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In April 2005, the Kuomintang (KMT) leader, Mr. Lian Zhan, made his initial visit to the Mainland China and met with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Secretary General, Mr. Hu Jin-Tao, at the Cross-Strait Party Summit, which had been the first historical meeting between KMT and CCP leaders after 60 years since 1945. In 2006, the KMT and CCP jointly held “The Cross-Strait Economic Forum,” “The Cross-Strait Agriculture Forum, and “The Cross-Strait Youth Forum,” during which extensive cross-strait measures beneficial to Taiwan’s agriculture, fishery, medicine, education, and culture were reached to draw Taiwanese people’s feelings. This paper examines and analyzes the dynamic interactions between the KMT and the CCP since KMT’s ice-breaking visit to Beijing in 2005. It concludes that, with the formally established contact and exchange between the two parties, the KMT’s push for the KMT-CCP forums was aimed to show that the party was more capable and competent than the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in dealing with cross-strait relations, while the CCP intended to deter the Taiwan-independence forces through the KMT-CCP cooperation. Unfortunately, such exchange mechanism has been unable to affect the incumbent DPP power structure, thus making it difficult to receive DPP government’s support for achieving any concrete implementation outcomes. On the other hand, once CCP’s “playing softer-and-softer” beneficial strategy fails to draw Taiwanese people’s feelings or to facilitate the Pan-blue’s victory in the 2008 presidential election in Taiwan, the cross-strait relations would very possibly evolve into a more insecure and dangerous situation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2004 Presidential and Legislative Elections in Taiwan have affected Taiwan's political, economic and social development as well as Taiwan's national security and the future trend of the cross-strait relations. More importantly, the election outcome involves both the issue of military balance between the two sides and mutual political interactions, economic and trade exchanges, and social impacts across the Strait. Indeed, the cross-strait issues involve the sophisticate, strategic triangular relationship among the United States, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan, as well as U. S. policy toward Taiwan and vice versa. Based on the outcome of the 2004 presidential and legislative elections, this paper attempts to explore the internal political rearrangements, possible orientation of the new public opinions in Taiwan, and the election impacts on Taiwan's policies towards PRC and the cross-strait relations. In fact, the passage of the first Referendum Act in Taiwan has certainly opened up possible referendum channels for deciding and executing critical political policies on Taiwan and cross-strait relationships such as drafting a new constitution and establishing a new nation, which intensifies PRC's discontent and worries. Despite President Chen's 2004 reelection, his plans to "retitle Taiwan," "draft a new constitution" and "build a new nation" have encountered setbacks due to lacking of legislative majority support. However, Chen's plan to implement a new constitution in 2008 stays firm. Under the conflicting standoffs between Taiwan's "amending or drafting the Constitution" and PRC's "Anti-Secession Law," it is anticipated that the future cross-strait relations will entail significant variations in a harsh atmosphere even though the two sides have, for the first time in 56 years, brought about two-way direct charter flights for the 2005 Chinese New Year showing that the political tension has not deterred a closer and closer economic, social and cultural exchanges across the Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Being one of the international "hot spot", the cross-strait relation could not only influence the future of China, but the stability of East Asia area and even the global system. To majority of researchers, what they pay the main attention should not be the past of the cross-strait relations, that is, why Mainland and Taiwan begin to fight each other, but how could they solve these problems in the future. From the perspective of liberalists, they think the so-called "Democratic Peace" or "Peaceful Transformation" maybe the key answers, it means when Mainland China finish the economic reforms and therefore lead to the political transformation, the problem of cross-strait relations would be solved in the same time. Nonetheless, to the realists who believe the concept of "Power Politics", before we construct an appropriate international regime to deal the conflict effectively, they are afraid that the cross-strait relations should be decided by power contrast between Mainland and Taiwan. In this paper, I will review the standpoint of liberalism and realism first, and then try to analyze and realize which one would be the possible choice to resolve the deadlock of cross-strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing economic and social interaction between Taiwan and China has posed a huge challenge to government regulation on cross-Strait activities. Nonetheless, there is no consensus about whether the government should pursue an advanced opening or not among people in Taiwan. The dispute over whether the current restriction on the cross-Strait activities should be cut down and the extent to which the government should open its economy and society to China have always been highly contesting issues. As one of the major actors in the policy-making process, legislators play a very important role in this dispute. Accordingly, this essay aims to examine the determinants of legislators' position on further cross-Strait opening over time. Our empirical study shows that although the liberal perspective in international relations theory argues that the increasing economic and social interaction between both sides of the Strait will gradually create a more positive attitude toward China among Taiwanese political elites, domestic politics play a more important role in Taiwanese legislators' consideration about further cross-Strait opening. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China, claiming sovereignty over Taiwan, has dramatically changed its policies towards the island ever since Taiwan?s first democratic presidential election in 1996. While there is no doubt that China is strongly motivated to influence Taiwan?s democratic elections to try to prevent victory for pro-independence candidates in Taiwan, it is less clear why their strategies have changed dramatically from each Taiwan election to the next.For the 1996 election, China exhibited both military threats and rhetoric threats. For the 2000 election, China exhibited high rhetoric threats but no serious military threats. And for the 2004 election, China exhibited low rhetoric and low military threats. With the 2008 election nearing, will cross-straits relations rise to another crisis at the level seen in 1996, or will it be low-profile as it was in 2004?My research will not only explore the varying policies and strategies China employed during each of Taiwan?s presidential elections but also attempt to isolate explanatory factors that caused those variations.Focusing on China?s rhetorical and military policy towards Taiwan, I will collect my policy data by on sampling, and categorizing Chinese officials' statements, speeches, official commentators' articles, military exercises, military procedures, and military statements, published in China's key indicator newspaper. The research span will focus on the three Taiwanese election periods, each roughly from eight months before the election to three months after the election. After categorizing, these newspaper reports will be translated into comparable statistical charts so that the variations in China's rhetoric and military threat will be clearly visible and facilitate comparing and contrasting. No analysis of Cross-Strait relations can be understood without considering the impact of the United States and its relations with China. The three presidential election time periods will be examined under the context of the US-China-Taiwan trilateral relationship. The meaningful questions here are when, which, and why certain rhetoric and military policies are taken under the trilateral interactions. By exploring these questions, we can try to understand China's intentions and predict its policies towards future elections in Taiwan, and security in general for the East Asia region. My research will conclude that: 1) there is a strong feedback function in China's policy toward Taiwan. In other words, China's policy making system learned and adapted through Taiwan's three presidential elections by trial-and-error; 2) China's policies, in spite of the variations, are still highly consistent to state rationality (realism). Other realist considerations include China's interesting deterrence-behavior patterns, in particular bluffing; 3) and predictions of possible Chinese policies towards Taiwan for the 2008 election and explanation for China's long term rationality. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]