In 1922, Lenin called for the Soviet Union to control "the commanding heights" of the economy -those critical industries which project tremendous political and economic power within and across borders. Lenin was talking about heavy industry, not high finance. But, in our generation, high finance has become the commanding heights. The importance of strong steel and chemical industries has declined and the power derived from moving capital nationally and across borders has grown in importance. Some suggest these commanding heights have come under attack in many countries. Banks have been targets since the mid-1990s, when the world witnessed a huge, seemingly coordinated worldwide wave of local bank acquisitions by foreigners. These acquisitions occurred after a series of financial crises in Mexico, Asia, Russia and Brazil culminated in the sales of many local banks in some countries, while other countries saw fewer sales. In all, over thirty countries were affected through this process of "financial liberalization." Latin America provided, perhaps, the most active gameboard on which this was played out in terms of both value and volume of acquisitions. Latin America had also provided the template for the sale of banks to foreigners in the 1990's, as Chile's experience in the late 1980's made it the poster child for both privatization and financial liberalization. But before their programs to sell banks to the highest bidder, though, Chile and Mexico had privatized banks in earlier, disastrous programs which had excluded foreign buying.Analyzing these waves of bank privatization and acquisition solely by using financial economics misses the most important aspect of this phenomenon: the processes were fundamentally political, and should be analyzed as such. Banks rely on governmental support and guidance. Banks are monitored and governed by national and international organizations established for that purpose and they lobby these organizations. Banks are also "privately monitored" by investors and other interested parties. In short, banks and financial systems operate in a complex web of politics. The power which banks derive from their informational asymmetry has long been recognized and appreciated by political leaders. The information derived from relationship banking is sought after by political leaders and other interested parties, who observe banks' actions. But this informational advantage comes to banks with a price--banks are subject to severe financial fragility. Barth, Caprio and Levine note, "banking crises are the train wrecks of finance," but these impacts are significantly deeper and wider than just in the world of finance. For these reasons, governmental actors are pulled and pushed toward banks and banks' power. They are pulled by banks' ability to deploy liquidity in productive ways, and pushed by the perceived need to regulate and monitor banking activity. These government officials experience an additional tug of war in that they face a conflict between acting for the public good and pursuing their private gain in their dealings with banks and banking regulation. The large variation in "cross-border" bank acquisitions is not adequately explained through regional expansion strategies of the acquiring banks, cultural affiliation between acquirer and target bank, size of country or type of government or international-level interactions. One can come much closer to an all-encompassing explanation of the pattern of cross-border bank acquisition by employing a different, more agnostic approach by considering the strategic interaction of the players in a cross-border acquisition game. Through examination of the actors' strategies, we find strategy, culture and, especially, politics all contribute to outcome... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]