Search

This paper identifies and examines a number of long-term trends reshaping the security environment in the Taiwan Strait in ways that might produce a military conflict. Focusing on long-term trends is a useful analytical approach that highlights the possibility that political leaders may knowingly take risky actions in response to perceptions that adverse trends are eroding their security. Taiwan?s democratic transition and growing sense of a separate Taiwan identity have changed the political considerations governing Taiwan?s policy toward the mainland. China worries about growing pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan, but lacks the political tools to build support for unification. As a result, China has sought to deter movement toward Taiwan independence while developing the military capabilities to deter U.S. intervention in support of Taiwan. China?s goal is to force the United States to choose between continuing its support for Taiwan or sacrificing Chinese cooperation on economic and security issues. The perceived Chinese military threat to Taiwan has caused the United States to increase its support for Taiwan, included increased security cooperation. These trends are gradually undercutting the basis for the ?one China? framework that has served U.S. interests effectively for the past thirty years. The paper examines these long-term trends and assesses their implications for the stability of the security environment in the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How best to avoid a possible crisis over Taiwan, which might escalate into the most unwanted war of this century? Traditional studies of Taiwan crises focus mainly on a rational choice theory of deterrence. However, they fail to account for risk-taking behavior that seems irrational but can be well explained by prospect theory. This paper employs prospect theory to explain China's different policies toward Taiwan under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. By using regime security as a reference point to define the domains of action, we suggest that Chinese leaders are more likely to use military coercion, a more risky policy, against Taiwan's pro-independence movements when they are in a domain of losses, i.e., when their regime security faces serious domestic and international challenges. On the contrary, Chinese leaders are more likely to employ political pressure, a less risky policy, to oppose Taiwan's pro-independence forces, if their decision making takes place in a domain of gains, i.e., when their regime security is insured. We conclude that maintaining a good U.S.-China relationship is the best strategy for the United States to avoid military crises in the Taiwan Strait. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper overviews sophisticated triangular relations among Taipei, Beijing and Washington after 2000. Then, it scrutinizes the development of US mediation as a form of third-party intervention in such complicated dynamics in the Taiwan Strait. The pattern of contemporary US mediation is studied in an analytical way. Then, it analyzes the role and approaches (strategies) of the US in mediating between the ROC and the PRC, as well as evaluates preliminarily the future of US mediation. Some key findings include, for example: the US is gradually moving towards the role of real mediator in the cross-strait dispute, the characteristics of the US itself and the environment are positive forces driving further effective US mediation, as well as the US will continue to play a mediating role throughout the George W. BushÂ’s presidency but has to be cautious of the effectiveness of its mediation and the differences between Taipei and Beijing in order to find a useful way to enhance the understandability and acceptability of its official position on the peaceful resolution of the cross-strait sovereignty dispute. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan resists reunification with China because of a credibility problem, but the problem is typically explained in a misleading way. While China has an incentive to renege on any promises it makes to respect Taiwanese autonomy under a “one country, two systems” bargain, Taiwan might still choose reunification if it thought that reunification would not independently diminish its bargaining leverage with Beijing. Taiwan’s leverage, whether it chooses reunification or not, depends on its expectations about the extent to which reunification would uniquely erode its economic ties outside China and its military support from the United States in the event of a crisis. If it were to lose those things anyway, it might choose reunification despite the mainland’s general lack of credibility. Historical comparisons with two analogous cases in the 19th century – Buenos Aries negotiations over Argentine reunification with the litoral provinces and Prussia’s negotiations over German unification with Saxony and Bavaria – illustrate our argument. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]