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For the last fifty years, the Canadian peacekeeping policy has been a true symbol of tradition and pride throughout the country. With the creation of the United Nations Blue helmets at the time of the crisis of Suez in November 1956, following an initiative having been worth the Nobel Price of peace to the Canadian Secretary of State to the External Affairs of the time, Lester B. Pearson, Canada made its participation in the peacekeeping operations a fundamental axis of its foreign policy and defense. Since then, all the White Papers on defense and all the statements on foreign policy reserved a place of choice to the Canadian participation in the peacekeeping operations, of which most recent Statement on international policy of the government of Canada published in 2005.However since the end of the Cold War, with the turning of the years 1990, the peacekeeping operations changed considerably, leading the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien to re-examine the engagement of the Canadian Forces in the peacekeeping operations during the decade in the White Paper on Defense of 1994. These new policies involved however a decline of the budgets allocated with defense and a significant reduction of the number of the soldiers within the Canadian Forces. At the end of the decade, the Canadian Forces faced the exhaustion and the erosion of their role of specialist in the peacekeeping operations. Burning defender of the multilateralism and dependent on his statute of « middle power » in the hierarchy of the powers on the scene of world affairs, Canada is confronted with a certain loss of influence on the international scene, in particular in the peacekeeping operations.The attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States marked the beginning of the war against terrorism. The engagement of the Canadian Forces to the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) of NATO in Afghanistan, and their withdrawal of Bosnia-Herzégovine then shows the limits of what Canada has to offer with regard to the international peace and security. The Publication of the Statement on International Policy, heading « A Role of Pride and Influence in the World », that was tabled in Parliament in April 2005 by the Liberal government of Paul Martin, provides an overview of Canada's role in international affairs and some of the main trends affecting its place in the world, and marks the result of a significant change in the engagement of Canada in the peacekeeping operations, in particular by a new approach of management, the « 3D approach » (Diplomacy, Defense, Development). This new policy contains a new role for Canada in the peacekeeping operations, which intends to be shown more selective and to play a part where its values and its interests are most concerned.These problems thus lead us to be questioned on the principal factors characterizing the formulation of the policy of Canada in the peacekeeping operations between 1993 and 2005, and the adoption of the 3D approach. More specifically, this research is interested mainly in the characteristics suitable for the decisional system as regards Canadian foreign policy, aiming at explaining the formulation of the policy of Canada in the peacekeeping operations under the reign of the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin. Indeed, several researchers and analysts noticed that the pressures and the constraints of the external and internal environments probably constitute the most important elements to explain the nature of the decisions as regards Canadian foreign policy... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite renewed interest in international security cooperation after 9-11, security coordination between Mexico, Canada and the United States has been limited. Lack of policy coordination between these three countries is no surprise. They all have developed different security doctrines and practices that are not likely to be changed in the near future. Hence, this paper will analyze the security policies of three North American countries from the end of World War II to the September 11 attacks. Post-World War II analysis will allow me to analyze how structural conditions regarding bipolarity interacted with the domestic conditions of each country. The second period to be analyzed, pre-September 11, will illustrate how structural changes are not immediately translated into new security doctrines, at least not in the near future. Policy adaptation tends to be slow and not always progressive. This paper will be structured in five sections. The first three sections will examine each country’s security doctrines during the Cold War period, focusing on the interaction between international and domestic politics. The fourth section will compare and contrast how each country reacted differently vis-à-vis the end of the Cold War. Finally, the last section will evaluate the implications of these findings and its impact on North American security cooperation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of strategic culture as employed in this project is constructed from two factors, the concept of security and operational principles. Together these serve, along with the socio-historic environment, as intervening variables which mediate between the independent variable of relative power and the dependent variable of grand strategy. The key question which informs this paper is whether the evolution, presentation, and interpretation of human security within the relevant departments of the Government of Canada (notably DFAIT and CIDA) then carried over to inform and affect the definition of mandate and of threat as well as the policies, procedures, planning, deployment, and operating principles and practices of Canada?s Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces? In particular we are interested in whether and, if so, in what ways the discourses on security and the operational principles informing the deployment and application of military force (and other forms of coercive means such as police or special forces) incorporated or were affected by the emergence of the ideas of human security and their incorporation into the international security discourse of DFAIT, the department which leads on Canada?s role in international affairs. Further, it will be of interest to explore the extent to which the internationalization of the human security discourse and policy objectives, as they were adopted and enunciated by a variety of countries including those who are members of the Human Security Network, contributed to the saliency of human security thinking within both policy and operational branches of the Canadian government. Did this have any impact on the security or strategic culture within the Department of National Defence? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses two key issues. One is whether since 9/11, a gap has formed in the Canada-US (CANUS) North American defense and security partnership. The second concerns the future role of Canada in this relationship in light of the new mutual national security issues that have emerged since September 2001. The article traces the historical evolution of this strategic collaborative alliance from 1940 to present, and highlights Canada's response to this perceived gap. As part of this examination two key factors emerged that could affect Canada's future role in defense of the North America. The first is the atrophy of the Canadian armed forces since the end of the Cold War. The second is the establishment of U.S. Northern Command in October 2002. Canadians see this unilateral move on the part of the US as presenting a challenge to their future role in defense of the continent because it calls into question the utility of the 49 year old North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Agreement. In addition, the swift unilateral action taken by the US caught the Canadian government by surprise, and that its inaction, due to its inability to overcome long-standing anxieties related to its national sovereignty, put a large strain on its relationship with the United States. The article proposes that greater understanding between the partners, linked to the nurturing of trust, will go a long way in bridging the gap that has formed within this long-standing defense and security relationship. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Any evidence of Canadian hemispheric defence concerns clearly would point to a lack of preoccupation, or at the very least to an ambiguous strategic relationship beyond Canada-United States links. However, to leave the question at that point would be to ignore some significant developments in hemispheric defence, and, in particular, Canada’s involvement. In short, there are strategic interests for Canada outside of its relationship with the United States; furthermore, those interests are expanding. Candad’s defence interests in the hemisphere of the Americas are determined by two compulsions. First, there is the Canada-United States defece relationship which, in many ways, defines the primary trajectory of Canadian defence policy. But there is also the Canadian tradition of multilateralism to take into account. Inasmuch as Canada may frame its defence through the lenses of its relationship with the United States, there is a history of working with other partners in order to forge a more independent history of working with other partners in order to forge a more independent policy. For observers of Canada[‘s defence and security policy, there are consequential developments taking place in the hemisphere that must be considered. This presents an interesting scenario for Canada’s relations with the hemisphere. Though Canada has never placed a great deal of importance regarding its security interests in the Americas, there is compelling evidence that this issue has gained prominence in the post-Cold War era. Not unlike Canada’s broader international security policy, its approach to the hemisphere is marked by is close alliance with the United States, yet highlighted by an increasing desire to voice an independent voice in the region. As demonstrated here, this ‘independence’ has come in the form of international regimes, which have typically been used by Canada to register a opinion that falls outside of its relations with the United States. Canada’s hemispheric security policy, then, may be viewed through the lenses of its bilateral relations with its American neighbours, but stands to be influenced increasingly by multilateral and regional relations. Broadening trade and commerce, coupled with an active interest in democratic development, has encouraged increasing interest in hemispheric security affairs in Ottawa. Multilateralism presents one way that Canada may register a relatively independent voice in hemispheric relations and, through collective action, realize its objectives in a collaborative manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Canada’s experiences with international arms control since 1990 illustrate how, with the appropriate will and resources, Activist States can promote an independent policy agenda under American hegemony. Canada’s efforts to lead arms control initiatives have been successful only when it chooses an identity that properly reflects the character of the international system. The character of the international system is defined by international norms and patterns of behaviour and provides the environment within which foreign policy is practiced. Because international norms and patterns of behaviour are established by the preferences of Great Powers and Superpowers, which are always changing, the character of the international system itself is always changing. However, because of their place in the international hierarchy of influence, Activist States can only react to this change, not define it. Policy makers must therefore understand what the character of the international system is, not what they want it to be, if they want policy initiatives to succeed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent discussion has centered on the viability of the European Union to establish an effective European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI); however, criticisms of the ESDI as unrealistic and impracticable (partly due to the current pattern of the United States increasing its defense budget while the Europeans decrease their share relative to defense spending), and duplicative of NATO responsibilities appear unfounded. As the European Union evolves into a more mature political, economic, and social actor on the international stage, so too will her Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) follow suit. While developing the latter policy in the coming years, the EU member states will indubitably undergo difficult transitions in order to achieve an effective and efficient ESDI; concomitantly, the United States, Canada, Russia, and NATO must adjust to the new realities of a European Union flexing not only her political and economic muscles, but her military ones as well. Contrary to most current thinking, an effective--and greatly upgraded--ESDI is not inimical to US/Canadian/NATO interests; in fact, Washington, Ottawa, and Brussels could very well benefit from the European Union increasing its defense spending; thus providing the ESDI with more military muscle than we have heretofore witnessed. Furthermore, I will argue that Russian participation, at whatever level, with the ESDI would be a welcome event, precipitating Moscow’s further inclusion within a Europe whole and free. Realist assumptions support the hypothesis that an effective ESDI would not only benefit the European Union, but would provide both tangible and intangible benefits to the United States, Canada, and NATO as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Civil or homeland security provides an interesting case for the study of norms transmission. The ‘norm-takers’ in these cases are often officials in cities or arms of government not typically responsible for foreign policy or defence: transportation, civil infrastructure protection, and emergency management. These levels and branches of government are not an obvious site for international relations and security policy, but they have become the focus of policy for preventing and responding to terrorism. However, there is some precedent for civil security norms penetrating arms of government not typical seen to be engaged in international security: the civil defence policies of the cold war. I apply Amitav Acharya’s idea of norm localization, whereby local norms-takers engage in a dynamic process of interaction to adapt local and transnational norms to match each other, to civil security. How do local officials localize regional and global anti-terrorism norms to environments where global security is a new priority, but which already have well-established norms for dealing with natural disasters, crime, and other emergencies? The literature on norms diffusion typically posits a trickle-down effect, with transnational norms-entrepreneurs generating norms to be implemented domestically. But in this situation where local actors possess expertise in emergency response, is there evidence of a trickle-up effect, with local practice influencing regional or international norms? This paper will also contribute to the literature on the life-cycle of norms because it will focus on a case where localization may include re-invigorating the dormant norms of civil defence. Empirically, the paper will examine Canadian civil security policy, with a focus on the all-hazards norm for responding to emergencies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decrying the erosion of freedom in the name of security, the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group reports that since the events of September 11th the surveillance and policing of people have been intensified by the use of new mechanisms: "sneak and peak" in the US, "stop and search" in the UK, "preventative detention" in Canada and "indefinite detention without trial" worldwide. Within the frame of the "war on terror," the relationship between civil liberties and security is being transformed. This paper argues, however, that these developments do not merely signal an erosion of civil rights in the name of national and international security, but a reconstitution of the meaning of liberty and freedom. By examining representations of liberty within contemporary security practices in the US, the UK and Canada, this paper will illuminate the conditions under which current security measures have been rationalized and deemed necessary for the continuation of liberal democracy itself. As security is posited as both entwined with the protection of territorialized nation-states while also imperative for the protection of liberty, this paper considers how new practices of security have come to serve as mechanisms for the liberal governance of populations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to put forth a hypothesis of an intelligence model, prescribed as an Integrated Results-Based Management Framework (IRBMF), and then postulate how to reasonably assess the performance of the intelligence community with a Canadian context. The assessment method should be forward looking, time independent, and unbiased. Examination is warranted because intelligence assists with decision-making, including those regarding the safety and security of citizens; tax dollars are expended on this endeavour; and there is the need to move beyond the simplistic assessment method of an intelligence failure being the unique criteria for assessing performance. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the mid-1990s, the promotion of human security has been heralded by both supporters and critics alike as a defining characteristic of Canadian foreign policy postures. While the rhetorical influence of the concept has waned under the Harper regime, human security continues to serve as one of the nodal points through which foreign policy discourses circulate. Thus, given its presence within the iterative of recent policy frameworks, there have been numerous treatments of the role of human security in the development of Canadian foreign policy. Yet, what have remained largely unexamined are the political effects of the myriad debates over the viability of human security as an organizing concept. Utilizing forms of critical investigation formulated by Michel Foucault, this paper will argue that human security and the disagreements it has engendered within the Canadian foreign policy community have made particular representations of Canada, human security, and the legitimate scope of foreign policy possible. Rather than indicating sharp differences amongst analysts and practitioners, it will be demonstrated how debates over the relevance and legitimacy of human security actually reveal a host of shared foundations that are not subject to critical scrutiny. Thus, debates that have taken place over theorizing and implementing a human security agenda in Canadian foreign policy will be analysed as events that cultivated particular power relations, which in turn, concretized shared conceptual and representational foundations that conditioned the very parameters open for debate. As such, rather than outline the partisanship of Canadian foreign policy in terms of traditional distinctions, this analysis will focus on the political element in terms of how foreign policy establishes and maintains particular systems of power in Canadian society and how these systems such as militarism, neoliberalism, and the idea of the national interest might become contested. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The events of September 11, 2001 sparked an interest in strengthening security cooperation between Canada, the United States and Mexico. Indeed, the launch of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) by the three NAFTA partners in March 2005 was in part a response to the new security dimensions induced by 9/11. The SPP is the new framework introduced by the three countries to deepen cooperation on common issues of concern. To this end, the SPP includes a number of security related initiatives meant to protect North America from threats both internally and externally (Report to Leaders, 2005). Curiously, the SPP does not contain much prima facia, on defence matters and is mostly security oriented. However, there exists some evidence to suggest that although limited, and often operating below the public radar screen there has been some movement on defence cooperation between the three countries. Canada and Mexico are especially active in forging a bilateral defence relationship which the US views as useful for the broader North American context. How has defence cooperation evolved in North America in the post 9/11 context? What are the prospects for the creation of a North American security regime? What are the implications for governance in North America? This paper will explore these questions and argue that we are witnessing the emergence of defence cooperation but not in the form of a formal international security regime. Rather, defence cooperation is becoming institutionalized gradually in North America but in a covert fashion, away from the public eye and without transparency and accountability. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the late 1990s, largely in response to its individual as well as the world?s collective failure during the Rwandan genocide, the Canadian government became a leading advocate of the concept of human security. More specifically, it sponsored the work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, and then became an outspoken advocate of its most important conceptual innovation ? the idea of the ?Responsibility to Protect? and the international community?s obligation to intervene where state governments fail to fulfill this Responsibility. Yet throughout this same period, the government of Canada was effectively eroding its resource capacity ? developmental, security, and diplomatic ? to respond to international crises both before and after they ?break.? The crisis in Darfur has brought these two contradictory trends to a head. How does a global ?middle power?, with expansive normative objectives but limited and eroding means, respond to a crisis in which the Responsibility to Protect is so flagrantly flaunted? What influence is it able to bring to bear in attempting to orchestrate an effective international response in line with the principles it has sought to promote? To what extent, conversely, does its inability to contribute more substantially to the international effort to respond to the Darfurian crisis weaken both its foreign policy credibility and the campaign to breathe life into the ?R2P? project? Finally, under the new Conservative regime are we now seeing a historic retreat from the ?norm entrepreneurship? role, and the concomitant commitment to African security and development, which marked the discursive priorities of the previous Liberal government? The paper addresses these questions through a critical analysis of Canada?s diplomatic, security, and developmental response to the Darfurian crisis. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some states internalize international security norms but not others? While there is by now an agreement that international norms matter for national security, the role of domestic agents (as opposed as domestic structure, culture, or institutions) ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1957 NORAD, a binational military structure located at Colorado Springs, Colorado, has been at the heart of Canada-US cooperation for continental defense. Originally called the North American Air Defense Command, the “a” was changed in 1981 to “aero ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of 9/11, Canada, the European Union and the United States have coordinated scientific, technical and policy efforts to address the broad variety of national security concerns terrorism, natural disasters, and other major emergencies. Bilateral ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The worsening Sino-Japanese relations threaten East Asian regional stability and have serious implications for Canadian interests in promoting peace, economic prosperity and good governance. Despite growing trade, investment, and other socio-economic ties between China and Japan since 1972 when the two countries normalized diplomatic relations, the level of mutual understanding and trust remains low today. The recent spats over territorial disputes, historical issues, military buildups, and alternative approaches to developing regional security and economic architecture pit the two Asian powers in a dangerous rivalry. There are many reasons behind the ambivalence of the bilateral relationship, including the two countries? changing domestic political dynamics as new generations of leadership take up the rein and as policy debates and processes are increasingly influenced by public opinions and growing nationalist sentiments; divergent views of and interests in the future security architecture in East Asia and the role of military alliances and suspicions in both capitals of each other?s intentions and military buildup; and perceived and actual competition for the region?s political and economic leadership with China?s continuing growth and Japan?s recent recovery. Complicating this changing relationship is the lack of mutual trust, which in turn is further fed by the legacy of the past, territorial disputes, and domestic developments. Indeed, a serious challenge to the leaderships in both capitals is that never in history have both countries been powerful at the same time and this raises the question of how this potential competition for regional primacy is to be managed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]