The European Community/European Union (EC/EU) has been on the brink of falling apart several times, or at least at times this appeared to be so. Obstreperous member states have from time to time torpedoed or otherwise undone intra-community cooperation; the European Commission has at times boldly overstepped its relegated authority; publics within member states have from time to time smarted at the democratic deficit and shut down integration by rejecting instruments that would push it forward. French President Charles de Gaulle’s inflexible opposition to creeping supranationalism in 1965-66, for example, blocked the development of the European common market at a rather crucial time and cast the community into crisis. In the 1970s failures to find consensus regarding energy issues and monetary affairs caused crises that threw the European Communities into what some saw as fatal disarray. Similarly the British-instigated battle of the budget that took center stage in intra-European diplomacy during the 1980s caused another crisis that some thought might be fatal, and in fact did seriously challenge the future of the EC. In 1992, the Danes rejected the Maastricht Treaty at least partially out of concern that the design of the new treaty, if institutionalized, would move centers of European decision making ever so much farther away from European people. Even today a potential crisis of integration surrounds the related issues of the eastward enlargement and institutional reform. Some proponents of the uniting of Europe might look upon integration since the 1950s as a rather smooth progression of positive steps in the direction of economic and political amalgamation. But a more sober, realistic, assessment suggests that European integration has been in considerable measure the product of a succession of political life-threatening crises that have been constructively resolved. Crises have been numerous and have in their time appeared grave indeed. But none have greatly damaged the functioning of the EC/EU or seriously affected ultimate movement toward greater European integration. This paper examines these periodic crises such as the Empty Chair Crisis in 1965-1966, the Oil Crisis in 1970s, the British Budget Crisis in 1980s and the Ratification Crisis in 1992 within the EC. Admittedly, this is a less than original research concern, since a good deal of work has already been done on crises of European integration. Yet, this paper is not so much in the conventional question of how the crises got resolved, but rather in the deeper and theoretically more important question of why the crises got resolved. That is, the fact of successful crisis resolution is not the issue of this paper; explaining successful crisis resolution is what the project is all about. Why was the crises successfully and constructively resolved? And in particular, theoretically, why? The problem of explanation of answering the why questions, is actually a good deal thornier that it might at first appear, because there are actually two major steps involved. Answering the why questions requires explanatory theory; that is why the search for an appropriate explanatory theory must precede the search for an appropriate explanation. The problem here is that none of the theories commonly used to analyze European integration turn out to be very useful for analyzing the effects of crises, and none of the theories commonly used to analyze crises turn out to be very useful for explaining European integration. After a good deal of effort trying to fit square empirical pegs into round theoretical holes, this paper falls back upon General Systems Theory to ground explanations. The tenets of General Systems Theory contribute importantly to explaining why even the very serious Ratification Crisis did not greatly damage the workings of the EC/EU or set back Europe’s progress toward greater integration. The primary goal of this paper is to show that memory matters, in that memory is a prominent source that regulates the crises. This paper argues that memory directly, indirectly and mainly influences constructive crisis resolution in the EC/EU. To pursue this goal, this paper is structured in three main sections. The first provides an overview of the crises. The second seeks to show that the interest-based explanation, arguing that the crises were resolved by rational calculations of objective national interests, is not satisfactory. The final section seeks to demonstrate that the Europeans continue to be burdened by the lessons drawn from World War II and memory of the wars is deeply embedded in a new political culture ? a problem-solving culture ? of the EC/EU. It is argued that the carriers of memory such as perseverance, acceptance, mutual responsiveness and friendship played an important role in resolving the crises. Then, this paper concludes that the regulatory capacity of the EC/EU system turned out to be more than sufficient to handle disturbances from the environment that caused the crises. The EC/EU is stable and durable, because the regulatory capacity of the system is rather impressive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]