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Taiwan resists reunification with China because of a credibility problem, but the problem is typically explained in a misleading way. While China has an incentive to renege on any promises it makes to respect Taiwanese autonomy under a “one country, two systems” bargain, Taiwan might still choose reunification if it thought that reunification would not independently diminish its bargaining leverage with Beijing. Taiwan’s leverage, whether it chooses reunification or not, depends on its expectations about the extent to which reunification would uniquely erode its economic ties outside China and its military support from the United States in the event of a crisis. If it were to lose those things anyway, it might choose reunification despite the mainland’s general lack of credibility. Historical comparisons with two analogous cases in the 19th century – Buenos Aries negotiations over Argentine reunification with the litoral provinces and Prussia’s negotiations over German unification with Saxony and Bavaria – illustrate our argument. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]