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Although economic theories have been advanced to explain public support for the common currency, we know very little about how public support for the euro has been affected by its economic impact, for example, on prices. We hypothesize that concern about rising prices following the introduction of the euro may have dampened enthusiasm for the project. We use Eurobaromater data spanning the first five years of circulation to examine how rising prices have shaped support for the euro. We find that while inflation has had a negative impact on support for the euro it is offset by more diffuse support for the European Union. This support, along with the impact of a strong currency, has led most (2/3's) Europeans to be generally positive about the euro. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As European countries continue along their path to a deeper and wider Union, the prospect of state fragmentation continues to threaten the traditional boundaries of Europe. But the current literature neglects an important theoretical and empirical question: does regional integration encourage ethno-national or regional groups to pursue separatism, including devolution or classic secessionism? In particular, has European integration changed the incentives for groups within European Union member states to pursue self-government so as to encourage such movements? In an attempt to supplement and expand upon earlier works on sub-national mobilization, I suggest the following causal mechanism: European integration has created conditions under which regional groups (e.g. the Scottish) may not need the state (e.g. United Kingdom) to survive internationally. First, I consider the Alesina and Spolaore (1997; 2003) model for optimal size of nations and tease out observable implications for empirical research. Second, utilizing the hypotheses developed in the theoretical discussion, I analyze the electoral support of regional parties. If the model has validity, regional parties will receive more support from citizens as their potential independent state becomes more viable within the EU. The empirical implications of the theory are tested with a dataset of regional party electoral and political economic variables. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the increased rhetorical weight of the European Union over this time period, this paper contends that national identity has moved from a more right-wing phenomenon to the center of European polities. The movement towards European Union has created, in a sense, an equal and opposite reaction towards the nation-state and increased the salience of national identities in unexpected ways. This shift may have precipitated the decisive defeat of referenda on the European Constitution in the Netherlands and France in 2005. The stickiness of national identity hinders the full integration of European nations on matters large and small, from a common fiscal policy to a pan-European military force. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we examine and compare the accession negotiations with regard to the institutional changes and the new processes of policy making that have emerged in three of the smaller new EU member states: Slovenia, Hungary and Estonia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The political and economic transformations, which the European continent is currently undergoing, are of great importance for the security, stability and prosperity of the region. One process that links these developments is the eastward expansion of the European Union (EU). The decision to invite 8 Central and Eastern European countries (plus the Mediterranean countries of Malta and Cyprus) to join the EU in 2004 is unprecedented in its significance for both the Union itself and the continent. The process leading to EU membership is long and consists of several distinct phases. Once a country expresses a desire to join the Union, it must be approved as candidate. Then, it enters the long phase of accession negotiations. Upon their completion, membership has to be approved both by the EU and the candidate country. Foreign assistance to the accession countries plays a major role in the enlargement process, helping along lagging members. From the theoretical literature on foreign aid, I draw two competing sets of explanations for the distribution of EU aid to the postcommunist countries. One is that amount of aid is determined by the need of the recipient country. Countries with greater needs are expected to receive more aid. Traditionally, wealth and economic growth are used to determine need. In addition, the future EU members have another set of ‘need’ factors, the ability to meet accession criteria. On the demand side, I use measures capturing levels of political and economic reform in each country. The other group of expansions focuses on the interests of the donating country as determining the amount of aid distributed. Countries, which are strategically and economically important partners, are expected to receive more aid, along with countries sharing similar cultural, religious, and historical characteristics. In this paper I use trade with the EU (exports and imports separately) to capture economic importance, and religion and proximity to EU to measure cultural similarities. Using annual per capita data for 12 countries for the 1990-2001 time period, I find support for both sets of arguments. Countries, which are lagging behind in democratic and economic performance receive slightly more Phare aid than the rest of the recipients. However, I find stronger support for the claim that EU aid serves the interests of the donor states more than the needs of the recipient economies. Consistently, in my analysis, I find that countries which import more goods from the EU receive more financial aid than countries which import less. Thus, indirectly, Phare aid ends up supporting the economies of the donor countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]