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The paper purports to offer a formal model that unifies deterrence and the security dilemma (or the spiral model) in a way different from the current literature’s. The two models, deterrence and the security dilemma, have been regarded as an alternative to each other. There are some formal works to unify the two, but even in such models, deterrence and the security dilemma are still treated as different worlds in the sense that actors do not know which world they are in and therefore act based on the probability for each. In my model, the world actors are in can change from one to the other as a crisis proceeds. More precisely, in one’s efforts to deter its adversary by building arms or mobilizing its force, one may well succeed in dissuading the other until some point. However, once its deterrent act exceeds that point (without recognizing it), the world is transformed to that of the security dilemma in which its deterrence backfires by (unnecessarily) provoking its opponent. This is the security dilemma in the sense that even if one’s opponent is greedy, its deterrence failure is not due to the adversary’s greed but rather because of the latter’s fear, aroused by one’s excessive deterrence, that the latter may be attacked in any event by the former. The logic behind it pertains to two types of credibility in deterrence, namely, the credibility of one’s threats and that of one’s assurances. As Schelling and others argue, a deterrent threat needs to be accompanied by the assurance that as long as the opponent stays there, one will not, the opponent believes, intend to hurt the other. This point has been argued by non-formal works. The existing formal models, however, are mainly concerned with how to make sure of the credibility of one’s threat without modeling to what extent it undermines the other type of credibility of an assurance. My model, by showing the inherent interconnectedness of deterrence and the security dilemma, illuminates the delicateness of deterrence. With the United States being at present the only superpower in the international system, policy implications of the model would be of vital significance. Jervis argues that state leaders tend to think that their benign intention is known to others even though it is not the case in actuality. If neorealists are right, the unmatched power of this country is ineluctably a threat to the others. Hence, unawareness of the security-dilemma side of deterrence could engender unintended consequences, ultimately undermining the US power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine the incentives or motives for India to adopt new practices associated with the latest RMA and its implications the Indian regional security environment and for the ability of India to tackle its security threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the levels of military force implemented by the United States when initiating a militarized interstate dispute. The militarized record shows variation in the initial level of force and this level of force directly affects the outcome of the dispute. In light of the relationship between the initial level of force and the dispute outcome, the issue is why the United States would choose to substitute levels of force in a dispute. Based on the previous research, the United States acts differently than other states when initiating a dispute in the sense that domestic factors are expected to have the greatest influence on the level of force; however, this has not been tested on the initial level of military force (Meernik 2000; Mitchell and Moore 2002). Using a model that consists of state level variables and a combined model that incorporates system level variables, the empirical results provide some evidence for this theory as well as the effect that system level variables have on the initial level of military force used by the United States when initiating a dispute. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]