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Israeli strategy of use of force in limited conflict is examined. The paper explores the strategic foundations of Israeli behavior, using quantitative and qualitative data analytic approaches. The study argues that Israel has early on adopted a policy of excessive use of force in retaliation to (and sometime in anticipation of) hostile actions by the Arabs. This strategy is believed to have been extremely successful. In practice, its only key effect was to induce escalation. The implications of this strategy for Israel’s national security and for regional stability are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine how demography and population shifts influence state policy and group behavior within states. Conventional wisdom has it that in states where numbers matter, the prospect of population shifts among different identity groups, includ ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is an enquiry into the dynamics of the theory, process, and debate of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and its impact on the security, defense planning, and military modernization trajectories of advanced small states - those that have the means, motives, and capacity to pursue the RMA such as Israel. Its purpose is to describe, analyze, and explain the Israeli RMA perceptions, processes, problems and outcomes during 1995-2008. In doing so, the study attempts to explain how Israel is responding or has responded to the changing dynamics of the RMA, and particularly, how the country attempts to leverage RMA concepts and capabilities in its force modernization trajectory. Accordingly, the study aims to expand the boundaries of the predominantly U.S.-centered literature on the RMA by providing a comparative perspective on the applicability of the RMA in divergent security environments and strategic settings. Its underlying premise is that risks and opportunities linked with the RMA theory and processes are not confined solely to the U.S context - RMA-related concepts and technologies continue to evolve and drive military modernization programs in many parts of the world, albeit in different magnitude, which has significant implications not only on how military organizations operate, but also on regional military balance, security policies, and the application of force. Therefore, if national security planners are to make appropriate strategic decisions, they need to understand how advanced small states and middle powers in world's major hotspots view the RMA in their force modernization programs, and its security ramifications. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The primary focus of intelligence studies is to find ways of improving the quality of information gathering and analysis. But excellence in obtaining and assessing the information is not sufficient. If the intelligence product has no impact on the decision maker, then resources spent on the intelligence system have been wasted. This paper explores the issue of how, when and why intelligence impacts ? or fails to impact ? decision making at the highest levels. The paper uses the typology method to identify four types of potential effect and failure of effect of intelligence on the decision maker. Each type is characterized by the unique traits of the decision maker and the intelligence maker, the relationship between them and the general context. The second part of the paper uses this theoretical typology to examine the impact of the Israeli intelligence (AMAN) on key decision makers in five critical episodes between 1955 and 1990. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that information age power should be understood as an invisible power exercised by the empire (of information). This paper will discuss how issues of invisibility and frustration affect to security policy. These effects strengthened by the information networks present a challenge to political decision makers and military leaders. Asymmetric and non-linear thinking with chaotic security environment underline the need to act fast with perception management capabilities. Therefore technology becomes more important to information age leadership and management because of the diminishing amount of soldiers in the battle space, and therefore lack of human perception capability. Also when a distinction between war and peace in information age is blurred, there is a need to create a new more visible enemy; criminals to be able to fight against it. Political and military leadership act neither with unlimited traditional military power nor simply through manipulation, but rather trying to shape the information environment with widespread consent of information.In information age warfare the control is still or even more important for the war machine. In the paper it will be argued how old philosophical metaphors are still useful to describe the mechanism of control. For the information age power control, the metaphor of Panopticon is useful to describe how massive discipline and corporal punishment are to be transformed down into flexible methods of control. The metaphor of Barbed Wire, which is more a Cold War period mechanism of control is not concerned with the general behaviour of those being observed, but simply their position with respect to the boundary, which contains them. The combination of these metaphors suggests that purpose of the invisible power in information age is to prevent people from leaving an authorized area and enter to a forbidden one. The paper concludes that to control the ?other? with physical borders using such tools as fences is too visible. To control the ?other? with borderless information using such tools as software surveillance becomes and has already became a discreet and interactive tool. Of course, there is still a lot of use for barbed wire, for example at the border between countries, like between the United States and Mexico, between Chechnya and Russian and the Palestinian territories are separated from Israel. The idea of panopticon and barbed wire continues to be present at the information and electronic power gates. In these gates the invisible power can be recognized: with software a suspected data or with X-rays a forbidden metal objects. Information and Electronic exits are used to spot concealed, suspected and stolen articles. All the customers undergo a thorough but invisible computer and software search or visible body search. When someone hides a suspected information or stolen article, it triggers both an alarm and the arrival on the scene of the visible security forces. Utopian power of information age warfare, information war is focused on individuals rather than states, with invisible control rather than visible enforced by the information age empire. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interest in the effect of martyrdom television programming on Palestinian children recently culminated in 2007, after Hamas's Al-Aksa television station tried to promote its political platform with the aid of a Mickey Mouse look-alike character, "Farfur," in The Pioneers of Tomorrow. Critics of this television program assumed that martyrdom programs were necessarily having a major impact on Palestinian children's decisions to engage in violent protest and, in turn, would threaten Israeli national security. Although this assertion may seem reasonable, it is not supported by my audience reception research. My findings are based on a detailed analysis of Palestinian children's television consumption decisions, their parents' opinions about these, and related family practices around the television set. This analysis is used to explore how Palestinian children use television amidst a scenario of on-going conflict. The data, which I collected from a sample of over 400 Palestinians in the Palestinian Authority and Israel, reveal, among other important findings, that Palestinian children do not watch martyrdom programs. Thus, somewhat unexpectedly and contrary to concerns voiced about Palestinian martyrdom programming, Palestinian children are not tuning in. Palestinian children tune into global, rather local Palestinian television programming content, including martyrdom programs. I conclude my paper by asking, what are the implications of Palestinian children's decisions to consume global programming, not just on Israeli but also, Palestinian national security? In turn, how do their decisions -- including to tune out from martyrdom programs -- prove instructive for understanding the power dynamics of cultural diplomacy within zones of conflict? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1953 and 2003, 19 major shifts have occurred in Israel's strategic environment. With only one exception (Egypt's decision to launch the War of Attrition in 1969) Military Intelligence (AMAN), Israel's national estimating agency, has failed to provide a warning against the emerging threat or to properly assess a promising opportunity. This paper covers the period of 1953-1973 and presents eight of the 19 cases. Each of these presentations is made of three parts: (a) the context in which the intelligence estimate took place; (b) AMAN's performance; and (c) the causes for quality of AMAN's performance. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Divides do not exist merely in the abstract. Divides are material realities; they are concrete barriers, barb wire, electronic sensors, watch towers. Divides can separate objects from different objects and can separate objects from each other. Israel is building a ?security fence?/?apartheid wall? in the West Bank. As a fence or a wall, this structure is conceived of as a divide. Furthermore, this divide is variously understood to be separating Israelis from Palestinians and Palestinians from Palestinians. My paper conducts a genealogy of Israel?s fence/wall and examines the implications of this structure for Palestinian-Israeli relations. It does so by asking two questions. First, what are the principles undergirding the idea of the fence/wall? And second, what are the political implications of these principles for Palestinian-Israeli relations?My thesis is that Israel?s fence/wall moves Israel and the Palestinians further away from a negotiated peace agreement. The structure is not a facilitator of peace, but rather a harbinger of future conflict. I develop my thesis in four stages. First, I briefly explain genealogical method. Genealogy enables me to identify ideational persistence where other analyses see discontinuity. Second, I show that analyses of the structure are abbreviated in their tracing of the ideational heritage of the fence/wall. I trace the idea to the 1923 work of Ze?ev Jabotinsky entitled ?The Iron Wall (we and the Arabs)?. In so doing, I establish that the principles undergirding the idea of the contemporary fence/wall include, inter alia, maintaining Jewish demographic dominance in Israel and a refusal to countenance any negotiated peace agreements in the contemporary period. Third, I demonstrate that the fence/wall assuages Israel?s demographic concerns; Palestinians, as a non-Jewish demographic, are imprisoned by Israel?s fence/wall. Conceiving of the structure as a divide occults this demographic imprisonment of Palestinians. Fourth, I find that the structure is, in accordance with Jabotinsky?s principles, an exercise in pragmatic Israeli colonialism that ensures Jewish demographic dominance in Israel while concomitantly foreclosing on the prospects of a Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement in the short to medium term. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the Israeli-Egyptian security regime between 1957 and 1967. A chart showing theoretical mapping of the Israeli-Egyptian relationship between the said period is presented which shows limited security regimes. Elements of the security regime involved the deployment of UN Emergency Force (UNEF) within Egypt and the stopping of the fedayyin incursions into Israel. Meanwhile, rules and procedures consist of tacit arrangements regarding Freedom of Navigation and UNEF.

This work explores the failures of Israel's public diplomacy, especially in the least decade. It employs tools for analysis including "the new public diplomacy," "soft power" and "world standing index" (WSI). The work begins with theory and methodology. The next section examines Israel?s place in the world as seen in debates about its right to exist, in the ?war of words? and at the UN. The third section presents data and analysis on media coverage of Israel in the West and major trends in public opinion. The last section analyzes Israel?s approach to public diplomacy, the failures of its past approach, causes for these failures, and a few possible remedies. The article reveals a huge gap between the threat to Israel?s national security and well being due to its poor reputation abroad and the meager public diplomacy program designed to address this threat. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]