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Much of the quantitative conflict literature employs data sets that draw a large portion of their cases from 1945-1990. This historical period coincides with the U.S.-Soviet bipolar competition and security arrangements associated with that competition. A debate within the democratic peace literature has emerged between those who view the democratic peace as a general phenomenon, and those who see democracy?s effect on international conflict as largely a function of the particular circumstances of the Cold War alignment. The critics of a general relationship between democracy and war focus specifically on the role of the United States as a leader of one of the bi-polar alliance blocks The possibility that observed relationships between democracy and war could be dependent on the particular historical circumstances of the Cold War raises the question: To what extent are other empirical findings about international conflict also a function of the hegemonic influence exercised by the superpowers during period? Using ordinal logistic regression to examine the pattern of third party joining this paper re-examines the extent to which the relationship between democracy and intervention as well as the relationships between variables commonly used to explain third party interventions in the conflict literature, such as proximity, power status, democracy, trade and alliances, are a function of the intervention choices of the United States during the Cold War. The paper finds that the intervention choice of the United States is by far the most important predictor of the intervention choices of other third parties to interstate wars. And that accounting for the intervention choices of the United States ?explains? away much of the general relationships observed in earlier studies. Interestingly enough though reduced in substantive importance, a statistical the relationship between shared democracy and joining remains even after accounting for U.S. intervention choice in this period. This finding suggests that the relationship between shared democracy and third party joining is not entirely dependent upon the exercise of American leadership during the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the early days of the Cold War, prominent students of American foreign policy firmly rejected the notion that the United States could initiate preventive wars against its adversaries. Preventive war is a persistent theme in the history of international politics. Unlike a conflict fought over a specific disputed issue, preventive war is fought to prevent the erosion of relative power to a rising adversary (even though that adversary does not pose an imminent threat). The logic of preventive war simply asserts that it is better to fight a war today under more favorable circumstances than to face a possible war in the future after an adversary has achieved military gains that raise the likely costs and risks of war for the dominant state. Despite the apparent rationality of initiating military conflict under these conditions, preventive war presents serious normative problems that have traditionally been considered too odious for a democratic state to overcome. Morgenthau, Kennan, Brodie, and Kissinger, among others, all argued that for democracies, launching preventive wars is taboo. More recent scholarship claims that no democracy has ever fought a preventive war because democratic public opinion simply considers preventive war, in the absence of a clear impending threat, to be morally abhorrent (even against a morally abhorrent adversary). ..ASA-Events of the past year, however, fundamentally challenge this claim about democracy and preventive war. Less than a year after President Bush declared that America would not tolerate unbalanced dictators seeking weapons of mass destruction, the United States was engaged in a preventive war against Iraq that ended with the destruction of the Iraqi regime and American occupation. Coupled with the president’s National Security Strategy of September 2002 that articulated a general vision of fighting pre-emptive wars in such cases, this event generated broad speculation and debate over whether America would turn its military might next against Syria, Iran or North Korea. In this period of weak international constraints on how America uses its power abroad, the potential for domestic constraints becomes crucial for understanding the degree to which American hegemony will be restrained in coming years. This paper examines several aspects of this issue. First, it measures the extent of anti-preventive war sentiment that actually exists in the United States as reflected in Congress and among the American public. Evidence for this question was generated from content analysis of the congressional debate over war with Iraq and public opinion surveys before the war. Second, it examines a related question: does congressional and public support for war with Iraq mean that the logic of preventive war has fully trumped the normative limits that may have prevented the United States from engaging in this particular form of war in the past? The paper presents evidence showing that domestic support for war cannot be explained outside the context of the terror attacks of September 11. It was not the purported threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction development that motivated majority support, but the link the administration drew between Iraq and terrorists that moved many to accept war. Third, the paper examines whether 9/11 has produced a shift in domestic attitudes about preventive war that extends beyond the Iraq case. To what extent do members of Congress and the public accept the general logic of preventive war as articulated in the administration’s pre-emption strategy? To what degree does anti-preventive war sentiment still exist in the U.S. after the Iraq war? To what extent are members of Congress and the public willing to support the logic of preventive war in other cases? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the intervention of the international community ? and specifically the form of new multilateralism activated by the Organization of American States (OAS) ? to crises in Peru and Venezuela. Although from a comparative politics perspective, these two cases present striking contrasts, with respect to the study of global governance it is the commonalities in the response that attractions attention. Reshaping existing regional sovereignty norms and practices, both interventions contained extensive ?internal? as well as ?international? components in which the boundaries or barriers between diplomacy and domestic politics were blurred. The centrepiece of both initiatives was the establishment of a ?mesa,? an OAS-facilitated dialogue roundtable or forum involving key domestic political and civil society actors from government and opposition in a sustained collective effort to negotiate a consensual and peaceful solution to political crisis. In the body of the work the process of this ?tale of two mesas? is traced through three distinctive components: the actors at the table; the agendas; and, relative achievements. As our paper demonstrates, significant differences between the two mesa processes make it difficult to articulate a single, coherent model. Nonetheless, we conclude that both the Peruvian and Venezuelan mesas exemplify a promising mode of multilateral intervention: ?intervention without intervening.? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the three predominant views on the latest war on Iraq--the anti-war perspective, the pro-Bush administration perspective, and the Arab world’s unique perspective--Operation Iraqi Freedom was about securing the U.S.’ oil supply, promoting democracy, and the re-colonization of the Middle East, respectively. Above all else, this war was about preserving the existing regimes of the Middle East and Gulf region as much as possible. The U.S. had other sources to compensate for the presumed loss of Iraqi oil, and has been instrumental in keeping repressive regimes in power. Similarly, the existing system has served the U.S. well, and a redesign would have entailed too great a risk to current U.S. interests. What is at stake for the U.S. is the stability of the Gulf region, which has been increasingly disturbed by three salient factors: the emergence of politically active Islamist organizations; more frequent challenges by democratic forces; and a genuine push to re-integrate Saddam Hussein’s Iraq into the world community. This paper explains American foreign policy from an Arab world perspective, taking into account recent regional developments with clear implications on the U.S.’ behavior. This paper discusses the nature of American foreign policy as a product of the socio- and political dynamics of the Gulf region; it is presented here as a reactive policy, but not a dependent policy. The U.S. has maintained control of its standing in the Arab world while adapting to new conditions to protect its national interest. In this context, this analysis is a departure from other studies emphasizing America’s global power, imperialism, and/or oil as the driving force of its foreign policy; the Arab world/Gulf region is treated as a unit of analysis, with its own internal dynamics eliciting changes in America’s foreign relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the intervention of Iraq, democracy has become one of the hottest issues within international relations. Whether, where and how the United States (and the international community) should promote democracy around the world have become central questions in the policy debates with regard to a host of countries including Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, and many others. While optimists see a democratic world order emerging, sceptics argue that democracy is a uniquely Western artefact that can never be successfully replicated in non-Western cultures. Especially Islam and democracy is considered to be incompatible with each other. This paper focuses on the relationship between culture and democracy. Can democracies be ?crafted? in different cultural settings, or are there certain preconditions and structural combinations that are needed for a progress toward democracy? To what extent can differences in democratic level be explained by civilizational differences? Based on two datasets on democratic performance (Polity IV, and the Freedom House Index) for the period 1973-1998, this paper concludes that the applicability of democracy ? defined by any of the measures ? is dependent upon civilizational belonging. Nevertheless, electoral democracies perform better in more civilizations outside the West than liberal democracies do. The Islamic and African Civilization is particularly resistant to democracy ? electoral or liberal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The choice of a governance regime has ceased being an exclusively domestic process. Though debates continue about its effectiveness and morality, democracy promotion has become a channel of virtual global governance, shifting and modifying the domestic authority of the democratizing country. However, the conditions and the extent of similar shifts are yet to be understood. This paper analyzes the conditions and the potential impact of the policies of the main democracy promoters, the EU and the USA, on the democratization processes of Armenia and Georgia. Special attention is paid to elections and civil society building projects as a way of influencing the choice of the authority and the choosers. This paper adapts the international socialization framework by introducing new variable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two foundations of American democracy are the citizen-soldier and the necessary support by the citizenry for its government waging war. This paper is not focusing directly on the validity of these democratic foundations, the efficacy and dilemmas of creating citizen-soldiers, nor judging those who have or are serving. Rather, the paper strives to demonstrate how popular culture can be utilized in an academic setting to illustrate and examine these foundations. The Political Fiction and Film (PF&F) course discussed in this paper addresses, inter alia, the following questions: Why and how should Americans pay attention to their government's war-making actions? What is the intersection of Americans understanding of war, the government's support for and ability to wage war, the role of the military in carrying out war, and the role of citizen-soldiers to fight these wars? To this end, I have created an upper-division, political science course to assist students in analyzing American values toward the military and war, as well as to understand the dialectic process between popular culture and the American citizenry in shaping and being shaped by our reasons to fight. This course is different in that its basis is the use of film and literature as the primary learning tool and subject matter. Films and literature provide essential heuristic tools for today's technological-focused students, as well as the "mirrors" to illuminate popular culture and public perceptions of war. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper treats democracy as a problematic yet under-theorised feature of the relations between states, as shown by the US and EU understood as "states unions". In such systems, the retention of the units' sovereign status is fundamental to their anti-hierarchical design yet subject to ongoing contestation, leading to ambiguity over the nature and extent of units' sovereign status. Given this context, the paper analyses how democratization - the process of appealing directly or indirectly to the people to settle political conflict - brings to the fore the question of the hierarchical relationship between the system and the units in the US and EU. In the antebellum US, the original settlement for preventing hierarchy broke down as both the Union and the units sought to justify their positions in an appeal to the people to settle political conflict. Similar appeals by EU member states and European institutions during treaty re-negotiations have likewise led to a clash over the proper locus of popular sovereignty. Hence the US and EU experiences serve to expose the potentially adverse consequences of democratizing relations between states. Consequently, the paper suggests that whereas democracy within states is associated with the improvement of relations between such states, the extension of democratic practices beyond the state poses profound difficulties for political organization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using John B. Thomson's book Political Scandal: Power and Visibility in the Media Age as a model, this paper will examine three late twenteith century scandals, Watergate, Iran-Contra, and the Lewinsky Affair to determine how and under what circumstances scandal impacts on American Foreign Policy. If Thompson is correct, what he labels the media age and other modern developments have created an environment where scandal cannot be marginalized and treated as aberrations. Scandal is part of an accelerating pattern of political discourse that has a particularly powerful impact on liberal democracy and foreign policy creation. Increasingly, foreign policy decisions are distorted by domestic scandal. When we factor in some interesting American cultural variables the problem of scandal and foreign policy becomes even more acute. Using Thompson's scandal typology: money, power, and sex, this paper explores whether some types of scandal have grater impact on foreign policy decisions as well as the manner in which scandal distorts foreign policy decisions in harmful ways. Finally, the paper will explore the question of whether the quickened pace of scandals in the United States in the Bush administration is a harbinger of permanent change in the dynamics of American Foreign Policy. Indeed fear of scandal may become more important than external threat. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the apparent tensions and divergence in approach between the United States and the European Union in efforts to promote democratic reform in the Middle East. Since this issue rose to prominence in 2002, the two sides of the Atlantic have often been viewed as taking diametrically opposite views of the relative urgency of Arab democratization, and of how best to achieve progress toward that goal. Yet, in a thorough review of diplomacy, official development assistance, and democracy assistance funding and programs, this paper finds that the divergence is more apparent than real. The paper finds significant similarities in the two actors' strategies and in their mix of democracy promotion activities. Yet both the European Union and the United States find reasons to sustain rhetorical divergence, and an element of strategic competition also colors their respective policies. The paper concludes that -- even if unintentional -- policy convergence between Europe and the United States in promoting democratic reform in the Middle East is not only evident, but may improve further over time. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to answer the following questions: Do states provide more foreign aid to those nations from which they can import oil? What is the relationship between foreign aid and imports/exports of oil? The current literature offers many of foreign aid determinants but little of this literature has explored the effect of oil imports on the amount of foreign aid received by the oil exporter. This paper's working hypothesis is that if state A buys oil from state B, state A will be inclined to give less foreign aid to state B. From the point of view of state A, the logic behind the inverse relationship is that the exporter's oil revenues in a sense finance the exporter's economy, so there is less need for foreign aid from state A to state B. The demand for oil and its byproducts is highly inelastic, and the revenues earned by oil exporters are substantially large. Importers consequently reduce their commitment of foreign aid to oil exporters. On the other hand, following "resource curse" literature, oil exports are related to the level of democracy in an oil-possessing country that may experience higher levels of corruption and lack of transparency and accountability of the government. Democracy is also correlated with foreign aid as donors tend to reward good governance and democratization. For these reasons, democracy is included in the model as an independent variable.To test this hypothesis, a time-series cross-section regression analysis is employed utilizing panel corrected standard errors and country fixed-effects. The analysis includes 81 countries from 1996 to 2004 for a total of about 700 observations. The states in the sample are all the countries of the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet Union, regardless of their possession of oil and regardless of whether they receive aid from the United States. The dependent variable is the amount of aid per capita received from the United States. The United States is selected as a donor for this study because of its prominence in provision of foreign and importance in the international system. The results of the regression analysis show that the value of oil imports to the United States has an inverse and statistically significant relationship to the amount of foreign aid the United States provides to an oil exporter. Democracy is positively related to the amounts of foreign aid. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historically, race has played a prominent role in framing US’ attitudes and actions in regards to Latin America. From independence onward, the Latin republics were greeted with doubt and derision as American policymakers argued that they lacked the racial pedigree to sustain legitimate democratic governance. Racial constructions of Latinos (as inferior, unstable, treacherous, weak, etc) figured heavily in the US interventions in Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central and South America that took place throughout the 19th and into the 20th century. In that era of popularly perceived white superiority, the influence of racialized thinking on American policies is not surprising. With the end of legalized discrimination and the dramatic shift in public beliefs starting in the 1960s, we would expect modern American policies to be color-blind. However, this is not the case. Most notably in the arena of drug policy, Latin American states continue to receive much different political, military, and economic treatment from the US compared to countries whose citizens are white. This discrepancy is strikingly illustrated in US â€" Colombia relations. Drawing on elements of history, sociology, and post-structuralist thought, the paper scrutinizes this paradox by analyzing a major component of American drug policy â€" Plan Colombia (2000). By employing a critical discourse analysis to examine the language surrounding this legislation, the paper seeks to draw out the impact of racialized thinking upon contemporary US policies towards Colombia and to generate insights into how race may continue to affect United States attitudes and actions towards the region as a whole ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historically, nuclear debates in the United States have centered on the “unspeakability” of nuclear war drawing this silence from the apocalyptic power of nuclear technology. This “unspeakability” is mirrored institutionally and, ultimately, this silence leads to depoliticized and sanitized policy paths and political realities. This can manifest itself in greater secrecy in policy decisions concerning nuclear technology and the phenomenon of “nuclear reclusion” in the public realm. Given the undisputed destructive power of nuclear weapons, the US tendency toward depolitization and secrecy short circuits democratic accountability. I will examine two cases toward this end: This paper compares the memorialization of nuclear weapons in Japan and the US. How do our collective memories differ? Can methods of remembering history lead us toward different policies or aid us in creating memories of the future that include open debate and de-sanitized nuclear policy? This paper seeks to analyze how nuclear memory operates within the democratic state, and how we bridge the apparent incongruity with global nuclear realities and the (re)creation of democratically accountable nation-states. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "Do Human Rights Matter? A Global Analysis of U.S. Foreign Economic Aid Allocation" prepared for the "International Studies Association Annual Meeting" held in Honolulu, Hawaii. It examines the effect of human rights violations on the decision of the U.S. to allocate aid to recipient countries. The paper mentions that the promotion of democracy has been the constant U.S. foreign policy goal following World War II.

With the Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy and the war in Iraq, the common argument that democracies do not fight preventive wars against rising adversaries loses much of its plausibility, and the more important question is the conditions under which democracies do and do not initiate such wars. This paper proposes a number of hypotheses to explain such outcomes, and explores these hypotheses through a series of mini-case studies of situations in which democracies faced with military rising adversaries 1) take military action (Israel vs Egypt in 1956, Israel vs. Iraq in 1981, U.S. vs. Iraq in 1991 and 2003), 2) seriously consider but do not take military action (U.S. vs. North Korea in 1994), and 3) do not seriously consider taking military action (France vs. Germany in the 1930s). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a theoretical foundation to support the notion that within democratic rule there needs to be citizen accountability for the misdeeds of government. In the area of foreign policy, specifically, citizens must be held directly responsible for any and all atrocities committed by elected officials. If what differentiates democratic polities from autocratic tyrannies is the free will of citizens to elect representative government, then those that govern do so with the consent of the people. Such tacit consent should be explicit enough for citizens to be held accountable when egregious policies are bestowed upon the citizens of other nations. Thus, a democratic burden exists when citizens are permitted such a prevailing role in politics as to select those who choose to inflict harm onto others. The burden, simply stated, is that the right to vote is accompanied with an obligation to take responsibility for the policies and actions of those you elect. Therefore, citizens of democratic countries should be liable for atrocious behavior similarly to those within government that give the commands or carry out the orders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The uniqueness of American nationalism as a critical factor shaping US policy has received scant attention. Even though nationalist themes often surface in academic and public political discourse, the phenomenon of nationalism as a worldview underpinning and driving much of US politics has not been sufficiently attended. More specifically, the impact of American nationalism on foreign policy perspectives, especially in regard to issues of international peace and security, has not been sufficiently addressed. What has also received insufficient attention is that within America's political and intellectual tradition one also finds an alternative worldview that challenges and competes with that of nationalism, namely, the worldview of peace-grounded democracy. From the perspective of conflict analysis and peace studies, the purpose of this paper is to initiate academic inquiry and practical dialogue on the fundamental parameters of the contradiction and competition between the worldview of American nationalism and that of American peace-oriented democracy, while exploring their implications for US foreign policy, relations with the international community, America's perspectives on its current wars and warfare in general, and its approaches to securing international peace and promoting democracy. The inquiry will conclude with a comparative exposition and assessment of the worldview of American nationalism and that of American peace-oriented democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unlike the self-centered claims about the EU's benevolence in contrast to the US's malevolence this paper analyzes the democracy-promotion strategies and tactics by the EU and the US in the South Caucasus. It shows that the policies of the two actors have largely flowed along the identical lines, although some minor variations can be traced in their approaches. The two actors seem to have pursued the same interests, notably, energy-related ones, and acted in accordance with the same normative drives of fostering democracy. Their ways of influence have also been similar with both the EU and the US targeting state and non-state actors and intending to breed democracy concomitantly as means and objective. However, the research renders that the US has exercised coercion and negative conditionality vis-à-vis Azerbaijan, while the EU has only favoured positive conditionality. Moreover, while the US has stood up as a staunch supporter of democratic norms using shaming, the EU has mostly opted for softness and praising. Ironically, the US seems to have been enjoying more credibility in the South Caucasus than the EU. The latter could be attributed to the US's hardness, in contrast to the EU's softness, perceived as a sign of moral solidity. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While almost a decade old, Ted Hopf's observation that the democratic peace is an observation in search of a theory still has some validity. In particular, the mechanisms behind the observed lack of war between democracies are poorly understood, making it difficult for scholars to provide a compelling explanation. While there has been some innovative work, particularly with respect to learning and the ability of an increasing number of democracies to cement democratic norms, Müller and Wolff note that normative and structural explanations are monadic explanations for a dyadic phenomenon. Underappreciated in the existing work is the role of identity and the importance this has for driving the democratic peace. With a focus on developing a dyadic democratic peace mechanism and using a case study approach, this paper utilizes the Copenhagen School's securitization framework to examine how identity plays out in the U.S. response to the Indian and Iranian nuclear programs. It finds that in fact identity does play a significant role in how security policy is constructed. The potential implications of this finding, particularly on policy, are significant. If the democratic peace does rely on identity to trigger the constraining norms that limit the escalation of conflict to violence, it is unlikely the democratic peace can be spread by force and it is possible that states nominally democratic can be excluded from the community of democracies if their behavior or significant other aspects of their perceived identity are at variance with the accepted democratic identity standard. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current American Empire confirms Thucydides'opinion that there are three essential motives that cause states to seek to expand their influence abroad: gain (defined as power and wealth), security and honour. But while the first two factors have received the lion's share of analytical attention so far (see inter aliaZakaria, 1999; Kagan, 2003; Mearsheimer, 2001; Gaddis, 2003), honour construed as the search for prestige in world politics deserves further examination.It is frequently stated (Layne, 2006; McDougall, 1997; Morgenthau, 1952; Kennan, 1951)that too a great extent the US expansion abroad, of which the current involvement in Iraq is but the latest episode, represents a direct result of the desire inherited from the days of Woodrow Wilson to spread democracy to other shores. Accordingly, these accounts contend that the principal problem of American foreign policy consists of a naive legal-moralistic concern with reshaping the world in America's own image, which leads to a dangerous and costly overextension of the US resources to areas that do not warrant in strategic terms a commitment of such magnitude. More often than not, the prescription offered is for the US to give up its illusions, acknowledge the harsh realities of international politics, and follow a moderate course of action by embracing either offshore balancing or selective engagement.However, by contrast to this engrained view, I am arguing that another and substantially different form of idealism may be at work in the US expansionist actions. Rather than seek to advance the cause of democracy all over the globe, this version of idealism is concerned with enhancing and preserving US prestige in relation to other states. Unlike the doctrine of Woodrow Wilson, which was advocating employing collective security, international norms and multilateral organizations for the benefit of all humankind, prestige-seeking encourages unilateralism and is self-promoting in the sense its sole concern lies in projecting abroad the image of continual American success. Moreover, since prestige is essentially intangible, the advantage sought is symbolic and at odds with realpolitik logic (Morgenthau 1985). Recent analyses (Kohut, Stokes, 2006; Mead, 2003) have hypothesized in a similar vein the existence of a so-called Jacksonian security subculture in American foreign policy, whose chief aim would be the vindication of American image in the world.My paper seeks to take this insight further by linking the Jacksonian approach to the quest for prestige, by identifying its main defining features, and tracing it through the historical record of American foreign policy. The tentative conclusion reached is that on the one hand, a policy of prestige is less benevolent and more aggressive than Wilsonian idealism and that, on the other hand, it is considerably difficult to discount as realist scholars would advise because of its considerable and enduring grip over the American national psyche. Appeals to moderation are therefore not likely to work unless prestige is also taken into consideration. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Democratic Peace Theory in its simplest incarnation is that democracies do not fight wars against each other. While many political scientists have developed elegant theories and analyses to support or oppose this thesis, political leaders in most countries have viewed it with a jaundiced eye. In spite of strenuous efforts by the United States, especially in Iraq, democracy has not taken hold and the Democratic Peace Theory appears to be strained when the United States attempts to work with other democratic states. The problem with the thesis is not that democratic institutions will not encourage nonmilitary resolution of conflicts, but rather a failure to understand what democracy actually is. Karl Popper wrote that democracy is a system whereby governments can be changed peacefully. Robert Dahl defined democracy as a system in which the people participate in the selection of their political leaders. Both definitions are incomplete. The lack of a generally recognized definition of democracy has led to false lessons and disastrous policy choices by political leaders in many states. For the Democratic Peace Theory to be a legitimate tool of political theory, we must understand what democracy really is. This paper is an outline of a more complete definition of democracy. Without it the policy makers of the 21st century cannot hope to achieve peace and the Democratic Peace Theory is an empty hope. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regional multilateral regimes have become important instruments for promoting and defending democracy around the world. The novel nature of these regional instruments has generated a cottage industry in social science scholarship. Yet, none of these works examine how the actors and processes that gave birth to the regimes have influenced their performance and future challenges. In order to fill this gap, this paper compares the democracy promotion and defense regimes of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the African Union (AU). We argue that the unique constellation of actors that are members of each respective organization have reinforced two distinct democracy promotion and defense paths. The state-driven regime evolution characteristic of the Americas contrasts with Africa's expert-driven process of regime construction. The state-centric process of the OAS regime has bolstered a narrow interstate multilateralism that upholds traditional sovereign state prerogatives and minimizes the role for non-state actors in the promotion and defense of democracy in the Americas. The expert-driven process of AU's regime construction has fostered a legalistic approach to democratic promotion and defense in Africa and opened up space for non-state actors to play a central role in the development of regional democracy promotion and defense norms. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the words of human rights scholar David Forsythe, George H.W. Bush’s foreign policy incorporated “moral impulses as long as they did not prove inconvenient to expediential concerns,” (1995:126). In short, analysts have argued that human rights was approached pragmatically during the first Bush presidency, subordinated in realist fashion to broader strategic concerns and the considerations of post-Cold War power politics. But what of the son? By contrast, the presidency of George W. Bush has seemed to feature a shifting stance on the question of balancing human rights concerns and national security interests. As a candidate and in the first months of his presidency, George W. Bush largely echoed his father’s realist and pragmatic approach. For example, while committed to the promotion of political openness and economic growth abroad, on the question of humanitarian interventions, the initial position of the Bush team was to shun such operations unless larger regional or strategic interests were at stake. Yet by 2006 the Bush administration had embraced an apparent liberal interventionist stance toward the promotion of human rights, declaring in National Security Strategy 2006 that “… the United States seeks to extend freedom across the globe by leading an international effort to end tyranny and to promote effective democracy,” (2006:2). In this paper I will compare the approach to human rights and national security policy during the two Bush presidencies, identifying and accounting for key areas of similarity and difference. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of September 11 2001 the United States has increasingly began to question its diplomatic engagement with authoritarian regimes in the MENA region. As a result of this President Bush has begun institutionalising a forward strategy of freedom for the Middle East. Its central policy aim proposes the spread democracy and free trade as tools to undercut the appeal of Islamic terrorism. Yet much of the academic literature on this policy has focused on the practice of offering ‘sticks and carrots’ to MENA regimes, and has taken essentially contested terms like ‘democracy’ at face value. As a result this paper seeks to return to first order questions and understand the model of democratization that is guiding the policy. Its findings demonstrate that the pluralistic nature of the US democracy promotion bureaucracy has created contending and often incompatible strategies based on alternative definitions of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’. It is apparent that a dichotomy exists between those who propose political reform and those who propose economic reform as a solution to the obstacles of Middle Eastern democracy. The result of this is a confused set of policies that attempt to balance America’s long term economic and security concerns with the desire to spread a form of democracy that reinforces American domination of the region. From this framework it is apparent that much of the American rhetoric about a radical new approach to US-MENA relations is a façade. In reality the forward strategy is a work in progress that promotes the conditions for a gradual reform of MENA allies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In earlier work the authors concluded that serious inadequacies and deficiencies exist in the professional military education (PME) received by U.S. military officers in the area of civil-military relations. Although just as vital to military professionalism as ethics and leadership, civil-military relations does not receive the same sustained attention throughout an officer’s career. This finding is particularly significant for field-grade officers because it is at this point in their career that they may first become involved in providing advice to civilian policymakers. Yet without prior consideration, how will these officers understand what constitutes acceptable professional behavior? It is clearly incumbent upon the PME institutions to adequately prepare military officers to interact appropriately with civilians. In this paper we focus on the intermediate-level U.S. PME schools, which provide a graduate-level degree to junior field grade officersâ€"-majors and lieutenant commanders. Based upon past research, professional expertise, and interviews with fellow faculty members, we identify “model” civil-military competencies that should be addressed at this level, and optimum methods for teaching these competencies. We further propose how to best integrate this topic within, and across, the curriculum of military institutions. We conclude with some tentative findings about the usefulness of these competencies for educating professional military officers in other democracies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between the end of the cold war and the September 11, 2001, terror attacks on the United States, numerous international organizations and regimes began to embrace new norms of participation and transparency. Environment, development, human rights and even security institutions increasingly opened their decision-making processes to a variety of previously excluded actors. These institutions also made more-and-more policy-relevant information publicly available. These changes helped overcome institutional "deficits of democracy" and bolstered the legitimacy of global governance organizations. Following the 9/11 terror attacks, however, the transnational public sphere became intensely securitized. In this environment, which "changed everything" according to the leaders of the world's most powerful state, many national and international political contexts seemed again to be marked by great secrecy and exclusion. This paper explores and assesses the prospects for participation and transparency norms in the post-9/11 political environment to address the question: Has ongoing global democratization been derailed? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

America has a significant interest in a stable Iraq that adheres to the principles of democracy. However, regime transitions are precarious and recent history shows that violence during and after a regime transition is common. In the contemporary literature on regime transitions the emphasis is increasingly on "thick" as opposed to "thin" conceptions of democracy. Whereas democratic procedures and institutional safeguards are sufficient to meet the "thin" conception of democracy, authors advocating a "thick" conception of democracy argue that procedures and institutions are viable only when the elite and society at large substantively accept democratic values. However, the latter are also often skeptical about the possibility of bringing about a change in political culture, arguing that the norms and values of a society can only be manipulated at the margin (cf. Fukuyama 2004). My argument is that the history of political thought actually offers some concrete insights about how to facilitate change in the values of a community. In this paper, I look at Plato's Laws and argue that Plato's theory of legislative preambles provides a political principle that promotes political unity in light of new values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democratic peace theory presupposes that established democracies have not only a normative claim to, but also a genuine strategic interest in, extending democracy. Yet much of literature tells us that the "soft goal" of democracy promotion regularly is subordinated to "hard interests" (economy, security, political stability) when it collides with the latter. Moreover, democratisation may also lead to unintended consequences. For instance, "undesired" societal forces may seize hold of democratic institutions or democratisation processes may be derailed in a (semi-) authoritarian way. Thus, while there may be synergetic effects of security considerations, economic interests and normative preferences in the long run, in immediate situations of conflict they frequently clash. Taking the two leading contenders in the field, the US and Germany, as examples, the paper looks at how the respective governments tackle problems of conflicting goals, whether their reaction is compatible with the long-term orientation towards global democratisation or whether their short-term action follows a "traditional" pattern of giving political stability priority over democratisation, even to the point of assisting directly or indirectly political repression. Two cases are taken up: Bolivia where indigenous movements impact on donors' economic and security preferences, and Russia where the rise of election-based (semi-) authoritarianism clashes primarily with normative preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "The Iraq Solution: Four Federal Provinces and a National Oil Trust Fund." It highlights the significance of the country's four provinces in addressing diversity among the ethnic and religious groups and a national oil trust fund to protect the Iraqi oil wealth. It examines the effort of the U.S. to build democracy and reconstruct Iraq following the fall of the late Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.

With the advance of the "third wave" of democratization, developed countries such as the United States have implemented explicit strategies of democracy promotion by providing assistance to governments, political parties, and other non-governmental groups and organizations through a variety of channels. This paper examines democracy support by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy (NED) from 1987-2002 to gauge the impact of these external sources of democratization. In particular, we ask how successful has such assistance been? We rely on a dataset composed of democratization data for the developing world and assistance provided by the National Endowment for Democracy and USAID, along with additional control variables. Our results shed light on the impact of U.S. democracy assistance, revealing a relationship between specific expenditures of democracy aid and progress toward democratization, while showing no relationship between general foreign and military aid packages and the spread and consolidation of democracy in the developing world. We conclude by weighing the implications of these findings for democratization and democracy promotion policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has the United States decided to promote democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq if the domestic impediments to democratization in both countries are substantial and efforts to promote liberal institutions may compromise America's material interests? This paper argues that the U.S. promotes democracy during its military interventions to legitimize those interventions to a domestic audience in the U.S., an international audience among America's liberal allies, and/or to people within the country in which the U.S. has intervened. Because domestic actors in the target country recognize that this dynamic is a recurrent theme in U.S. policy, they often push for democracy as a strategy designed to build alliances with the U.S.. In Afghanistan, the Bush administration embraced democracy promotion more as a response to an international audience and to the initiatives of Afghans than as a way to legitimate the intervention within the U.S.. It embraced regime change in Iraq initially because policy-makers believed that the promotion of democracy would be the best strategy for transforming Iraq into a strong and stable ally and were convinced by Iraqi exiles that a transition to democracy would be relatively easy. More broadly, this war was designed to spread the democratic peace to the Middle East by imposing democracy on Iraq. As opposition to the occupation of Iraq increased over time within the U.S., Bush responded by placing increasing emphasis on liberal themes to legitimate that occupation. The combination of domestic structural impediments to successful democratization and the strategic imperatives that can lead the United States to attempt to manipulate electoral outcomes is likely to generate some political liberalization and limited electoral competition, but is not likely to lead to fully consolidated democracy. The developing global norm of democratic governance, however, provides all actors with strong incentives to maintain the institutional forms of democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq, even if the quality of those democratic institutions may not reach the standards of full democratization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper "The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy After the Post-Cold War: Making Sense of It All" presented at the "Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It provides a synthesis on various issues such as continuity and change, president's ability to govern and the tensions between the demands of national security and democracy in creating U.S. foreign policy. The conceptual models which will help to explain the overall system of the policy are accounted.

Hegemony is distinguishable as a type of rule by its reliance on two contrasting forms of power, coercive and legitimating. It is the latter that makes hegemony more stable, efficient and cost effective than simple domination. Utilizing its legitimating principles, a hegemon is able to exert influence as much through promoting consensus as through the use of force. A hegemon has a preponderance of ‘discursive power,’ meaning it can shape and promote the legitimating principles on which its hegemony rests and on which it bases its interactions with other states. Since World War II, the United States has been highly successful in using its ‘discursive power’ to legitimate its ‘benign hegemony’. Through the promotion of liberal principles of multilateralism, free markets, democracy, sovereignty, and human rights, the United States was able to create a hegemonic system that was stable and served not only its own interests but those of other countries as well. Since the attacks of September 11th, the United States has retreated from many of these legitimating principles, causing rancor and animosity among its traditional allies and supporters. Adopting unilateralist strategies, such as the ‘doctrine of preemption’, Washington is now discovering the limits to its discursive power, while the legitimating foundations of its benign hegemony begin to unravel. The purpose of this paper is to examine the limits of hegemonic discursive power. Focusing on the legitimating principles of multilateralism, democracy, and sovereignty, the first part of the paper will describe their promotion by the United States and wide acceptance as international norms of behavior. The second part will analyse their abandonment by the United States and the failure of U.S. discursive power to legitimate new hegemonic principles. The final part of the paper accesses the consequences of this failure and the limits of hegemonic discursive power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last 25 years and especially after the Cold War, the international community is witnessing remarkable changes. More and more countries are turning away from their authoritarian past and moving towards liberal democracy. Since 1975, when there were approximately 30 liberal democratic societies, there has been a vast increase in the number of such democracies in the world. Now more than 120 countries arguably offer their citizens at least a liberal democratic constitution. These transitions toward liberal democracy have varied from country to country. Some countries such as the Czech Republic have been largely successful in achieving free and fair elections and in protecting a broad range of human rights. Other countries have made progress, but have a long way to go (e.g., South Africa), while some (e.g., Haiti) have not fared as well. As countries have attempted to implement liberal democracy, many Western governments, including the US, have developed democracy assistance programs as part of their larger foreign policy to promote liberal democracy. While some scholars offer a clearly optimistic account of the US role in these developments, this paper presents a more guarded assessment of US democracy promotion and its affects on countries undertaking transitions. During the Clinton administration some attempt was made to promote democracy around the world. The Bush administration has for the most part reversed this policy. Especially after September 11, 2001, President Bush has focused on the war on terrorism to the detriment of democracy promotion. Countries like Pakistan have been given both diplomatic and financial assistance because of their support in the war on terrorism. After comparing these two administrations and their policies on democracy assistance, this paper concludes by addressing the likely impact of neglecting democracy promotion in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rise of the Global Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Foreign Policy in the Periphery traces American foreign policy from the late 1940s to the late 1990s and explains how the United States became the world’s only superpower and hegemon of the global capitalist system. Through an analysis of 30 forceful interventions into developing countries, it is shown that American diplomacy in these years was not about containing the Soviet Union, but rather about projecting its own power globally. These 30 interventions also foreshadow likely forms of involvement in the future, especially in an era of greater globalization and war against terrorism. The cases are drawn from 10 presidencies and five geographic regions. A number of patterns related to the methods and personalities involved in American foreign policy are identified. One conclusion is that harm has come to most of the local societies targetted by the US interventions, ranging from the mere loss of democracy, to the consolidation of authoritarianism. Comparative analysis of the 30 cases reveals that more than 500 years of local politics have been interrupted as a result of America’s actions, and that the overwhelming military technology used in these interventions has led to disproportionate destruction of life. In short, US foreign policy in the periphery of the global capitalist system may have succeeded in securing the United States as hegemonic successor to earlier imperialist powers. But it has been at a tremendous cost, especially for the societies under siege and in lesser measure for the United States itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current understanding of U.S. hegemony rests on the assumptions of neoclassical theories of both the state and the market. While the service-dominated economy is considered post- Fordist, the rhetoric of the state focuses on institutions of democracy. To what extent is our understanding of democracy dependent on the prior assumptions that the economy is ‘free’? If we reexamine the assumptions about the links between state and economy, drawing on the work of Gramsci, and Polanyi the necessary link between state and economy assumed in our current neoclassical theory looks quite different. The thesis of this research is that hegemonic ideologies of the relationship of state and market reinforce the interests of the commercial class at the expense of any meaningful representation of the working classes. Reconceptualizing the links between state and market in terms of an economics subordinate to social relations beyond those of commercial interests indicates the possibilities of a ‘post- Smithist’ understanding of both the imperfections of neoclassical market theories, and of the narrowness of institutional analyses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the extent of separation of religion and state between 1990 and 2002 in 152 states with populations of over one million which are included in the Religion and State (RAS) database. The results show that when using a strict interpretation of separation of religion and state ? no state support for religion and no state restrictions on religion ? no state has full separation of state except the United States. Even when discounting moderate amounts of government involvement in religion over three-quarters of states do not have separation of religion and state. The findings also show: that government involvement in religion has increased slightly between 1990 and 2002; that economic development is associated with higher levels of government entanglement with religion; that states with Muslim majorities have considerably higher levels of government support for religion; and that democracies, while rarely having full separation of religion and state, do have higher levels of separation of religion and state than do less democratic states. All of this contradicts predictions by many social scientists that in modern times religion will cease to be an important political and social factor as well as the idea that separation of religion and state is an essential element of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Globalization and new information and communications technologies are transforming the role of cities. According to Manuel Castells, the information age is ushering in a new urban form, the informational city. (Vol. 1, 398) Local governance, then, matters more than ever. At the same time governance at all levels is said to be accompanied by a democratic deficit and declining legitimacy. One of hope of ICTs is that in a globalizing world they can ameliorate the democratic deficit and close the gap between citizens, their representatives and other policy-makers. In principle local governments are supposed to be closest to their citizens and the most democratically accessible level of government, the space where e-democracy should have the greatest potential. Yet, I argue, in a comparison of the evidence - studies, polls, and an analysis of urban websites - in four countries, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia that e-democracy is failing. It has become subordinated to the hegemony of neo-liberalism with its emphasis on the service state and the citizen as consumer, not democratic participant. Despite this, I argue, citizens are using ICTs democratically, forming networks, linking the local and the global but not in a manner intended by state authorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do democracies sometimes select into tough fights? Why do they win some of these wars and lose others? In this paper, I begin to answer these questions. As has been widely noted, democracies are more likely than non-democracies to win their wars, especially those they initiate. Reiter and Stam credit this outcome to a "selection effect," whereby democracies are more likely than non-democracies to start wars that they can win quickly and decisively. On occasion, however, this "selection effect" breaks down. Specifically, the United Kingdom and the United States have selected into a number of wars where an easy victory was anything but assured. This follows from the fact that they are offshore balancers, charged with upholding the balance of power in critical regions when a potential hegemon threatens to overturn it. Despite the considerable risks they have incurred, the United Kingdom and the United States have ultimately prevailed in such wars when they have exploited the advantages that come from their geographical insularity. They have fared poorly when the nature of the conflict renders those advantages moot. The bulk of the paper develops these points theoretically. I reserve empirical testing for future work. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the advance of the “third wave” of democratization, developed countries such as the United States have embraced explicit strategies of democracy promotion by providing assistance to governments, political parties, and other non-governmental groups and organizations through a variety of channels. However, the efficacy of such actions by “democratic sponsor states” is challenged by those who conclude that democratizing states are more likely to engage in conflict than other states. Others suggest that steady progress in democratization reduces this “dangerous democratization” effect. This paper examines the role and impact of democracy assistance in promoting democratization and reducing conflict. Taking on the “dangerous democratization” argument, the paper asks whether the provision of democracy assistance increases or decreases the likelihood of conflict in democratizing states. To examine this question, the paper relies on a unique dataset of democracy assistance provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development, along with data on democracy aid from other donors and a variety of social, economic, and political characteristics of recipient countries. It tests the impact of democracy assistance on “dangerous democratization” through a variety of techniques and models, including time series cross sectional general least squares techniques. Results shed light on the role of “democratic sponsor states” as external sources of democratization as well as the relationship between democratization and conflict. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will argue that a U.S. policy of democracy and human rights promotion characterized by consistent and institutionally embedded multilateralism and multiculturalism is likely to yield more significant and enduring results than past U.S. approaches. It will build on the work of a variety of scholars who have written about the role of international organizations in promoting transnational democracy and human rights in recent years (notably Anderson 2002; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; DeGreiff and Cronin 2002; Eade and O’Byrne 2005; Leatherman and Webber 2005; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; McFaul 2005; Morrison 2004; Payne and Nayef 2004; Reus-Smit 2001). This paper will argue that U.S. policy should move away from the practice of unilateral condemnation of human rights violations and seek instead to strengthen the processes for addressing them within regional and global institutions, empower indigenous groups working for change at the local or national level, and develop the mechanisms by which multilateral force can be used to address the most grievous violations. As with other aspects of human rights, the standards and practices of democracy risk being regarded as illegitimate and even imperialistic if they are seen as being imposed from outside. Efforts to expand the scope of global democracy will be most effective if they are conducted mainly through the auspices of international bodies and the forms of democracy which emerge are allowed to develop in culturally distinct ways, which are more likely to be regarded as legitimate and therefore more likely to endure. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explains the durability of authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa by emphasizing the Arab countries’ structural position as client states in the international system. Previous arguments that account for the lack of democracy in the Arab world have traditionally pointed to domestic-level variables, such as cultural values, oil endowments, and state coercion. More recently, regional observers have paid lip service to external variables by excoriating global powers like the U.S. for their repeated interference in regional affairs. Yet beyond the rhetoric of casting blame on “great power meddling,” students of Arab politics have failed to engage in comparative research that would uncover how, precisely, support proffered by foreign patrons for their authoritarian allies has structured the dynamics of regime stability in the Middle East. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War and the accompanying decline of the dependency literature, virtually no new development has advanced what once was a vibrant research question: given asymmetrical patron-client relationships in the international system, how does external support from the foreign patron shape the domestic politics of the client state?This paper intends to fill this gap by furnishing a new theory of cliency to delineate the causal linkages between international patronage and client regime durability. It interrogates the post-colonial experiences of Jordan, Kuwait, and Tunisia to inductively weigh the historical effect of support linkages from external patrons, in the form of diplomatic sponsorship, economic aid, and security assistance, on the capacity of neopatrimonial ruling incumbents to survive domestic crises. Based upon historical research and field interviews, the project finds that long-term patronage from external powers generates a perverse effect. On the one hand, it expands the client regime’s autonomy from mass opposition within society by bolstering its political, fiscal, and military resources without exhausting its domestic productive base. Yet it ironically constricts the autocrat’s autonomy from key support groups, such as business elites and political minorities, because their own fortunes become tied even more intricately with authoritarian continuity. Much as the incumbent situates himself as client to an international patron, these domestic supporters insinuate themselves as clients to regime patronage. Neopatrimonial Arab autocracies survive domestic crises because support from external patrons enables incumbents to focus on pacifying not popular opinion or even broad anti-regime movements, but rather their narrow coalition of elite supporters whose continued loyalty is critical. This contrasts sharply with neopatrimonial dictatorships that have fallen to revolution, such as the Pahlavi monarchy in Iran or the Marcos regime in the Philippines: for these failed autocracies, either sudden drops in international patronage or the failed incorporation of external support into maintaining domestic regime coalitions led to the downfall of the incumbent. In essence, authoritarian durability in the Arab world results from a balancing act between two sets of patron-client relationships. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States and other democratic polities are in the midst of a sustained expansion of domestic and global electronic and human surveillance projects, ostensibly in order to detect the presence and activities of terrorist cells and networks, and espionage and sabotage activities of enemy states. The mobilization of the surveillance apparatus of democratic polities has not been without controversy and concern, which has voiced by human rights, civil liberties, and privacy NGOs, and investigative reporting in both mainstream and alternative media. While the current wave of expansion, and concern about, surveillance projects, is at times presented as a unique problem created by the various “wars on terror” of the early 21st century, the legacy of previous waves of surveillance mobilization and opposition inform the contemporary debate about the need for, and danger of, massive domesticand global surveillance projects.This paper examines the current mobilization of the surveillance apparatus, and concern about this mobilization, in the United States, United Kingdom, and the European Union, in a comparative historical context. The first section of the paper examines quantitative indicators of the waxing and waning of wiretapping in the United States and the United Kingdom from the immediate pre-World War II period to the present, and utilizes analytic statistics (time series analysis) to examine the correlates of domestic surveillance mobilization. This analysis is designed to answer the following questions: is domestic surveillance mobilization provoked more by external or internal threats, and which types of external or internal threats is surveillance activity most sensitive to (global levels of terrorist events, power differentials between peer competitors, internal disorders and/or criminality)?After discussing the patterns of expansion and contraction of internal surveillance activity of the United States and United Kingdom in historical and global context in the mid-20th to early 21st centuries, the paper moves on to a series of case studies examining specific electronic and human intelligence based surveillance projects in the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union from the 1990s to the present. In particular this paper examines the open source literature on the internal surveillance operations, and enabling legislation, of surveillance programs carried out by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation and National Security Agency, UK GCHQ and MI5, and the European Community’s reaction to the Echelon surveillance project, and attempts to integrate the surveillance activities of the member states of the European Union, which was accelerated by the Madrid and London terrorist attacks of 2004 and 2005.These case studies will examine the: 1) debate surrounding the enabling legislation for surveillance projects; 2) open source evidence of the range and intensity of these various surveillance projects; and 3) how NGOs, and mainstream and alternative media, become aware of these surveillance projects, and begin to mobilize against, and draw attention to, the possible threat to human rights, privacy rights, and civil liberties presented by these projects.The goals of these case studies are fourfold. These cases investigate: 1) the rationale for electronic and human surveillance enabling legislation and projects; 2) the origins of concern with, and opposition to, the legislation and projects; 3) the application of political movement literature to examine the mobilization of opposition to these pieces of legislation and projects; and, 4) locating this specific debate in the broader discussion about the domestic impact of the "global war on terror" and other "emergent threats". ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Great Powers have been historically regarded as significant in international society. As for English School scholars, Great Powers have been even one of major institutions to maintain order and promote well-being of international society. For instance, the end of slavery system and the end of slave trade (the early 19th century), the compliance with international law beyond western states (the late 19th century), self-determination (1960s), human rights (1980s) and democracy (21st century) can be seen as not only historical limited progress, but also as Great Powers’ explicate contribution to promotion of welling of international society. In the 21st century, as Great Powers, the US and UK have aggressively promoted and consolidated democracy. Increasing numbers of states have become democracies across international society, such as in America, Europe, Asia and Africa. Great Powers’ promotion of democracy and more states’ adoption of democracy are not simply coincident. In my paper, I will examine how Great Powers can have an impact on democratic development across international society in the awareness of three different structures of international society like pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist, and of three different types of Great Powers’ preponderance over lesser power states, like hegemony, primacy and dominance. In this paper, China, South Korea and Iraq are adopted to reveal their relatively different paths toward democracy on the basis of Great Power’s relatively various relationships with them under different structures of international society. Taken together, Great Powers have greatly influenced democratic development in international society in the 21st century. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the effect of military interventions with liberal goals (pro-democratization) by the United States on neighboring states? A cornerstone of US President George W. Bush?s foreign policy is that the spread of democracy will benefit the United States largely due to a belief in the democratic peace and that peoples in democratic societies are less likely to support terrorism. While President Bush is hardly alone among US presidents in believing in the value of the spread of democracy, his foreign policy has also relied in part on the hope that creating democratic regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq will serve as examples for other states with majority Muslim populations, particularly in the Middle East. This paper examines the underlying assumption of this policy by examining the contagion effects of past US interventions with liberal objectives on the neighbors of states in which the US has intervened since World War II with explicitly liberal objectives. Drawing on existing databases of US interventions and the Polity IV index, the paper uses statistical tests to measure the relationship between US intervention and democracy in surrounding states 1, 5 and 10 years after the intervention begins. The paper will also examine one case of US intervention in depth. This paper has policy implications not only for the current US administration, but for future ones as well by examining the net effect of past US interventions on the level of democracy not only on the target states, but also on surrounding states. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The American War on Iraq and Democracy in the Gulf Region: Democracy via Military PowerBy Adnan M. HayajnehThe aim of this paper is to explore the democratic process in the Arab Gulf States. It aims at discussing and analyzing the democratic initiatives created in these countries. What have they achieved? Where they are heading with regard to democratization? It will discuss democratic development, obstacles and future prospects. It will offer an assessment of previous developments and a future forecast of what we can expect from those countries in democracy building, namely after the American war on Iraq?After a critical analysis of the development toward democracy which varies from one state to the other, the paper will look at the internal factors that have led to these developments which in some countries are still far from calling them democratic development. The paper will look at the role of international factors in political development namely the role of the U.S. after its War on Iraq. Many may argue that the War on Iraq has gotten the U.S. more interested in democratic reform in the Gulf region. The paper will try to explain to what extent the US is interested in seeing democracy in the Gulf?The developments in Iraq are alarming people in the region for trying ?American democracy?. No body wants to be like Iraq. It can be argued that many governments in the Gulf region may use this to get more public support for the resistance of American democracy and for any call for real democracy. Thus, the future of democracy in the Gulf region may be the result of power conflict between U.S. pressure and domestic resistance. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proper balance between democratic control of the bureaucracy and the professional discretion and choice that is essential for effective policy administration has long been a topic of debate for policy scholars and practitioners. This paper enters the debate by exploring the relationship between regulatory discretion and choice of policy techniques that improve policy administration by limiting the use of its powers of coercion. The goals of this paper is to: 1) asses the contribution of policy scholars to understanding, explaining, and unraveling the issue of administrative discretion, and 2) demonstrate that rule-based regulatory innovation offers a way to improve the practice of policy implementation without sacrificing policy integrity. I argue that administrative discretion in the adoption of flexible policy approaches enhances capabilities of agencies to achieve substantive policy goals without sacrificing policy integrity. Building on the insights from the literature that assesses the contexts, levels, and types of administrative discretion, I generate propositions about the role of discretion and regulatory innovation in policy implementation. I explore these propositions through two case studies of the introduction of flexible, incentive-based instruments in the U.S. air and water quality policies, administered by the Environmental Protection Agency. I find that discretion, which embraces the goal to improve policy implementation through formal procedure and rule-specific innovation, moves policy forward and can initiate a legislative response, which in its turn adds to policy legitimacy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most crucial challenges to a democratizing society is the need to forge a balance between the need to be consensual (designing government institutions so as to be inclusive of different groups via decision making and power sharing processes) and the competing instinct to be majoritarian (to design institutions so as to limit the number of disparate actors in the political system). This is especially true in countries transitioning towards democracy. The three transcaucasus states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia strongly represent this truism. This paper, in turn, classifies democracy prospectively in these countries using a revised Lijphartian model. Theoretical and practical value yields from this. This leads into a discussion on the problems the continuing transition towards democracy in these countries will bring about for U.S. foreign policy. Ethnic conflict, geo-strategy, and vast hydrocarbon resources in the South Caucasus are the salient reasons that demand the need for this. We conclude the paper with foreign policy recommendations along with suggestions on how to replicate the analysis of this paper in other regions and countries where democracy is sprouting, such as in five republics of Central Asia and Afghanistan. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing research on the link between regime type and terrorist targeting practices consistently shows that liberal democracies are more prone to be targeted by transnational terrorist groups than other types of states. Several explanations for this phenomenon have been proposed, most of which can be traced back to the characteristics of liberal states emphasized in Immanuel Kant?s essay Perpetual Peace: cost sensitivity, adherence to the domestic and international rule of law, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, open borders, etc. In other words, the very characteristics that make democracies appealing to live in and that constitute the foundation of the democratic peace that exists at the interstate level are also said to be prime causes (or at least enablers) of terrorist activity. Although these explanations are certainly plausible, they neglect another important characteristic of liberal states noted by Kant and other liberal writers: the tendency of liberal states to engage in so-called democratic crusades, i.e. militarized conflicts and other forms of foreign intervention that are aimed at transforming non-liberal into liberal states. To address this oversight in the existing literature, this paper seeks to examine whether and to what extent the foreign policy behavior of liberal states ? particularly military interventions into the domestic affairs of non-liberal states ? helps to explain the terrorist penchant for targeting liberal regimes. Using a modified version of the ITERATE dataset developed by Mickolus and Sandler and analyzing the time period 1968-2002, the paper shows that the foreign policy behavior of liberal states does indeed account for a significant portion of the effect that democracy has on the likelihood that a state will become the victim of terrorist attacks. This suggests that what democracies do abroad is no less important than who they are (i.e., their domestic political characteristics), and that more restrained foreign policies are likely to result in a significant reduction in the terrorist threat facing the United States and its liberal allies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the extent to which different forms of parliamentary democracy may have different effects on crisis decision making. In general it is argued that the more power is concentrated into the hands of relative few decision makers, the more these will risk displaying symptoms of defective decision making. Variation in the degree of power concentration in parliamentary democracies may be related to constitutional arrangements (e.g. Presidential or parliamentary systems, the powers of the Prime Minister, electoral system), political structure (coalition cabinets one party government; minority versus majority cabinets) or political culture (informal norms and rules related to decision making). The paper will back these claims with case study material from foreign policy crises involving, amongst others, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and the Netherlands. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]