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The policy puzzle for this project focuses on the rhetorical basis for the engagement policy toward China and the strategies employed by recent administrations to maintain their policy against political opposition. Since Tiananmen Square and the end of the Cold War, the engagement policy debate has become more polarized and the dominant engagement frame has been challenged by more negative interpretations of Chinese intentions. This policy situation raises three important conceptual questions. Why do particular policy frames (like engagement) become dominant and how are they maintained over time? Under what conditions do dominant policy frames become vulnerable to new arguments that require a reframing of the policy issue? What effect does the either-or dichotomy that dominates discussion over Sino-American relations have on an administration’s ability to pursue a pragmatic foreign policy? This paper draws on literature in issue framing from studies in social psychology, public opinion, the media, social movements, and foreign policy to address these questions. The premise underlying this study is that policy framing entails a three-level game, rather than just a two-level game. First there is a game among advisors who work to influence the president’s policy agenda and policy decisions. Second, administrations work to balance international policymaking to domestic political realities. This paper is part of a larger project focusing on the impact strategic framing has on foreign policymaking context in the Nixon/Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II administrations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]