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The question this paper addresses is whether and, if so, to what extent can existing IR theories of high politics decision making be applied to low politics issue areas, specifically international environmental policy. The paper considers three individual level theories: Prospect Theory, Political and Policy Risk Theory and Poliheuristic Theory. Each is applied to two case studies, The Montreal Protocol and The Kyoto Protocol, to test its ability to explain the decision-making processes of United States presidents. The climate change case study is most illustrative, either for or against the applicability of a theory, as the risks presidents faced were greater. The paper concludes that none of the applications lend full support to any of the theories. At the same time, none of them completely invalidate the theories either. Of the three, Political and Policy Risk Theory shows the most promise, while the analysis of Prospect Theory reveals some weaknesses in its applicability and the results of the application of Poliheuristic Theory fall somewhere in between. The findings suggest that foreign policy analysis theories may be best able to explain international environmental policy choices if they can capture the complexity of the issue, better define risk and allow for more human agency in terms of personal preferences and belief systems. In general, the applications to environmental policy suggest that the three theories could be adjusted or amended to become better generalizable to different policy areas. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What may make climate change agreements attractive to states? Russia's decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol is one that could potentially constrain its economic development. I argue that the international relations literature on climate change agreements can be best advanced with the inclusion of models from comparative politics. This argument is carried out through an analysis of Russia's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. I employ a combined two-level game theoretical framework to rediscover Kyoto ratification and explain why it became both rationally sound and politically possible in Russia. At the domestic level, it appears that Putin made ratification politically possible through the elimination of what are called veto-players with the potential to block Kyoto. At the international level, ratification will be shown to be logically sound through a discussion of nested games. Russia, at the time of ratification, was engaged in multiple games at both domestic and international levels. Although Russia appeared to choose suboptimally, its decision becomes optimal when one analyzes the whole network of games with which it was engaged. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the theory of two-level games, negotiators will tailor the agreement at level I so as to be ratifiable at level II in all major countries. This did not happen in the Kyoto negotiations as far as the United States is concerned. We interviewed 27 German, Norwegian, and U.S. participants in and observers to the climate change negotiations regarding their views on three explanations of why the United States did not become a party to the Kyoto Protocol. Explanation 1 argues that delegations in Kyoto mistakenly thought the U.S. Senate was bluffing when adopting the Byrd-Hagel resolution. Explanation 2 contends that the Europeans preferred a more ambitious agreement without the United States to a less ambitious agreement with the United States included. Finally, explanation 3 suggests that in Kyoto the Clinton-Gore administration had already given up on achieving ratification by the Senate, and essentially pushed for an agreement that would provide them with a climate-friendly face. All three explanations received at least some support from people we interviewed. However, explanations 1 and 3 received more support than explanation 2. Moreover, while explanation 1 received most support in Germany and Norway, explanation 3 received most support in the United States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On November 5, 2004, the Russian Federation ratified the Kyoto Protocol, in effect saving the treaty following the United States’ decision not to ratify it. Why did the Russian government – with little popular pressure and little enthusiasm for environmental protection – decide to ratify Kyoto, and what measures will it take to implement the treaty? Proponents of ratification were numerous, consisting mainly of scientists, environmentalists, and business interests, but they were countered by a small number of powerful anti-Kyoto voices in the scientific and political communities who appeared to dominate the debate. In the end these battling interests had little influence on the decision due to the centralized institutional environment in Russia which allows the President to make foreign policy decisions largely single-handedly. President Putin ratified the treaty because Russia would likely experience economic gains rather than losses from Kyoto provisions, gain leverage in other international negotiations, and contribute to an image of itself as a good member of the club of advanced industrialized states. The president delayed ratification in order to clarify evidence about gains versus losses and secure concessions from other Kyoto ratifiers in other international negotiations. Implementation of the treaty is proceeding slowly, in part due to uncertainty during the ratification process, and existing efforts indicate that Russia's implementation strategy will likely be directed more at maximizing profits through treaty mechanisms to modernize industrial sectors than at maximizing emissions reductions. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]