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This papers seeks to examine the role of external actors within the democratization efforts of post-Soviet eastern Europe.Much scholarship has focused on the domestic conditions which can breed democratic norms, however,little is discussed of the role of external actors wtihin democratic transitions. This is becoming an increasingly important question due to the growing interdependence between the consolidated democracies of Europe and North America and the emerging democracies of the former Soviet Union.This paper seeks to explore and analyze the role of the European Union within the democratizating states of eastern Europe.The EU has provided much in the way of technical and financial assistance, however,due to the implementation of competing and divergent policies with regards to democratic promotion this institution has fostered the emergence of 'two worlds' within eastern Europe.The EU has succesfully promoted democratic norms within states such as Poland and the Baltic republics,while stifling democratic promotion within states falling under the auspices of the European Neighbourhood Policy.Due to the institutional and domestic interests of EU member states,the EU can no longer serve as a tool democratic promotion. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies on support for the European integration process note that a serious threat to such support is the presence of a strong national identity that perceives the EU negatively. The integration process in Europe has included policies of devolution, tapping into regional identities and strengthening these sub-national entities to the detriment of the governments of the member-states. An empirical question arises: Is there a relationship between regional attachment and support for the European integration process that can be observed in the European Union? Using Eurobarometer survey results, this paper develops and tests a theory connecting regional attachment and support for the EU. The paper builds on previous research on euroskepticism and support for the EU to establish the causal link between regional attachment and support for European integration. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The basic argument of the paper is that the success of the Bologna Process is not due to state actions such as legislation, but to the actions of civil society and market forces. The theoretical argument is thus that the successful progress of the Bologna Process is not a result of top-down efforts, but of bottom-up mechanisms.The paper is a contribution to the debate on the identification of the forces which are driving European integration; while many argue that efforts of national governments and their legislation are leading to the successful development of the European-level policies of higher education, there are just as many who argue that these successes are not due to the state governments' efforts, but rather to neoliberal market forces which were effectively unleashed through policies resulting from intergovernmental agreements and cooperation, effectively arguing that governments' efforts are only indirectly responsible for the successful coordination and development of European-level higher education policies. To support the argument of the latter, this paper will focus on the activities of national and European accreditation agencies and their role in the realization of the European Higher Education Area. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper asks what kind of an effect the importation of EU environmental policy will have on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. What are the costs and benefits of pursuing an entirely centralized EU environmental policy. Objections have frequently been raised about defining environmental policy through universalized international standards (see e.g. Bhagwati, 1994). The paper finds that the adoption of EU environmental regulations is likely to result in a significant diversion of financial and administrative resources away from potentially more important Central and East European policy objectives. Moreover, current levels of pollution in these countries do not warrant such exorbitant expenditures. In fact, measured in per capita terms, the emission levels of most major pollutants are comparable those in other EU countries. Finally, given the relatively weak development of civil society, NGO?s and Green parties in these countries, little will be done to define and defend an alternative environmental agenda. In this regard, the importation of EU policy is likely to dampen already weak environmental movements, divert attention from more pressing environmental problems, and divert attention and resources from the necessity of economic development. The consequences are likely to be long term and potentially unfavorable for the Central and East European countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SITUATION: MINORITY RIGHTS AND EU ACCESSION With the exception of Belarus and Russia, all post-communist European countries have expressed their desire to join the European Union. While eight of those countries are now set to join the EU next year, the non-accession countries of Eastern Europe continue to adjust their domestic policies in accordance with perceived EU requirements in preparation for eventual membership. This paper will look at which minority rights policies states need to adopt, if any, for acceptance in the EU. While economic criteria and the political criteria of Human Rights and Democracy are relatively clear, distinct requirements for minority rights remain elusive. Which policies need to be followed for acceptance in the European Union? RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: THREE GROUPS FOR COMPARISON (i) EU MEMBER-STATES; (ii) CURRENT ACCESSION COUNTRIES; (iii) NON-ACCESSION COUNTRIES This research paper is a comparative analysis of various European states and analyzes three distinct blocs of countries to understand both which minority policies are required for acceptance in the EU and how far away the non-accession countries are from that goal. First, the paper looks at EU member-states to discover if there is any common policy inside Europe with respect to national or ethnic minorities; by exploring EU-wide policies, we can learn more about what will be expected of future members. Ascertaining member-state policies is accomplished by analyzing EU-wide documents as well as national legislation from member-states. Second, the paper looks at the eight post-communist EU-accession countries and their experience over the past 13 years. What demands were placed on these countries vis-à-vis their minorities? What lessons can be drawn and what standards have been created? Third, the paper looks at the non-accession post-communist countries themselves, selecting a few case studies from South-East Europe and the former Soviet Union to compare their legislation with those of the first two groups. LACK OF STANDARDS This paper will show no common standards exist regarding minorities inside the EU; the only applicable standards are those connected with human rights Moreover, while the EU has established distinct criteria for potential members, we can actually draw very few concrete policy measures from the accession countries’ experience. Aside from a vague prescription for “inclusive” rights found in the Copenhagen Criteria, no minority rights policies were uniformly made conditional for invitations to join the Union. This lack of enforced rights exists in spite of the gravity attached to ethnic conflicts this past decade, and despite the foreign policy priority given to minority issues after the internecine wars witnessed in the post-communist region. More importantly perhaps, this paper will demonstrate that pressure to protect minorities that does exist is not based on any normative principles of minority protection, but rather guided by the political goal of international stability on the European continent. In fact, all policy demands have been and continue to be ad hoc measures applied inconsistently to different East European countries depending entirely on specific concerns related to individual countries and their minorities’ ability to mobilize. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the advance of the political and economic situation in the European Union there has been a huge number of transactions involving parts in different countries of the European Union. With this, the number of disputes has grown a lot and the importance of the ECJ to solve these disputes increased tremendously. The number of justices was increased in order to handle the bigger number of cases and the legislation involving European countries has also increased. Of course that is it essential that the nations accept the decision of the ECJ as binding and non-conflicting with the decisions of their own national court decisions. The ECJ has had decisions pro environment and pro Europen Union. The decisions analyzed in the paper are good examples of this position. As in any country, the role of a strong well developed Judiciary power is absolutely necessary for the reality of Europe nowadays. The Luxembourg based court has been mostly in favor of international business. It is important to mention that the Court is neutral and applies the European legislation, which absolutely sponsors international business and the protection of environment. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using party position data of European national political parties, the paper examines political party support and resistance for continued security and foreign policy integration in the European Union. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper theorizes that the success of European Integration thus far can largely be attributed to the ability of European political elites to limit the forces of democracy among the European citizenry; it further questions the likelihood that this 'democratic deficit' can continue to sustain.Using Comparative Manifesto data from 1945 - 2003, this research explores two primary hypotheses. The first asserts that the expansion of the EU - in size and scope - from its original five members in 1952, to the core of fifteen members in 1995, largely resulted from the ability of political elites to limit the scope of EU deliberation at the domestic level. The second hypothesis explores the possibility that the motivation for support (opposition) of the EU among citizens of Western Europe (the EU15) may be shifting from a purely economic cost-benefit analysis to a cost-benefit analysis that increasingly intertwines considerations of economic well-being with those of cultural homogeneity, and argues that such a shift will limit the degree to which elites can continue to control the reigns of integration. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper suggests that previous literature has focused too narrowly on the institutional limitations to democratic responsiveness, to the neglect of the cultural-identity concerns raised in democratic theory. I provide and test a framework for conceptualizing identity, and noting its determinants, which takes into account a variety of factors previously addressed in the literature on EU support. Eurobarometer survey data is utilized in a multi-level model, allowing for the simultaneous consideration of both individual-level and state-level theories of identity formation. Identity development is found to be primarily influenced by diffuse elements of policy support and latent socialization mechanisms. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents original data on the use of a mechanism for differentiated application of European legislation. It further explores the effect of such diversity accommodating procedures on EU integration. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper draws comparisons between integration efforts in Europe and South America. The comparison points to several universal conditions for the causes, origins, development and, specifically in South America, the future of the integration effort. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legislative speeches are an important part of parliamentary activity in the European Parliament. This paper presents new data on the allocation of speaking time in the EP, including a new survey of European party groups and a statistical analysis of speeches during the 5th European Parliament (1999-2004). Contrary to common assumptions in the EP literature, our findings suggest that party groups do not punish dissenters by limiting their speaking time on the floor despite their formal power to do so. Instead, party mavericks take the floor significantly more often than party faithfuls. We argue that there is an institutional explanation of parliamentary debates. Speaking time actually serves as a communication outlet for dissenting MEPs to put the reasons for their defection on the public record, in particular when there is a conflict between the national party and the European political group. The electoral disconnection between European party groups and the European electorate does not motivate the groups to prevent those dissenters from taking the floor. It does not matter whether dissenters denigrate the party label as this has little effect on the party's prospects as a whole. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

.This paper investigates the effects of referendums on news coverage of the European Constitutional Treaty (ECT) and on the emergence of a trans-national media discourse. In order to do so it draws on the content analysis of sixteen daily newspapers from France, Spain, Italy and Britain. Results show that referendums affected both the visibility of the ECT and the quality of coverage. They also suggest that by increasing the salience of EU issues, referendums can lead to the development of a trans-national public sphere. The 'domesticisation' of EU affairs and the 'polarisation' of political elites at referendum time are examined as possible explanations for these patterns. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Party politics in Europe has become more volatile. Parties require flexibility to respond to this volatility, but the EU constrains the behavior of parties. This paper examines how this contributes to the volatility of the European party space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nationalist movements, with few exceptions, are rarely framed or understood as transnational actors. However, they can be understood and analyzed as such -- social actors that engage in meaningful patterns of cooperation across state boundaries (and who see themselves as part of a transnational community), but who simultaenously maintain strong connections with specific, local or regional polities. In Europe, moreover, these transnational nationalist networks create complex webs linking together nationalist actors, states, and the European Union. In this paper, I argue that globalization and the European Union have significantly expanded the political opportunities for regional nationalists to establish and make use of transnational nationalist networks. However, not all nationalist networks are able to capitalize equally on this expansion. I examine the impact of the EU on two different kinds of nationalist networks: first, licit networks that link together officially sanctioned, institutionalized groups, and second, illicit networks of primarily underground and violent nationalist organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is essentially a comparison of the relative levels of pro-environmental public policy across several European states. Unlike previous studies, however, this treatment extends far beyond the current boundaries of the European Union (EU) to incorporate several Eastern European and Post-Soviet societies. Key to this analysis is a measure of the relative strength or weakness of the Green Party within those nations? respective electoral and governmental systems. The overall objective of the study is to see if the presence of a strong Green Party has had a positive effect on increasing the level of environmental-friendliness, and if stronger parties?or stronger public support for such parties?lead to higher levels of environmental-friendliness; therefore producing greater enactment of pro-environmental public policies. However, other variables?including institutional measures, economic measures, and energy consumption measures?will also be considered, in order to gain a better understanding of the true causal effects underlying positive and negative environmental public policy outputs. Our hypothesis is that the greater the level of Green Party electoral support, and representation in government, the more ?environmentally-friendly? a nation will be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

East-Central Europe has become the battlefield for a new ideological war. The lingering after-effects of the 20th century drive to create ethnically homogenous states clashes with the quest to bring down borders for free movement in a broader Europe. Yet, this clash has gone unnoticed as analysts’ tend to use lay understandings of Europeanization -- or rather, harmonizing with European Union policies. This paper unveils the clash, particularly its significance for nationalist politics, by considering how it affects the process of coming to terms with two key moments in 20th century history: the post-Second World War German expulsions and the 1920 Trianon treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although reforms in the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties enhance the role of the European Parliament, a substantial amount of decision-making power remains with EU institutions not directly elected by citizens of the EU. As a result, the EU is often considered to possess a “democratic deficit.” Moreover, in many Member States, elections to the parliament are characterized by lower levels of voter turnout than in elections to national parliaments. Using data from European Parliament elections, this paper investigates the role of electoral competition and other variables, such as compulsory voting and strategic voting, as factors in EP elections. While findings confirm existing research on factors such as compulsory voting and weekend voting as significant variables in the turnout equation, the findings also suggest an additional factor absent from much of the current literature on EP elections: electoral competition. Electoral competition is related to levels of higher turnout; these effects are independent of other factors. Implications of these findings for the problem of the Democratic Deficit and the current Enlargement of the EU are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes to explain why the European Union decides to intervene outside of its borders to support electoral processes in transitional and non-established democracies. EU’s support for elections takes the form of electoral assistance projects and election observation missions. Election assistance is the technical and material support given to the electoral process, and election observation is its political complement. The EU has been active in the area of election support since the early 1990s, and it has become one of the leading actors in the world in this domain. Although EU’s foreign policy has been studied widely, very little attention has been given to explaining why the EU has become such an important actor in the area of election support. In order to fill this gap, this paper answers the following question: what explains the EU’s decision to provide electoral support to transitional and non-established democracies? This paper will present an analysis of the EU decision-making process and the determinants of intervention in the area of election support since 1993. Preliminary research shows that criteria for interventions fall into four main categories: strategic, ideological, operational, and circumstantial. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence of a new extreme right populism has been identified as a byproduct of crisis of confidence in the democratic and representative institutions. Both the xenophobic behavior and the distrust in politics and politician have been appointed as the main reasons for voters that have voted in Extreme Right Political Parties (ERPs). The ERPs’ agendas are mostly oriented by euroskeptism because European institutions represent the extension of new representative arenas where national interests can count little as well as the opening of all sorts of frontiers between member states. This paper follow the argues that economic issues are not more important than identity for voters that support ERPs, above all sovereignty defense and national culture are crucial issues for them. Scholars have already analyzed cultural factors influencing support for integration, such as attitudes towards foreigners, however the ways to measure the euroskepticist attitude are not already sufficiently explored. This paper claims that the representation deficit in European institutions is the key aspect to be analyzed in order to have a better understanding of the growth of votes on ERPs in the Western Europe. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the face of calls for new modes of governance this paper will explore the extent to which the transnational European Political Parties (Euro-parties) have sought to enhance their role and significance within the EU’s governance architecture. It will look at their structure; role and responsibilities; response to changing institutional environments. In so doing it will highlight an interaction between path-dependent legacies and individual agency. The paper argues that the Euro-parties have had to deal with three path-dependent deficits:.x000d..x000d.Genetic deficit: to what extent is it possible to develop political parties beyond the nation state?.x000d..x000d.Functional Deficit: despite Article 191 (EC Treaty) their role within the EU institutional architecture remained undefined .x000d..x000d.Linkage Deficit: Euro-parties lack a structured linkage platform with Europe’s citizens/national party members.x000d..x000d.Taken together, such deficits clearly constrain their capacity to deliver. This paper will show that by pursuing a process of institutionalisation the Euro-parties have sought to overcome those obstacles in the run-up to the 2009 European Parliamentary elections. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In June 2008, the Irish public rejected the EU Constitution in Europe’s only referendum on the document. The purpose of this paper is to examine the official one-month pre-referendum period in order to better understand the debate on both sides and discuss its impact on Irish relations with the EU. Why did the “no” side prevail during the referendum despite a massive government campaign to persuade voters to support the EU Constitution? The paper will examine the arguments of both sides through a discussion of their positions. The pro-constitution position will be evaluated based on the arguments of the government, political parties, and other organizations in support of closer European integration while the anti-constitution side will be evaluated from the arguments of the political parties and groups opposed to Ireland’s participation in a strengthened EU. I visited Ireland for two weeks in May 2008 to observe the pre-referendum debate process on the EU Constitution and this paper will reflect personal observations and conversations with the Irish public as well as information from the pro and con organizations behind of the issue. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the early 1960s, the European Court of Justice has been a driving force behind the integration of Europe. As the highest court in the European Union, one of its most important duties has been to delimit the powers of the EU. In performing that function, it has frequently favored the interests and institutions of the EU over those of EU member states (Weiler 1991). Despite seeing their sovereignty reigned in by an external, unelected judiciary, EU member states have quietly complied with even the most revolutionary ECJ decisions (Weiler 1991, Caldeira and Gibson 1995, Brown 2000). The lack of opposition to the ECJ is puzzling in light of the experience of the United States Supreme Court, whose decisions limiting state sovereignty in the early 1800s were regularly denounced and defied by the states (Warren 1922, Goldstein 1997). Scholars have offered a variety of explanations for why the ECJ has endured relatively less opposition to its rulings (Weiler 1991; Mancini 1991). Some scholars emphasize institutional differences between the ECJ and the Supreme Court. The ECJ, for example, issues a single unanimous decision in every case, whereas the Supreme Court often splits in its most controversial cases, thereby lending ammunition to its critics. Other scholars have argued that political deadlock in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s simply made European states more receptive to court-driven integration than their eighteenth-century American state counterparts. This paper offers an alternative explanation. It suggests that the Supreme Court faced stiffer opposition from the states because the cases it decided in its early days of the union frequently involved high-stakes litigation (e.g., burdensome revolutionary war debts, state lottery revenues). The ECJ, by contrast, has introduced some of its most pro-EU rulings in cases involving more mundane or trivial matters (e.g., a $5 utility bill, obscure chemicals). Interestingly, when it has adjudicated higher-stakes disputes (e.g., German beer purity regulations), the ECJ has come under attack from the member states. Thus, compliance with ECJ decisions may have more to do with the ECJ’s docket – the characteristics of the disputes it adjudicates – than with institutional design or political context. To develop my thesis, I analyze a sample of groundbreaking decisions made by each court and catalogue state responses to them. I focus on the stakes involved in each particular case, as well as the exact nature of any post-decision opposition. In addition to shedding new light on the brief history of the ECJ, the paper raises questions about the future of the ECJ: Will it encounter stiffer resistance from member states as the jurisdiction of the EU expands and the ECJ’s rulings are applied in more substantial disputes? Or are legal doctrines immune to such opposition, once settled? It also proposes a more general theory of state compliance with court decisions limiting their sovereignty, helping to predict when and how states will oppose such decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What determines support for European integration? Easton (1975) argues that political support ranges from the specific to the diffuse. Citizens usually assess national governments in terms of short-term performance and judge governmental institutions in terms of long-term experience. European integration is neither a government nor a set of institutions; it is a process The European Union (EU) also does not govern in the traditional sense of the term. Can Easton’s framework be applied here? If so, how are these evaluations framed? The EU will be defined as an asymmetric federation: duration of membership, the degree of shared trade, and financial costs and benefits vary across the member states. These differing contexts could condition how individuals perceive integration. Consequently, this paper will address two questions. First, to what extent do specific and diffuse evaluations drive support for European integration? Second, to what extent are these evaluations framed by the fragmented nature of Europe integration? Data for the analysis will be drawn from responses to identically worded questions in Eurobarometers 51.0, 52.0, 53.0, and 54.1 (which were conducted in the fall and spring of 1999 and 2000). The dependent variable will be an additive index that measures whether respondents prefer national-level or European-level decision-making in 17 major policy areas. Integration increases as national policies are shared at the European level and decreases as European policies are recaptured by the member states. An additive index of support for the four major European-level institutions will represent diffuse support, and an additive index of the perceived national benefits of EU membership will represent specific support. Years of membership, intra-EU trade, and net EU budget contributions will be the key contextual variables. Additional, relevant individual-level and national-level predictors also will be included. When pooled, the surveys include 60 national-level and approximately 58,000 individual-level cases, which permits a multilevel model to be adequately specified at both levels. Consequently, a multilevel rather than a contextual model will be used. This paper should contribute significantly to the literature on European integration. We do not know how either specific or diffuse support contribute to popular perceptions of European integration. Evaluations of integration may be an extension of national-level concerns, as the literature on second-order elections would seem to indicate. Or integration could be assessed via European institutions, in which case some form of European identification potentially may exist. The framing effects of national context are of equal importance. If these perceptions vary with the amount of shared trade or financial contributions, then they may be fleeting; but if they vary with duration of membership, then they may be more enduring. With the introduction of the Euro and the upcoming accession, the EU is at an historical juncture. One only can estimate how far European integration will proceed is one understands how Europeans view this process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Union of European Football (Soccer) Associations is geographically, culturally, politically, and economically a much broader array of countries than the European Union. Russia, Israel, and Turkey, for example, are members of UEFA but not the EU. This raises two questions: First, why are so many more peoples and countries considered European in terms of soccer (UEFA) but not politics and economics (EU)? Second, what would the EU be like if its membership was the same as UEFA's? Using EUFA’s borders as a theoretical maximum definition of Europe may offer new insight into the pressing questions of EU expansion. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing research has attributed recent pension reforms to demographic aging and, more recently, to a process of policy diffusion, whereby reforms in one country are said to be causally related to similar developments in peer nations. We argue that the first line of research is incomplete because it cannot account for temporal clustering of reforms. The second line of research is unsatisfactory, because it neglects the importance of national institutional frameworks and international pressures in shaping both policy instruments as well as intensity of adjustment. Using data on pension reforms in the European member states between 1980 and 2002, we argue that pension reforms in this region are the result of independent government reactions to the "common shocks" of demographic aging and European Monetary Union. We find that this effect only holds for high deficit Bismarckian pension systems, but not for Beveridgean systems. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how national parties position themselves in European Parliament (EP) speeches. We apply a new computer-based content analysis technique, Wordfish, to estimate party positions in the European Parliament using the word counts in speeches. We test three hypotheses of position-taking in the European Parliament: a left-right ideology hypothesis, a pro/anti-Europe hypothesis, and a national politics hypothesis. Surprisingly, and in contrast to studies of roll call votes, we do not find evidence that national party positions from MEP speeches reflect the parties' overall left-right ideology. Instead, these positions reflect the parties' stance with regard to EU integration and national redistributive characteristics. We test the robustness of our results in a threefold manner. First, we take advantage of the multilingual environment of the European Parliament and show that the estimated positions are robust to the choice of translation (English, French, and German). Second, we use independent measures of national party positions from analyses of roll call votes and two expert surveys. Finally, we apply a range of statistical models to account for measurement error of the independent variables and the hierarchical structure of the data. Our robust findings suggest that the entire corpus of EP speeches reflects partisan divisions over EU integration rather than left-right politics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Second image reversed analyses abound in the literature, but none of them directly address the European Union as the dependent variable. An analytical framework is proposed here. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although economic theories have been advanced to explain public support for the common currency, we know very little about how public support for the euro has been affected by its economic impact, for example, on prices. We hypothesize that concern about rising prices following the introduction of the euro may have dampened enthusiasm for the project. We use Eurobaromater data spanning the first five years of circulation to examine how rising prices have shaped support for the euro. We find that while inflation has had a negative impact on support for the euro it is offset by more diffuse support for the European Union. This support, along with the impact of a strong currency, has led most (2/3's) Europeans to be generally positive about the euro. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and its effect on Egyptian abd Tunisian societies. The foreign policy approaches of the U.S. and the European Union (EU) differ. The U.S. foreign policy is unilateralist while the EU foreign policy is multilateralist and encourages the creation of regional networks in third countries.

As European countries continue along their path to a deeper and wider Union, the prospect of state fragmentation continues to threaten the traditional boundaries of Europe. But the current literature neglects an important theoretical and empirical question: does regional integration encourage ethno-national or regional groups to pursue separatism, including devolution or classic secessionism? In particular, has European integration changed the incentives for groups within European Union member states to pursue self-government so as to encourage such movements? In an attempt to supplement and expand upon earlier works on sub-national mobilization, I suggest the following causal mechanism: European integration has created conditions under which regional groups (e.g. the Scottish) may not need the state (e.g. United Kingdom) to survive internationally. First, I consider the Alesina and Spolaore (1997; 2003) model for optimal size of nations and tease out observable implications for empirical research. Second, utilizing the hypotheses developed in the theoretical discussion, I analyze the electoral support of regional parties. If the model has validity, regional parties will receive more support from citizens as their potential independent state becomes more viable within the EU. The empirical implications of the theory are tested with a dataset of regional party electoral and political economic variables. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The linkage model of external democratization contends that strong ties of transition countries to estab-lished democracies decisively foster political transformation. Yet, the model has only been tested at the aggregate level of states and on transition countries already moving ahead with democracy. This paper takes a different perspective by examining whether linkage to 'the West' may also transfer democratic rules and practices into Arab authoritarian regimes hitherto reluctant toward political liberalization. It will be examined whether social and communication ties to democracies can create important domestic stakeholders for democratic change by transforming state officials into democrats within a non-democratic polity. In order to directly examine attitude change rather than infer it from behaviour, an original scale is developed. Empirically, the argument is tested on Morocco's linkage to Europe using data from an original survey among state officials employed in different ministries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In May 1995, European Union (EU) issued the White Paper “Preparation of the Associated Countries of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) for the Integration into the Internal Market of the Union”, stating that the main challenge facing the associated countries lied in adapting their administrative machinery to the conditions necessary to make the legislation work (para 3.25). In December 1995 the future challenge became the “consolidated administration” accession criterion. Bridging the gap the literature on Europenisation generated by not deepening the study of EU provisions for public administration reform, I offer a possible, democratic reading of the “consolidated administration” criterion as presented by EU to Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania during 1998-2006. My assumption is that EU nurtured the democratization of the organization and functioning of CEE public administrations by means of its “consolidated administration” criterion. My argument draws from Dahl’s democratization theory and makes use of the analysis of both strategic domestic documents of the countries in question and the Progress Reports designed by the European Commission during the fifth enlargement process. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the increased rhetorical weight of the European Union over this time period, this paper contends that national identity has moved from a more right-wing phenomenon to the center of European polities. The movement towards European Union has created, in a sense, an equal and opposite reaction towards the nation-state and increased the salience of national identities in unexpected ways. This shift may have precipitated the decisive defeat of referenda on the European Constitution in the Netherlands and France in 2005. The stickiness of national identity hinders the full integration of European nations on matters large and small, from a common fiscal policy to a pan-European military force. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although much scholarship exists to demonstrate that national parliaments in Europe are increasingly attuned to the legislative role played by their national courts, very little research has examined the relationship between European parliaments and the supranational court that now exists above national systems in European Union (EU) Member States, the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This paper investigates one EU national parliament, the German Bundestag, and its relationship to the ECJ. Are parliamentarians attuned to the jurisprudence of this supranational court? Do they account for its decisions - and even attempt to anticipate them - as they draft national legislation? I trace the use of several ECJ equal treatment decisions in the German Bundestag and use these case studies to evaluate hypotheses about the circumstances under which parties anticipate ECJ decisions. I find that, contrary to the established literature on the interactions between national parliaments and national courts, governing majorities do not engage in anticipatory behavior vis-à-vis the ECJ, nor do they feel threatened by it. The Government's lack of attention to ECJ cases was noted even when the ECJ case was well-publicized and the decision meant sweeping changes for German law. By contrast, parties in the legislative minority view the ECJ as a useful ally and make extensive strategic use of its decisions to secure important partisan victories in parliament, policy victories they may not have won without the Court's decision. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the effects of European integration on national level legislatures in European Union member states. Many economic and political decisions previously made by democratically elected national legislatures are now decided at a supranational, or European, level. National legislatures have responded to this change by increasing their oversight of European affairs in order to impose more democratic accountability and transparency into the opaque decision-making process of developing European legislation. While all national legislatures of European Union member states have established European Affairs Committees to help strengthen oversight of European affairs, there is considerable variation in the institutional strength and political control invested in these committees. I argue that the more recently a country joined the European Union, the more likely its European Affairs Committee will have the power to issue binding recommendations to the government. Cross-sectional statistical analysis shows a strong correlation between the timing of membership and a legislature's approach to parliamentary oversight of European affairs. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tests five competing theories of support for integration previously examined within the EU-15 among the 10 new member states, with the goal of better understanding the kinds of policy demands likely to emanate from the region. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we examine and compare the accession negotiations with regard to the institutional changes and the new processes of policy making that have emerged in three of the smaller new EU member states: Slovenia, Hungary and Estonia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contends that French protest movement, ATTAC, represents a resistance to perceived threat on cultural identity, and as such a challenge to European institutions and the coherency of a single European constitutional order within the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ireland has nearly abandoned its traditional role as a major contributor to UN peacekeeping and now concentrates its efforts in support of the EU and NATO. This paper examines this transformation from a global to European-centered policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The political and economic transformations, which the European continent is currently undergoing, are of great importance for the security, stability and prosperity of the region. One process that links these developments is the eastward expansion of the European Union (EU). The decision to invite 8 Central and Eastern European countries (plus the Mediterranean countries of Malta and Cyprus) to join the EU in 2004 is unprecedented in its significance for both the Union itself and the continent. The process leading to EU membership is long and consists of several distinct phases. Once a country expresses a desire to join the Union, it must be approved as candidate. Then, it enters the long phase of accession negotiations. Upon their completion, membership has to be approved both by the EU and the candidate country. Foreign assistance to the accession countries plays a major role in the enlargement process, helping along lagging members. From the theoretical literature on foreign aid, I draw two competing sets of explanations for the distribution of EU aid to the postcommunist countries. One is that amount of aid is determined by the need of the recipient country. Countries with greater needs are expected to receive more aid. Traditionally, wealth and economic growth are used to determine need. In addition, the future EU members have another set of ‘need’ factors, the ability to meet accession criteria. On the demand side, I use measures capturing levels of political and economic reform in each country. The other group of expansions focuses on the interests of the donating country as determining the amount of aid distributed. Countries, which are strategically and economically important partners, are expected to receive more aid, along with countries sharing similar cultural, religious, and historical characteristics. In this paper I use trade with the EU (exports and imports separately) to capture economic importance, and religion and proximity to EU to measure cultural similarities. Using annual per capita data for 12 countries for the 1990-2001 time period, I find support for both sets of arguments. Countries, which are lagging behind in democratic and economic performance receive slightly more Phare aid than the rest of the recipients. However, I find stronger support for the claim that EU aid serves the interests of the donor states more than the needs of the recipient economies. Consistently, in my analysis, I find that countries which import more goods from the EU receive more financial aid than countries which import less. Thus, indirectly, Phare aid ends up supporting the economies of the donor countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the impact of the influx of new EU-level political actors from the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) on the internal structure and functioning of European Union (EU) institutions (particularly the European Parliament (EP)). The focus includes an examination of existing norms and organizational structures within the EP and a comparison to those existing within the CEEC legislatures. The research focuses in particular on several key aspects of internal legislative behavior and structure including: party discipline structures (whips, roll call voting etc), party and coalition voting cohesion, internal hierarchy structures, committee influence, the role of ideology and inter-institutional relationships. The goal of the research is to determine the similarities and differences between the political institutions of the accession countries and those already existing in the EU that may lead to conflict, change or dysfunction as large numbers of CEEC representatives join their ranks. This research incorporates key issues related to enlargement, including the institutional problems it may cause, especially within the EP as the home of party politics in the EU. In addition, however the research also addresses some aspects of the Europeanization literature as it suggests that the causal arrow may in fact flow from the national level to the European level and not only the other way around. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research identifies three major factors that can explain increased restrictions in migration policy, all of which are related to globalization. The first is targeted migration for labor market efficiency. The second is nationalist dialogue and loyalties, which have continued to dominate politics despite, or possibly because of, the globalizing world. The third is transnational institutions, in this case the European Union, calling for standardization of politics..x000d.The sample includes Britain and Germany, which are both large receivers of asylum seekers and refugees. They are also large receiving countries of guest workers and both are wealthy states. The asylum policies of these two states have become increasingly more protectionist since the 1970s. Greece and Sweden are the other cases studied as immigration numbers have significantly increased in these states in recent years. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the Irish “no” vote on the Lisbon Treaty, there have been renewed calls by Euro-federalists to pursue a multispeed Europe. This would allow states desiring deeper integration to pursue more ambitious projects quicker without being hindered by laggards. At other times, laggards have desired a multispeed approach to integration to avoid implementing policies to which they object. Moreover, these proposals have been at times resisted and at times accepted by both camps. This raises an interesting puzzle. Under what circumstances will laggards propose/object to a multispeed Europe, and under what conditions will federalists propose/object to a multispeed Europe? Using spatial models, we investigate the institutional rules and member state preference configurations that lead either camp to accept or resist multispeed proposals. We determine instances in which Euro-federalists and laggards are either hurt or helped by the possible existence of multiple options, paying particular attention to how a multispeed approach would affect member state bargaining power after the choice is made. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The member states of the European Union each have different security needs. Their national security policies each member reflects not only the needs of the states, but also the goals of the public and the domestic institutions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why does Germany support some aspects of a Europeanpension market, but not others? To encourage labor mobility, theEuropean Commission has recently launched several initiatives aimedat facilitating the movement of corporate pensions across borders.However, Germany torpedoed the first attempt to create a commonpension market in 1991, offered lukewarm support for a pension funddirective in 2003, and fiercely opposed a directive proposaladvocating pension portability in 2005. We argue that variation inthe German position can be explained by the role of on-balance sheetpensions in encouraging Germany's characteristically long-term laborrelations and patient capital flows. Such pensions are diametricallyopposed to labor mobility. Thus, support for European pensionpolicies depends on the congruence between the nature of the EUpolicy (whether it applies to off-balance or on-balance pensionschemes) and the institutional framework underpinning theoccupational pension sector. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work revisits scholarship on immigration, integration and the nation-state, including the research of Rogers Brubaker, Adrian Favell and Christian Joppke. It challenges those suggest that recent immigration to European countries, and the resultant responses, have changed the fundamental philosophy of the nation-state. I focus specifically on Germany and France because political-theoretical studies of citizenship often characterize these two countries as extremes on the ius sanguinis-ius soli axis (Brubaker). In the past decade, several prominent scholars have attempted to show that policy change is a direct result of changing values. This work takes issue with these scholars who, noting the rapprochement between France and Germany in terms of citizenship policy have suggested that the philosophies of citizenship in these countries are not only mutable but changing. My theoretical research and interviews conducted in these two countries show that while the European Union has brought about a significant change of the two countries' policies, it has not affected their perceptions of citizen and foreigner - it has not, that is, impacted their understanding of the term "integration." I first establish the policy basis for the discussion by evaluating recent developments in the integration (and, more generally, immigration) policies of France and Germany, as well as those of the EU. I submit that there has been a very pragmatic recognition, especially at the political level, that European countries have become "countries of immigration." And yet, my research shows that there has not been a corresponding ideological shift to some form of encompassing multicultural citizenship. After reviewing the legal and political frameworks in these two countries, I show that both maintain very traditional conceptions of the ideal-type citizen. In France, the assimilationist model, which has long been assumed to have fallen out of favor, remains an extremely dominant underpinning of French ideology. In Germany, the political and ideological trajectory of citizenship and integration values at least partially substantiate the claim that German state citizenship and German nationality remain two different, yet salient, concepts. In both cases - albeit for different reasons - these traditional definitions are the latent cause of the "crisis of integration." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines and evaluates the ratification of the EU Constitution. It compares and contrasts the 2004-2005 ratification process in Europe with that of its American counterpart in 1787-1788. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the distribution of EU structural funds across EU regions on level one and two of the NUTS classification. Our empirical results suggest that swing voters crucially determine the allocation of structural funds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]