Search

In the last two decades of the twentieth century, interactions among Taiwan, Hong Kong, and mainland China have undergone extensive change, moving from intensified confrontation to closer economic exchange. After Taipei legalized travel to the mainland in November 1987, new economic opportunities were opened up to both sides of the Strait. This change aroused plenty of discussions, with the main discussion centered around the possibility of an economically integrated Greater China . The great volume of trade across the strait and the huge amount of investments on the mainland by Taiwanese entrepreneurs have created a dense economic relationship that is potentially beneficial to further integration. In view of this, many scholars and political elites in the region have expressed their optimistism on the formation of Greater China through many of their discourses. The usages of terms such as “Greater China,” “Chinese Economic Area,” “Common Chinese Market,” or “South China Economic Sphere” all reflect these scholars’ eager expectation. However, the concerns for each side’s security, sovereignty, and domestic politics hinder such development, and the expected spillover from economic corporation into a higher level of integration has not yet appeared. In this paper, I would try to answer why the economic integration is unlikely in Greater China. And I would like to argue that the current economic interaction and given cultural similarity cannot lead to economic integration in the absence of political understanding. On the surface, comparative advantages come from complementary economic development on both sides of the Strait , geographic proximity (reducing transportation costs) and cultural affinity (reducing transaction costs in investment and technology transfer). However, fundamental sovereignty and identity differences remain. In the first part of this paper, I would like to apply Keohane and Nye’s framework, interdependence, to argue that the growing trade and investment volume flowing across the Strait does not imply interdependence. Since interdependence is a necessary antecedent to economic integration, integration is unlikely without any interdependence. Even if the ongoing trend can lead us to cross the threshold of interdependence, the political concerns are still able to undermine further institutionalization. In the second part of this paper, I would like to focus on the concept of cultural affinity which is supposed to be a plus for integration. However, given current political considerations, what we have are perceived hostility and alienated identification, and these factors reverse the plus to a minus for integration. In the third part, I would like to emphasize contested sovereignty, identity, and security tensions which can be seen as the prerequisites for the progress of economic integration. According to Joanne Gowa, security matters, however, enlightened by David Laitin’s study on leadership, I argue that the government/leader’s political concerns towards sovereignty and identity can play the most important role in hindering the progress of negotiation, furthermore, the future process of integration. I would like to conclude that since the political issue, especially sovereignty and identity issues, is not settled yet, it is too optimistic to expect the spillover effect that brings the current thriving economic interaction into a more institutionalized economic integration in the Greater China region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Linking domestic & international politics, this paper offers a model of "Four-Level Nested Games" approach to Taiwan problems. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper wants to study how the PRC perceive the Taiwan Problem and explain how it made and implemented Taiwan policy incrementally from three perspectives(individual actors,domestic structures, and contextual constraints). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military threat was intensively used by China during Taiwan's presidential elections but is widely argued as counterproductive because it didn't prevent pro-independence candidates from winning the elections. To explain the logic of China's military threat and outcomes of the elections, this paper develops a formal framework in which China and the incumbent party has better information about the state of the world than voters and non-incumbent party. China's threat is interpreted as a way to transfer information to voters. Although she doesn't prevent the pro-independence party from being elected, China successfully prevents the winning party from declaring formal Taiwanese independence. In this way, China is always better off by issuing threats. In general, this paper not only attempts to improve our understanding of Taiwan Straight confrontation but also tries to shed new insight on the study of military threat in International Relations. It also offers a concrete game theoretic model to illustrate Putnam's two-level game metaphor. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explains the volatility accompanying the pacifying power of economic interdependence in Taiwan-China relations. Viewing from Taiwan's domestic politics, I argue an explanatory factor is how consolidated the Taiwanese leader's power was. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tries to look at the interactions between the U.S., Taiwan, and China in the period of 1987-1997. It will test two hypotheses that explain conflicts and cooperation between two regional rival states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to fill a void in international relations literature by highlighting the substantial economic and political influence of the Overseas Chinese in Mainland China, Taiwan, and the Pacific Rim. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely recognized that Taiwan was the most conflictual issue in U.S.-P.R.C relations both in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras (Ross, 1995). How the dynamics of the “strategic triangle” consisting of the U.S., Mainland China and Taiwan to be understood? How is the U.S. “strategic ambiguity” policy to be explained? Neorealists may argue that there was a tacit agreement between Beijing and Washington that so long as cooperation was imperative, the status quo in U.S.-Taiwan relations was temporarily acceptable. Revisionists such as Robert S. Ross, however, hold a more sophisticated view that even in the midst of cooperation, the ongoing conflict required continuous negotiations and mutual adjustment between the U.S. and P.R.C. (Ross, 1995). Nevertheless, few study, if any, have provided theoretical answers to the questions that under what conditions the equilibrium of status quo holds, how the U.S. commitment to defending Taiwan will affect the equilibrium outcomes of the game, and how the so-called strategic ambiguity policy is to be explained? By developing a game theoretic model, this paper will provide theoretical answers to those unresolved questions, drawing out both theoretical and policy implications. A historical examination of the interactions between the U.S., Mainland China, and Taiwan since the Korea War will be done to further illustrate the model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan Strait is one of the few explosive spots in today's world that has the potential to trigger military confrontations between two major powers (the People's Republic of China and the United States). Since the leader of Taiwan is determined to seek Taiwan's formal independence, which cannot be accepted by the PRC, many scholars warn that a Taiwan Strait War will break out in the foreseeable future. Other observers argue that the PRC will not risk a war over Taiwan because it can hardly afford the economic cost of such a war. What are the possible consequences of a future Taiwan Strait War? This article examines the impact of war on the PRC through the history of three major Sino- wars that occurred after the establishment of the PRC. I also look back to the Tiananmen Square Incident to see the international reactions and its damage of a quasi civil war. Although history indicates that war does not necessarily impede the development of China in the long run, the consequences of a Taiwan Strait War will be more serious because of the uniqueness of the Taiwan issue as well as the highly interdependence between the PRC, Taiwan, and the rest of the world. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Post-rationalist PE perspective is used to inspect Taiwan?s debate over the movement of wafer fab to China. Besides materialist interests, non-materialist discourses have resulted in a less predictable but contested sphere for public discussions. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author finds that Taiwanese have a weak sense of extended deterrence, but they are willing to choose independence than to remain status quo across the Taiwan Strait were they attacked by China. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past, international relation scholars analyze the interactions of states based on the theories of realism and idealism. Recently, scholars try to explain the reasons why there is conflict or cooperation in international society by reviewing the dimensions of concepts, ideas and culture which is so called constructivism. However, as the state boundaries fall away, the contact among states are getting closer. The subject those international relation theories explain has been shifted from states toward international regimes. Some scholars interpret the practice of these international regimes by applying regime theory. The emergence of international regimes not only means the coming era of globalization, but also stands for the difference between regime members and non regime members. In addition, many states believe that they would have higher status if they could join international regimes. Therefore, it is obvious that states look for any chance to become regime members. Since the withdrawal from the UN in 1971, Taiwan has been eager to join international regimes, especially those which require governmental representatives. However, due to the obstruction that Beijing government makes, Taiwan always fails to join international regimes. After striving for several years, Taiwan joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) which is one of the most important international economic regimes on January 1st 2002. As a member of WTO, when Taiwan does hard to fulfill its obligation, it is no doubt that Taiwan should possess equal status as other members and enjoy the interests that WTO brings to Taiwan. Yet, because China keeps protesting in WTO, it is not easy for Taiwan to carry out its duty and to perform as a good regime member. In WTO, the competition between Taiwan and China is everywhere and repeated. How Taiwan can find a way to solve this situation and how to protect its national interests by applying the institutional rules of WTO have become significant issues which should be taken seriously. Although the competing relation between Taipei and Beijing has not been better off after both became WTO members, in this research plan, we try to explore the possibility to see whether WTO could be a new arena where both members are able to cooperate in some issues. Furthermore, this papaer also wants to see if the economic interaction within WTO could help Taiwan and China restart dialogue in the near future. After the institutionalization and legalization, international regimes have gradually become the bridge among states. From internal perspective, regimes must defend their members’ interests, and solve the disputes and conflicts between members. Besides, international regimes have to play the role of the guard of international order from the external perspective. Furthermore, in small states’ point of view, how to interact with powerful states, gain maximum interests, and bring their influence into full play are those issues that they care about most. There is no common opinion in the international relation theories when seeing international regimes. However, even though the regime theory has developed since 1980s, it is still a question whether it is able to explain the interaction between Taiwan and China in international regimes. There might be something to be supplemented and needed more research and analysis. The core issues of my research plan are as follows: 1) the interaction between Taiwan and China within WTO: competition and cooperation; 2) what international relational theories and regime theory would say about the interaction between these two members in WTO: explanation and supplement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]