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This research identifies sources of interpersonal trust in Latin America by exploring why the most developed countries in the Americas, namely Canada and the United States, show higher levels of interpersonal trust than their neighboring countries. The findings of this paper suggest that Latin America's high economic inequality poses a challenge to democracy because it triggers interpersonal mistrust. This paper also finds that in Latin America interpersonal trust, rather than civic participation, ideology or trust in government, promotes citizens' support for the implementation of public policies aimed to close the gap between rich and poor. Taken together, the results suggest a vicious circle between Latin America's historically high economic inequality, low interpersonal trust, and low support for redistributive policies within certain segments of the population, especially the well-off. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The involvement of citizens in public issues plays an important role during and after transitions to democracy, as it leads to contacts of citizens with political institutions that may or may not be responsive to their demands. In this paper, I look at the paradoxical relation between citizens political activism, intense distrust in institutions, and relatively stable evaluations of democracy in eight Latin American countries (Chile, Peru, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Dominican Republic and Peru). Using data from the World Values Survey 95/97, I use simultaneous equation modeling to uncover the nature and extent of the relationship between the three variables. The findings show that participation engenders more institutional distrust and less belief in democracy’s effectiveness, yet higher levels of distrust and democratic effectiveness generate higher participation. This suggests that the greater trust and confidence in democracy that should be the result of higher participation is not occuring. At some point in the connection between participation and institutions, the expected relationship fails to materialize. This study examines explanations for this result and for subtle country differences in the three variables examined [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The third wave of democracy (Huntington 1991) ushered in a substantial dedication to the discovery of factors promoting democratic consolidation in developing nations. One of the many factors which has been theorized to contribute to democratic consolidation and stability is the extent to which political parties are institutionalized. Samuel Huntington (1968) noted the necessity of political institutionalization in promoting political stability. Early research such as Ruhl (1975) examined the role of executive and legislative institutionalization in assessing the empirical accuracy of Huntington’s gap hypothesis. Recent research, including but not limited to McDonald and Ruhl (1989) and Mainwaring and Scully (1995) has focused on the importance of political parties as institutions, though often in a much less systematic methodological manner. This paper proposes to examine the validity of Huntington’s gap hypothesis using political party institutionalization as the relevant measure of political institutionalization. The data collected on political parties (Janda 1980), which is employed to test this hypothesis pertain to the second wave of democracy in Latin America. Specifically, factor analysis is used to create multifaceted measures of party institutionalization, distribution, and social mobilization. These factor scores are then subsequently analyzed through Ordinary Least Squares Regression. The results suggest the relevance of party institutionalization, given a relatively small n, support the relevance of parties in past democratic experience of Latin America and encourage future systematic collection of data related party institutionalization in the more recent wave of democracy in Latin America. However, economic measures are have a much greater impact on levels of instability [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research closely examines 220 pro-democracy contentious political challenges that occurred between 1981 and 1995 in seven Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. The data show that pro-democracy challenges tend to be large, nonviolent (especially using demonstrations), and organized by political parties. The main question addressed in this paper is the effect of pro-democracy protest on democratization processes. The clearest type of potential effect would be what I call the "democracy now" effect, in which pro-democracy challenges lead to regime change, but it is difficult to find clear evidence of this. Another way of looking at the effect of pro-democracy contentious challenges on democratization is to look for smaller reforms. There were twenty cases in which governments did grant concessions to pro-democracy contentious challenges, including loosening certain repressive measures, annulling controversial state and local elections, or reforming electoral procedures. A quantitative analysis showed that less authoritarian regimes were more likely to grant such concessions, as were governments that were weaker and more dependent on foreign aid and investment. Furthermore, challengers could increase the likelihood of gaining concessions by organizing contentious challenges that are longer, have larger participation, and utilize nonviolent yet disruptive tactics. One of the strongest factors was focusing demands on more concrete subnational issues, such as questionable local and state elections, rather than demanding "democracy now." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we analyze transitions to democracy (and semi-democracy) and democratic breakdowns in 20 Latin American countries between 1945 and 2005. We argue that domestic conditions cannot explain the region-wide wave of democratization that took place in 1978-95. Our transition models control for standard socio-economic predictors as well as for domestic institutional conditions (including the nature of the authoritarian regime in transition models, and the type of party system in breakdown models). We include a battery of additional predictors to capture the impact of international factors, including measures of diffusion (using spatial lags, and distinguishing short-term and long-term effects) and an original indicator of US support for democracy. Our results indicate that political leaders tend to emulate transitions in neighboring countries in the short-run, even though there is no evidence of a long-term equilibrium effect at the regional level. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the “third wave of democratization” expectations regarding democratic strength and electoral dynamism were high among scholars. Particularly, in Latin America by 2000 most of the countries in the region were under democratic rule. Yet, enthusiasm quickly vanished as trust in government eroded and electoral participation started declining..x000d.Some have argued that trust in government is a key ingredient of a healthy democracy. Nonetheless, the relationship between democracy and trust is complex and even paradoxical. The legitimacy of political actors and institutions relies heavily on trust. Yet an intrinsic feature of any democratic regime is a “healthy distrust” or skepticism towards those who detain power on their behalf..x000d.The goal of this paper is to examine the impact that declining trust in government and public institutions has had on turnout throughout Latin America. Using the Latinobarometer 2005 survey we found that interpersonal trust does not influence people’s decision to vote. Trust in government and the institutional setting positively affects turnout. Interestingly, whenever voters have a pessimistic assessment of current political and economic events, the likelihood of voting also increases. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Few scholars have used a clear systematic analysis to examine the relationship between regional integration and foreign direct investment in Europe and Latin America. Debate remains on the direction of the causal relationship between foreign direct investment and regional integration. In an effort to resolve this debate, this study will analyze regional integration in Europe and Latin America and each state’s respective level of foreign direct investment for the time period 1990-2004. Event history analysis is employed to test the hypothesis that those countries with high levels of foreign direct investment will integrate into regional economic agreements at a faster pace. Forty-one Central/Eastern European and Latin American countries are included in this study. All countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America, which have complete data available, are used for study in this paper. Because of the potential for an endogeneity problem, it is necessary to control for the following variables: gross domestic product per capita, trade openness, and the level of democracy for each state. A Cox regression shows that we should expect Latin American countries to integrate at a faster pace. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does democracy influence social spending? Previous research has generated mixed results on this question. In this study, the author argues that these inconsistent results are due to a lack of attention to the role of societal pressures, specifically, the effect of democracy is conditional on the existence of social groups (predominantly labor) that pressure the government for policy changes. If there is a strong labor force, then democracy does have a positive effect on social spending in comparison to nondemocracies. However, if the country has a weak labor force, then democracy has a negative effect on social spending in comparison to nondemocracies. Using fixed effects models on 14 Latin American countries, this paper demonstrates that democracy results in higher social security and welfare, education and health expenditure when there is a strong labor presence that is pressuring the government for greater social protection. The author also demonstrates that democracy is negatively associated with all types of social spending when there is either no or very little labor pressure. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to recent research, we find an "anti-political" budget cycle in a panel of fifteen Latin American democracies from 1973 to 2000. During the period in which Latin America underwent the most lasting and widespread wave of democratization, elections worked to limit the degree to which incumbents manipulate fiscal policies for electoral advantage. We show that governments undertook fiscal adjustment by reducing spending in the election year and in the inaugural year of the newly elected government. Though the capacity to enact austerity is moderated by the transition to democracy, new Latin American democracies also adhere to fiscal restraint. This paper shows that, at most, the period of democratic transition in Latin America may postpone bitter fiscal adjustments to periods when democratic regimes are stable. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary Latin America is experiencing a region-wide violent crime epidemic, the political consequences of which are largely unknown. Many commentators imply that the crime wave bodes ill for democracy in the region, causing disillusionment with government, reducing mass political participation, and increasing popular support for authoritarianism. This paper questions the micro-foundations of that conventional wisdom. Analysis of survey data indicates that crime victimization may cause increased political participation at the individual level. Rather than becoming cynical, disenchanted, or disempowered, Latin American crime victims are actually more politically active than their non-victimized peers. Crime victimization has an ambiguous impact on opinions about democracy and dictatorship; further research will be needed before firm conclusions about this relationship can be drawn. The results are robust to specification checks and multiple different quantitative methods, and they are based on data from multiple years of the LAPOP and Latinobaómetro surveys. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As Latin America democratizes, ordinary citizens appear less enthusiastic about democracy. What explains this paradox? This paper attempts to fill in the gap between disparate literatures on corruption, urban violence, and democratic orientations by presenting a causal relationship between victimization, corruption, and democratic values. I argue that the increase in criminal activity and perceptions of corruption throughout Latin America may explain part of the variation in democratic orientations and that victims of crime express negative feelings toward democracy and are often have less confidence in political institutions. Using survey data from the 2005 Latinobarometro, I find that victims are indeed less likely to support both democracy as an ideal as well as the political institutions in place while respondents who perceive high levels of corruption are more likely to support democracy but are significantly less likely to support political institutions. Analyses from ordered logit models demonstrate that these results hold across Latin America. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to offer insight into the potential and limits of civil society as a vehicle for deepening democratic values in newer democracies. I analyze a large cross-national survey of Latin American citizens in 18 countries to examine the question: Is civil society in Latin America nurturing democratic values or breeding authoritarian sentiments? A multidimensional analysis of civil society brings nuance to our understanding of the relationship between civil society and democratic values. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper posits that contrary to modernization theory, economic progress does not lead to democratization, rather it leads to a process of de-democratization. A Latin American case study is used demomstrating this thesis. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of this paper is to explain the duration of cabinets in presidential regimes in Latin America. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Numerous observers have noted the recent trends of increased voter abstention, reduced confidence in politicians and political parties in decline. Such complaints are levied against the advanced democracies of Europe, their post-communist neighbors, the United States, and Latin America. Some use the term “anti-politics” to capture these apparently global phenomena that affect new and old democracies alike. This usage includes everything from relatively benign conditions of voter apathy to the more consequential loss of regime legitimacy. Whatever the specific symptom, they reflect varying degrees of negative public attitudes toward politics. Along with the rise of anti-politics, particularly in the 1990s, came a resurgence of populism. Several right-wing populists emerged in Europe, at times capturing surprisingly large shares of the popular vote. In Latin America, so-called neopopulists generated discussions of delegative democracy, hyperpresidentialism, illiberal democracy and so forth. Populist leaders of all stripes tend to exploit domestic problems to their own advantage. They play on the complaints of common citizens and blame the nation’s rulers from causing the hardships. As such, their efforts and rhetoric could be described as “anti-political.” Yet this raises an interesting question: what, exactly, is the relationship of anti-politics to populism? Are these merely two terms that describe the same phenomena, or are they analytically distinct? This paper attempts to clarify the relationship between populism and anti-politics. It enters into the conceptual discussion of populism—offering a new definition of populism as a political movement, rather than a style or strategy and so forth—and argues that anti-politics is best considered as a means of securing support. That is, if populism is not in itself a political strategy, then anti-politics must be the strategy populist leaders use. Although one can conceive of non-populists using anti-political strategies, it is difficult to conceive of populists not relying on anti-politics. Populists of all stripes rely on it. The classic populists in Latin America rose in reaction to the oligarchical parties that dominated politics at the time, and infused their messages with nationalist rhetoric. Neopopulists of the 1990s similarly reacted to the so-called political class that seemed aloof and removed from the problems of ordinary citizens. In these, as well as with the agrarian populism in the United States and the right wing populism in Europe, the effort to mobilize support includes the claim that the political system is not working properly, that the interests of ordinary citizens are ignored, and without some big changes the status quo will remain. In all of these cases the predominant argument in favor of the change is that the system needs fixing. Populists claim to offer an appropriate solution. This paper will present the logic behind this conceptualization and explore their relationships in the cases of Peru and Venezuela, with an eye toward providing an inter-regional comparative framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the conditions under which party leadership and legislators successfully modify the legislature's formal internal rules of order. Given the historical instability and fluctuations between democratic and authoritarian rule in Latin America, constitutional design of institutions is one of the most significant considerations when democratic rule is established. Numerous Latin American countries recently negotiated transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule. To be successful, these negotiated transitions required compromise from both democratic supporters and the exiting authoritarian rulers. The capacity of legislators and parties to make policy is in part determined by the organization of the legislature in which they work. Understanding what motivates legislators and party leaders to pursue changes in the legislature's rules of order is important to understanding how one of the key democratic institutions operates, which in turn influences the legitimacy of democratic rule, particularly whether legislators will be able to represent the people who elected them. Chamber rules offer stability that permits the legislature to conduct its business without debating procedures constantly.

Using a comparative analysis that includes democracies in Europe and Latin America, I demonstrate that gender-based shortcuts do function outside of the US, and that their function and power varies in different political environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legitimacy of democracy is problematic without the support of the citizenry. This research will investigate the hypothesis that citizen satisfaction will increase after the adoption of a Mixed-Member Electoral system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When will politicians find it useful to entrench policies in a written constitution? Why do some politicians that have the power to amend constitutional provisions decide not to, while others do so? Previous approaches to this problem suffer from three types of flaws. First, most legal scholars and political theorists who have examined the dynamics of constitutional change select on the dependent variableâ€"all the cases examined are cases in which attempts were made to amend the constitution. Second, the few comparativists who have tackled the problem have not adequately controlled for an omitted variable bias (see discussion in Przeworski, 2004). Finally, those researchers who have proposed mechanisms which would make constitutional provision hard to change have not suggested how such theories might be tested (Weingast, 1997). This paper develops a theory about the incentive structures that drive constitutional politics, using data from Latin American constitutions. By developing a testable theory aimed at addressing aforementioned flaws, this paper will generate insight into the effect of constitutions on the political life of democracies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to explain levels of FDI flows in 15 Latin American countries for a 20-year period. The authors, by utilizing a cross-sectional time-series model of FDI level, build on the literature that has found a wide array of explanations for flows of investment in the region (Biglaiser & DeRouen 2006; Montero 2008; Trevino et al 2002; Tuman & Emmert 2004). While these four recent studies employ similar methods for a similar time period, the results are wide-ranging and the findings are contradictory. We find support for several key explanations found in previous research, but we uncover a more nuanced understanding of FDI flows in the region. In the paper we argue that previous scholarship has not paid sufficient attention to the effects of different sorts of risk associated with respective domestic political situations. Specifically, the nature of political terror in the country influences investment decisions. Likewise, we argue that the influence of democracy becomes an important part of the explanation under certain conditions. As well, we argue that prior spending decisions and investments by states help to determine inflows of FDI in Latin America. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper presents evidence that protest drives democracy, confirming the supply and demand theory of democratization while calling the dominant modernization approach into question. Modernization theory has remained the centerpiece of comparative research on democratization over the previous decade, amassing an impressive body of empirical research linking democracy to economic development. Drawing from an established cultural tradition in comparative politics, this paper challenges the dominant modernization approach and advances a theory that does not rely upon economic development to explain democratization. The supply and demand theory of democratization posits that the institutional supply of democracy flows naturally from the societal demand for democratization. Accordingly, countries cannot simply buy democracy with economic development, but rather, democracy must be actively pursued at the societal level. Using protest as an indicator of societal demand for democracy, cross-national evidence from Latin America confirms the new theory, providing robust evidence that societal demand drives democratization in the third wave. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines how the recent surge in protest against economic liberalization has affected the quality of democracy in the Latin American region. Existing research on the consequences of economic liberalization does not expect societal mobilization to take place, much less waves of mobilization to contribute to the deepening of democracy. Moreover, protest and conflict are seen largely as anathema to democracy. Using cross-sectional time-series data from 17 Latin American countries for the 1970-2003 period, this paper provides strong evidence that economic liberalization deepens democracy because of increasing levels of mobilization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

That leaders with strong democratic records and high exit approval ratings to leaders with weak democratic records and low exit approval ratings (and variations in between) are voted back into office alike poses a puzzle: Why do formers leaders make comebacks and why in the elections in which they do? This paper challenges hypotheses that attribute electoral comebacks to positive performance retrospective voting, to popular appeal or charisma, to the number of alternations of democratic transitions, or most recently, to a preference for familiarity during times of economic volatility and party fragmentation. Instead, this paper posits that it is the persistence of old political coalitions and institutions within the political system that secures comeback efforts. In doing so, it contends that a focus on transitions has overlooked and underestimated instances of continuity in political systems. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is a viable system of interest groups essential to the consolidation of Latin American democracy? The argument in this paper is that it is essential even in the qualifiedâ€"non-liberal democraticâ€"forms (electoral, presidential, etc.) of democracy that has emerged in the region, particularly since the mid-1980s. .x000d..x000d.This paper draws on work on all Latin American countries with original research from Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. By applying an analytical framework, it identifies a wide-range of contemporary success of the establishment of independent, institutionalized interest group systems. Then, the paper assesses how interest groups, and the role of so-called power groups, have advanced or hindered the prospects for consolidating democracy in particular countries..x000d..x000d.However, the study of the region’s interest group systems cannot be achieved by simply applying the theories used in liberal democraciesâ€"such as pluralism and neo-corporatismâ€"to the Latin American case. It must be based upon a synthesis of this theory with aspects of Latin American political development and interest activity including the corporatist tradition past and present, elitism and low levels of political efficacy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades, it was widely assumed that the reasons behind the poor performance of Latin American governments were the absence of democratic elections or the problems of an overgrown state. Yet, recent experience in Latin American democracies suggest that it is plainly wrong to assume that regime change or market reforms lead automatically to improved governance, and therefore it is necessary to understand the determinants of the quality of government. This paper is an attempt to move forward the discussion by analyzing two of the most relevant variables identified in this literature with time-series, cross-sectional data for the Latin American region, and employing data on quality of government that includes three dimensions of the quality of government (professional bureaucracy, lack of corruption and law enforcement). The empirical analysis shows that we can have a richer understanding of how democracy and structural adjustment improve the quality of government if we look at how their components affect our dependent variable. We now know that regime change or economic reform involve different mechanisms, and that each of these mechanisms behave differently, and it should not be assumed that they will follow the same dynamics.Thus, the main argument of this paper is that, behind those broad aggregate indicators, there are specific components at work. In the case of democracy, it shows that political participation has a negative effect on the quality of government, political constraints on the executive have a significant positive effect, and free press and electoral competition have no significant impact. For structural adjustment, this study suggests that neither government size nor fiscal discipline have an effect on the quality of government once "openness to the world economy" is included in the specification. Is this latter variable what explains variation in the quality of government in the region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The World Bank has long promoted controversial education reforms in Latin America. This paper seeks to explain how variations in democratic governance and executive power can either help or hinder the passage of these reforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper employs an approach that embeds the problem of criminal violence in a broader framework that allows us to examine a variety of linkages with democracy in Latin America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Which economic, institutional and cultural factors influence support for democracy in developing countries over the course of democratic transitions? This paper offers an integrated understanding of democratic legitimacy in Latin America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares two theories of democratic citizenry--delegative democracy and stealth democracy. Empirically, we analyze confidence in parliament and the level of delegative democratic attitudes in 10 Latin American countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The observed decline in levels of political trust around the world has been interpreted in two ways: on the one hand, low and declining levels of trust may suggest a crisis of democracy and of democratic institutions; on the other, this decline may suggest a change in the ways that citizens evaluate governments, suggesting the development of a critical citizenry. This debate has been renewed in the context of new and unconsolidated democracies, where low levels of trust can also be observed. Are these low levels of trust suggesting a crisis of democracy? Or do they suggest a response to problems of democratic governance? To be able to answer these questions, it is important to understand what the origins of trust are. In this paper, I evaluate competing hypotheses about what makes people trust or distrust political institutions in Latin America. Special attention is given to the impact of values on trust, and to the measures of governmental performance, such as corruption, in the region. The results suggest that, although trust in the region is low, the reasons are linked to problems of democratic governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I explore the relationship between public support for two closely related yet distinct objects and the stability of democratic regimes. Despite the presumed significance of public support for sustaining democracy, there has been relatively little systematic analysis of the relationship. A cursory review of the literature and survey data on Latin America paints a paradoxical image of public opinion concerning democracy in the region: people’s support for democracy goes hand in hand with high levels of political cynicism and dissatisfaction. Furthermore, the preliminary analysis of the Venezuelan case suggests that contrary to the conviction that public support for democracy could act as an effective deterrent against antidemocratic forces, the existence of the paradox may threaten the very stability of democratic regimes. When voters support democracy but lack confidence in democratic institutions, particularly political parties, they may withdraw from the act of voting or stop identifying with political parties, making the rise of antidemocratic leaders more likely. Thus, the study suggests that without trust in key political institutions, democratic regimes may have difficulty ensuring political stability and, in some cases, may not survive. The paper draws on Venezuelan public opinion polls and electoral data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the World Values Survey and the Latinobarometro, the paper explores changes in fundamental political and social values in Latin American countries over the past two decades. It will specifically explore preferences for market-based economic policy versus a larger role for the state, notions about the responsibility of the state or the larger society for individual well-being, acceptance or rejection of fundamental democratic values, the inclination to political participation, and the willingness to tolerate the participation of minority communities or political adversaries. It seeks to explore the consequences of changing values for modes of participation, including voting, involvement in social movements, and community-level volunteering. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is focused on how institutionally shaped path dependence mechanisms are interrupted by the political articulation of emerging new social cleavages. This theoretical puzzleis explored through the comparative analysis of the changes experienced by Latin American welfare regimes after the exhaustion and replacement of the import substitution industrialization model. I contend that this change in the development strategy inaugurated a new critical juncture with important new institutional crystallizations in terms of the patterns of social citizenship within welfare regimes. However, I will also hypothesize, cross-national variation regarding both the ways in which these transformations were politically processed and their final outcomes is partially determined by institutional inheritances derived from different patterns of working class incorporation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the case for the negative, country-level political effects of income inequality has been advanced in various studies. Central to these arguments is the following assumption: that there is a causal connection between “objective” economic interests; individual perceptions about how just the distribution of income is within one’s society; and ultimately an individual’s commitment to a democratic political system. While the micro foundations of arguments assuming this causal connection are typically well developed theoretically, this causal chain has not been empirically tested in any systematic way. The central goal of this paper is empirically examine this micro-level causal chain underpinning many prominent arguments. Our data comes from four Latinobarómetro surveys. We test various arguments through logistic regression analysis. We find that one’s political orientation and prospects of upward mobility (POUM) are more strongly related to perceptions of income inequality. Furthermore, our empirical evidence suggests that negative perceptions of income inequality leads to high levels of dissatisfaction with democracy, which in turn leads to individuals being less committed to a democratic form of government. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do political parties tend to nationalize over time? Caramani (2000, 2004) uses constituent-level voting data to empirically support the phenomenon of party nationalization, or the progressive national integration of electorates and party systems, in Western Europe. I argue that parties in some developing democracies exhibit a different pattern of evolution as a result of distinct economic, geographic, and institutional factors. Parties tend to nationalize when countries are more geographically unified, the electorate is more economically homogenous, and electoral rules discourage the cultivation of a personal vote. Conversely, parties tend to regionalize when their electorate suffers from geographic divisions, economic inequality, and electoral rules that provide incentives for a personal vote. In this paper, I use legislative electoral data from forty political parties in Latin America between 1990 and 2006 to show that while some parties evolve as predicted by progressive nationalization, others show a tendency towards progressive regionalization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is a viable interest group system essential to the consolidation of Latin American democracy? In answer, this paper presents a framework for understanding the development, current role, and future developments of interest groups in the region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the question of how ordinary people understand democracy. Do contemporary publics display a reasonable understanding of the meaning of democracy, and what are the contents of their definitions? Do people focus on the procedural aspects of democracy-elections, democratic institutions, and processes-which are the main focus of democratization efforts. Alternatively, do they see democracy in economic or social welfare terms? We draw on a wide range of public opinion surveys that have recently been conducted to explore these questions in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America. Our research yields two generalizations about popular conceptions of democracy. First, most citizens of new democracies are cognitively capable of imputing meaning to democracy in their own words. Second, and most important, most of those cognitively capable citizens think of democracy in terms of the freedoms, liberties and rights that it conveys, rather than procedural and institutional conceptions of liberal democracy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the link between property rights and democracy. In examining regime type and property rights we explore the relationship that a number of authors suggest exists between democracy and property rights (Cheibub 1994, Hayek 1944, Freidman 1962, Lindbloom 1977, Olson 1993). Here the authors generally contend that democratic policies reduce predatory actions and secure property rights. In contrast, others suggest that democracy does not necessarily protect property rights. Here individuals may influence policymakers to restructure property rights in exchange for political support, often regardless of regime type (Przeworski and Limongi 1992, Haggard 1990, North 1991, Olson 1982 and Huntington and Nelson 1976). In addition, iherent in much of the discussion on regime type and the protection of property rights is an underlying assumption of a link between capitalist economies, democracy and the protection of property. We examine this link as well.In order to test the strength between property rights and regime type we have created a unique data set covering all of Latin America over the last 50 years. We explore not just regime effects on the protection of property rights, but we explore the mechanisms through which regimes may affect property rights by focusing on executive power and the presence of institutions of accountability. We conduct a pooled time series analysis and find that while regime type and economic growth matters, institutional explanations including power of the executive, decree authority and institutional accountability do a much better job of informing our understanding of who will do a better job of protecting property rights. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is a viable interest group system essential to the consolidation of Latin American democracy?  In answer, this paper presents a framework for understanding the development, current role, and future developments of interest groups in the region. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to explain people's evaluation of democracy in Latin America. We use a cross-sectional, cross country analysis, which includes Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article proposes to demonstrate the conceptual disparity among some authors with respect to democracy who, despite having a procedural perspective on the same, do not coincide on their classification of situating the year in which the democracies in Hispanoamerica political regimes commenced between the end of the XIX Century and the beginning of the XX Century. For this reason we propose an axis criterion in order to classify the democracies, and we apply this to Latin American countries in this period, more commonly known as the “first wave of democracy”. We then make a comparative analysis of these early democracies. Finally, we create an explanatory outline that permits us to identify independent variables of democratic advancement in this region in this particular time in history. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current saliency of technocrats in Latin America has stimulated a lively theoretical debate about their influence in policy making and their effective independence from other sociopolitical actors, especially their politically appointed superiors, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and business interests. Do experts enjoy considerable independence from other sociopolitical actors? Is their power derived from other actors or is it their own? Through an in-depth analysis of the recruitment and operation of economic experts in Colombia and Peru this article assesses the power técnicos wield. My findings show that significant levels of technocratic independence in economic policy making have been achieved in both countries. This independence is based on (i) technocrats’ use of expertise to enhance and maintain their independence and (ii) the particular conditions found in economic policy areas that protects experts from sociopolitical pressures. These results help to explain why it is more likely to find experts in economic policy areas than in other areas of the Latin American State. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose that regime preference is a nominal response variable that follows a multinomial distribution. We use an exposure-acceptance model and the 2003 Latinobar?metro to examine regime preferences of individuals in 17 Latin American countries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This analysis will look at the effects of perceptions of discrimination (economic and racial), equality before the law and satisfaction with democracy on the perceived importance of the democratic value of voting. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparing three cities in different countries, I explain why only some experiments in participatory government succeed in Latin America. I argue that strongly institutionalized parties can undermine decentralization?s benefits for local democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although much remains to be learned regarding numerous aspects of politics and governance in Latin American democracies, gaps in our understanding are particularly glaring in the area of mass attitudes, and especially citizens’ attitudes toward democracy. Unlike in the United States and in other advanced industrial democracies, citizens of most developing nations have had neither extended experience with democratic political practices nor prolonged exposure to the sorts of information that foster consensus regarding the propriety and legitimacy of those practices. Consequently, we should not be surprised that the people of these nations vary in both their understanding of democracy and their commitment to the preservation of democratic institutions (Schaffer 1998). It is only quite recently that students of Latin American politics have begun to assess citizens’ conceptions of democracy. Thus, not surprisingly, much remains to be learned. Two recent projects provide evidence regarding both what is known about how people of the region view democracy and what remains to be discovered. The first is a project led by Roderic Camp (Camp 2001a) in which a team of scholars examined survey data from Chile, Costa Rica, and Mexico. The second is the 2002 rendition of the Latinbarometro (Press Report 2002), which included a few important items regarding citizens’ views of democracy. Extant data are somewhat limited in what they reveal regarding conceptions of democracy in Latin America. The procedure on several surveys has been to ask respondents to summarize the meaning of democracy in a single word, and, likewise, to express what they expect from democracy in a single word. These approaches have two critical limitations. First, given the complexity of democracy as a concept, it is possible that these “top of the head” responses capture citizens’ views of democracy too coarsely. The single word most accessible to the respondent at a given moment may tell us something regarding the salience of particular aspects of democracy, but the necessary simplicity of responses means that little is learned as to the depth of opinion. A second, and related, point is that extant approaches inevitably depict the individual respondent’s view of democracy as being unidimensional. That is, the respondent who reduces democracy to “liberty” is presumed not to conceive of democracy in terms of electoral participation, whereas we would conclude that the respondent who answers “voting in elections” does not view protection of liberty as being central to democracy. The problem, of course, is that each of these respondents may well consider both liberty and voting in elections—and perhaps even a few other things as well—to be components of democracy. Survey procedures that permit only a single response option preclude identification of multiple dimensions of meaning. To fully understand the nature of citizens’ views of democracy, I contend that two factors must be considered: the components of those views and the manner in which those components are combined. Put differently, we need to understand both how and how complexly citizens conceive of democracy. To this aim, I conducted a series of focus groups in Costa Rica in the Summer of 2003. These focus groups were designed to identify, first, the various meanings participants attribute to democracy, and second, the complexity of these conceptions. Using Q-sort methodology, I seek to identify groupings of people based on their sorting of items measuring their attitudes toward various democratic values and principles. With this research technique, subjects of the focus groups are able to express the relative importance of various factors explaining their understanding of democracy, and to reveal combinations of political attitudes that most accurately describe such understanding. The technique also will reveal how subjects think that other individuals and social groups in Costa Rica perceive democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose and test a formal model explaining the rise of the left in Latin America. It is a game with a finite number of voters, who are either rich or poor. A right candidate represents the rich, a left candidate represents the poor. The elected candidate takes a single decision: the level of taxes, to be redistributed lump-sum to all citizens. Candidates pick the optimal taxes for their constituency. Candidates differ on other dimensions, which we summarize by a valence shock incurred by all citizens. We assume that the rich, and only the rich, form a lobby and can offer bribes to get their candidate elected. Then we show that the probability that the left candidate is elected follows an inverted U shape relationship. At low levels of inequality, the rich do not bribe any voters and poor voters are increasingly likely to vote for the left candidate based on redistributive concerns. At high levels of inequality, the rich want to avoid redistribution and bribe poor voters, causing the left candidate to be elected with decreasing probability. We find strong support for our model looking at elections in 18 countries in Latin America from 1978 to 2008. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development of racial consciousness in Latin America is directly connected to the power and longevity of racial democracy in the region..x000d.Racial ideology matters for identity formation and in the case of Cuba has inhibited racial consciousness through a language of racial harmony, denying the revelance of race as a social cleavage. Yet I argue that the ideology has not been able to quell consciousness completely, especially among black Cubans. Through survey research I argue that despite the racial democracy ideology, the presence of racism in Cuba, particularly following the special period, has allowed race to exist as an important social cleavage among many blacks. Black consciousness exists in various forms in Cuba both socially and politically, which matters in how black Cubans identify themselves and in turn affects how they make decisions regarding political and social behavior. I analyze not only how groups have challenged racial democracy overtly through activism and/or organization but how individuals reject the ideology informally in their own everyday lives as well. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Latin America turned democratic during the second half of the twentieth century. Yet poverty and income inequality are still present in the same order of magnitude if not worse. This persistence of poverty and inequality is at odds with predictions based on the median voter theorem and in particular with predictions based on traditional theories of redistributive taxation under democratic regimes. If the poor can vote and hold accountable politicians, why we do not observe large redistribution of resources to the poor? Among many forms of redistribution in favor of the poor, the public provision of elementary education has become a fundamental tenet of development strategy and poverty alleviation programs around the world. Given this primacy of elementary education for alleviating poverty, we can rephrase the question posted above: Why are Latin American poor citizens not becoming more educated? and more important why are Latin American countries favoring public spending on tertiary education over primary education? The purpose of this study is to disentangle what is the political mechanism in place that explains the elite bias in the public provision of education in Latin America. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How democratic is civil society in Latin America? Utilizing the Latinobarometer I develop a comparative framework to analyze the strength of civil society activity across 18 countries. Rather than focus on one type of civil society activity, I compare civil society capacity along three dimensionsâ€"organizational, mobilizational, and dialogical strength. This analysis not only provides an empirical baseline for examining the strength of civil society across the region, but also allows us to compare how different forms of civil society participation affect citizens themselves. I examine civil society’s potential for strengthening democracy in Latin America by analyzing how participation in three modes of civil society activity- voluntary association membership, protest activity, and political discussion- affect the democratic political orientations of individuals. I examine three types of democratic political orientations: attitudes toward oneself, including feeling of self-efficacy; attitudes towards others, including trust and tolerance, and attitudes toward the system, including support for the democratic process. This analysis contributes to our understanding of civil society's potential for deepening democracy in the region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]