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The purpose of this paper is to map the limits of the geopolitical imaginary in post-Cold War Germany. The research for this paper is a first cut into a broader investigation into the reasons for the absence of a geopolitical renaissance, despite a strong German tradition of Geopolitik. While the early 1990s saw a number of publications on new opportunities for German geopolitical interests, these publications never seemed to have had a significant impact on the politically relevant discourse. The present paper will provide a brief analysis of these publications and the representations of geo-political space found in them. As such, they are taken to outline the expanded space of geopolitical imagination in post-Cold War Germany. In a second move, the paper will trace the actual contours of the German government’s emerging post-cold war discourse, 1989-1994. The paper will pay particular attention to this discourse’s geographic spatialization and the government’s attempts to continuously anchor Germany’ in the West, thus foregoing any reconsideration of German foreign policy’s Weltbild. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks into the evolution of regional co-operation in Europe and East Asia since the mid-1990s and at the policies of Germany and Japan in those contexts. Using role concepts as analytical tools for the comparative analysis, the paper assesses the specific role concepts of Germany and Japan with regard to regional co-operation, both in the economic and in the security context. It is widely assumed that East Asia represents an entirely different context for regional co-operation from Europe, and therefore has developed a new, specifically Asian way of regionalism. So far, less attention has been paid to Japan´s specific aims and policies in promoting and supporting regionalism in East Asia. Has Japan been important in promoting shallow forms of regional integration in East Asia, in contrast to Germany´s support for deep integration? If so, how should this be seen from the perspective of the civilian power role concept? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper seeks to conceptually develop the notion of gender mainstreaming through a systematic comparison with the equal rights approach that preceded it. It takes as an example the agricultural policy arena in Germany, comparing the development of pension rights for farmwomen in the early 1990s to the implementation of gender mainstreaming at the turn of the century. Experts charged with implementing gender mainstreaming have argued that the notion is conceptually unclear and leads to confusion in its application. Movement activists, in addition, have charged that gender mainstreaming has become an excuse to cut funding for programs that favor women. The observations of these feminists show that the implementation of gender mainstreaming takes place and gains meaning in political contexts. Gender mainstreaming has become a new, unique site of gender politics. The paper will survey organizational theory to develop propositions about gender politics in the German agricultural ministry and its political environment. In particular it will probe the following questions: -How do the organizational discourses on equal pension rights differ from those on gender mainstreaming? -How do organizational networks charged with implementing equal pension rights differ from those charged with implementing gender mainstreaming? -In these organizational discourses and networks, how are gender hegemonies and gender hierarchies reconstructed? The purpose of the paper is to employ an outsider’s perspective and a political science perspective to assess the significance of gender mainstreaming for feminist movement politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the reform of the Law on the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA Law). It does so by utilizing the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM). The paper argues that the BPM's stand-sit proposition and the resultant proposition have strong explanatory power. On the other hand, the bargaining proposition proves useful only to a certain extent. While interaction between bureaucratic actors surely was a crucial element of the decision-making process, the model's focus on the executive branch made it miss other actors that were also important for the reform of the BKA Law. This suggests that the explanatory power of the BPM would be further enhanced if domestic constraints on bureaucratic bargaining processes are systematically incorporated. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims at presenting research about the roots of Realism, in particular about the origin(s) of Hans J. Morgenthau's Realism and his ideas about international politics which can be found in his German years in the Weimar Republic. The thesis presented in the paper is about the impact of the liberal as well as the conservative and emerging totalitarian 'Zeitgeist' on young Morgenthau, especially during his time as lawyer in Frankfurt (1923-1932, interruptedly). The German years have to date been a crucial aspect which is almost neglected in the literature focusing on the history and evolution of Realism and of International Relations (IR) as a discipline so far. Nevertheless, the core argument of this paper is that we have to take Morgenthau's life and work in Germany - in particular the historical, political and economic context in which he was embedded, and the influence of intellectuals such as left social democrat Hugo Sinzheimer and far-right conservative Carl Schmitt on Morgenthau - seriously as the constitutive moment of Realism. If we truly want to understand the genesis and trajectory of Morgenthau's thought it becomes of dire necessity to incorporate and to explore this time period of his life. To illustrate my argument: Morgenthau's criticism of US foreign policy was, among other things, characterized by a multitude of legal and moral arguments against US interventionism in Central and Latin America and against Vietnam War. One of his arguments was about the moral attractiveness, integrity, and legitimacy of the United States as a model of society to be emulated by other nations. This perhaps even critical and normative bias, at first glance, seems to be paradoxical when thinking about 'Realism' as a purely power-based theory. If we are to understand the tensions, inconsistencies and even paradoxes in Morgenthau's thinking about power, international law, and morality, and if we seek to deal with them, we must begin by reconsidering his early Weimar ideas (which are in deep contrast to his later postwar American ideas) and his socialisation in the 'Twenty Years' Crisis'. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today people of Turkish origin comprise Germany's largest ethnic minority, with an estimated number of around 2.5 million Turks living in Germany. With immigration naturally arises the issue of integration, of how the immigrants will relate to and live in the host society. Integration encompasses economic, political, social and cultural factors which are fundamental in building bridges between the two societies. In recent years the failure of this community of Turkish immigrants to integrate into German society has come to light. The pressing issue of this community’s struggle illustrates the wider problem of immigrant integration facing Germany. This paper will address the challenges of integrating Germany’s minority immigrant populations. Focusing specifically on Germany’s Turkish immigrant population provides a valuable case study of the challenges facing Germany in regards to understanding the relationship between these spheres German society. Three possible hypotheses on the underlying causes of Germany’s difficulty in integrating its minority immigrant populations will be examined: the role of German state policies, the societal perception of immigrants among the German population, and the role of the minority immigrant communities. The implications of this paper extend beyond Germany’s relationship with its Turkish population to the issue of immigration within Germany and more broadly within the European Union. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the politics of youth unemployment in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. For decades following World War II, joblessness among young people was consistently lower than the adult rate; today, however, Europeans between the ages of 18 and 25 are experiencing significantly higher levels of unemployment and underemployment in comparison to older workers, despite being better educated and a smaller total percentage of the population than previous generations. While traditional explanations of youth joblessness emphasize the transitory nature of the youth job market, maintaining that high levels of youth unemployment are, in a sense, “natural,” this paper argues that in France and the UK, young people have served as a “test” group for labor market liberalization for successive governments since the early 1980s. In France, this has led to a massive increase in unemployment rates for young people, while in the UK the effect has been a decline in the relative wages and employment rates for youth and a huge spike in the number of Britons under 25 involved in government education, training, and work schemes. In both countries, liberalizing the youth labor market has created an “insider/outsider” system for older and younger workers, with potential long-term political, economic, and social implications. While rigidities are still prevalent in the German youth job markets, the strength of the German apprenticeship system and the more deeply rooted system of legislative protections for youth have generally served to cushion young people from the negative side of labor market liberalization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the diplomatic engagement of the EU3 (Germany, France and the UK) with Iran, in the context of growing regional and international concerns about the Iranian uranium enrichment programme and Tehran's perceived regional hegemonic ambitions. Drawing on the academic literature on coercive diplomacy/strategic coercion, this paper examines EU3 negotiating strategy and that of Tehran, focusing on three key elements: demands, threats and time frame. The central argument is that the Iran case is a unique, if not anomalous example of coalitional coercive diplomacy, in which the states engaging in diplomatic negotiations lack either the military capabilities or political will to threaten coercion, and the states making threats are not engaged in diplomacy. Nonetheless, the Iran issue provides an interesting case-study which highlights the possibilities and limitations of coalitional coercive diplomacy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper begins from reflection upon a very real fence and the imagined bridges constructing the theme of this year’s ISA conference. In preparation for the G8 summit in Heiligendamm, Germany, taking place on June 6th to 8th 2007, an enormous fence has been built around the little Baltic Sea resort. The fence is some 12 kilometers (7.5 miles) long, 2.4 meters (7.9 feet) tall, stabilized by 4,800 concrete slabs and crowned by four rows of barbed wire, which are, in turn, covered in thick rolls of razor-wire. 18,000 police officers and at least 1,100 military personnel will be deployed to safeguard the G8 proceedings. Authorities are preparing for mass arrests of protestors, and harassment of organizations supporting protest mobilization is already in full swing. In this paper this fence is viewed to symbolize the division of critique from power. The argument will be made, in line with the panel theme, that those academic approaches that are employed to buttress the defenses of power against critique should be contested. What is in order here is not bridge-building but the tearing down of fences for the sake of both exposure and access. The bulk of the paper will consist in a discussion of how and which academic approaches in our field contribute to the protective self-enclosure of politically dominant institutions and practices. The aim is to identify lingering epistemological and institutional obstacles to critically engaged IR scholarship. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The “theory” of preventive war predicts that states are most likely to undertake military action in response to a rising challenger if they expect that the adversary will surpass them in military strength and then engage in hostile behavior, so that a future war with the challenger is likely. The biggest apparent anomaly for this theory is the Western rejection of a strategy of prevention based on better-now-than-later logic in favor of the strategy of appeasement in the 1930s. In our previous work on the Rhineland Crisis of 1936 and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1938, we demonstrated that the British and French non-response is not at odds with preventive war theory because British leaders believed that the transition had already occurred prior to 1936, leaving France and Britain with few options, and because French leaders would not take a firm stand against Germany without British support. This interpretation begs the question of why Britain and France did not respond more firmly to the rise of Hitler and to German rearmament before 1936, either through military buildups of their own, a containment strategy based on alliances, or perhaps through coercive threats or preventive military action. In this paper, we address this important question with an analysis of British and French government documents and private papers. We conclude with a discussion of the limits of preventive war theory. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past two decades, there has been an upsurge of interest in the research on the effect of prime ministers on foreign policymaking. One of the most controversial issues within this body of research concerns the following question: What is the primary determinant of how prime ministers manage foreign policy decision-making processes in parliamentary systems? The response to the question has taken different shapes: Whereas students of comparative politics prioritized structural constraints that affect the power position of a prime minister (such as ministerial autonomy, existence of a pivotal party within the coalition, etc.), scholars in leadership studies emphasized the personality factor and leadership style. Structural approaches to the question tend to downplay the extent to which individual prime ministers can shape the process, while psychological perspectives understate the importance of external constraints within which any agent is to act. In seeking to bridge the relevant literatures in comparative politics and international relations, I offer a systematic comparison of prime ministerial management of foreign policy-making processes which attends simultaneously to institutional constraints and the leadership styles of individual prime ministers. Following the structured-focused comparison method, the paper focuses on a total of six cabinet decision-making cases in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Israel. The paper is guided by the following question: How does the interaction between leadership style and institutional constraints shape the prime ministerial management of the foreign policy decision-making process in various types of cabinets? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European integration has been deepened and expanded several times toward the Eastern enlargement whose start was to realize the renunciation of war between Germany and France. Although variety of issues arguing self interest occurred, shared interest coming from European common values has seemed to exceed self interest, which has led to the EU eastern enlargement. Compared with European Union which has its institutional way of integration, East Asia is called as functional way of integration led by enterprises not by nation states, which has led to the de facto integration. We examine in this paper the origin and the characteristics of the introversion of East Asian region with public goods approach. Also we investigate the way in which East Asian internationalism will appear and East Asian international order with independency will also be born, whose tendency is investigated in this paper by function provided by reiterated communication (typically insisted by Axelrod) and by beneficial viewpoints of creating FTA and customs union (typically asserted by Kemp and Wan). Those viewpoints emphasize importance of free mobility of goods, labor and capital, communication and reiteration towards Pareto optimal situation, towards more integration. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the failures of a preventive war strategy in the case of Iraq, preventive military action has not been fully discredited in wider policy and political circles. The 2006 National Security Strategy reiterates the Bush administration’s commitment to the preventive war option in principle, while a number of military analysts, think tank pundits, and presidential candidates from each major party, continue to treat preventive war as a viable strategic option to address future power shifts. This is particularly evident in the debate over how to address Iran’s nuclear program, reflected in the insistence of many policymakers, analysts, and political leaders that “all options” â€" including preventive attack â€" must remain “on the table.” Given this enduring interest in preventive war, scholars must continue to critically examine the difficult calculus involved in thinking through this policy choice.This paper argues that a severe shortfall in most analyses of the preventive war option is created by heavy emphasis on raw military variables in calculations of likely costs and benefits of launching a preventive war. Short shrift is given to another dimension of preventive war that is at least as important, and in some cases more important, than the military dimensions: the political costs of initiating war in the absence of overt aggression by the target state. Previous studies have noted two types of political costs of initiating preventive war. The need to generate and sustain domestic political support for preventive war in the absence of overt aggression or a clearly imminent threat from the target state can be an insurmountable obstacle to executing the option, or perhaps politically debilitating in the long run. At the international level, initiating preventive war without broad multilateral support can have a costly ripple effect across many issue areas. Yet there is a third type of cost that has not been developed in the preventive war literature, a cost that follows from the political effects of preventive war within the domestic political system of the target state. The likely domestic response within the target state to what its leaders can portray as unprovoked aggression will be nationalist hostility and support for revanchist armed conflict. To the degree that the goals of a preventive attack include a more stable post-conflict order and acceptance of the status quo by the target state, this backlash must be treated as a potentially severe cost of the preventive war option itself, an effect that ultimately negates the rationale for conducting the preventive attack in the first place.To explore this political cost, the paper presents a counterfactual study of what is perhaps the critical, and certainly the most widely cited, case of a power shift that did not, yet which many assert should have, motivated a preventive war in response: the rise of German power in the mid-1930s. Building on a recent burst of interest in counterfactual analysis among international relations scholars, the paper demonstrates that, despite being unorthodox methodologically, it is an essential method for studying any preventive war, either proposed or actual, both historical and in the future. And using the logic developed in the paper on the political effects of preventive war within the target state, the case study advances the provocative claim that a preventive war against Germany in the mid-1930s would not have allowed the Allies to avoid the horrendous costs of the war in Europe that the Nazi regime eventually unleashed. Moreover, an allied preventive war would have rendered the goal of creating a more progressive international order that included Germany as a status quo power extremely unlikely. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that NATO can still play a useful role in providing security to its members after September 11. The alliance had been prepared for terrorist attacks politically and militarily and continues to adjust to a new security environment. As a consequence, it acted swiftly and decisively in response to September 11. In addition NATO generated two important "second image reversed" effects. First, its defense planning system coordinated and implemented common military goals and ensured interoperabililty among national forces. Second, its decisions changed the political discovered in member states. Using the example of Germany -- currently the most reluctant ally of the U.S. -- the paper shows that the discourse changed from "(self)interest" to reputation" after NATO invoked article 5. However, when important conditions are missing such as agreed contingency plans and pre-delegated authority NATO is weak and indecisive. This was the case when NATO discussed the war in Iraq and defending Turkey in case of an Iraqi attack. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper makes two complementary points: firstly, that we have to look beyond norms and identities if we want to reach a comprehensive understanding of how ideas shape political debates over international issues; and secondly, that the common practise of discourse analysis as reading newspaper articles and public pronouncements, not necessarily enables us to get the full picture of discourse "out there", as actors may strategically use and withhold ideas and arguments. To illustrate these points, the paper draws on the German domestic debate on the eastern enlargement of the European Union. A qualitative and quantitative content analysis of parliamentary speeches and newspaper editorials reveals how paradigms such as "interdependence" or "multilateralism" functioned as analytical prisms and played a key role in the public political struggle over the enlargement issue. In a sense, the advocates of enlargement were successful as their normative and empirical arguments made a proactive policy toward the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) a duty. Nevertheless, based on a narrative of economic disaster and political instability in the CEEC the rhetoric "backfired" to certain extent. In the light of already circulating paradigms, those interpretations fostered the definition of risks of enlargement and were used as justifications for delaying full integration. Finally, the growing relevance of egocentric "national interests" in the debate can be explained by the fact that the "public minority" actively taking part in the debate argued before a rather sceptical audience which they tried to convince by the strategically usage and withholding of relevant moments of elite discourse. By comparing the linguistic "foreground" and survey data on the cognitive "background" of the debate, two distinct types of intended and normatively problematic manipulation are described. Firstly, although the common truism of the purely rhetorical character of normative arguments in political debates seems to be exaggerated, the way expectations of positive consequences for the applicant societies were used as justification to meet the proclaimed "responsibilities" was not authentic. The claimed altruism towards the applicant societies, though, serves as an example of strategic usage of justifications. Secondly, unemployment as a rather common perception of a "German" risk of enlargement has been neglected in the public debate - an example of the strategic withholding of counter arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "The Impact of War and Successful Reconstruction: Evaluating the Bush Administration's Germany-Japan-Iraq Analogy" prepared for the "International Studies Association Convention" held in Honolulu, Hawaii. It examines the legitimacy of the analogical reasoning by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush in the Iraq war based upon on an assessment of the commonalities across Japan, Italy and Germany. The paper mentions different meanings of path dependence theory according to several authors.

Germany categorically refused to participate in the war against Iraq, and there was little debate about this. At the same time, however, there was a debate about war: about German memories of Allied strategic bombing against German cities in the Second World War. Despite the devastation caused by this bombing, such memories remain difficult to speak about. Some therefore argued that a debate about these memories was overdue, whilst others saw them as ethically problematic, self-serving and sentimental, in particular because they allegedly construe Germans as victims. This paper goes beyond the political debate that quickly shuts down the ethico-political issues raised and demonstrates the implications of confronting such memories through reading a novel. A close engagement with these memories not only potentially undermines the stories told to legitimate war today. The paper argues that the very painfulness of these memories, and their propensity to return unbidden, are significant to the ethico-political question of war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Migrant communities embedded in global diaspora networks have long been disregarded by national policy actors or merely seen as policy problems, as their emergence ran counter to the assimilationist efforts and "either-or" citizenship constructions in their host countries. Following that logic, recent public debates focus on the dark side of transnationalism - globally operating networks of terrorists. A quite different trend has emerged in traditional immigration countries like Canada and is now spreading to nontraditional immigration countries like Germany: Policy actors in various fields have discovered the bright side of diaspora networks: the high potential they offer for bolstering their host country's engagement in international development on the one hand and international trade relations on the other. This paper argues that both aspects of policy discourse show a paradigm shift in the construction of diaspora networks - even in nonclassical immigration countries: They are taken for granted, treated as collectivities and seen as side-effects of blurred national boundaries. Focussing on discourses in Germany on the potential of diasporas for international development, the paper also shows that the growing activity and public influence of diaspora communities is a crucial factor for the convergence of national policy discourses - thereby transforming a field that has traditionally been shaped by domestic voices and concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the heart of the EU?s problems in turning its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) into an effective crisis management instrument are differences among EU member states about what role the EU should play as a security actor in a changing international context, what kind of instruments are to be used in what situation, and what the role of the military should be in all of this? This paper will analyse national responses to ESDP. The central argument presented is that while all EU members face the same pressures emanating from the international environment and ESDP, their responses are culturally conditioned. Growing convergence among EU member governments about the security challenges the EU is facing therefore does not produce convergence with regards to how to address them. The results are conflicting visions about the EU?s role in the world and the function ESDP should perform as an instrument at the EU?s disposal. I will briefly summarize external pressures expected to trigger policy change in EU member states. Second, I will outline a framework for comparative analysis, to examine how EU member states respond to these adaptation pressures. Finally, I will apply this framework to the case of Germany. An appendix sketches initial thoughts on the cases of Austria, France and the United Kingdom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the East Bloc crumbled and Germany was reunified in 1990, it promised countries such as Poland that it would act as their advocate in the EU, pushing the EU to admit them. Did Germany keep its word? What mix of motivations drove it? This paper will show that, while Germany saw itself as pursuing European goals, it also was driven by national foreign policy and domestic goals. Expansion strengthens Germany--both by promoting its reconciliation with the East and by strengthening Germany’s central role in the union. Yet Germany has reason to fear low-priced competition from its neighbors. As the EU prepares to take on new members in 2004, the accession negotiations offer a rich field for studying the mix of European and national interests in the new Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1999, Germany’s reformed citizenship laws permitted the naturalization of some 350,000 ethnic Turkish/Kurdish long-term immigrants in the country. As new German voters, this group now represents about 1 percent of the electorate. But by 2006, the next time German voters will elect a national government, Germany’s political parties expect this voting bloc to double, which will significantly influence the outcome of national elections. This author proposes that despite a 70 percent rate of support among the ethnic Turkish/Kurdish Germans in favor of the Social Democrats and the Green Party, it will be the Free Democrats who will garner a significant percentage of the Turkish/Kurdish vote by 2006. The author intends to evaluate the transformative political impact of the ethnic Turkish/Kurdish vote on Germany’s political landscape. A primary focus in this paper will be on changes in public discourse regarding issues such as business development, immigration, and multiculturalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine the inter-relationship between Germany’s enforced disarmament following the First World War and the international disarmament process launched under the auspices of the League of Nations by the peace settlement. It will consider three linked themes: (i) how the initial, highly-limited model of what international disarmament entailed steadily evolved into the far more ambitious conception of a general limitation agreement covering all spheres of armaments and embracing all states; (ii) how Germany’s political position evolved from that of an object with no voice in the disarmament debates to that of an integral participant with an effective veto power on any agreement; (iii) how differing British and French views of the importance of Germany’s continued enforced disarmament for European security effectively blocked a successful compromise on international disarmament during the years from the war’s end until the collapse of the League’s World Disarmament Conference in 1933. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ratification process for international treaties has become increasingly politicized in many democratic states, often pitting domestic actors against one another in intense debates about institutional commitments and sovereignty. But while scholars have devoted attention to the negotiation of international agreements, few have studied ratification struggles that define the ultimate success or failure of international commitments. Fewer still have examined the dynamics of this process in comparative perspective. This paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature by exploring the politics of contemporary international treaty ratification processes across democratic regimes. Drawing on two-level game theory, I posit that successful elite strategies for treaty ratification in democratic states must take into account regime type (which conditions executive-legislative relations), interest group pressure, and public opinion in the domestic political environment relative to international commitments. A structured, focused comparison of case studies is presented to analyze the experiences of the United States, Canada, and Germany in ratification struggles in the past decade. Treaties that have been successfully completed, including the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Treaty on European Union, are compared to high-profile treaty failures such as the United States’ position on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol. I conclude that the likelihood of successful treaty ratification across issue areas depends primarily upon executive strategies and electoral systems (which condition elite consensus in government). In addition, federalism and factionalism appear to function as important intervening variables. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can differences in climate policy between Norway, Germany, and the United States be explained and understood? What sources of influence were important for different policy outcomes? This paper discusses how three sets of causal factors explain sources of influence for climate change policymaking in Norway, Germany, and the United States in the time period 1988-2001. The analysis demonstrate how these causal factors can be used as maps to understand both the differences in climate change policymaking processes and policy outcome in the three countries. The findings suggest that domestic politics factors like social demand for and governmental supply of policy, together with the distribution of costs and benefits between domestic actors that can be expected from policy, mean much for both process and outcome. In fact, it seems to mean more than overall national cost-benefit assessments as such, as well as cultural differences between countries and learning-induced changes in perceptions that potentially can set the course for the policymaking process. This research contributes to the discussion about which theoretical approach offers greatest understanding of the aspects of the policymaking process, and further the understanding of the processes, actors, and driving forces that shape climate change policies. It also helps to explain why some countries adopt a more proactive climate change policy stance than others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines several key problems in the application of the enforced disarmament of Germany by the Allied powers after the First World War (1919-1928). It will focus on how different conceptions of disarmament amongst the Allies responsible for its enforcement (in particular France and Great Britain) undermined both the alliance and the disarmament process. It will discuss the importance and failures of the intelligence process in the enforcement of German disarmament. It will also show how the First World War and the idea of total war made the effort to enforce disarmament profoundly more difficult compared to the pre-1914 era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines (a) the functional, relational, and discursive dimension of the normalization thesis in one study, (b) for both web 1.0 and web 2.0 features, (c) in a longitudinal design. It is based on a quantitative content and structural analysis of German party websites in the National Elections 2002-2009. The results show that the normalization thesis holds true in all its dimensions over time and in the web 2.0 era: Parties still focus on the top-down elements of information provision and delivery while interactive options are scarce. The digital divide between parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties has narrowed over time, but remains visible for all online functions in 2009. Moreover, the gap is wider in web 2.0 than in web 1.0. Finally, German e-campaigns increasingly reflect those patterns of traditional election coverage that have been held accountable for rising political alienation in the public, i.e. strategic news and extensive negativism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the German political parties’ strategies towards immigrant voters in elections since 1990. It hypothesizes that the 1999 citizenship reform has produced a new mobilization scenario, with the mainstream parties now increasingly competin ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Learning from the past to shape a better future usually involves scanning history for instructive patterns or successful policies that can be transferred into the present. In this paper, I discuss a social movement that took a different ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within debates on Global Governance corporate participation in various forms of self-regulation is increasingly being studied. Yet, a variable formerly considered to be important, the home state, has not drawn much attention recently. However, first research results indicate that in explaining the differences in corporate behaviour in self-regulatory initiatives the home state still matters.Two different patterns of corporate engagement can be distinguished: Corporations can either accept and implement existing norms of an initiative which would qualify them as norm-consumers. This rather passive absorption of norms can be contrasted with a second pattern of corporate behaviour, the active engagement in norm formation and norm development within CSR-initiatives. Thereby corporations are taking on the role of norm-entrepreneurs.The paper aims to investigate the conditions for these variations in corporate behaviour, either acting as norm-consumers or norm-entrepreneurs. In contrast to theories of transnational corporations that describe corporations as de-nationalized entities, we argue that the political environment of a corporation’s homestate determines in how far a corporation is willing to take on the role of a political actor. Following the Varieties of Capitalism approach, it will be shown that characteristics of coordinated and liberal market economies are decisive not only for explaining business strategies but also whether corporations take on the role of norm-consumer or norm-entrepreneurs.This argument will be illustrated by empirical findings from case studies of eight companies from four countries (France, Great Britain, Germany, South Africa), representing different types of economies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Post-Cold War military reforms in Britain, France and Germany have been characterized by patterns of convergence in the objectives, instruments and institutional forums of defense policy, but by divergence in temporality. These patterns of convergence and divergence cannot be fully explained by cultural approaches. Neither can they be explained solely by a focus on the role of 'international structure', as neo-realism posits, although the post-Cold War distribution of capabilities is driving Britain, France and Germany towards policy convergence. Instead the analysis builds upon the insights of neo-classical realism and its emphasis upon 'state power' by demonstrating the important intervening role played by domestic material power relationships in incentivizing figures within the core executive to respond to systemic power shifts. The paper argues that in Britain and France 'executive autonomy' in defense policy, resulting from the unitary state, weak linkages between defense and social policy subsystems and formal powers of the core executive in defense has allowed policy leaders to focus on the 'national interest' and convergence with 'systemic imperatives'. In Germany the federal system and linkages between social and defense policy circumscribed 'executive autonomy' in defense policy and incentivized an acute concern within the core executive about the domestic political ramifications of convergence with systemic imperatives, leading to the temporal management of reform, producing short-medium term policy stasis. Culture emerges not so much as a cause of action as instrumental and a resource for policy leaders in the domestic political and temporal management of reform. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is hardly novel to argue that terrorism is a metaphorical construction. Only five days after 9/11, George Lakoff published a short piece on “Metaphors of Terror” in which he shows that the US-administration at first framed the events as a “crime”, but changed to “war” within hours. Surprisingly, not much research on the metaphorical construction of terrorism has followed since, despite continued terrorist attacks. We will show in our paper that this is a serious failure, as metaphorical analysis allows us to understand not only how we came to understand terrorism in a certain way, but also why we reacted the way we did. As metaphors construct the phenomenon in a specific way, they make certain counter-terrorism policies possible while other means of addressing the issue remain outside of the options considered as a response. To support our claim we present empirical evidence from a comparative study on terrorism-metaphors and their policy-implications in Germany and the UK. Arguing that popular images are at least as important as expert images we have focused on terrorism-metaphors in the tabloid press (‘Sun’ and ‘Bild’). However, we not only compare popular metaphor-use in these two countries, but also examine the way they have evolved over time: while there is little difference between the metaphors in Germany and the UK, they have changed remarkably from 9/11 to Madrid (2004) and London (2005). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I will challenge the common myth that Westphalia was the birth of a new secularizing order in Europe. I will instead explore John Bossy's idea that the birth of the modern state represented a "migration of theholy" from the church to the state. I will draw on the historical work of Heinz Schilling and others to show that confessionalization was not solved by Westphalia but was itself deeply implicated in the creation of the modern state, and I will explore the implications of this for contemporary political theory. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I will argue that any reconciliation process will impact the quality of a democratization process. Consequently the main hypothesis is that the intensity and inclusion of specific actors such as former enemies, perpetrators and victims of human rights violations, minorities, new and old political elites and civil society during the transition period and after a post-conflict, war or authoritarian regime is crucial in order to strengthen democratic institutions and mechanisms. A transition period without any elements of reconciliation will lead to functional failures of newly established democratic institutions such as the rule of law or free elections. Society will not be able to learn to experience justice and thus build trust in (new) democratic institutions. But without an experience of justice through reconciliation a democratization process will never fully succeed because strong and stable democracies depend on trust and proper function of institutions. Examples of Germany, Spain and Turkey in Europe after 1949 will be given to underline the main argument. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Germany has gone from being a non-participant in humanitarian interventions until 1992 to having 10,000 men deployed in various peacekeeping missions in late 2006. German policy has throughout this period remained driven by the same underlying principle: to incorporate the lessons of the Holocaust, particularly the prevention of genocide and militarization. Yet the implementation of that dictum has seen a 180-degree shift, from Cold War reluctance to being among the loudest voices to call for a European mission in Darfur. What has brought about this change? One crucial reason is the emergence of international norms on humanitarian intervention in the wake of Rwanda, Somalia and the Balkans. One country finds itself time and again in the forefront of propagating these norms: Canada. Ottawa has led the efforts behind the Responsibility to Protect and has through its strong peacekeeping tradition led the way in changing perceptions of intervention. This paper will contrast these two examples and in each case investigate the interplay between domestic and international norms. In the first instance, the reticence characteristic of the German domestic norm comes under increasing attack from increased expectations of participation from allies and others; the analysis is based on the mobilization of the norm by entrepreneurs with the German political elite. In the Canadian case, the norm diffusion process is the opposite and results in concerted efforts by similar entrepreneurs to export a domestic norm to the international level. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the 1930s, British decision makers pursued a strategy of appeasement in dealing with Germany that culminated in the settlement of the Sudeten crisis at Munich in the fall of 1938. Following the Munich settlement, much of British elite and mass opinion shifted away from appeasement toward a deterrence strategy in dealing with Hitler. However, the Chamberlain Cabinet persisted in the pursuit of appeasment up to the outbreak of war in September, 1939. Why did Prime Minister Chamberlain and Foreign Secretary Halifax persist in the face of negative feedback, especially after Germany violated the Munich pact and occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia in March, 1939? In this paper we examine evidence of learning patterns in British public statements between 1937 and 1939, as these leaders addressed the German problem in a series of confrontations with Germany over the Austrian Anschluss, the Czech Sudeten crisis, the Prague Coup, and the Polish crisis over Danzig. We conclude that Chamberlain's belief system played a pivotal role in explaining why Britain persisted with an appeasement strategy in the face of negative feedback. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In April 2005, during the national election campaign in Germany, the Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party, Franz Müntefering, likened private equity firms and hedge funds to swarms of locusts sucking out firms and laying off employees. His remarks were among the shrillest in an increasingly intense international debate on the better regulation of international financial markets. New forms of private capital have amassed such huge amounts of financial resources that state regulators not only in Germany increasingly fear risks for global financial stability. However, Germany is particularly active in this regard. During its presidency of the G-8 in 2007, Germany has made the tighter regulation of global financial industries one of its core objectives. These initiatives lead directly into some of the core controversies of the literature on global economic governance: what is the extent of state capacity in regulating global financial markets, which forms of regulation are achieved, and what are the theoretical instruments allowing us to explain cooperation and non-cooperation among states and between states and private actors? This paper looks at the reasons and prospects of Global Economic Governance initiatives under the new financial (non)architecture, using Germany as empirical example. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that empires were the dominant political actors in the international system up until the mid-twentieth century, and that these empires differed from Westphalian states in crucial legal and practical aspects. Empires were organised as hierarchical sub-systems in an anarchical international system. They included dependent states or state-like entities which complicated the sovereignty of the imperial whole and cast doubt on prevailing theories of the sovereign state. Rejecting IR historiography that has tended to categorise and re-write the past in terms of present, case studies of the Ottoman, British and German Empires illuminate the differences that distinguish these polities from their sovereign state successors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the pacification of Europe is a process that was set into motion in early 1950s, it was the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 that sparked a flurry of publications that aimed to describe and explain how such an achievement was possible. After this initial theoretical enthusiasm, the current decrease in the research output is proportionally inverse to the growth of integrative linkages in the European Union. This article argues that the old epistemological tools to understand the pacification of Europe are becoming obsolete as they are embedded in a regional context that no longer exists. In order to overcome this shortcoming, this article introduces a new interpretative framework predicated upon the idea of regional peace and security clusters (RPSCs). In the paper the European RPSC is assessed in a comprehensive and historical way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Europeanisation' has become a focal point of discussion in European integration studies. Although the term is used in different ways to describe a variety of phenomena, its meanings have usually been restricted to (in a strict sense) political processes, i.e. domestic political changes caused by European integration. Most studies have emphasised topdown dynamics inherent in this particular notion of Europeanisation, whereas bottom-up and/or transnational processes and attempts to analyse their interplay have entered the debate only recently. Our paper seeks to contribute to this debate by focusing on what we describe as the 'societal/trans-national' dimension of Europeanisation: Europeanisation dynamics within a societal context (football) with a considerable degree of transnationalisation. Through analysing five cases of Europeanisation within the realm of German football, we not only want to shed some light on an under-researched field of study for political scientists interested in 'Europeanising' mechanisms. We also aim at exploring the applicability of Europeanisation concepts derived from the analysis of political contexts to other areas of social interaction in order to capture hitherto neglected processes. Opening up the field in the societal/transnational direction should add to the awareness of the complexity of Europeanisation processes, but it may also incorporate the consciously perceived 'Europeanised' life worlds of European citizens into the academic debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democratic peace theory presupposes that established democracies have not only a normative claim to, but also a genuine strategic interest in, extending democracy. Yet much of literature tells us that the "soft goal" of democracy promotion regularly is subordinated to "hard interests" (economy, security, political stability) when it collides with the latter. Moreover, democratisation may also lead to unintended consequences. For instance, "undesired" societal forces may seize hold of democratic institutions or democratisation processes may be derailed in a (semi-) authoritarian way. Thus, while there may be synergetic effects of security considerations, economic interests and normative preferences in the long run, in immediate situations of conflict they frequently clash. Taking the two leading contenders in the field, the US and Germany, as examples, the paper looks at how the respective governments tackle problems of conflicting goals, whether their reaction is compatible with the long-term orientation towards global democratisation or whether their short-term action follows a "traditional" pattern of giving political stability priority over democratisation, even to the point of assisting directly or indirectly political repression. Two cases are taken up: Bolivia where indigenous movements impact on donors' economic and security preferences, and Russia where the rise of election-based (semi-) authoritarianism clashes primarily with normative preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sovereignty, though often discussed in the international relations literature, remains a vague, disputed concept. Sovereignty concerns have strong effects on state preferences, particularly with regards to the amount of policy making powers states are willing to hand over to international institutions. One way in which policy making authority is transferred to international institutions is through state agreement to abide by a highly legalistic dispute settlement mechanism enshrined in an international agreement. Sovereignty concerns comprise an important piece of the puzzle in analyzing state preferences vis a vis international legal decisions, an issue at the core of this conference's main theme. Yet, despite much academic work on sovereignty, the factors relating to the relative strength of a state's sovereign status, and the influence of these factors on a state's willingness to be bound by legalistic agreements, remains an untested puzzle. Previous work on legalism in international agreements outline two principal hypotheses pertaining to states' willingness to sign an agreement with highly legalistic dispute settlement mechanisms (DSM). One such argument states that highly legalistic DSMs are more common among democratic states. The second hypothesis in the current literature states that highly legalistic agreements, particularly those with legalistic DSMs, are rare due to the sovereignty costs incurred by the member states. The loss of freedom to make economic policy, and the tendency of arbitrators and courts to assert their independence in ways that exceed the contracting states' intentions, lead states to prefer an agreement with fewer legal constraints. Theoretical discussions in this vein have speculated that states with sovereignty concerns, or "weak" sovereignty, may be even more reluctant to incur these sovereignty costs for the sake of economic cooperation. Integrating these two sets of ideas, this paper tests a new hypothesis: Can concerns about sovereignty explain low levels of legalism in regional trade agreements as measured through DSMs? As a first step in analyzing this hypothesis, I utilize previous works on sovereignty to establish measures of "weak" and "strong" sovereignty. Second, the levels of legalism in DSMs are measured with the use of a large data set of regional trade agreements. This data set includes some of Smith's data, but also includes agreements established post-1995, as well as several agreements from developing and transitional states that only recently became available. Through preliminary statistical testing, I find a correlation between low levels of sovereignty and low levels of legalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "Mobilizing Liberal Democracy: The Role of Civil-Military Institutions and Political Education in the Transition to Democracy in West Germany and South Africa" prepared for the "46th Annual Conference of the International Studies Association" held in Honolulu, Hawaii. It discusses a theoretical approach to civil-military relations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It examines the restructuring of the South African National Defence Force during the period 1994-2000, and the German Bundeswehr from 1949 to 1956.

The article presents the conference paper "Repairing Historical Injustice: German and Japanese Military Sexual Slavery" delivered at the "Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association" in Hawaii. It examines the various factors supporting the views held by states about reparatory justice. According to the author, a new progressive of ethic of care and justice is needed to redress such injustices whereby the moral worth of victims is recognized and the injustice of the harm they suffered is acknowledged.

The article presents a conference paper titled "War and Innocent Victims: The Paradox of Westphalia," prepared for presentation at the International Studies Association in Honolulu, Hawaii. It argues the two key factors that distinguished that savagery of global violence. It also discusses the rebels who violated the tacit trinitarian understanding among governments, armies and civilians.

The international political economy literature is rife with observations that states are under increasing pressure to trim their budgets, but though broad empirical work suggests trends and correlations between these pressures and changes in spending, these studies tell us little about how these reforms were achieved or what their effects were. Examining fiscal reforms in France, Germany, and Italy over the course of the 1990s, I argue that the approach to and content of reforms varied greatly, reflecting domestic circumstances. This paper finds that election timing, government fragmentation and polarization, and perceptions of an electoral mandate made governments more (or less) confident of their ability to push reform and dramatically influencing their approach to reform. More confident governments tended to pursue confrontational reforms that generally were characterized by refusal to negotiate reform with unions, by policies undermining unions’ future role in social policy, and by avoidance of side-payments or concessions to unions. Less confident governments’ more cautious reform efforts were marked by extensive negotiations with unions, by policies that supported unions’ future role in social policy, and by side-payments, sometimes in the area of social policy under reform, sometimes in a completely different policy area. Perversely, confident governments that were seemingly in a politically strong position sometimes were less able to achieve reforms. In regard to the content of the government’s reforms, this paper finds that cursory examinations of aggregate levels of spending and taxation do not adequately capture the effects of partisan politics or the distributional effects of reforms. Considering the more subtle effects of tax shifting and benefit targeting, I find that reforms reflect the government’s partisan inclinations with discernably different distributional impacts for the citizenry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The collapse of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the fall of 1989 occurred in a completely unanticipated manner. Not only did the revolution follow a nonviolent course but the GDR’s formidable state security apparatus--the sword and shield of the party--failed to mount any major resistance. A subsequent attempt at reform on its part proved shortlived, and the organization was dissolved in toto within a matter of weeks. This paper will explore the various reasons why the Ministry for State Security proved unable to fulfill its stated mission, and why its ultimate fate contrasted so markedly with that of other East bloc security organizations. In terms of sources, the paper will rely on archival documentation, firsthand accounts by leading participants, and several recent full-scale studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to the structural crisis of the world economy, as well as in response to the related but distinct recurrent national economic crises of the last two decades states have engaged in neoliberal economic restructuring. This paper illustrates the extent to which the form of neoliberal reform can be negotiated by focusing on one particular issue area of public policy: labour markets. Labour markets, like other policy areas, have been directly and indirectly subjected to regulatory reforms that are informed by neoliberal ideas. Unlike other policy issues, labour markets continue to be an essentially domestic policy area whose structural characteristics nonetheless are uniquely linked to developments in the global structure of production. Thus, although structurally determined by exogenous conditions, in terms of policy making labour markets continue to be the domain of individual states whilst at the same time policy making in this area impacts most directly on society. In this way, regulatory reform of labour markets is structurally locked into the process of global, neoliberal economic restructuring while concurrently opening up space for the political contestation of the hegemony of neoliberalism at the national level. Based on these premises, the paper analyses the structure of labour market reform in Canada and Germany examining how the differential position of (different segments of) labour and capital in the international structure of production defines their respective interest in national labour market reform. In this context, the paper explores a) how far-reaching the reform process has been in each of the countries and b) the political process of its implementation, focusing in particular on the contested role of the state and the political and economic co-optation, or otherwise, of (parts of) the labour movement to the neoliberal project. Based on these considerations, the paper argues that the labour market policies of the two countries are less a response to the global hegemony of neoliberalism than a neoliberal response to the requirements of economic restructuring. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper will discuss post-transition prosecutions of human rights violators, emphasizing the European Court of Human Rights decision in Streletz, Kessler, and Krenz v. Federal Republic of Germany (2001) (holding that prosecution of the architects of the Berlin Wall policy did not violate the principle of nulla poena sine lege), and with reference to the famous 1958 Harvard Law Review debate between Hart and Fuller on the post-World War II prosecution of a Nazi informant. The paper will explore jurisprudential and pragmatic considerations favoring limitations on the pursuit of criminal justice after regime change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

That German foreign policy was constrained by Cold War bipolarity never precluded vigorous debate among German policy makers about the requirements of domestic and European political order. Party politics also contributed to such disputes, but an emergent pattern in the debates over East-West relations and unification is better explained by a constructivist approach that links public order to the way language functions to create rules (and thus rule). This perspective accords an independent role to ideas and to policymakers as political agents, but it also explores constraints on what it was possible to say, and to think, in postwar Germany. In previous rounds of debate, exponents of a Kantian institutional approach to order squared off against Lockeans who emphasized rights and agency. In general, the Kantians (Adenauer, Brandt, and Kohl) prevailed over the Lockeans (Schumacher, Kiesinger, and Lafontaine), resulting in a Germany that built institutions first and asked questions about national rights later. But, can this pattern be expected to continue in the post-Cold War era, or should we prepare ourselves for a reassertion of a Hobbesian world view (characterized by coercion, the issuance of directives, and demands for compliance)? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]