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This paper analyzes the effects of individuals' perceptions of social inequality on their political engagement in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Using new survey data in 13 CEE countries, the preliminary findings suggest that individuals who see excessive amounts of social inequality exhibit lower levels of social activity including opportunities to build social capital and a deeper community life (including perceptions of their own political efficacy) than those who do not. However, this high perceptions group also displays a consistent and distinct pattern of political engagement in the form of interest, knowledge, and political participation. More interestingly, in contrast to the overall corrosive effect of income inequality on political engagement, especially for lower income individuals, the mixed effect of social inequality only weakly and sporadically mediated by individuals' income levels despite initial evidence that income moderates perceptions of social inequality. Thus, overall, we find evidence that social inequality is not only theoretically separate from income inequality but also exerts an independent influence on individuals' engagement with democratic politics in post-communist states.This paper analyzes the effects of individuals' perceptions of social inequality on their political engagement in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Using new survey data in 13 CEE countries, the preliminary findings suggest that individuals who see excessive amounts of social inequality exhibit lower levels of social activity including opportunities to build social capital and a deeper community life (including perceptions of their own political efficacy) than those who do not. However, this high perceptions group also displays a consistent and distinct pattern of political engagement in the form of interest, knowledge, and political participation. More interestingly, in contrast to the overall corrosive effect of income inequality on political engagement, especially for lower income individuals, the mixed effect of social inequality only weakly and sporadically mediated by individuals' income levels despite initial evidence that income moderates perceptions of social inequality. Thus, overall, we find evidence that social inequality is not only theoretically separate from income inequality but also exerts an independent influence on individuals' engagement with democratic politics in post-communist states. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By 2006 all of the post-communist states of East and Central Europe (ECE) had adopted laws on Freedom of Information (FOI). This is intriguing considering that it took most “traditional” democracies much longer to pass such laws. The paper asks why the laws were adopted so quickly in ECE and if they are truly effective. The study identifies three mechanisms that contributed to the adoption of FOI laws: a) pressure from civil society; b) unexpected consequences of membership in transparent international organizations; c) direct involvement by international actors. It argues that the differences in the processes leading to FOI law adoption in these countries have translated into differences in their effectiveness. I generate a series of hypotheses and test them by developing two gauges of effectiveness of FOI laws: 1) the public’s use of laws (based on the number of FOI requests received), 2) the implementation of laws by officials (based on the proportion of requests receiving answers). The research looks at developments in Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the highly influential ‘The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism’ of Gosta Esping Anderson (1990) most of the scholarly discussion of comparative social policies has been held within this consecrated framework of liberal, corporatist/Christian democratic and social democratic welfare systems. .x000d.Outside of the Western world little- if any- work on the relationship between government partisanship and the structure of social policy has been done. Part of the purpose of this paper is to fill this gap with a study of the systems of social redistribution in the former Communist countries. The paper will test the relationship between government partisanship and the structure of social spending in twelve new democracies from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). .x000d.Two alternative explanations for the final structures of social expenditure in these twelve countries will also be considered. The first alternative is developed within the ‘path dependency’ framework and looks at how the Communist regimes as well as the initial social needs after democratization shaped the structure of social spending. The second alternative looks at how the need to meet the requirements for EU accession shaped the social policies in the candidate countries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars who have examined the concept of euroscepticism to date have argued that opposition to European integration is multifaceted. An increasingly popular debate surrounding this differentiation of eurosceptics attempts to separate so-called “hard” euroscepticism (complete rejection of attempts to integrate) from “soft” euroscepticism (qualified objection to Europeanization). Much of the existing inquiries of this kind have been conducted in terms of how these forms affect the party system, but little is known about what individual level factors might drive each of these forms of euroscepticism, especially when it comes to regions that have recently entered into the process of integration. Our paper looks at these multiple types of euroscepticism in the context of central and eastern Europe and asks which demographic, political, and attitudinal factors drive views toward the structural and policy-based questions driving integration. We also inquire into the conceptual distinctness of these types of euroscepticism at the micro level. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we examine the nature of political competition regarding the issue of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries’ EU accession. The conventional arguments in the literature emphasize the importance of the presence of political competition and pro-EU consensus in public as the main factors leading to the decision to join the EU in CEE. This “convergence” argument emphasizes parties’ responsiveness to public’s interests on this issue area. We suggest that rather than political competition the accession to the EU can be better explained by theories that examine the tools available to political elites to manipulate the policy space (for details see Dunleavy (1991), Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989), Budge and Farlie (1983). We examine this argument by analyzing the party manifesto positions and the public’s position on the EU membership in the period before the accession and present evidence contrary to the “convergence” argument. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the collapse of communist regimes in East-Central Europe (1989-1991), party competition emerged in the region that was once dominated by a single communist party. However, this process differed greatly form country to country. On the one hand, in some countries such as Romania or Latvia, first elections were characterized by a small number of electoral parties (2-3 parties). Opposite to this was Poland that produced during its first free and fair election no less than thirteen successful electoral parties. Others, for instance, such as Estonia, Slovakia or Czech Republic, registered mid-range values between 4 and 6 for the number of electoral parties. Almost twenty years later, Romania and Poland are more similar than dissimilar in terms of the number of electoral parties, while countries such as Slovakia increased from mid-range values to upper extreme of 9 parties. What explains the variation over time in party system size in East-Central Europe? This paper aims to answer this question by considering the interplay among the institutions (electoral systems and electoral laws), state subventions, and societal heterogeneity. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]