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This paper explores the issue of making the EU a gender-aware or gender-sensitive organization, i.e. genderizing it in the gender consultants’ parlance. Such a transformation would have a significant impact in making the EU not only post-hegemonic, but also post-patriarchal. Considerable steps have been taken to genderize the EU, but so far these have suffered from being largely based on a limited and top-down perspective. Nevertheless, the paper argues, there has been a significant developing country input into the EU’s gender agenda. In terms of development policy, gender made its first appearance in the l984 Lome III Convention, often taking a traditional ‘welfare approach’. The Cotonou Agreement of 2000 showed huge strides forward in gender awareness, including the ‘gender and development approach’ and efforts at mainstreaming gender. However, ngos and others have been extremely critical of the EU’s lack of commitment on the ground to implementing a gender-aware approach to development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As we await a final report from the commission investigating the terrorist attack on the US in September 2001, we know enough now to determine whetehr or not the failure to detect and thwart the surprise was the fault of America’s multi-billion dollar intelligence system or something else. The purpose of this paper will be to evaluate the intelligence activities surrounding 9/11, determine what failed and why, and draw lessons for the future from this extraordinary event. The paper will comment as well on the steps that have already been taken to prevent such surprises in the future and the laws that have been passed to protect national security, perhaps at a great cost to human rights and personal freedoms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building on Susan Strange’s ideas, this paper points to the usefulness of the distinction between relational and structural power in analyzing inter-state monetary power relations. While relational power is the ability of one state to influence another state’s behavior directly, structural power refers to one state’s power to indirectly influence others by controlling the monetary structures within which they must operate. In this paper, I argue that structural power in the global monetary system influences outcomes in a wider range of areas than even Strange identified. I explore this broader significance through a brief examination of 1) colonial currency relations in the first half of the 20th century as well as 2) the structural power that the US derives from dollarization today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the emergence, evolution, and crisis of the Washington Consensus. It suggests that in order to assess the orientation and content of future economic policies in Latin America we need to understand the generation, diffusion, adoption, and impact of neoliberalism since the mid-1980s. The paper also explores several hypotheses about the success/failure of the consensus, the disarray in ideas over development and economic policy, and why the consensus remains influential despite disenchantment and discontent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparing three theoretical approaches to congressional-presidential interplay in foreign policy, this paper argues that the most useful and convincing theoretical explanation of congressional deference to the George W. Bush administration national security policy focuses on three variables: a) Congress?s perception of the existence of a global threat to U.S. national security; b) presidential success in foreign affairs; and c) the presence of an undivided government in Washington (with both Congress and White House controlled by the same party). Of the three variables, a) seems to be the most significant important. Thus, this paper concludes that the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington have created the conditions for a Cold War-like consensus in the United States. The general agreement that international terrorism is a global threat that needs to be fully assessed by the U.S. government reverts back to the Cold War pattern with respect to national security affairs of a dominant presidency and a compliant Congress in U.S. legislative-executive relations. In the near future, Congress may assert its foreign policy powers to a greater degree if the White House experiences difficulties with the global war on terrorism or if the Democratic Party regains control of the Senate and/or the House of Representatives. However, it seems that as long as Congress perceives that U.S. national security is threatened by the ?global and urgent threat? of terrorism, the presidency will be able to concentrate national security powers in its own hands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been evident for some time that trade policy and environmental policy cannot long pretend to ignore each other’s existence. Conceptually, each is an integral element of sustainable development; which, ostensibly, is a stated goal of both. Practically, they already cast long shadows on each other and the actual implementation of each influences, and is influenced by, the other. After years of tortured public discussion on the subject, the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO), held in Doha, Qatar, finally placed a limited set of trade and environment issues on the negotiating agenda of the multilateral trading system. The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg, South Africa, reaffirmed the need to establish more coherence between trade policy and environmental policy. Limited as these incursions might be, they suggest a trend and a tendency that is likely to be irreversible. It has been argued that within the context of the WTO, the question is no longer whether trade and environmental policy are going to be linked, but how. The answer, of course, is far from clear because a) the Doha mandate on trade and environment was left purposely vague; b) the issue is new to multilateral trade negotiations and its many implications and manifestations have not yet been fully explored; and c) because of that, parties have yet to fully develop and firm their positions on this subject as they have on many others. For all of these reasons, there is an opportunity for all parties to shape the agenda on future trade and environment negotiations in rather more profound ways than might be possible on many other issues. This opportunity is particularly pertinent to the developing countries of the South because they, for most part, have been generally suspicious of environmental issues seeping into trade deliberations and accepted the Doha mandate for trade and environmental negotiations rather hesitantly, if not grudgingly. The purpose of this paper is to better understand Southern concerns about the forthcoming trade and environment negotiations and to explore how an emergent Southern agenda might take shape. The analysis presented here derives directly from a review of Southern views on trade and environment issues compiled as part of an ICTSD/IISD/RING research project on the ‘Southern Agenda for Trade and Environment.’ While a budding literature on the subject does exist, this project was an early attempt to systematically collect and analyze the views of developing country delegates themselves. Methodologically, two distinct ‘data’ sets were constructed. The first compiles together the various formal interventions and proposals made by developing countries within the WTO; most particularly within the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE). The second data set of Southern views on environment and development is drawn from several months of consultations and discussions with developing country negotiators in Geneva and Brussels. These small group discussions sought to elicit a first-hand articulation of Southern concerns and interests in relation to trade and environment issues from developing country delegates, especially in terms of the post-Doha negotiation agenda. This paper presents a review and synthesis of the learning from these two data sets of Southern views on trade and environment. The research concludes that although the developing countries are likely to adopt a conservative strategy in negotiating the environment and trade aspects of the Doha workplan, this is to be expected. This is because developing countries a) had initially resisted these provisions, b) are the historically weaker parties and therefore prone to risk-minimizing strategies, and c) the newness of this issue for trade negotiations coupled with the resource and time strains on Southern delegations will itself limit the scope of innovation by any party. The previous section has outlined three key ingredients of the South’s post-Doha concerns that are likely to influence the defensive aspects of the South’s negotiation position between now, and January 2005. However, the more important conclusion relates to the emerging willingness within the developing countries to begin engaging the trade and environment agenda and to possibly re-craft it within the framework of sustainable development. This is neither going to be easy, nor automatic. While it is to the obvious benefit of the South (and many other parties) for the developing countries to adopt a proactive strategy, doing so will require much effort from the South itself and a supporting environment from other actors interested in a furthering the links between trade, environment and sustainable development. What can the South do itself to move from a reactive agenda defined by its apprehensions about trade and environment to a proactive agenda that seeks the opportunities to be realized by defining sustainable development as the goal of international trade? How can other international actors assist? The paper will outline four key steps in this direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates how the profound changes at work in the world, known commonly and somewhat opaquely as globalization, have altered the behaviors and orientations of those citizens who participate in the dynamics of globalization. The evidence of rapid and pervasive transformation seems to be everywhere as neoliberal economic policies, vast movements of people around the world, communications and transportation technologies, and a host of other dynamics have led to what has been called the death of time and distance. These changes are so profound that it calls into question the assumption that those who preside over economies, societies, and polities simply absorb these changes into traditional practices. Rather, we theorize that globalizing processes and the backlashes against them alter the lives, outlooks, practices and relationships of all people?rich and poor, leaders and followers, Northerners and Southerners. More than that, we suspect that some of the most extensive transformations have occurred in the lives of those elites in all walks of life who are on the cutting edge of the dynamics presently underway. Using two surveys of over 800 American elites conducted in the fall of 1999 and the winter of 2002-2003, this paper investigates the degree to which an individual’s participation in the processes of globalization transforms his or her loyalties to a nation-state, attitudes toward authority, and orientations toward other collectivities. It also measures whether protests against the WTO and World Bank, the September 11th terrorist attacks, and the war in Iraq have affected the orientations of elites to globalization. To identify those respondents on the cutting edge of global processes, the authors develop an index to measure a respondent’s involvement in global processes. The authors then use this index to conduct chi-square tests that uncover significant attitudinal and behavioral differences between elites on the cutting edge and the other respondents. These tests find that an individual’s participation in the processes of globalization significantly affects his or her orientation toward both the nation-state and other authorities. Those respondents on the cutting edge viewed globalization significantly more favorably than the other respondents. They travel significantly more; use communications technologies more extensively; are more likely to place their employers’ or organizations’ interests before their governments’ interests; and feel significantly more empowered in the face of global processes. These findings support the argument that global elites today are developing political orientations that are incommensurate with traditional, state-centered notions of identity and loyalty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper considers the role of the IMF in managing financial crises in developed nations. It argues that principal-agent and constructivist approaches to studying the Fund pay insufficient attention to client state preferences and that these preferences give the clearest indication of the degree of country ownership of IMF programs. As such, it argues that lending decisions should also be considered in domestic political and economic statecraft terms. The paper draws on primary evidence from the Fund's last non-routine interaction with a developed nation, the UK in 1976, and shows how established preferences for restoring balance to the British economy through the introduction of deflationary measures within the framework of the open international economy were delivered by preference laundering through the IMF. In light of these findings, the paper notes that further research into Fund interactions with developed nations from the domestic statecraft approach is needed if the IMF's legitimacy is to be enhanced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is part of a larger project on central bank independence (CBI) in developing countries. My theory explains central bank reform in developing countries as a function of the need for capital, and of domestic institutional hurdles. The theory has found quantitative support in a sample of developing countries between 1973-2007. This paper explains the evolution of central banking in Argentina and Brazil. An analysis of the reforms affecting CBI, and of instances of lack of reform, provides qualitative evidence of incumbents' motivations for central bank reform, and of the obstacles they face. The Argentine case shows how a need for capital motivates incumbents to delegate monetary authority to the central bank. It also shows that when incumbents are not constrained by need of capital they are more likely to restrict CBI and use monetary policy as another instrument of domestic policy. Even when the Brazilian reforms are fewer and more limited, qualitative evidence helps to explain the reasons of the timing of reforms affecting CBI. The evidence presented here was gathered through the analysis of primary and secondary sources, and semi-structured interviews. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do small states use international organizations to manage the consequences of exogenous shocks? This paper examines this question through exploring how small states negotiate with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for crisis management support during a period of 'disaster capitalism'. Focusing on the case of Iceland, the paper argues that while small states can potentially build scale economies in specialist sectors such as banking, the risks inherent in rapid financial expansion greatly increase their vulnerability to external shocks. In such circumstances, small states are likely to struggle to level the playing field in their attempts to negotiate the constraints and opportunities provided by engagement with the IMF during international crises, when they face higher stakes compared with larger economies and have a narrower policy choice set at their disposal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper investigates the changes to the Fund's bilateral surveillance policy as a response to the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Specifically, the paper asks about the factors that caused the quick and deep shift to a systemic approach to IMF surveillance. In doing so, the paper casts doubt on exclusive reliance on theoretical models that interpret change as exogenously-driven. In other words, although the financial crisis was certainly an important catalyst, the causes of the quick and deep transformation of IMF surveillance lie in the cumulative effects of previous policy changes. Specifically, policy entrepreneurs capitalised on the changes adopted over the 1990s in order to advance their preferred (but complex) reform proposal and shape a supportive coalition around the role of the IMF as a systemic supervisor. Advancing this argument, the paper contributes to the literature that aims at showing the importance of temporality and process sequencing to explain policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores in which ways and by which mechanisms the EU and broader European conditions effects national policy development and discusses the conditions under which such factors will effect national policy development the most. The paper combines Europeanization and Entrepreneurship theory and presents new conceptualizations on how the EU and the European environment affect national policy-making. First, it is argued that institutional and structural features, as highlighted by the Europeanization literature, may create severe constraints on national policy-making - but that this is seldom the case. Entrepreneurship is a common mechanism through which EU policy and other European features shape national policy-making. I distinguish between three kinds of entrepreneurship: Model-Making, Fashion Queen and Shrewd Lawyer. Model-makers bring European impulses into national policy development, often transforming the model along the way. Fashion Queens argue that national policies must be improved so that their country can lead the way for the rest of Europe; and Shrewd Lawyers negotiate and reshape formal EU steering signals. The theory propositions are based on a comparative qualitative case study of three national climate policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper claims that the European Union (EU) has had a very peculiar relationship with the globalized post-Cold War economic order. On the one hand, the EU was instrumental in bringing about this order. It aggressively promoted (both internally and externally) the principles and policies upon which this economic order has been based. On the other hand, this proactive engagement was translated within the EU into a highly polarized and antagonistic public discourse that led to a serious identity crisis. In this way, it is argued that economic globalization emerged in the EU as a debate on the nature and future of Europe. After 2005, this polarized and antagonistic discourse started to change. The rise of flexicurity, as a new way of thinking about Europe's place and orientation in the global political economy, has been instrumental in this shift. The paper examines and evaluates these developments and their implications for the European project. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that the aid relationship needs to be comprehended both as a particular, and for African states, particularly important, international relationship, and as a social developmental process. Yet, discussion of aid is mainly dominated by debates about economic and political efficacy of aid policy. The paper argues that analysis of aid needs to unite a consideration of social-developmental purposes and content with analysis of specifically international-geopolitical dimensions. The paper explores the idea of uneven and combined development (Rosenberg) for understanding both the legacies of state formation in Africa and the developmental prospects of aid as a particular contemporary instance of combined development. It suggests that the prospects for contemporary western aid policies are premised upon the achievement of relatively homogeneous liberal forms of governance in Africa, yet face significant obstacles in this regard. Indeed, the lessons of combined development point to the production of heterogeneity rather than homogeneity. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The overall objective of this paper is to understand the sources of variation in institutional quality and thus differences in development trajectories. Building on theories emphasizing the importance of high quality institutions for economic development, this paper develops and tests the argument that institutional quality and resulting divergent paths of economic development can be understood as a result of differences in leaders' perceived threat of losing power without compensation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last decade a significant body of feminist research on global governance emerged, however this research hardly analyzes processes of economic governance. At best feminist scholars deal with global economic governance in the context of gendered impacts of economic restructuring. What is missing is a systematic analysis of the gender norms and rules that underlie processes of economic governance and lead to gendered outcomes of economic policies. This paper seeks to expose a feminist research agenda for investigating issues of global economic governance. It starts with discussing the liberal feminist governance literature arguing that these approaches are deficient for theorising gender in processes of economic governance. Drawing on discourse theoretical approaches I argue that governance has to be captured as a process of boundary drawing in which the object of governance - the (gendered) meaning of economic and social phe-nomena - get constructed. Emphasising the role of knowledge as a form of social power (power/knowledge nexus) this paper illustrates how processes of economic governance can be analyzed from a gender perspective. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the IMF deal with 'renegade regimes' that rebel against the economic 'rules of the game' created and sustained by Western international society? This paper uses the example of norm renegades to investigate how the IMF's influence over a government's economic policy orientation works in cases of weak socialization. The paper seeks to enhance our understanding of both the IMF's role in propagating global monetary norms and how the IMF engages states that resist socialization into those norms, as well as exploring the limits of the organization's influence. The central argument presented here is that the IMF uses material incentives to establish a pattern of interaction with norm renegades, which can create recurring opportunities to persuade domestic actors to re-conceptualize how they should pursue their interests. Even where the organization's direct influence over regime behavior might appear to be weak, this can potentially enable the IMF to gradually cultivate a substantive shift in a regime's economic policy orientation over a medium-term time horizon. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will explore the economic theory underlying the concept of privatization. In contrast to the conventional wisdom about privatization, this paper will argue that all persons working for the government-- including government employees-- are "contractors." As a consequnce, there are real economic choices about how government functions should be carried out-- either by employees or contractors-- and that these choices should be made based on a cost-benefit evaluation and not automatically assumed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to explain the varying, and sometimes intriguing, outcomes of the past threerevisions of the Treaty concerning the Community's Common Commercial Policy. Subjectingthe external trade policy outcomes of the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice and theConstitutional Treaty to causal analysis, the paper argues that stagnancy and change can beexplained by four factors: (i) functional pressures; (ii) the role of supranational institutions;(iii) socialisation, deliberation and learning processes; and (iv) countervailing forces. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the actual construction of responsibility, blame, and sanction in loans to the states in the course of dealing with debt problems since the 1970s. It argues that this process can be best described as the gradual institutionalization of the assignment of responsibility, blame, and sanction based on the juridical construction of knowledge. Because juridically constructed causes often contradict real social causes â€" which include, at a minimum, the agency of creditors and indebted states, institutional settings, and structural conditions â€" they are inaccurate and inadequate bases for ethical inquiry. The paper serves as what critical naturalists call an explanatory critique that examines how the dominant ethical discourse about a social practice, such as the debt reduction practice, not only justifies the existing order and power relations surrounding the practice but also contradicts a scientific explanation that clarifies the causal mechanism of this practice. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper adopts a critical political economy perspective and contests the liberal order that divorces the political from the economic. Orthodox ‘economy building’ operations adopt unreflective assumptions about economic laws and treat economic reform as a technical, a-political, value-free issue. Nor does a critical perspective endorse the liberal project’s assumption that physical and structural violence can be artificially divorced. Distributive injustice and structural violence continue when physical violence stops. Conflict creates new incentive structures for primitive capital accumulation, which is a continuous process and not just bound historically. It involves plunder, predation, resource exploitation and violence as well as profits made from exchange in windfall conditions. These conflict incentives include the displacement of ‘legal’ options; new borders that create obstructions and incentives for engaging in risky exchange; a premium on movement, access and ownership of the means of transport. Liberal peace processes introduce new tensions and neglect the functional aspects of unregulated political economy that nevertheless enable people to get by in situations where new regulatory norms are emerging. This paper draws on TWE (transforming war economies) research to show that the imbalance arising from liberal policies of macroeconomic stability, neglect of production, failures of emergency job creation and poor social protection has an inhibiting impact on economic recovery and potential growth. These policies are only viable in conditions where citizens are cushioned from the deleterious effects of liberalisation by the existence of non-observable economies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The traditional sanctions literature, as well as the emerging literature on targeted sanctions, treat sanctions episodes as integrated units of observation. The sanctions regime is their main focus. This approach is particularly reflected in classical studies such as Economic sanctions reconsidered: history and current policy (Hufbauer, et. Al. 1985), as well as in more recent work such as The Sanctions Decade (Cortright and Lopez, 2000). In contrast to this conventional view, I argue that the sanction regime has to be disaggregated in order to get a better understanding of the impact of targeted sanctions. It is no longer possible to evaluate the success or failure of sanctions regimes by only taking into account a sanctions regime from the day it starts to the day it is being terminated. On the contrary, in each sanction regimes there are in fact several sanctions episodes, defined on the basis of the targeting dynamics which later sanctions regimes do. This paper thus provides a new approach on how to further segment sanctions regime studies, and the broader theoretical implication this has on sanctions studies. Moreover, this paper will present new data on how to better understand the dynamics of individual targeting, which is a core attribute in the shift from comprehensive sanctions to targeted sanctions. My goal is to provide a better understanding of the role targeted sanctions can play as a strategy for achieving behavioral change. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) has made it increasingly important to determine their effects on trade flows. At the center of the debate over the impact of these agreements are the questions of whether they are trade diverting or trade creating (Rahman et al 2006) and whether they are on balance trade-liberalizing or protectionist (Krueger 1999). Goldstein et al (2007) find the impact of nonreciprocal PTAs to be negative, contradictory to the underlying goals for such agreements. This paper seeks to further test this and other studies that have found a negative relationship between nonreciprocal trade agreements, preferences, and trade using a recently implemented non-reciprocal trade agreement between the U.S. and Sub-Saharan Africa, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000. The AGOA seeks to promote trade, investment, and economic cooperation between the U.S. and AGOA countries by offering 36 eligible African countries duty-free access for most goods, providing coverage for additional commodities above and beyond those covered under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). U.S. non-oil imports under the AGOA have become the largest category of trade for eligible countries. A traditional gravity model is employed to test whether the AGOA is trade creating for eligible countries targeting the U.S. market. The findings of this study suggest that AGOA membership or eligibility for AGOA textile benefits have no significant impact on trade. The uncertainty of the life span of preferences, eroding preferential margins, and the inability for African producers to respond adequately to preferences are theoretical explanations for these results. The importance of this paper is to advance our understanding of the effect of PTAs, specifically those between a major economic power and less developed countries at a time when preferences are eroding yet remain at the center of debate in the current Doha Round. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conventional arms trade has long resisted the influence of international norms on its conduct. Following several “arms to Iraq” scandals and increased attention to ethnic conflict in the early 1990s, however, many states sought to revise their laws to provide for transparency and norms-based export regulations. Yet such developments remained largely at the domestic level, with multilateral criteria regarding the transfer of weapons to countries involved in conflict and/or severe human rights violations still elusive. It was only with the adoption of the 1998 EU Code of Conduct that states began to collectively recognize and promote shared obligations regarding arms exports. While NGOs have been influential in securing these issues on the international agenda, it has nevertheless been the advocacy of key states that has propelled these multilateral efforts forward.This paper will explore the factors behind the transformation of states from norm-takers to norm-makers. Using case studies of the UK and Germany, I ask why some states have sought to become global advocates for setting and promoting arms export norms, as with Great Britain, or have chosen to remain supportive but less active, like Germany. To answer this question, I examine the role of state culture and identity, domestic political structure, and national interest in driving states to seek actively the spread of “responsible arms trade” norms. I find that culture plays a minor role, if any, in this case. Rather, I argue that domestic structure aids in this transformation, whose more immediate motivation stems from a desire and need to demonstrate certain ideas of national identity, in response to various political pressures both at home and abroad. This paper will add to the literature on the agency of normative diffusion, drawing from document- and interview-based research in the two countries of study. More generally, it highlights the simultaneous importance of identity and interest, broadly defined, in understanding the effects of NGO and state pressure on foreign policy-making. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several studies show that foreign aid fails in producing the expected results. Also, despite constituting an international practice, foreign aid receives little attention from international relations theory. This paper inquires how foreign aid can be understood on international relations grounds, after the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Making use of existing scholarly work, I assess the existing international relations theory literature on foreign aid and I identify relevant insights from other fields, from practice, and from the development of the aid regime. The paper takes the stagnating debates on foreign aid a step further by showing two major obstacles to a functioning foreign aid regime which rest on international relations groundsâ€"the current understanding of inter-state relations/sovereignty and of ‘doing development’. Also, the paper shows why understanding aid requires an interdisciplinary approach and finds that the failure of implementing the Millennium Development Goals represents a critical event which will lead to further improvements in the aid regime. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global financial markets have changed dramatically since the turn of the century. Rapid and dramatic financial innovation, especially in the form of complex derivatives, has transformed cross-border trading and ownership patterns, while new actors, especially hedge funds and private equity, are challenging both traditional forms of market organization and state-based modes of regulation. While critics regard these developments as leading to new modes of hyper-marketization (“locusts”?), stripping away not only assets but also social protection, advocates argue that what is emerging is, in essence, a new form of transnational “organized capital” â€" growth-oriented “patient capital” (“honeybees”?) without the kind of state neocorporatist or national strategic support emphasized in the “varieties of capitalism” literature. Governments are increasingly debating the issue of regulating these actors and markets, but so far they have remained essentially unregulated. Only proposals for new kinds of self-regulation are clearly on the table in the absence of effective national regulation or of any international financial architecture. This paper argues that these developments constitute a key example of Lake’s notion of the “privatization of governance” in a world where sovereign states essentially play a blocking role with regard to international regulatory innovation. This paper asks: “Is organized capital going global?” and considers the regulatory implications of alternative developmental pathways in the globalization of finance. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the last two decades, economic liberalization emphasis on regionalism has been a prime concern for wider sectors of civil society around the world. Over and over, these groups are presented in the mass media as opponents to these policy options. Less has been said about the alternatives they have put forward and how some of these have been incorporated into official policies. Moreover, for some of these groups if regionalism aims to benefit marginalized sectors of society in the Global South, then trade and services liberalization policies need to be abandoned in favour of gender sensitive, community based and environmentally sustainable regionalisms. This position has raised key issues of power and resistance in the international political economy and has stirred heated debates among scholars, practitioners and members of civil society. To date, few systematic attempts have been done to map these debates and to develop a comparative analysis of them, despite of the relevance that these could have for the long-term sustainability of regionalism. This paper aims at contributing to fill this gap as part of a larger research agenda that develops a systematic and comparative analysis of the specific proposals put forward as alternatives to overcome socio-economic deficits embedded in contemporary regionalisms; and the practices of governance that are emerging and are proposed for the implementation of these alternatives (how are these alternatives been implemented, by whom and for whom). More specifically, this paper focuses on concrete cases of cross-border civic activism in which the notion of citizenship as a struggle proves to be crucial in the discursive framing of alternative forms of regionalisms, including the specific proposals and the mechanisms that are foreseen for their implementation. In particular, these case studies display the relevance that a meaningful enforcement of formally granted citizenship rights in national and local arenas and/or the extension of these rights across borders have for urban and rural women organizations to contest highly unaccountable regional governance mechanisms. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States have all released defence industrial policy papers in the recent past. Canada has yet to release a similar document. This paper will examine the defence industrial policies of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States with a view to establishing common themes and principles that each nation has established. Next the paper will explore reasons for why Canada has not found it necessary to release a defence industrial policy and discuss whether or not one is necessary within the context of a broader North American Defence Industrial Base. Finally, the paper will conclude that regardless of the broader North American Defence Industrial Base, Canada should have a defence industrial policy. The paper will present, based on the common themes of our allies, what Canada’s defence industrial policy principles and strategies should be for the future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing interactions and the worldwide complexity have had great significance between the main trading blocks |USA, Europe and Asia| since the evolution of 'Globalization'. The economic and political costs and benefits of the so-called 'Globalization' haven been subjects of lively public and academic debates all around the world. A wonderful by-product for the economic profession has been the emergence of a new research topic. The interaction between national and supranational policies and regulations is best seen in the European Economic and Monetary Union. Besides that, the arena for economic policy has shifted towards the world level. The novelty in our paper is to show the consequence and impact of `World Economic Governance'; outgoing from the European Framework with some `New Modes of Economic Governance'. We use simple 'Comparative Institutional Analysis' to explain: what are the adequate modes of world economic governance? Our paper show: on what terms the modes of economic governance is successful and what are the necessary and sufficient ingredients. Further research in that field is necessary and urgent because of the increasing international conflicts in economic and political issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In practice, politicians, prime ministers and finance ministers are the most important players in the making of exchange rate policy. This paper agrees with the idea that exchange rate policy is a political process. However, I argue that in Eastern Europe, research needs to consider the opportunistic use of currency arrangements. The general argument is that when information sources are scarce, visible fixed exchange rates give politicians a useful tool to convey information. Ex-communist parties in transition countries can use currency commitments to signal their willingness to become mainstream political organizations that can carry out stabilization policy. For the empirical tests I use newly coded monthly data on exchange rate arrangements and events. Data indicate that the political model fares better than a pure economic model when predicting changes in currency arrangements. There is also support for my hypothesis: former-communists value exchange rate commitments relatively more than right wing parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the study of contemporary development involves a thoroughgoing rethinking of the disciplinary divisions between International and Comparative Political Economy. It seeks to set out a new framework within which to move towards a greater and more constructive meshing between these two branches of political economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The IMF has used Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) to encourage economic development in Less Developed Countries by alleviating short term financial difficulties and imposing loan conditions mandating economic restructuring in recipient countries. In general, SALs require governments to balance their books, reduce expenditures for social programs, promote export-orientated growth, and de-regulate and privatize state-held entities. There is much speculation in the popular press and in the academic literature on human rights that the imposition of SALs induces recipient governments to reduce their level of respect for internationally recognized human rights (Bello 1994; Commonwealth Secretariat 1989; Danaher 1994; and Sadasivam 1997). While there has been much previous research on this topic, most of it has been based on the observation of only one or a few cases, usually over a short time period (Bello 1994; Commonwealth Secretariat 1989; Chipeta 1993; Danaher 1994; Dennis 1992; Handa and King 1997; Kane 1993; Sadasivam 1997; Sowa 1993 and Vuorela 1991). Only a few scientific studies attempt to assess the effects of SALs from a cross-national time series perspective (Poe and Camp Keith, 2001; Buchmann 1996; Çagatay and Özler 1995; Dorosh 1996; Due and Gladwin 1991; and Sahn 1996) and only one of the previous scientific studies addresses the cross-national effects of SALs on government respect for specific civil and political rights (Poe and Camp Keith, 2001). Recent work (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2002) has examined the impacts of IMF adjustment controlling for issues of selection. Their findings indicate a selection process, which connects the factors that determine both the receipt and impact of adjustment lending. The negative impact on economic growth and income distribution, generate questions about the impact of adjustment on other issues including the respect for human rights. This paper investigates the impacts of IMF structural adjustment lending on respect for human rights and will employ a data set that includes annual observations of specific human rights practices for all countries from 1981 to 2001. Thus, we will be able to draw conclusions about how SALs affect particular human rights practices. We also will estimate the direct and indirect effects of SALs on the human rights practices of recipients and determine whether the relationship we discover between receipt of a SAL and subsequent human rights practices might be due to selection effects rather than the effects of the loans themselves (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2002; 2003; Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2002). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper criticises the traditional realist distinction between high politics (sovereignty and security matters) and low politics (economics and other less important state activities) on several grounds. First, it ignores the economic underpinnings of military power and national security. Second, it overestimates the independence states have both from the international economy and from domestic political opposition when mobilizing economic resources in support of security objectives. Finally, it glosses over the potential for states to achieve national security objectives in an interdependent world economy by using economic instruments, such as economic sanctions and economic incentives. This article, therefore, makes the case for treating the political economy of national security as a distinct subfield of security studies for both teaching and research purposes. It identifies a unique set of political economy issues that have a direct bearing on national security calculations. It reviews both the classical geopolitics literature and a growing literature by contemporary international relations scholars that address these issues in an effort to bridge the chasm between political economy and security. Finally, it suggests avenues of further research to flesh out the conditions under which domestic and international economic factors affect the pursuit of national security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During his tenure in the White House, Bill Clinton devoted an unprecedented amount of time and energy to Northern Ireland. His personal interest, manifested in three presidential visits to the province, drove a sequence of major policy initiatives, which, at certain stages, played a pivotal role in advancing the peace process. His decision to grant a U.S. visa to Gerry Adams was an important element in the IRA=s decision to declare its first cease-fire in August 1994. Senator George Mitchell, Clinton=s principal representative in Northern Ireland, used all his political skills to win the confidence of most of the province=s political leaders and lay the foundation for the 1998 Belfast Agreement. In the hours before the Agreement was signed, Clinton worked the phones from the Oval Office, giving assurances of support and encouraging compromise from all the major participants. Later, the Clinton administration tried to achieve consensus over the most divisive issues of the Good Friday accord. In autumn 1999, when the whole deal seemed to be unraveling, George Mitchell=s review helped secure the convening of the Northern Ireland power-sharing executive. And right up to the final hours of his presidency, Clinton continued to work for a breakthrough. He kept in contact with the major political leaders and sent Jim Steinberg, his Deputy National Security Adviser, to participate in multi-party talks aimed at ending the impasse over decommissioning, demilitarization, and policing. While Clinton=s political interventions in Northern Ireland have received widespread media and analytical coverage, significantly less attention has been paid to his support for economic development. This has tended to obscure the key role which helping deliver a peace dividend played in Washington=s strategic considerations. My paper provides a narrative account of the Clinton administration’s economic initiatives, particularly the investment conferences and work of the International Fund for Ireland. It also examines the rationale and aims of these initiatives and assesses their impact on the Northern Ireland economy and the peace process. My work is based on interviews with US, Irish and British officials, government documents, material from political parties, and articles from newspapers and the internet. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-Asian Financial Crisis context there remains doubt over the importance of state structures in an era dominated by global finance. The restructuring experiences of the Crisis-affected countries in 1997-1998 highlighted the increasing importance of international financial guidelines in the development and evaluation of financial sectors in developing countries. Although the debates as to the importance of these international guidelines have not focused explicitly on the apparent ?retreat of the state?, the terms of this debate, so dominant in the International Political Economy literature, and the assumptions on which it is premised, continue to inform the evaluation of the relative positions and influence of states in the global economy. Through the adoption of Colin Hay?s ?moments of stateness? this paper evaluates the efforts made by the Indonesian governments in the restructuring of the banking sectors. I argue that instead of leading to a diminution in the role of the state in a globalised financial market, the international guidelines actually require governments to strengthen, extend and broaden the remit of the state structures. This undermines the neo-liberal economic assumptions that privatisation and reform after a crisis should, and will, result in greater market-centred activity and stronger market discipline accompanied by the withdrawal of the state. Underlying the ongoing importance of the state within the banking sectors is the extent to which political decisions and political will provide essential support and direction for private actors in developing countries if these banking systems are to retain any degree of international creditworthiness. An underlying tension within the retreat of the state debate is the expectation that change to a state structure will result in a neo-liberal state, and that this is the result of a decrease in the functions of the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a growing literature exploring the effects of foreign direct investment on economic growth. Another set of models (Polachek (1980) and Polachek et. al. (1999)), with roots to such classical political philosophers and economists as Eméric Crucé, Baron de Montesquieu, Richard Cobden , Sir Norman Angell, Rousseau and Jacob Viner (1937), predict a negative association between conflict and trade. These models predict that trading partners protect their trade gains by cooperating more and fighting less, thus leading to less conflict. During the 1990’s capital flows were ten times the size of trade flows. Given the increasing importance of capital flows, this paper examines the effect that FDI has on conflict. We also explore how relaxing a country’s budget constraint through foreign aid and loans from the IMF, impact on their tendency to engage in international conflict. Using pooled cross-section time-series data on bilateral FDI and political conflict and cooperation measures for 135 countries (taken from WEIS, COW, the Cooperation and Peace Data Bank), empirical analysis verifies that FDI is both associated with decreased dyadic dispute while at the same time increased overall defense expenditures. We similarly find evidence for an adverse effect of foreign aid and lending by multilateral institutions on conflict that may partly explain the failure of these strategies in achieving economic development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the relation between politics and inflation control in developing countries by comparing cases of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Israel and Turkey. It is focused on how one aspect of politics, the degree of democracy, affects the ability of a country to introduce and pursue effective economic policies, particularly ones related to inflation. Both qualitative and quantitative analyses are used to assess the how inflation is related to the degree of democracy and the findings indicate that not the degree of democracy itself but its stability is the most important political condition for decreasing inflation. Therefore, both stable authoritarian regimes and consolidated democracies are able to eliminate inflation. Democratization increases inflationary pressures in the short term. Thus, it may be difficult to decrease inflation immediately after a transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime. However, as democracy matures, it becomes easier for governments to introduce and implement anti-inflationary policies. On the hand, unstable authoritarian regimes are as ineffective as new democracies in ending inflation problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The next EU enlargement will take place in May 2004. Cyprus is joining the EU along with nine other new memder states. The Mediterranean island, however, is still de facto divided and the Cyprus problem unresolved. This paper argues that the EU is now in unique position to play a role in solving the problem and bringing about permanent peace and stability on the island, and improving Greek-Turkish relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The processes of globalization have forced local communities into the international economic arena. At times, the interests and agendas pursued by these communities diverge from those at the national level. This has been particularly evident with respect to free trade agreements and the pursuit of foreign investment, where the impacts at the local level may be felt quite directly and profoundly. While local authorities have been careful to stay within accepted bounds when pursuing their global agendas, the potential for conflict with the federal government remains. This paper will examine the increasing salience of sub-national foreign economic policy initiatives and the ways in which these initiatives are affecting (and are being affected by) existing federal-local relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the historical development of the nuclear sector under a nationalist paradigm, and how it organized and confronted President Menem privatization policies. As I will show, while economic factors were important in hindering the nuclear privatization proposal, sectoral organization ?based on a class-cross coalition among professional, technical and administrative personnel- served as an early deterrent to the liberalization of the atomic program. The sector?s resistance was led by an epistemic community formed by nuclear professionals who shared similar ideas on how nuclear energy had to be developed. These principles of development, based on economic nationalism and developmentalism, were mainly threefold: i) the centrality of the state in the nuclear effort; ii) autonomy as the guiding principle of development; and iii) the centralization of all functions (research and development, energy generation, and regulation) in the National Commission of Atomic Energy (CNEA). This epistemic group withdrew all support to the government and vocally opposed the de-nationalization of the program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The sanctions debate has traditionally paid little, if any, attention to the role of domestic political institutions. While some researchers have investigated the part they play in the decision to launch sanctions, less attention has been devoted to their effect on the actual outcomes of episodes. This project demonstrates that more democratic senders generally enjoy a higher level of success when using economic sanctions. Further, the governments of democratic targets are less likely to stand firm in the face of damaging economic punishment then are non-democratic leaders. It is then demonstrated that the basic logic linking regime type to certain outcomes in the case of negative sanctions also has important implications for understanding the political effectiveness of positive sanctions (such as conditional foreign aid, or high level diplomatic exchanges) as well. The basic model introduced in this paper contends that sanctioning episodes can be conceptualized and analyzed as bargaining episodes. Since democratic states share certain institutional characteristic which make them relatively transparent they will posses greater credibility than their autocratic counterparts. Note that this credibility differential hold even for relatively low profile issues that would not allow ‘audience costs’ arguments to come into play. Democratic senders can make more credible threats and promises, and hence enjoy a relatively greater margin of success in the realm of sanctions. This approach also recognizes that positive and negative sanctions are intimately interconnected on a theoretical level. One cannot grant benefits (positive sanctions) without the implicit threat that they may be taken away (negative sanctions). Likewise the promise of the restoration of normal economic relations, if certain criteria are met, is implicit in most trade embargoes. Any theory of the role of regime type in economic statecraft must be able to deal with both positive and negative sanctions. The fulfillment of costly promises by the sender involves credibility issues similar (but not identical) to those entailed by threats. Once again, the increased transparency and credibility of democratic states allows them to overcome these problems a greater percentage of the time. Finally, while on the whole autocratic states are not particularly vulnerable to negative sanctions, certain types of non-democratic targets may be susceptible to strategies that emphasize positive inducements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper begins with an empirical puzzle: in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Unites States maintained a high tariff wall even as it flung its gates open to millions of European immigrants. America?s trade and immigration policy was unambiguously inconsistent: the United States was clearly ?open? on immigration, but ?closed? with respect to trade. This inconsistency poses a significant puzzle for standard economic theory, which views trade and factor flows as substitutes, and expects states to adopt consistent policies across international economic dimensions. It also points to a much broader set of questions that are rarely addressed in the International Political Economy literature: How are we to understand the foreign economic policies of states across issue-areas, especially with respect to trade and factor flows? Why do some states display greater consistency across foreign economic policy dimensions than others? Drawing upon the histories of the United States and Australia in the decades preceding World War I, I argue that a broadened domestic politics approach ? one that incorporates multiple issue-areas and treats them as interdependent ? offers the most convincing answers to these questions. Significantly, I argue that the preferences of domestic actors cannot be properly understood or anticipated when issue-areas are treated in isolation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The causal interactions between democracy and economic development are treated in two separate literatures. On the one hand, the literature on democracy has established that economic development is an important determinant of the level of democracy in a country. If this prerequisite is not in place, countries tend to have a lower level of democracy than otherwise. On the other hand, the literature on the effect of democracy on economic development, on the other hand, is debating the effect of democracy on economic development. However, these studies generally agree that political regime type has a significant effect on economic development. Taken together, these two literatures indicate a reciprocal relationship between the level of economic development and the level of democracy in a country. This paper develops a simultaneous equation model of democracy and development. The endogenous variables are the level of democracy and the level of economic development, as measured from real GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity differences across countries. The independent variables include various determinants of democracy and development from the literature, as well as variables measuring economic openness of a country to the world (globalization). The policy implications of the results for democracy and economic development will be discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much research has been devoted toward understanding when states impose economic sanction and with what effect. Little attention has been devoted toward understanding when sanctions, once imposed, are removed. Ostensibly, sanctions are accompanied with a demand for a change in behavior on the part of the target; so sanctions should end if and only if this demand is met. Sanctions are often imposed as a punishment, with no accompanying demands, however. Moreover, in some cases where demands are made, the target never changes its behavior; and, when the target does make some changes, the sender’s demands are almost never fully met. The answer to When do states remove sanctions? is thus not obvious. In this paper, we explore the relationship between several factors (domestic politics, target type, costs of sanctions, issue type) and when sanctions end. We use a new data set on sanctions that occurred between 1970 and 1989. Our investigation will uncover several empirical insights upon which further theoretical development can be based. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the 1950s to the present, dissident analysts have offered critiques of, and programs for transformation of, the US economy. Amory Lovins in the 1970s, for example, discussed the energy economy of the US and argued that if a ‘soft energy path’ was not taken, the result would be more wars and intensified ecological decline. Seymour Melman has argued over a long career that the US was in the grip of a ‘permanent war economy’, and proposed a program of ‘disarmament and conversion’. In the 1990s, economic critique focused on important issues of neoliberal globalization, privatisations, and investor rights agreements and institutions like the WTO, IMF, and World Bank. At the same time, however, the predictions of Melman and Lovins were coming true. This paper argues what might therefore be obvious to some: that an international system that offers peace and security is impossible without transformation of the most powerful segments of the US economy. It asks international relations scholars to revive ideas of ‘soft energy paths’, ‘disarmament’, and ‘conversion’, and look at political programs for bringing them about. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing number of scholars argue that international governmental organizations (IGOs) promote peace and cooperation among states. Existing approaches emphasize the number of IGO memberships as an important causal attribute of individual states (much like economic development and regime type). Our paper provides an alternative approach to the study of IGOs and conflict. We introduce a social network perspective that borrows from behavioral studies of human and animal groups in anthropology, psychology and sociology. We argue that the international system of IGOs is best understood as a relational social network through which states’ international conflict positions and actions emerge. These organizations are not simply state attributes reducible to the properties of the agent. Moreover, these IGO ‘networks’ are not neutral or apolitical; they make certain states more powerful than others and they generate the seeds for conflict among certain members. We introduce new IGO relational data and test our claims on a sample of politically relevant dyads during the period 1885 to 1992. We demonstrate that social network hypotheses successfully contribute additional predictive power to existing models of conflict. While some relative positions generated and reinforced by the patterns of IGO membership decrease the likelihood of conflict, others can actually increase it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The design of current regional economic organizations (REOs) is remarkably diverse. Some REOs address numerous economic issues, while others have only limited mandates. Some REOs have an independent bureaucracy and a legalized dispute settlement mechanism (DSM), while others do not. What determines this institutional variation? Thinking about these institutions as devices that generate credible commitment to a rule-based regional cooperation, institutionalists maintain that the intensity of commercial ties determine regional institutionalization and institutional independence. A number of recent studies question this logic and argue that it is "naïve." Empirical evidence on the links between commerce, economic scope, and regional institutions is scant, however. Using an original data set that contains detailed information on the economic activities and institutional structure of twenty-eight REOs over three decades, this paper presents one of the first systematic analyses of these relationships. The empirical analysis indicates that the institutionalist wisdom is right after all. It shows that higher levels of regional trade are associated with greater institutionalization and economic scope, but only if implementation of signed agreements is accounted for, and that regional commerce and greater economic scope are associated with more independent bureaucracies and more legalized DSMs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The financial crisis of 2008-09 has cast palpable doubt on the relevance of the current legal framework governing trade in services for financial crisis prevention and management. The crisis revealed the limited utility and effectiveness of services trade law in dealing adequately with the trade-related regulatory fallout from the financial upheaval and the potentially distortive measures taken to mitigate its effects. Even as the crisis had little to do with trade policy as a contributing factor, such a statement still leaves unanswered the question of whether services trade law can or should play a more critical role in shaping the post-crisis financial architecture. The paper posits a number of trade-related policy and legal ramifications flowing from the financial crisis and its resolution. The post-crisis period affords a unique opportunity to clarify the scope of GATS law in financial services, establish with greater precision the remit of the prudential carve-out, and complete long stalled rule-making journeys on the key outstanding GATS disciplines of necessity and subsidies without which the law of services trade runs the very genuine risk of remaining a construct more theoretical than real. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Responsibility to Protect is fraught with challenges, not only in convincing skeptics on the UN Security Council of its value in protecting the innocent from mass atrocity, but in establishing the basis of a legal norm. Although Article 39 of the UN Charter can be cited as the authority on which the Security Council may proceed, Article 2(7) precludes intervention and interference in the internal affairs of states. Moreover, there is no provision in customary international law that lends legal authority to such action. Furthermore, history has shown that the Responsibility to Protect is highly selective - its application occurs exclusively in vulnerable post-colonial states and societies - and the initiators are almost invariably the industrial powers that seek long term economic advantage through intervention, preferably under the auspices of the UN, which lends both legitimacy and spreading the economic and human cost of military action. Most important though, the Responsibility to Protect has, as a position of human rights advocacy, become convoluted, nebulous, and unattainable because of the emphasis on prevention that was elucidated by the 2005 World Summit Outcome. This paper examines the challenges to the Responsibility to Protect presented by the UN Charter, the politics of the Security Council, the North-South divide, and UN policies since 2000. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The latest global financial crisis triggered economic hardship also among member states of the European Union (EU). To help countries in crisis, the International Monetary Fund and the EU have so far set up joint programs for Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Greece, and Ireland. This paper analyzes the novel IMF-EU crisis lending coordination from a principal-agent perspective. We take an interesting empirical observation as our point of departure. The IMF has advocated more Keynesian economic policies, but the loan programs at best partly reflect its new approach. We seek to explain this discrepancy with the limited discretion that the European Commission as an agent of the EU member state is granted for negotiating the programs with the IMF. There is, we argue, a "paradox of weakness" at work in crisis lending, which translates the Commission's weak internal position into a strong external one vis-à-vis the IMF. The nature of intra-organizational delegation affects inter-organizational coordination patterns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]