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Voluntary human shields have so far been active in Israel, Afghanistan, and Iraq. As it seems reasonable to assume that their presence will to continue to increase, their status under international law must be codified. During the US’s build-up to war with Iraq in 2003, dozens of peace activists traveled to Iraq to serve as voluntary human shields. Their goal was to protect various sites throughout the country from destruction by using their civilian status as a deterrent to US or British attack. Although their goals were clear, their legal status was not. In fact, voluntary human shields do not fit into any of the accepted categories recognized by international law. Furthermore, while there is a substantial body of literature on the status and use of involuntary human shields (i.e. hostages), little has been written about volunteers. My paper attempts to provide a much-needed examination of the legal status of voluntary human shields both during and after international armed conflict. I therefore begin with a discussion of how voluntary human shields do not fit into any of the accepted categories recognized by international law. For example, taking part in hostilities is one of the characterizing distinctions between civilians and belligerents. Human shields, however, do not appear to be taking part in hostilities in any recognized way. In both the Hague and Geneva Conventions, the concept of belligerency is based on the possession and use of weapons, but human shields are not armed. Illegal combatancy similarly requires the possession of weapons, so voluntary human shields do not fit in that category, either. Perhaps the closest legally recognized analog is the civilian authorized to accompany the armed forces of a state, as described in the Geneva Convention. This analogy, however, raises as many conundra as it resolves. If the presence of a voluntary human shield is not authorized by his host military, under current law he cannot be treated as a prisoner of war. If he does have the proper authorization, his host military may be in violation of international protocols which prohibit the use of civilians as shields. In that situation, the human shield himself might be entitled to prisoner of war status on the theory that a treaty violation by his host military should not be held against the shield himself. In either event, voluntary human shields should not be treated as civilians when military commanders are deciding whether or not to strike a target where human shields are present. What is needed is a resolution in international law regarding the status of voluntary human shields. An approach to that resolution is presented by this paper. This will provide both the shields and the parties to an armed conflict guidance regarding the proper treatment of these volunteers, both during and after military operations against a site where they are located. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the range of international law debates on war in Iraq as they appeared in the leading journals and discussion forums. Divergent interpretations of existing rules of war contributed to a degree of conceptual and practical confusion over whether war was justified. Two lines of analysis are identified. One argument is that a fundamental change in circumstances after September 11th allows for a reconsideration and even reform of existing rules of war. A second argument sees the concepts of imminent threat and collective security as still relevant in the post-September 11th world. The author’s primary focus is on the weakness of either argument to offer fresh ideas on the meaning and goals of war in this new era and to suggest new ways of moving the field forward on such questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a conference paper titled "States, Violence and Norms: International Law Regulating the Use of Force: The Case of Iraq and the UN." It examines the role of norms pertaining to the regulation of international uses of force in human rights violations and terrorism. It centers on the case of Iraq from its war with Iran in the 1980s through the U.S. invasion in 2002.

This paper on the responses to terrorism is an analysis of normative trends in unilateral use of force with particular emphasis on the recent US-led military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. At a general level, it investigates the relationship between law and politics, and analyses how normative structures regulate applications of power and force. It extrapolates how the interaction between the principles and concepts of international law regarding the use of force and non-legal factors, i.e. differences in wealth and military strength affect the development of normative structures. In particular, the paper aims to enquire the extent recent military interventions have led to any normative change in admissible justifications for unilateral use of force. In this context, it also aims to analyse the repercussions of the contending interpretations of ‘self-defense’ for international security.The paper focuses the question at hand from an interdisciplinary approach, which combines aspects of theory and practice of international law with elements of international relations theory and methodology. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essential element of effective post-war state building is the processes and methods by which both interim governments and permanent constitutional arrangements earn their credibility. Such credibility goes to the heart of contemporary concerns with post-war state-building because it has been seen, poignantly in Iraq since the invasion of 2003, that incipient states lacking in credibility generate opposition and violence. Moreover, they are wholly ineffective in delivering either security or development, which are necessary elements of their longer term survival. This paper evaluates the sources of credible post-war states from both the external perspective of the legitimacy of international intervention and transitional administration, and the internal legitimacy derived from either widespread consent (or acquiescence) to the new state?s authority or through a democratic mandate achieved through a free and fair electoral process. We evaluate the conditions under which external legitimacy for post-war states is achieved in terms of international law for both United Nations transitional administrations and other forms of trusteeship gained, for example, through international norms that bind occupying powers. We also evaluate the conditions under which internal legitimacy is achieved, either through ?tacit consent,? constitution-making processes with public affirmation, or through post-war electoral processes. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the challenging and often controversial field of monitoring international humanitarian law (IHL), where actors range from national military authorities, to international advocacy groups, to the International Criminal Court, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is unique in both legal and practical terms. I describe the nature of IHL monitoring as distinct from the monitoring and supervisory activities in international human rights law, explain why the ICRC is politically constrained in its informational role, and examine the origins of the ICRC’s confidentiality policy. I offer an explanation for the political dynamics behind the ICRC’s confidentiality policy that kept the organization silent with respect to the Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib prison situations, despite its role as an international humanitarian agency committed to speaking up about potential humanitarian violations. I trace two political sources that explain the ICRC’s confidentiality policy and the moral dilemma it faces as a humanitarian organization. First, I argue that the organizational and funding structures of the ICRC constrain its function as an information provider. I specifically compare the organizational structure of the ICRC to that of non-governmental organizations that advocate human rights, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Secondly, and more controversially, I argue that democratic countries whose political climate is influenced by public opinion often provide perverse incentives for some humanitarian organizations not to speak up. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]