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China's rise as an economic and political power constitutes both an opportunity to promote regional stability as well as a threat to derail regional stability in Asia. One of the major factors effecting China's international role in the coming years will be the management of the so-called Taiwan question. Taiwan's unresolved future, as well as Sino-Japanese relations will, in turn, become increasingly significant issues within Chinese domestic politics. At present, China is doing its best to reassure its neighbors of its peaceful rise to the role of regional power. China wants to be seen as the pragmatic promoter of multilateralism to ensure regional stability, opposed to the China of previous decades, which created instability in numerous Southeast Asian countries by pursuing ideological objectives. On the other hand, when dealing with what Beijing calls a domestic affair, the so-called Taiwan question, China's stance threatens to destabilize the region, a cause of great concern throughout Asia. Increasingly, as Chinese society becomes more pluralistic, the leaders of China could conceivably come under intense pressure from factions within several domestic constituencies to adopt an even tougher stance toward Taiwan, to ensure that the goal of reunification is not nullified forever. Moreover, in the event of economic stagnation, a domestic crisis could propel the Chinese leaders to force a settlement in the Taiwan Strait in an attempt to divert public opinion away from problems at home. This paper will focus on Chinese policies in Asia, describing the development of these policies as they become more accommodating, on the one hand, while simultaneously, due to domestic constraints, more uncompromising and hard-line in the Taiwan Strait and vis-à-vis Japan. The paper will attempt to analyze the effect that the diversification of Chinese politics as well as the emphasis on China's century of humiliation have on China's dual-track Asia policy and its effects on stability in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When do independent states choose to unify? We propose that unification agreements are most feasible when one of two conditions holds. The unification bargain does not independently erode the bargaining power of the weaker state, or the more powerful state can commit credibly not to utilize its increased bargaining power to restructure the agreement ex post. We demonstrate the argument's utility via two historical cases: 19th century Argentine and German unification. We then show that the argument helps to explain why the PRC has found it difficult to make progress on achieving a peaceful bargain with Taiwan, and we consider possible future scenarios in cross-Strait relations in light of the theory and case studies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]