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The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) report fails to fully engage the ethical and political dilemmas of alternative concepts of 'responsibility'. The R2P report focuses on strategic benefits of intervention: suffering at the margins of power is implied to be worth addressing only because, if left unchecked, it can produce a threat to the 'civilized' world. Moreover, the R2P report thinly veils a narrative of metaphysical duty reminiscent of colonialism by asserting that there are circumstances in which states have a duty to protect those who have no right to expect that protection. A closer examination of the report's intellectual links to the just war tradition shows that its arguments rely on an obscured set of meta-ethical premises. The way the report's authors seem to conceptualize concepts like 'responsibility', 'obligation', and 'justification' restricts and cheapens the vision they offer for a 'responsible' form of global politics. This paper draws from feminist and postcolonial theorizations of 'global ethics' to critique the R2P concept's privileging of knowing, benevolent, Western decision-makers as those whose task it is to decide which duties must be acted upon and when. By emphasizing the elements of accountability and answerability that are essential parts of the concept of responsibility, it is possible to imagine a new and transformative mode of engagement where global actors would commit to the engaged justification of their actions and truly take responsibility for their failings. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a conference paper titled "The responsibility to protect militarily and moral escape hatches: alternative intervention modes" prepared for presentation at the "46th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It offers a review of the perspectives in international ethics on the responsibility to protect and assesses the moral escape hatches within the perspectives.

While much attention has been dedicated to the economic and political dimensions of hegemony, there has been little interest in its moral character. Yet hegemony has often been draped in the trappings of universal morality: we need only look to the recent debates over the morality of the recent American-backed intervention in Iraq to find an intimate connection between the claim of moral hegemony and the practice of political hegemony. This paper explores the role of moral hegemony in a different aspect of contemporary international politics?that of economic globalization. Two very potent phrases have begun to appear in the statements of financial leaders in recent years: universal standards and civilizing globalization. Both have occurred in the context of recent debates around the future of international financial governance. What makes these two phrases particularly interesting, however, is the fact they are both very new and very old. On the one hand, they represent a significant departure from the neutral and technical language that we have come to associate with international financial governance, appealing instead to more explicitly moral conceptions of international order. On the other hand, they echo a much older concept?that of the standards of civilization?which was employed by European states in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to justify the imposition of European standards and laws around the world, supporting an earlier phase of globalization. By examining the parallels and discontinuities between nineteenth and twenty-first century conceptions of standards of civilization, I hope to make further sense of an empirical puzzle: the current move by IMF representatives, among others, to frame economic globalization in the explicitly universalist ethical terms of civility, responsibility and ownership. At the same time, I will seek to tackle a broader theoretical question: whether we are witnessing an attempt to build a new moral hegemony to both support and obscure the politics of globalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a conference paper titled "Mandates, Instruments, Results: Outlining a Consequence-Based Ethic of Intervention" presented at the "46th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It aims to propose criteria for a consequence-based ethic of intervention that does not separate military operation from larger efforts at peace building and post-conflict reconstruction.

In the past ten years, humanitarian intervention has been justified in British foreign policy discourse as a matter of saving people and preventing suffering. The archetypal example of this was the Kosovo intervention of 1999. Equally, in most international relations literature on the topic, both from cosmopolitans and the English School (e.g. Richard Falk and Nicholas Wheeler) the human is at the heart of ethical justifications for war. Yet, in both cases, it is a specific and limited conception of the 'human' that is treated with such care: a human that must be protected on their own soil, but not transferred to a different territory. Perhaps the most obvious ethical solution (cheaper, easier and less violent) to the Kosovo conflict, if protecting the human was key, would have been to airlift refugees into NATO countries. However, such a policy of hospitality was explicitly rejected in British foreign policy - in fact the British government was generally hostile to more refugees. Similarly, humanitarian intervention literature barely touched upon it, despite the importance of cosmopolitan 'hospitality'. Given this, it cannot be a concept of the human stripped of all its political content (what Agamben would call 'bare life') that is key to the ethics of war. Rather, it is a 'human' that must be kept distant, tied to a territorial identity, and separated from the subject that does the saving. It is argued that interveners and cosmopolitans alike need to differentiate their conception of the human, especially in its relation to a territorial 'home'. A more complex conception of the 'human' would be much more difficult to place simplistically at the centre of an ethics of war. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

“Windows of opportunity” has been a core concept in the security studies literature for a long time. It generally refers to a period during which a state has significant advantage over a rival. In turn, this advantage is thought to encourage aggressive behavior by states looking to subdue their adversary. Despite its prominence in scholarly and policy writings, few studies have actually tested the “windows” argument in a systematic way. Rather, it is treated as an article of faith among many analysts that shifts in military capabilities generate windows and these windows trigger aggressive behavior. Military factors, however, are only oneâ€"and perhaps not even the most importantâ€"component of a window of opportunity. Recent work on the role of third-parties in international disputes suggests that diplomatic considerations play an important role in decisions of war. A state would be reluctant to risk war against a rival if doing so might prompt the intervention of third-parties who could influence the war’s outcome. Conversely, leaders who anticipate outside support or indifference are more likely to take such risks. Shifts in diplomatic relations, then, may also open and close windows of opportunity. Absent from the literature is any effort to disaggregate and compare these different types of windowsâ€"military and diplomatic. Yet, this distinction is an important one. It points in two different and often opposing directions for understanding and predicting aggression. I attempt to fill this gap. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on some issues of comparison and criticism on ethical foreign policies. The author emphasizes that examination of the politics of memory which is at work where the domestic and the foreign meet and intersect should be done to understand the moral basis of foreign policy. It mentions that engagement of humanitarian intervention in non-war settings destroyed by natural disasters is a way of adding an ethical dimension to foreign policy.

This essay utilizes competing views on international morality?those of Michael Walzer and Charles Beitz?to argue for a human rights-based understanding of humanitarian intervention. I maintain that the prevailing views on international morality render the conditions under which intervention may take place as either too permissive, or restricted for reasons having little to do with human rights. To be morally consistent with the primacy of human rights, the use of force must be restricted to instances of human rights violations whose moral significance goes beyond the mere existence of human suffering. Thus, this essay employs a Kantian doctrine of human respect in tandem with a utilitarianism of rights test in order to fully encompass the human rights implications of the use of military force. The application of both doctrines is shown to be necessary for a consistent human rights-based understanding of humanitarian intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that motives are central for the classification and evaluation of humanitarian intervention. This conforms to the traditional definition of humanitarian intervention as the coercive interference in the internal affairs of a state for th ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]