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This paper focuses on the use of different forms of power by a (leader/patron/hegemonic) state to get the other (non-leader/client) states cooperate with its policies: the use of different forms of power in obtaining cooperation from other states in exercising economic sanctions against a target state. Most of the literature on cooperation operate on the level of bargaining power where the policy changes are directly visible to or observable by the researcher. In this paper, I attempt to show how bargaining power model is not adequate in capturing the complete picture of the relationship between Turkey (a non-leader/client state) and the US (leader/patron state) in their cooperation and non-cooperation with regard to Iraq during the Gulf Crisis and the US War Against Iraq, respectively. In that regard, I attempt to show that the three levels of power (Krause 1991) is a much better and more comprehensive framework in understanding and explaining the power relationship between Turkey and the US. There are three main objectives of this study: (1) to shed more light on the cooperation process, (2) to challenge the conventional wisdom in the area of cooperation that states? cooperative or non-cooperative behaviors are best understood or explained on the bargaining level, and (3) to challenge the utility of paradigms, in this case the rational choice, in the discipline. This study attempts to show why a client state cooperates with a patron state even when this does not look as the best interest to that state, i.e., that state?s first preference is not to cooperate or that state does not have a dominant strategy to cooperate. Similarly, this study also aims at showing why a client state does not cooperate with a patron state even though cooperation seems to be the best interest to the client state. My working hypothesis is that Turkey?s cooperation (or non-cooperation) with the US with regard to the Iraq issue can not be fully understood or explained by using solely a bargaining model which focuses on directly observable (visible) results of a policy or an observable policy change that, for example, could be utilized by either empirical non-quantifiable, or empirical quantifiable data. Lisa Martin?s (1992) game theoretical model is a good framework to look at the relationship between the two states on the bargaining level. But it does not take into consideration the two other levels of power, i.e., it focuses on bargaining power, and omits structural power and hegemonic power. A comprehensive framework of different forms of power relationship between a patron state and a client state is needed to explain the cooperative/non-cooperative behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates in security studies in the U.S. and Europe have drifted almost completely apart. In Europe it is common to present the theoretical landscape in terms of, say, critical security studies, the Copenhagen School, traditionalism and feminism. In the U.S. it is more common to see the major debate within security studies as being the one between offensive realism and defensive realism! Previously, almost all theoretical inventions in IR were made in the U.S. Currently, distinct theories are widely associated with places like Aberystwyth (Critical Security Studies), Paris (Bigo’s Bourdieu-inspired work) and Copenhagen (securitization). The new European approaches differ not only from security studies in the US, they also stand apart from most work done in other parts of the world. Are these theories peculiarly ‘European’ and if so, why? The paper aims at explaining the emergence of these European security theories. The explanation draws partly on the political context in the different regions, and partly on features of the intellectual fields, International Relations and Security Studies. The theories are also assessed briefly as to their relevance and usefulness. To what extent are they bound to local, European problems or relevant to the issues that are addressed elsewhere and vice-versa for the theories that flourish in the U.S. and the periphery respectively? Can they travel to the other parts of the world in a helpful role? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how secondary states experience unipolarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern nation-states, especially those that are builtupon former white settler societies, share a legacy of violence against their indigenous populations, which both serve as the anchor for legitimating the state and justify contemporary political action. I argue that these states operate on a form of "barbaric sovereignty" that is premised on dismantling challenges to its authority, through Eradication and extermination campaigns against indigenous groups. Following a Hegelian conception of history, every historical moment, or moment of consciousness, includes all that precedes it. My claim is that white settler societies employ barbaric sovereignty as a means of Transforming themselves into nation-states, but because total destruction of the past is not possible, such sovereignty produces both the state and a continual anxiety that haunts the nation. Former white settler societies are persistently forced to legitimate their violent histories and reconcile their national anxieties, while disavowing any connections to a larger legacy of colonialism. This paper maps out the historical debates taking place in the United States and in Australia concerning how colonialism in their countries should be written. I use discourse and textual analysis of speeches from political leaders that address their nations’ indigenous populations and colonial past to demonstrate how historical accounts of violence tailor speeches for national leaders when they are responding to national emergencies in their time. I focus on political speeches from political heads of state: Andrew Jackson, Ulysses Grant, Bill Clinton, Paul Keating, and John Howard. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last few years a spate of books has rekindled the debate as to the status of American hegemony (eg., P.Khanna, The Second World; F. Zakaria, Post-American World, etc.), and returned systemic inquiry to the earlier 1980s analyses of Robert Gilpin Wa ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discussions of cultural problems raised in 9/11 report, WMD commission and frequent editorial comments all stress the problems of culture within the Intelligence Community. A few comments selected from recent commentary:? Information sharing is blocked by culture. ? The culture of the Directorate of Operations impedes cooperation with law enforcement organization.? There is a general conflict between civilian and military cultures within the Intelligence Community. ? The Director of the Intelligence Community lacks the authority to direct the community.Sociology and organizational theory dominate the discussion of Intelligence Community reform but the tools of anthropology ? especially those from political and cultural anthropology ? may help us see more clearly the problems that impede effective integration of Community. Among the tools we might take from our anthropologist tool kit are linguistic analysis, organization and concepts of primordial identity, study of status, authority and hierarchy, boundary maintenance and exclusivity of belonging, group responsiveness to external changes, the role of shamans and soothsayers, etc. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]