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The epicentre of the Indian Ocean earthquakes and the tsunami on the 26th of December in 2004 was a hundred kilometres off the coast of the Province of Aceh, Indonesia. Within a couple of weeks after the tsunami a massive 4.8 billion Euros tsunami recovery and reconstruction effort was pledged and in August 2005 the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that ended 29 years of armed conflict. For many, it was time to 'build Aceh back better'. This paper explores the normative effects of 'building back better' in Aceh offering insights to the wider discussion on governmentality of reconstruction efforts. The paper focuses on the constructs of linear temporality and developmental spatiality of community-based approaches of reconstruction efforts. Drawing on the emerging literature in IR on conceptualisation of politics of temporality and spatiality (Hutchings 2008; Edkins 2003) the paper articulates local subversion that suggests that 'Aceh' is in a constant process of becoming. The analysis draws on the recently completed PhD research on the normative boundaries of gender mainstreaming advocacy in the post-tsunami context in Aceh, Indonesia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to answer two questions. First, what strategies are available to non-combatants caught up in violent civil wars? Few writers have considered the strategic choices open to civilians. Those who have focus on flight and collaboration. I suggest a third strategy. Echoing students of peasant resistance, I seek to understand how unarmed civilians engage powerful armies. Based on several months of fieldwork in Aceh, Indonesia, I found that community leaders responded to the separatist conflict with distinct strategies. Aceh's chiefs engaged armed groups by acting as diplomats and advocates, exemplifying a strategy of voice. But I also found that, facing the same objective conditions, the positions of community Islamic leaders were predicted by conflict dynamics. In state strongholds Ulama side with the state, in rebel strongholds they supported and joined the rebels, and in contested areas they remained neutral. This pattern of siding with the strong party supports predictions of collaboration offered by Stathis Kalyvas. This variation begs a second question: why do some village leaders challenge combatants, while others make the more pragmatic decision to collaborate? I propose that the strategies of village leaders are largely determined by cultural expectations, norms held by villagers, village leaders, and to some extent, armed groups. Through a variety of methods, I show that Aceh's chiefs are guided by a strong cultural expectation to protect villages and villagers. In contrast, Islamic leaders are expected to deepen Islam in their communities, a responsibility which lends itself to a range of positions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This project is a comparative study of nationalism and the politics of language in Muslim minority conflicts of secession among the Moros of Mindanao in the southern Philippines and the Acehnese of Sumatra at the western edge of Indonesia. The objective is to advance and correct a general theory of nationalism which argues that language, as the primary element of culture, is the locus of nationalist identities and ideologies in modernizing societies. It has been argued by Ernest Gellner, Adrian Hastings and other prominent theorists of nationalism that Muslim populations are the exception to this rule, in that Islamic religious identity precludes the emergence of an ethnic or cultural national identity. As a result, claims for autonomy among Muslim minorities in multiethnic states are typically perceived as religious conflicts rather than national or ethnic conflicts. This paper endorses a weighting of language choice as a policy goal sought by secessionist actors representing distinct Muslim minorities in states with both Muslim majorities (Indonesia) and non-Muslim majorities (Philippines). Following Gellner's parallel model of the non-Muslim modern nation, industrialization rebuilds social structures to create citizens sharing a culture of seamless communication, most often cultivated by state education. As a result, social mobility requires fluency in this shared literate culture. Hence, it is proposed that Muslim minorities, despite any peculiar properties of political Islam, are not exempt from this dynamic. In this view, Muslim minorities engaged in national politics should be expected to behave as ethnic minorities -- advancing and protecting a minority culture and language -- irrespective of their faith. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the war-weary people of Aceh, Indonesia there was a ray of hope on December 9, 2002; ?peace? became ?a possibility?. After twenty-seven years of bloody violence, the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) ? the main warring group in Aceh ? and the Indonesian Government signed an agreement to end hostilities. Unfortunately, the negotiated cease fire only held in the region for the briefest time period before collapsing in May 2003. During that time, however, a number of ?Peace Zones? were established in Aceh, the main purpose of which was to ensure that demilitarisation took place in order to pave the way for humanitarian aid and rehabilitation. Establishing ?zones? to facilitate [among other things] safe disarmament or demobilisation is a common feature of the ending of many violent and protracted conflicts. They are variously named ? safe zones, demilitarised zones, assembly areas, protected zones ? and have been used frequently, but with varying degrees of success. Those set up in Aceh between January and May 2003 can hardly be counted among the successes but a review of their history can be useful. There is much that can be said about and learned from the process and the parties involved in setting up the zones and from the overall peace process itself [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One familiar type of sanctuary or zone of peace is that created temporarily in order to assist in the cantonment and disarmament of rival combatants. This paper examines the contrasting experience of a number of such zones created to assist at various sensitive stages of a peace process when some form of safe territory is needed for confidence building among the combatants. Data is drawn from examples such as the ending of the decolonisation conflict in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and recent efforts to bring the fighting in Aceh to an end [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to examine the effects of severe exogenous shocks on pre-existing conflicts. It will explore in greater depth the case of Aceh, Indonesia, a region torn apart by a 30+ year civil conflict, with seemingly intractable elements. However, after the tsunami of 2004 in which over 125,000 inhabitants in the region perished, disputants were able to finalize a peace agreement. The goal is to examine how this tragic environmental event created a foundation for conflict resolution. What linkages were created that, either did not exist prior to the event or were not properly exploited until the disaster? Are there any lessons to take away which can possibly facilitate other seemingly intractable conflicts? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union has been praised for its successful role as the guarantor of the peace process in Aceh, Indonesia, and the EU-led monitoring mission cited as a model for future international peace operations. For the European Union the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) represented a test case for the newly established civilian crisis management mechanisms within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and demonstrated the ability of the EU to live up to its vision of being a credible global actor in international politics as proclaimed in the European Security Strategy.By examining the experiences of the Aceh Monitoring Mission this paper will argue that far from representing an innovative form of intervention in the 21st Century globalized world, the AMM was a product of high-level diplomacy used as a tool to serve EU's strategic interests. I will begin with the provisions of the peace agreement which leads to questions about the role of the EU-led monitoring mission and its approach to fulfilling its tasks. Finally, I will highlight some of the problems concerning the human rights and justice issues in the peace process. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]