , regional and sub regional spheres. Nevertheless the regional integration process in the southern cone and the international role that Brazil has been signaling it would like to play since the transition to democracy have allowed the governments of Brazil and Argentina to define some strategic orientations. During the last fifteen years the civil authorities have established some defense and security policies in the absence of direct intervention on the part of the armed forces, in contrast to previous periods. In this paper we shall analyze the conceptual sources incorporated by the political elite in both Argentina and Brazil and the means and resources available for decision making in the security sphere in these countries . We shall investigate the process of securitization in the regional context taking into account the interaction between endogenous and exogenous variables. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A common theme in the literature on international rivalries concerns the role of war. War can exacerbate rivalries, but by acting as a shock, war can also catalyze changes that help to deescalate or terminate rivalries. Using William Thompson?s integrative framework as a guide, this paper examines the impact of wars on the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry, from independence in the early nineteenth century through the deescalation and apparent termination of the rivalry during the 1980s and 1990s. War between Argentina and Brazil did not catalyze the deescalation process, but examining Argentina?s entire rivalry profile reveals that the threat of war does play an important indirect role, in conjunction with the realization of a widening capability gap between the two states. Other factors include Brazil?s program of domestic liberalizing reform (abertura) and Brazil?s attempts to distance itself from the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a research project that presents an analysis of the international expansion of Brazilian multinational corporations and Brazil's international relations, and their fit into the discussion about hegemony and imperialism today. Multinational corporations have a major role in capitalist development, contributing historically to the transformation of states in hegemonic powers. States, at the same time, finance and structure the juridical and political field, that permit corporations to act at the international level. The Brazilian state supports the internationalization of Brazilian companies especially through foreign policy and public credits. Building Brazilian multinationals has been central to the prevailing domestic development model and to Brazil's new role as an "emerging power" in the world order. This article discusses the relationship between state and capital in Brazil's current capitalist development. Negative impacts upon communities, workers and environment show that the rise of Brazilian corporations has been not only consensus but also conflict inside and abroad. Recent examples are Petrobras in Bolivia, Odebrecht in Ecuador or Vale in Canada. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Norway has made a point of administering its petroleum resources using three distinct government bodies: a national oil company (NOC) engaged in commercial hydrocarbon operations; a government ministry to help set policy; and a regulatory body to provide oversight and technical expertise. In Norway's case, this institutional design has provided useful checks and balances, helped minimize conflicts of interest, and allowed the NOC, Statoil, to focus on commercial activities while other government agencies regulate oil operators including Statoil itself. Norway's relative success in managing its hydrocarbon resources has prompted development institutions to consider whether this "Norwegian Model" of separated government functions should be recommended to other oil-producing countries, particularly those whose oil sectors have underperformed. Seeking insight into this question, we study eight countries with different political and institutional characteristics, some of which have attempted to separate functions in oil in the manner of Norway and some of which have not. We conclude that while the Norwegian Model may be a "best practice" of sorts, it is not the best prescription for every ailing oil sector. The separation of functions approach is most useful and feasible in cases where political competition exists and institutional capacity is relatively strong. Unchallenged leaders, on the other hand, are often able to adequately discharge commercial and policy/regulatory functions in the oil sector using the same entity, although this approach may not be robust against political changes (nor do we address in this paper any possible development or human welfare implications of this arrangement). When technical and regulatory talent is particularly lacking in a country, better outcomes may result from consolidating commercial, policy, and regulatory functions in a single body until institutional capacity has further developed. Countries like Nigeria with vibrant political competition but limited institutional capacity pose the most significant challenge for oil sector reform: unitary control over the sector is impossible but separation of functions is often impossible to implement. In such cases reformers are wise to focus on incremental but sustainable improvements in technical and institutional capacity. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Norway has made a point of administering its petroleum resources using three distinct government bodies: a national oil company (NOC) engaged in commercial hydrocarbon operations; a government ministry to help set policy; and a regulatory body to provide oversight and technical expertise. In Norway's case, this institutional design has provided useful checks and balances, helped minimize conflicts of interest, and allowed the NOC, Statoil, to focus on commercial activities while other government agencies regulate oil operators including Statoil itself. Norway's relative success in managing its hydrocarbon resources has prompted development institutions to consider whether this "Norwegian Model" of separated government functions should be recommended to other oil-producing countries, particularly those whose oil sectors have underperformed. Seeking insight into this question, we study eight countries with different political and institutional characteristics, some of which have attempted to separate functions in oil in the manner of Norway and some of which have not. We conclude that while the Norwegian Model may be a "best practice" of sorts, it is not the best prescription for every ailing oil sector. The separation of functions approach is most useful and feasible in cases where political competition exists and institutional capacity is relatively strong. Unchallenged leaders, on the other hand, are often able to adequately discharge commercial and policy/regulatory functions in the oil sector using the same entity, although this approach may not be robust against political changes (nor do we address in this paper any possible development or human welfare implications of this arrangement). When technical and regulatory talent is particularly lacking in a country, better outcomes may result from consolidating commercial, policy, and regulatory functions in a single body until institutional capacity has further developed. Countries like Nigeria with vibrant political competition but limited institutional capacity pose the most significant challenge for oil sector reform: unitary control over the sector is impossible but separation of functions is often impossible to implement. In such cases reformers are wise to focus on incremental but sustainable improvements in technical and institutional capacity. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Europeans, though already a potent influence, were not yet able fully to dictate the rules of engagement governing their interactions with non-Europeans in the period dealt with by this paper. Ethno-historical literature is deployed to attempt a comparison between three zones of European expansion in the Americas. The three areas are the north-east interior of the present-day USA, south-western Brazil and the far south of South America. Processes of ethnogenesis and state-building prompted by the collapse of the pre-Columbian order are found to have features in common and to be mutually constitutive with the development of creole polities within imperial frameworks where European monarchs and their agents acted sometimes as ring-holders and sometimes as protagonists. The methodological difficulties of deploying European concepts of war, diplomacy, balancing and trade when relating the history of the further reaches of early-modern Europe are also explored. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the left wing government of Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva, Brazil has made a far-reaching turn in its foreign trade policy. Since 2003, the government has started active coalition building both within the WTO as well as on a regional scale: Firstly, Brazil has created several negotiation groups inside of the WTO. It is playing a leading role in the G-20, NAMA-11 and the G-110. The "Lula" administration is also focusing on alternative south-south coalitions outside the WTO, with the new India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA). Secondly, Brazil has begun to oppose the US project of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Together with Venezuela and Argentina the country has blocked further negotiations.Brazil has apparently returned to a policy similar to 1970's "terceiro mundismo" (Third Worldism). Its move towards a "New Axis of the South" has already changed trade flows. For example, between 2001 and 2008 the share of the traditional core countries (US, EU and Japan) in Brazilian foreign trade decreased about 15 %.This paper analyzes Brazil's project of "Neo-Third Worldism". It is argued that both a coalition of left wing nationalists in the Brazilian foreign ministry as well as the Workers' Party PT are pushing forward the new agenda. However, there have been constraints. For instance, Brazil's attempts to achieve a deeper regional integration of South America have hardly made progress. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Triggered by the distress around climate change and security of supply, European countries struggle to diversify their energy portfolio with other energy sources while producing less of CO2 emissions. To avoid a system collapse they prefer a transition. This situation, however, is not new. Already thirty years ago, Brazil started its transition to a less oil-dependent economy, which was triggered by the oil crisis, a drop in sugar prices, and low employment rates. Although the pace and pattern of their economic evolution was variable, Brazil has reached a stable bio-ethanol economy today.This paper analyses the historical bio-ethanol transition of Brazil using an approach elaborated on the synergy of Institutional Economics, Social Theory, Socio-Technical Regimes and Actor-Network Theory. This multi-disciplinary approach portrays the dynamics at the agent, the interaction and the system layers and the relevance of information feedback structures for giving shape to the ethanol economy in Brazil. It is concluded that, despite the historical and geographical differences, European countries can benefit from the experience of the Brazilian transition when struggling for a low CO2 emission energy portfolio, namely relevance of an objective-oriented transition, role of the government as initiator of a transition process, and how to deal with the risks of a direct institutional transplantation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is essentially a dialogue with Alfred Montero's insightful idea of approaching the generic and controversial concept of "development" through a more empirical notion of "productivity-enhancing synergy" between public and private agents at the heart of developmental outcomes, in his comparative analysis of Brazil's and Spain's subnational governments (Montero, 2002). As a way of discussing his contributions, we decided to subject it to a tentative quantitative test, based on another pair of countries, Brazil and Mexico, in a context of stabilization of the market reforms and of reasonably sustained growth that is different from his original setting. Based on preliminary data gathered, we will indicate that there is a high correlation between market-conforming institutions and developmental performance of the states of Brazil and Mexico, without taking into account how strategic actors and institutions interacted through a "productivity-enhancing synergy". Put it simply, this restricted test will allow us to bring into some questions to Montero's concept of "productivity-enhancing synergy" to possibly advance his contributions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the foreign policies of Brazil and Venezuela during the last decade in order to understando what changes have taken place in South American actions towards the U.S. and how important and long-lasting they are. We want to test the proposition that in foreign policy, actors are conscious and reflexive, and act with the purpose of attaining their preferences, but different actors under similar ideational influences and different material circumstances may construct their preferences differently. As the variable to look at, we have chosen changes in development strategy (structure) for they almost always produce shifts in foreign policy (agency), granting credibility to the claim that internal political aspects of developing nations are key factors in the shaping of their foreign policies. If important changes have taken place in the development strategy of a country, this should have more lasting effects on its foreign policy and this is the notion we explore through our case studies. Our aim is to answer the following questions: 1) what changes have taken place in South American foreign policies towards the U.S.? 2) What is the influence of structure and agency in them? And 3) what are the implications for the new U.S. administration? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The trade policies of Brazil, India and South Africa have significant historical similarities: these countries are original WTO members; they adopted import-substitution industrialization; promoted neoliberal reforms; have been playing important roles in their regional contexts; and, more recently, they have also formed alliances and coalitions (IBSA, G20) in order to increase their capacity to influence the trade regime. At the same time, they are intensifying bilateral and regional ties which are different in scope and degrees of institutionalization. The result is that, despite of having similar roles which are derived from their status as middle powers, these three countries have developed different strategies concerning their trade policy. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyze comparatively the trade policies of Brazil, India and South Africa in the multilateral and regional environments. Our contention is that there are significant differences in their conduct on those two levels, in such a way that it is not possible to establish a fixed pattern of trade policy amongst middle powers, at least not amongst these three. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sugar cane has remained central to the Brazilian economy, and increasingly so as rising petroleum prices spark an increase in the demand for ethanol. As a world le1eader in sugar cane based ethanol production, Brazil has a need for low-skilled, low-wage workers in this industry. As petroleum prices rise, and with them the demand for biofuels, the incentives to produce more sugar cane in Brazil have fueled the demand for labor on plantations and in sugar mills. In Brazil's sugar-producing regions of the central and southeastern states, the labor demands in the fields are primarily filled by migrants. However, these migrants are not foreigners, but Brazilians who migrate seasonally from northern and northeastern states such as Maranhao, Bahia, Alagoas, Para, and Minas Gerais. Although these workers are Brazilians traveling and working in their home country, they face many of the difficulties that international migrants in other countries face, including discrimination, poor wages, and inhumane working conditions. This paper discusses theoretical approaches to domestic sugar cane labor migration in Brazil. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivated by the debate about the rising power of Southern countries, most notably the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China), we critically examine whether it inhibits the potential for the transformation of North-South relations within the global political economy. We argue that these new North-South-relations are much more characterized by similarity and complementarity rather than challenge.This paper analyzes both the regulation of money and production for Brazil, China and India, as well as the ideologies by which they legitimize their orders in international arenas such as the IMFC and the IMF Board of Governors. Such a combined examination of both material and ideational structures reveals that, beyond the rhetoric of contestation, these countries share much of the politico-economic common sense within the G7. In effect, these countries align to the Post-Washington Consensus on how to regulate order in the political economy. This "tolerant liberalism" is able to incorporate any substantial different order stemming from emerging powers. The "challenge" of Southern economies thus does not bring about any substantial change which would not have been on its way within the G7 anyway. Furthermore, it does not enhance the potential for developing countries to pursue independent development strategies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The adoption of a single currency in much of Western Europe, as well as incremental moves toward institutionalized European political representation and policy cooperation, raise the question of what propels sovereign states to forge increasingly sturdy regional ties. Our paper explores the options of South American countries with respect to three competing visions of hemispheric economic integration: NAFTA-Plus, Mercosur-CAN, and the Bolivarian Alternative. The three correspond to the preferred projects of the US, Brazil, and Venezuela, respectively. We suggest, albeit tentatively, that not only domestic political imperatives but also new opportunities and constraints created by the 21st century international system make Mercosur-CAN a likely choice, as well as the most viable option over the medium-run. We particularly emphasize the importance of the democratic transition throughout the continent in the 1980s to resolving collective action problems and making cooperation, even where there are conflicting interests, possible. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How and when do politically influential interest groups influence national economic policymaking? A well elaborated formal political economy literature suggests that macroeconomic and public policy outcomes vary when opposed partisan coalitions?representing, for example, either business or labor?come to control the executive and other high policymaking positions. Yet existing partisan models have not always traveled well when applied to developing country and historical cases, arguably because most such models assume that the underlying political system is an advanced industrial democracy. Opportunistic models of political economy also present problems when applied outside the OECD. I propose a model that accommodates political variation along two dimensions. First, politically dominant partisan coalitions may be either rightist/conservative or leftist/developmentalist. Second, the scope of national political participation may be low, medium, or high. The result is six types of national political regimes, each of which generates strong incentives to incumbent leaders to prefer certain types of national economic policies. Appendix I outlines the application of this framework to predicting choices of national financial architectures across historical and developing country cases. Appendix II sketches a research design focusing on policies for national financial ?reform? in Brazil and India from the early nineteenth century to the present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Viewed in comparative perspective, Brazil's regulation of agricultural biotechnology in the period 1995-2005 raises two puzzles. Why was Brazil relatively slow to permit the commercialization of genetically modified (GM) soy? And, why did Brazil develop more permissive regulatory policies after the election of President Lula, to the disappointment of some of his most important constituents? This paper argues that the explanation for Brazilian policy outcomes lies in the interplay between a constellation of societal interests (consumers, environmentalists, small and landless farmers, and agribusiness) and political institutions (weakly institutionalized parties, federalism, and malapportioned legislative bodies). The paper's point of departure is the observation that key actors in the debate about GM technology in Brazil view it as an extension of two other policy debates, those addressing land reform and the modernizing "green revolution" in agriculture. To a large degree, the political alliances behind each of these policy debates overlap. The key difference between the GM debates and the other two policy debates is the social, political, and legal backdrop in place at the time each debate began. The emergence of consumer protection legislation and consumer advocacy groups, environmental legislation and environmental groups, and the globalization of the commercial agribusiness sector and its renewed importance to the Brazilian economy set the stage for a debate about GM technology that was relatively, if imperfectly, pluralist. Appeals to consumer interests (both actual and potential) were more effective than environmentalists or small producers at convincing policy makers to enact regulations that were opposed by large agricultural interests. Brazilian federalism contributed to the pluralist nature of the GM policy debate, but malapportionment in the national congress detracted from pluralism in legislation regulating GM technology as well as other policies related to land and agriculture. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mirroring the heated debates over the choice of exchange rate regimes among economistsand policymaking elites in Latin America over the last decade, a growing discussion hasevolved in academic circles with respect to identifying the underlying political drivingforces of such policy choices. Conventional wisdom holds that these political pressuresthat determine exchange rate policymaking are both general and specific insofar as policydecisions affect both macroeconomic aggregates and the economic welfare of particulargroups within society. Moreover, as an economy undergoes reforms leading to greateropenness on both capital and current account, therefore turning the exchange rate into anincreasingly prominent variable with significant distributional implications through itsimpact on monetary policy and on relative prices, this political conflict around exchangerate policy decisions is expected to intensify (see e.g. Frieden 1994).This paper intends to evaluate and substantiate this hypothesis of exchange ratepoliticisation by tracing the effects of 'abertura' (opening) in the 1990s on the politicalprominence and framing of exchange rate issues in Brazil. Using empirical evidencecollected in media analyses, opinion surveys and interviews with representatives ofgovernment, labour as well as business organisations, the paper intends to dissect themodalities and drivers behind exchange rate policy's greater political prominence and toinvestigate the evolution of the public understanding of this issue area and, in particular,organised interests' political positioning during this process. This paper argues thatinternationalisation had the expected effect in terms of turning exchange rate policy into arelatively more conflictual area of policymaking but it posits that institutional and cognitivefactors fundamentally determined the intensity and the actual patterns of conflict thatemerged around this policy variable. In particular, this paper examines the role oforganisations representing business and labour in identifying and pursuing the exchangerate policy interests of their members. Against this background, the paper concludes bycalling for a more differentiated use of the term 'politicisation' in the exchange rate politicsliterature, which more accurately depicts the manner in which new actors join politicaldebates around issues like exchange rate policy and thus acknowledges the crucial role ofrepresentative associations in this process as well as their effects on exchange ratepolicymaking more generally. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dominant institutional focus often misses the importance of discourse and semantic power in affecting the quality of democratic control of the armed forces in societies in transition. This paper therefore argues that the policy process and its outcomes are a more effective measure of the de facto quality of civilian control. To investigate this claim, the analysis will apply the securitisation approach associated with the "Copenhagen School" to identify actors empowered to participate in the process of threat definition in Brazil. In Brazil, these notably include legitimate policy bureaucrats, both civilian and uniformed, as well as academics, retired military officers and representatives of military clubs and academies. The paper will illustrate how, in a society in transition, the continued ability of these latter two to attain securitising actor status, and thus exercise influence on policy outcomes, constitutes an ongoing problem for the establishment of full civilian control over the military establishment. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reports on the results of a workshop on active teaching and learning sponsored by the Instituto de Relações Internacionais at the University of Brasilia. This two-day, intensive workshop was designed by the authors to introduce teaching and learning strategies and promote critical dialogue for professors and advanced students from institutions across Brazil. Sessions addressed the philosophy behind active teaching and learning, resources available for developing and carrying out exercises, a wide range of applications, and the importance of debriefing and assessment. This paper reviews the outcomes of the workshop and discusses the particular challenges and benefits of an international program on active teaching. In summary, the workshop was highly successful, and the authors are building upon this model to develop further workshops for training graduate students and professors in the United States and abroad. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the initial spread of the nuclear weapon within the western hemisphere, the spread of the nuclear weapons has been curtailed to some extent. In the 60th year of the successful development of this weapon the original nuclear club comprising of United States of America, Russia (Erstwhile U.S.S.R.), France, United Kingdom and China have grown by only two new countries namely, India and Pakistan. However, the question that arises is that if states such as Brazil and Argentina could renounce their nuclear weapons program, then why did states such as India and Pakistan go ahead and develop the same. The striking aspect of this situation is that all four countries have been designated as developing countries, and hence faced similar challenges in their quest to find a place within the world political order. Thus, I plan to attempt to answer this paradox in this paper based on the case studies of Argentina and Brazil to explain why they renounced their nuclear weapons program and compare it to the case studies of India and Pakistan to elucidate the absence of the factors identified by me, as a result of which they pursued a nuclear weapons program. The case study methodology will evaluate the various social, economic, political and cultural factors that enabled some of these countries to renounce nuclear weapons development while the absence of these factors resulted in countries such as India and Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons programs. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates discursive factors as indicators of the extent of civilian control of armed forces in societies in transition. As an aftereffect of military rule (or societal militarisation), societies in transition often face a situation in which the competence to deal with security issues is low among civilians and high—at least in technical terms—within the armed forces. In these cases, militaries often claim a “monopoly on competence” and seek to control the threat definition process that is the basis of security policy formulation. This investigation will illustrate how military establishments in societies in transition use their discursive control of the security debate, and specific marginalizing tactics, to establish themselves as the sole legitimate securitising actors at the national level. Their ensuing influence over policy outcomes allows them to counteract very successfully the efficacy of formal institutional arrangements designed to shore up civilian control. The creation of a Defence Ministry in Brazil in 1999, while fundamentally altering the institutional landscape of civil-military relations, has yet to bring about substantive changes to the country’s declaratory defence policy. The Brazilian Armed Forces have been able to stave off policy change due to their ability to set the conceptual and linguistic terms of the security debate, and thus ultimately the agenda for threat definition. This is the result of the continuing exalted position of the Higher War College and the effective marginalizing tactics used to enshrine its doctrine as the only legitimate framework for discussion of military matters. Based on extensive field research, the investigation presents for the first time decisive elements behind the formulation of Brazilian security policy in the democratic period, including the drafting process of the 1994 National Defense Policy and the policy modernization process currently underway. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can theoretic ideals of state sovereignty remain viable within the context of environmental interconnectivity? Brazilian territory holds the majority of the Amazon rainforest, an ecological wonder long-touted as the largest forest-based carbon sink on Earth. Brazil, then, stands at the crossroads of much international environmental policy-wrangling. Historically, the Brazilian state has fiercely resisted international attempts to regulate and govern its Amazon rainforest territory, citing sovereignty as its defense. In recent years, however, Brazil has experienced increased economic and normative pressure from the international community on issues of rainforest conservation, and to counter this pressure, the Brazilian state has suggested a model of cooperation that uses selective incentives as a way to reconcile international demands with the sovereignty of its state. This proposed policy model denotes that while traditional notions of sovereignty regarding the Amazon rainforest territory remain significant to Brazil, sovereignty alone fails to explain fully Brazil's newly devised environmental policy strategies regarding this issue. Instead, a sort of hybrid environmental policy combining issues of public goods with notions of state sovereignty provides a more useful theoretical framework with which to examine Brazil's recent Amazon-related interactions in respect to the international community. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although little studied as a laboratory for nuclear management, Latin America is a particularly appropriate place on which to focus issues of nuclear proliferation. Numerous Latin American states have historically followed different nuclear paths and logics, ranging from covert (Argentina) to overt nuclear strategies (Brazil), as well as non-proliferation strategies (Mexico). In spite of these variations, little is known as to why so many similar states in Latin America have followed such diverse and dissimilar nuclear patterns. This project attempts to explain divergent nuclear logics by examining how the evolution of civil-military relations has shaped regional nuclear policy preferences. Since most nuclear weapon projects in Latin America were once handled by military institutions, we need to know how the armed forces and their civilian counterparts have grappled for control over nuclear policy during different historical periods. In particular, we need to know how civilian control of the armed forces affects (or not) nuclear strategies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first decade of the 21st century in South America was characterized by the renewal of national projects after the 1980s crisis and the alignments of the 1990s to the Washington Consensus neoliberal agenda. Inspired by a rebirth of the leftist thinking this renewal has come in different forms, inspired by two different yet somewhat similar, lines of action, Brazil and Venezuela. The aim of this article is to explore the similarities and differences of both this International Relations projects towards the world and South America, exploring its trends of cooperation and conflict focusing on the governments of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Has an "associational revolution" taken place in Japan's civil society? Is civil society in Japan "robust?" We try to provide an answer to these interesting questions by drawing on data we have accumulated from a comparative survey of civil society organizations conducted between 1997 and 2007 in ten countries, including Japan, South Korea, the United States, Germany, China, Turkey, Russia, the Philippines, Brazil and Bangladesh. In addition to the data from the ten-country survey, we used about 40,000 items of data from the 2006-07 Japan Interest Group Survey 2 (or JIGS2), which examined neighbourhood associations, social associations and NPOs in Japan. With the exception of NPOs, our analysis suggests that an "associational revolution", defined as a rapid increase in associations, does not seem to be taking place across the nation. We can confirm such a revolution at a prefectural level, however, as is the case in Hyogo. Moreover, we find that associations closely tied to the profit sector still make up the majority of the social associations that exist and are also orientated towards economic development. As we expand our focus to include neighbourhood associations and NPOs, though, we find a Japanese civil society that has a strong grass-roots foundation.In addtion, we also seek for the answer to these quetions such as how influential civil society organizations are in different countries,how they perceive their efficacy.?. Surveys in each of these states ask CSOs to evaluate their own influence, as well as the influence of other political players. Interactions between state and society, or the characteristics of political regimes, history, culture, people’s awareness, and institutional legacies all affect organizations’ self-evaluation regarding influence. I analyze such differences among countries by comparing JIGS (Japan Interest Group Survey) survey data, collected by the JIGS project from over 10,000 organizations in 10 countries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brazil will gain a place as a significant player in the multi-polar international system taking shape since the end of the Cold War simply on the basis of its economic size and material capabilities. However, its potential to influence international outcomes is likely to be determined more by the capacity of the country's elites to identify and harness qualitative assets associated with its stable and democratic governance than by any hard power assets. Brazil is the quintessential soft power BRIC. Among the four BRICs, Brazil is the only one positioned to become a potential environmental power in a world increasingly preoccupied with global warming. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

American hegemony has passed its peak. The twenty-first century will see a more multi-polar international system. Yet Western European countries may not be the United States' main foils in decades to come. Four new poles of the international system are now widely known in the business and financial press as the "BRICs economies" (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Does the concept of "the BRICs" have meaning within a rigorous political science framing? From the perspective of an economic liberal employing neoclassical assumptions to understand the world economy, the category's justification is surprisingly weak. In contrast, a political or economic realist's framing instructs us to focus on states that are increasing their relative material capabilities—as each of the four is. Finally, within a liberal institutionalist's mental model, the BRICs countries are a compelling set, yet one with a deep cleavage between two sub-groups: large emerging powers likely to remain authoritarian or revert to that state, and those that are securely democratic. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brazil has recently developed an extensive intelligence system composed of at least thirteen different organizations. The most important factors determining the main characteristics of this system were on the one hand the noxious stigma associated with intelligence organizations during the military dictatorship of 1964 - 85, and on the other hand the benign view of the outside world held by Brazilian decision makers and the general public. The development of the system was slow and drawn out due to these two factors and exacerbated by political weakness and even disarray in the executive branch between 1985 and 1995, and the slow emergence of interest by members of the legislative branch in the issue of intelligence. The system is the creation of the executive and the legislature with great emphasis on legality and transparency. The resultant system is a crucial element of democratic consolidation both in terms of motivation and roles. In light of this background, however, there is real concern as to the effectiveness of the system due to the way it is structured and staffed. The concern with effectiveness is new, and is due to rampant violence by organized crime in the biggest cities of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, and the upcoming Pan American Games to be held in Rio de Janeiro in July of 2007. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democracy is supposed to give citizens oversight of the behavior and choices of their political leaders, while providing leaders with electoral incentives to respect the preferences of citizens. A shift from authoritarian to democratic rule consequently ought to alter policymaking. Using the case of Brazilian trade policy, we explore changed versus consistent patterns of post-transition interest aggregation, political participation, and economic goal-setting. Contrary to expectations of a notably enlarged role for Congress, we find that Brazil's executive still dominates trade policymaking. However, significant and increasingly transparent interest aggregation occurs within the executive. Moreover, policy capture by sectoral special interests is down, non-traditional civil society participants have gained some influence, and trade policy outcomes are arguably more public-regarding. We judge that Brazil's trade policy process has been incrementally democratized. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1922, Lenin called for the Soviet Union to control "the commanding heights" of the economy -those critical industries which project tremendous political and economic power within and across borders. Lenin was talking about heavy industry, not high finance. But, in our generation, high finance has become the commanding heights. The importance of strong steel and chemical industries has declined and the power derived from moving capital nationally and across borders has grown in importance. Some suggest these commanding heights have come under attack in many countries. Banks have been targets since the mid-1990s, when the world witnessed a huge, seemingly coordinated worldwide wave of local bank acquisitions by foreigners. These acquisitions occurred after a series of financial crises in Mexico, Asia, Russia and Brazil culminated in the sales of many local banks in some countries, while other countries saw fewer sales. In all, over thirty countries were affected through this process of "financial liberalization." Latin America provided, perhaps, the most active gameboard on which this was played out in terms of both value and volume of acquisitions. Latin America had also provided the template for the sale of banks to foreigners in the 1990's, as Chile's experience in the late 1980's made it the poster child for both privatization and financial liberalization. But before their programs to sell banks to the highest bidder, though, Chile and Mexico had privatized banks in earlier, disastrous programs which had excluded foreign buying.Analyzing these waves of bank privatization and acquisition solely by using financial economics misses the most important aspect of this phenomenon: the processes were fundamentally political, and should be analyzed as such. Banks rely on governmental support and guidance. Banks are monitored and governed by national and international organizations established for that purpose and they lobby these organizations. Banks are also "privately monitored" by investors and other interested parties. In short, banks and financial systems operate in a complex web of politics. The power which banks derive from their informational asymmetry has long been recognized and appreciated by political leaders. The information derived from relationship banking is sought after by political leaders and other interested parties, who observe banks' actions. But this informational advantage comes to banks with a price--banks are subject to severe financial fragility. Barth, Caprio and Levine note, "banking crises are the train wrecks of finance," but these impacts are significantly deeper and wider than just in the world of finance. For these reasons, governmental actors are pulled and pushed toward banks and banks' power. They are pulled by banks' ability to deploy liquidity in productive ways, and pushed by the perceived need to regulate and monitor banking activity. These government officials experience an additional tug of war in that they face a conflict between acting for the public good and pursuing their private gain in their dealings with banks and banking regulation. The large variation in "cross-border" bank acquisitions is not adequately explained through regional expansion strategies of the acquiring banks, cultural affiliation between acquirer and target bank, size of country or type of government or international-level interactions. One can come much closer to an all-encompassing explanation of the pattern of cross-border bank acquisition by employing a different, more agnostic approach by considering the strategic interaction of the players in a cross-border acquisition game. Through examination of the actors' strategies, we find strategy, culture and, especially, politics all contribute to outcome... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]