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In order to be (re)elected, what is the most effective distributive politics so as to increase the probability of a politician's being (re)elected and win a seat? When it comes to the party level, how would party organization target to win the majority of seats? Recent political economy literatures treat this question with theoretical models and generally suggest two different ideas; invest in core supportive districts vs. invest in swing districts. This study attempts to empirically test the theories, which is relatively underdeveloped in the field, using Korean election results and intergovernmental transfer. This study, unlike earlier studies of Korea on this subject focusing on the relationship between the outcomes from presidential elections and intergovernmental transfers, relates the intergovernmental transfer with the general election for the National Assembly. By combining general election result, I examine whether political parties of Korea invest more in the supportive or swing regions. The result confirms Cox and McCubbins’s core supporter theory. I explain this as a result of strong regional voting bloc and the third party threat in many districts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]