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This paper attempts to understand how and why China has been portrayed as the primary military threat in Taiwanese security discourse through an examination of offence-defence theory. It is based on the premise that those events or factors that one identifies as dangerous come to be ascribed as such only through an interpretation of their various dimensions of dangerousness. The paper first introduces the protracted debate among the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government, the 'Pan-Blue' opposition parties and US officials and analysts over the 2004 Special Defence Budget controversy. In defence of its arms procurement program, the Chen Shui-bian administration resorted to a particular mode of interpreting danger, that is, the military balance across the Taiwan Strait has been shifting in China's favour and thus it is imperative to correct the imbalance through fielding the weapons systems provided by Washington. The paper then explores the underlying assumption of that pervasive interpretation in the official articulation of Chinese military threat in Taiwan and the United States, which holds that offensive advantages make war more likelyâ??a principal hypothesis of offence-defence theory. Rather than questioning the methodological ambiguities about how to define and measure the 'offence-defence balance', the paper argues that it is precisely these ambiguities that make China's threat image in Taiwan possible. The special budget case is indicative as to how Taiwan's defence policy is better understood as a political practice central to the constitution, production, and maintenance of a peace-loving Taiwanese identity contrary to the belligerent Chinese than as an instrument to build and maintain a capable defence posture against potential attacks from the mainland. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper identifies and examines a number of long-term trends reshaping the security environment in the Taiwan Strait in ways that might produce a military conflict. Focusing on long-term trends is a useful analytical approach that highlights the possibility that political leaders may knowingly take risky actions in response to perceptions that adverse trends are eroding their security. Taiwan?s democratic transition and growing sense of a separate Taiwan identity have changed the political considerations governing Taiwan?s policy toward the mainland. China worries about growing pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan, but lacks the political tools to build support for unification. As a result, China has sought to deter movement toward Taiwan independence while developing the military capabilities to deter U.S. intervention in support of Taiwan. China?s goal is to force the United States to choose between continuing its support for Taiwan or sacrificing Chinese cooperation on economic and security issues. The perceived Chinese military threat to Taiwan has caused the United States to increase its support for Taiwan, included increased security cooperation. These trends are gradually undercutting the basis for the ?one China? framework that has served U.S. interests effectively for the past thirty years. The paper examines these long-term trends and assesses their implications for the stability of the security environment in the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How best to avoid a possible crisis over Taiwan, which might escalate into the most unwanted war of this century? Traditional studies of Taiwan crises focus mainly on a rational choice theory of deterrence. However, they fail to account for risk-taking behavior that seems irrational but can be well explained by prospect theory. This paper employs prospect theory to explain China's different policies toward Taiwan under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. By using regime security as a reference point to define the domains of action, we suggest that Chinese leaders are more likely to use military coercion, a more risky policy, against Taiwan's pro-independence movements when they are in a domain of losses, i.e., when their regime security faces serious domestic and international challenges. On the contrary, Chinese leaders are more likely to employ political pressure, a less risky policy, to oppose Taiwan's pro-independence forces, if their decision making takes place in a domain of gains, i.e., when their regime security is insured. We conclude that maintaining a good U.S.-China relationship is the best strategy for the United States to avoid military crises in the Taiwan Strait. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The state-centeredness of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) reinforces the prevailing Westphalian international system. International organizations privilege cooperation among nation-states so as to ameliorate anarchy. However, events like the establishment of international human rights regimes and the advancement of globalization since the second half of the twentieth century have called into question whether this hegemonic form still represents the best route to global governance. When national governments lack accountability, serious inadequacies may develop. What happens when governments, through which the rights bestowed on individuals by international human rights covenants, are themselves violators of human rights, especially against those of ethnopolitical minorities? What happens when governments, which are entrusted to provide the best care to the well-being of their people, hide information and obstruct international assistance? These glaring gaps are in plain view in the way China initially responded to the crisis of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) of 2003. The World Health Organization (WHO) and China both went through a learning curve.In the era of globalization, the traditional state-centered approach is further inadequate when disputes over sovereignty hinder the rights to which a significant population is entitled under international law. A well-known anomaly in conventional international law and organization is the contest over Taiwan?s (or formally, Republic of China?s) international legal status and its consequent impact on the rights of the people of Taiwan and the benefits that the international community might have enjoyed with the participation of a significant player in global trade, technology, and democracy.This paper seeks to break some new ground in this theoretical and policy lacuna by presenting a sui generis model for Taiwan?s IGO participation that might simultaneously assure China?s concerns, enable Taiwan to play a part commensurate with its global importance, and permit the international society to benefit from the contribution of a key player and improved cross-strait relations. This model is grounded on the recognition that global governance in the era of globalization mandates the inclusion of all functional competent entities and will require adjustments in mindsets and practices. Its key elements are: (1) decoupling the issues of Taiwan?s IGO membership and diplomatic recognition; (2) amending charters or constitutions of those IGOs that allegedly only admit sovereign states so that they can also admit a functionally competent entity (for a particular issue area); (3) stating on Taiwan?s accession documents that admission into a given IGO does not have any impact on that body?s position on China representation or imply sovereignty for Taiwan; and (4) stipulating that Taiwan will automatically lose membership if it declares independence after its entry into the IGOs. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper overviews sophisticated triangular relations among Taipei, Beijing and Washington after 2000. Then, it scrutinizes the development of US mediation as a form of third-party intervention in such complicated dynamics in the Taiwan Strait. The pattern of contemporary US mediation is studied in an analytical way. Then, it analyzes the role and approaches (strategies) of the US in mediating between the ROC and the PRC, as well as evaluates preliminarily the future of US mediation. Some key findings include, for example: the US is gradually moving towards the role of real mediator in the cross-strait dispute, the characteristics of the US itself and the environment are positive forces driving further effective US mediation, as well as the US will continue to play a mediating role throughout the George W. BushÂ’s presidency but has to be cautious of the effectiveness of its mediation and the differences between Taipei and Beijing in order to find a useful way to enhance the understandability and acceptability of its official position on the peaceful resolution of the cross-strait sovereignty dispute. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When do independent states choose to unify? We propose that unification agreements are most feasible when one of two conditions holds. The unification bargain does not independently erode the bargaining power of the weaker state, or the more powerful state can commit credibly not to utilize its increased bargaining power to restructure the agreement ex post. We demonstrate the argument's utility via two historical cases: 19th century Argentine and German unification. We then show that the argument helps to explain why the PRC has found it difficult to make progress on achieving a peaceful bargain with Taiwan, and we consider possible future scenarios in cross-Strait relations in light of the theory and case studies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China, claiming sovereignty over Taiwan, has dramatically changed its policies towards the island ever since Taiwan?s first democratic presidential election in 1996. While there is no doubt that China is strongly motivated to influence Taiwan?s democratic elections to try to prevent victory for pro-independence candidates in Taiwan, it is less clear why their strategies have changed dramatically from each Taiwan election to the next.For the 1996 election, China exhibited both military threats and rhetoric threats. For the 2000 election, China exhibited high rhetoric threats but no serious military threats. And for the 2004 election, China exhibited low rhetoric and low military threats. With the 2008 election nearing, will cross-straits relations rise to another crisis at the level seen in 1996, or will it be low-profile as it was in 2004?My research will not only explore the varying policies and strategies China employed during each of Taiwan?s presidential elections but also attempt to isolate explanatory factors that caused those variations.Focusing on China?s rhetorical and military policy towards Taiwan, I will collect my policy data by on sampling, and categorizing Chinese officials' statements, speeches, official commentators' articles, military exercises, military procedures, and military statements, published in China's key indicator newspaper. The research span will focus on the three Taiwanese election periods, each roughly from eight months before the election to three months after the election. After categorizing, these newspaper reports will be translated into comparable statistical charts so that the variations in China's rhetoric and military threat will be clearly visible and facilitate comparing and contrasting. No analysis of Cross-Strait relations can be understood without considering the impact of the United States and its relations with China. The three presidential election time periods will be examined under the context of the US-China-Taiwan trilateral relationship. The meaningful questions here are when, which, and why certain rhetoric and military policies are taken under the trilateral interactions. By exploring these questions, we can try to understand China's intentions and predict its policies towards future elections in Taiwan, and security in general for the East Asia region. My research will conclude that: 1) there is a strong feedback function in China's policy toward Taiwan. In other words, China's policy making system learned and adapted through Taiwan's three presidential elections by trial-and-error; 2) China's policies, in spite of the variations, are still highly consistent to state rationality (realism). Other realist considerations include China's interesting deterrence-behavior patterns, in particular bluffing; 3) and predictions of possible Chinese policies towards Taiwan for the 2008 election and explanation for China's long term rationality. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan resists reunification with China because of a credibility problem, but the problem is typically explained in a misleading way. While China has an incentive to renege on any promises it makes to respect Taiwanese autonomy under a “one country, two systems” bargain, Taiwan might still choose reunification if it thought that reunification would not independently diminish its bargaining leverage with Beijing. Taiwan’s leverage, whether it chooses reunification or not, depends on its expectations about the extent to which reunification would uniquely erode its economic ties outside China and its military support from the United States in the event of a crisis. If it were to lose those things anyway, it might choose reunification despite the mainland’s general lack of credibility. Historical comparisons with two analogous cases in the 19th century – Buenos Aries negotiations over Argentine reunification with the litoral provinces and Prussia’s negotiations over German unification with Saxony and Bavaria – illustrate our argument. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]