Search

This paper discusses the revision process of the EU emissions trading system (ETS). The ETS has so far operated on the basis of a main directive adopted in 2003 and a 'linking directive' adopted in 2004. In January 2008 the European Commission put forward a formal proposal for a revision of the system and hence new rules for trading in the 2013-20 period. The proposal was debated in the EU decision-making bodies in the course of 2008 and the final revised directive was adopted in December 2008. With the outcome of the process and the significant changes adopted as the dependent variable, the paper discusses three main explanations. First, applying 'intergovernmentalist' lenses, the key determinants for EU policy are found at the level of member states. The member states are the ultimate and main decision-makers, through decisions in the Council. Second, applying the lenses of multi-level governance theory, key determinants for EU policy are (increasingly) found in the positions and actions of the European Commission and the European Parliament. The Commission is the formal agenda-setter in the EU, but has also formal and informal influence in the decision-making phase. The Parliament has become a formal co-decider in the EU. Third, looking through global lenses, key determinants for EU policy may be found in global factors and institutions. Not least, EU policy-making is often embedded in global regimes/institutions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper addresses the rapid initiation, decision-making and implementation of the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) in light of EU resistance to emissions trading during the Kyoto negotiations. It discusses the explanatory power of three explanatory perspectives, all rooted in established theory traditions. First, we discuss the relevance of ‘Liberal Intergovernmentalism’, indicating that the EU ETS was requested by central Member States and the rapid decision-making process was possible because a majority of Member States quickly came to favour such a system. Second, we assess ‘Multi-Level Governance’ and institutional approaches to EU policy making, indicating that the EU ETS was initiated by the enrepreneurship of European Commission in alliance with non-state actors, and the rapid decision-making process was possible due to the leadership of the Commission and the European Parliament. The third perspective is inspired by literature on international regimes, indicating that the EU ETS was a result of external institutional factors, such as the Kyoto Protocol and developments within the climate regime. The paper concludes by using the relative explanatory power of these perspectives to shed light on the functioning of the EU ETS so far and discuss the prospects for an environmentally effective system in light of the recent proposal for a revised EU ETS for the period after 2012. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the foundations for pessimistic expectations in the European Union (EU). It discusses the underlying models and variables and extent to which they succeed in capturing the essence of enlargement and the nature of EU environmental policy. It claims that reluctant member states and insufficient EU institutional capacity will lead to slowdown in EU decision making. It details the basis for domestic environmental policy in new member states.

Analysts have mainly painted a gloomy picture of the consequences of enlargement for EU environmental policy. Enlargement is widely expected to protract decision-making and widen the implementation gap. In this paper, we first specify and the arguments and logic behind the gloomy expectations. Second, we confront these arguments with empirical evidence from three issue-areas: air pollution, GMOs and climate change. The main concusion is that the consequences of enlargement vary between issue-areas. Air pollution indicates status quo, climate change som unfortunate consequences whereas the new memebr-states have strengthened EU's restrictive policy on GMOs somewhat. The paper then goes on to discuss why there is a mismatch between expectations and empirical observations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]