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What factors explain the unilateral and multilateral uses of force by the United States? That is the research question this paper addresses. In order to answer the question, the paper uses the dual concepts of opportunity to use force and conditions for the use of force (Meernick 1994, Ostrom and Job 1986) to identify a set of factors that lead either to a unilateral uses of force or to multilateral uses of force by the United States. Among those factors are NATO memberhip, which pushes the use of force in Europe towards multilateral options, and direct threats to the homeland, which pushes the United States towards unilateral uses of force. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper builds on the work of scholars who study foreign policy decisions by courts as well as legal scholars who have noted an anecdotal trend of court deference to the political branches of government when deciding cases involving international law. It puts these anecdotal observations to the test by empirically examining if courts faced with cases involving international law follow the attitudinal model or instead defer to the expressed preferences of the political branches, particularly the Executive branch. This will build on a paper I am presenting at the Southern Political Science Association, which examines international law cases in the U.S. Supreme Court. It will study whether the lower courts follow the same patterns of decision-making. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The shift in U.S.-Indian relations around the turn of the twenty-first century provides an ideal opportunity to test competing explanations of global power relations. Through examination of primary and secondary source materials, this paper investigates the timing of and justifications for the rapid changes in the relationship between the United States and India. This evidence is used to test the utility of explanations based on political regime type, extent of economic liberalization, global and local balance of power considerations, and nuclear proliferation concerns in light of changes in U.S.-Indian relations. Although the United States currently has friendly relations with China, this paper finds that the U.S. government is engaging India as a balancer against Chinese power. This suggests that the United States' role as a regional hegemon encourages it to promote a balance of power in Asia, even if the immediate threat of China is arguably minimal, implying that U.S. foreign policy decision-makers feel compelled to intervene in order to remain the sole regional hegemon. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historically, religious conflict has occurred when two distinct religions meet at a specific geographic frontier or border (i.e. Ireland/England, Pakistan/India, Yugoslavia, etc.). In each of these cases, religion was not necessarily the exclusive source of conflict, but quickly established itself as the focal point around which individuals defined their identity. Although the differences between the two groups may have been numerous (political, economic, cultural, etc.), religion provided the easiest and most prominently accessible tool for mass mobilization and identity differentiation. Once this shift occurs, the religious identities become so salient that all future interactions tend to be defined along religious lines, which in turn lends itself to intractability. This paper argues that globalization has fundamentally changed the nature of international interactions and has eliminated geographic proximity as a necessary condition for the development of religious conflict. Groups previously isolated from one another now find themselves interacting to a degree never before seen in history. While much of the world has accepted globalization, certain groups (i.e. Al-Queda) have viewed it as a threat to their lifestyle and have reacted with force and religious rhetoric. U.S. response to these actions (i.e. Afghanistan, Iraq, support for Israel, etc.) has been perceived as overzealous by many in the Middle East and has sparked a growing frustration with U.S. foreign policy. Although many within the region may not have initially seen this conflict along religious lines, Islam provides the most prominent and convenient forum for articulating their frustrations. The similarities between the current U.S./Islamic tensions and the early stages of other historic religious conflicts are striking. In this paper, parallels are drawn between previous intractable religious conflicts (Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia) and the current developing conflict between the United States and the Islamic world. Although the United States has made a concerted effort to declare a war on “terror” and not Islam, the perceived threat associated with current U.S. foreign policy behavior is encouraging the redefinition of Middle Eastern identity in Islamic terms and creating the possibility of intractable religious conflict on a global scale. Ironically, it appears that the use of conventional military and political approaches to the war on terror will likely exacerbate and strengthen the Islamic identity of individuals in the Middle East contrary to the desires of the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper problematizes the current "rogue states" debate" and proposes a new theory. It presupposes a domestic logic of "rogue" behavior, citing a common historical precedent of small third-world states both born in the aftermath of violent conflict and subject to dangerous internal legitimacy vacuums. These vacuums are filled by self-styled, autocracy-prone leaders who combine repression and an overarching ideology to cement legitimacy among a population that would otherwise not easily accept it. As internal pressures continue to abound and policy maneuverability remains low, these leaders begin to look outside their borders for solutions that can both secure material resources and demonstrate commitment to an ideological cause on which the regime's legitimacy rests. The particular decision to "go rogue" occurs when a deteriorating domestic condition coincides with specific regional and international opportunities and/or threats, forming a self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts. I deploy both this theoretical lens and George's "actor-specific model" to historically examine the recent examples of Syria and Libya. These cases demonstrate the nuanced calculi by which leaders may or may not adopt "rogue" tactics. I conclude with an assessment of implications for current U.S. policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines media coverage of the Iraq war, from February 2007 through January 2008, and in relation to the U.S. "surge" strategy. It reviews the similarities and differences in media coverage across thirteen countries: the U.S., U.K., Spain, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Canada, Mexico, Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, Pakistan, and South Africa. Within a world systems analysis, I find that the openness of each media outlet to criticism of the war is strongly influenced by its position within the system, and as a part of a core, periphery, or semi-periphery country..x000d.I examine the war in Iraq as a classic case of neoliberal intervention on the part of the U.S. and its allies. A systematic historical review of U.S. policy planning in the Middle East, and the relevance of that planning to the neoliberal occupation, are addressed at length. .x000d.Those countries located furthest outside of the core of the world capitalist system follow the Iraq war the least consistently, on a month by month basis, but are the strongest in their challenges to the legitimacy of the occupation. Conversely, core countries cover the conflict far more closely, and are more limited in their sympathy to strong criticisms of the war. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Malcontents of hegemony are states that want to assert their own national goals. The goals these states wish to purse conflict with the goals of a hegemonic power. Malcontents of hegemony will begin to find ways of challenging the hegemon as hegemonic decline sets in. As the hegemon finds itself unable to enforce its rule the malcontent will achieve its goal, giving impetus to other powers to try the same thing. This paper seeks to create taxonomy of malcontents, dividing them up into three major groups, benign, revolutionary and passive-aggressive. Each type of malcontent will approach its goal a different way, benign will use diplomatic and economic means, passive-aggressive will utilize under handed and devious methods and revolutionary malcontents will whatever means necessary, including violence. The development and study of malcontents is important, especially as the declining strength of the US permits many smaller states to begin exercising goals that conflict with American foreign policy. Identifying malcontents within the hegemonic sphere of influence will allow social scientists to see where the hegemon is weakest and what the future power distribution of both regions and the world may look like. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How will the current financial crisis affect American foreign policy? Reviewing the literature, it is initially unclear how domestic events can systematically affect foreign policy. Examining the role of public opinion, threat of electoral punishment and interest groups offer unsatisfactory explanations as to why domestic politics matters to foreign policy. Moving beyond these alternative explanations, careful examination of psychological factors, mainly risk expectations derived from prospect theory, provide a compelling explanatory narrative. This paper asserts that the financial crisis will eventually drive the US towards higher levels of engagement in international crises. Case studies of the 1930s and 1970s substantiate this hypothesis. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When and how will the United States intervene to bring international crises to an end? In this paper, we use a competing risks hazard model to explore when the United States will utilize particular coercive tools. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Little is known about gender dynamics in defense and foreign policy-making in the House of Representatives. In this paper, we explore gender differences in committee membership and legislative activity in these domains from 1991-2007. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article assesses U.S. neoconservative policy prescriptions for democratizing and empowering political Islam and considers the sources of the neoconservative understanding of the Arab world. The analysis of the Middle East is almost exclusively normative, arguing what U.S. policy toward the region should be. Neoconservative aims are ambitious and inherently controversial. The paper examines what various neoconservatives have said and written about Islam and its democratic prospects.

This paper examines the impact of elite framing on the attitudes of Americans and Mexicans toward political and economic ramifications of NAFTA ten years after the agreement was signed, using data from 2004 national samples from both countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States of America and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have a long history of diplomatic ties and friendship. Saudi Arabia is one of the United States’ closet allies in the Middle East and as such garners a certain amount of both respect and hatred from the rest of the world. Since the attacks on September the eleventh, the Saudi royal family is looked at with suspicion and trepidation due to the possibility of their support of terrorists and blocking investigations. The question then becomes if the relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia will suffer and how. This paper addresses what those relations were and what the future will hold for both states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Central America has been an abused and traumatized region, with decades of violent civil conflict in El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and to a lesser degree, Honduras. Historically, U.S.-Central American relations have been at best cordial and at worst bloody, and most Central Americans hold ambivalent views of the United States. However, since the end of the Cold War and the signing of peace accords in the region, the United States has been attempting to rebuild its image, and in the wake of Hurricane Mitch and the dual earthquake disaster in El Salvador the United States has been helping to rebuild Central America. But much of U.S. aid to the region is channeled through international development NGOs, and few Central Americans realize where the funds are coming from. Using survey data, personal interviews, and field visits, this paper strives to determine how Central Americans understand this NGO connection and how it might be affecting opinions of the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper utilizes one case, the issue of child soldiers, to evaluate the roles and impact of activists and the US government during the process of establishing a human rights standard. This work is an early component of a larger study investigating the emergence, campaign strategies, and influence of transnational activists as they strive to address global children?s issues. To assess the impact of the US on the transnational campaign against the use of child soldiers, this study briefly examines the emergence of the issue on the international ?agenda? and the negotiation process for a standard within the United Nations. First, I argue that transnational activists were responsible for the emergence of a campaign on child soldiers and that the US played no relevant role during this stage. However, the US role dramatically increased when the UN began to address the issue in 1984. At that time, the political opportunity structure of UN negotiations ensured that the US position highly influenced and limited the final outcome. This brief study illustrates the complexity of international relations debates over power and influence. While a narrow view of the case shows the US limiting the influence of transnational activists, a more detailed analysis reveals the critical roles of activists who placed the issue on the international agenda in spite of limited US interest. Additionally, an historical analysis also reveals areas where transnational activists exerted significant influence outside of arenas dominated by the US - such as within UN offices and in regional conferences. Ultimately, while the US position limited the international agreements, the final compromise did involve a change in US policy. Thus, one can conclude that transnational activism has diverse impact, but when facing the hegemon its impact was curtailed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two aspects of the politics of post-September 11 U.S. foreign policy are addressed. First, the development of an expansive and aggressive Bush Doctrine, including an emphasis on preemptive or preventive war, is traced. Second, the revival of a positive discourse on U.S. empire and hegemony within policy and opinion circles is explored. This paper surveys and categorizes a range of interpretations of these developments, primarily but not exclusively from the political left, that seek to explore elements of continuity and change in the foreign policy approach of the Bush administration. An argument is put forward about the importance of distinctive “policy currents” within U.S. ruling circles, and the distinctive economic, political, and ideological forces to which they give expression. The development of the policy current associated with the Project for a New American Century is explored as an important case in point. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does the president’s partisanship make a difference in decisions to use force abroad? Most explanations of the diversionary use of force argue that presidents attempt to compensate for their poor handing of the economy by using force (e.g., Ostrom and Job 1986; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Richards, et al 1993; Smith 1996). But such policies may contribute to deteriorating domestic economic conditions, harming the president’s political standing. This paper develops a Poliheuristic explanation (e.g., Mintz 1993; 2003) of U.S. presidential uses of force, which identifies the domestic economic incentives presidents have to use force according to their partisan macroeconomic preferences. Drawing from the partisan political business cycles literature (e.g., Hibbs 1977; 1987) and the empirical studies linking the president’s electoral success with the state of the economy (e.g., Erikson 1989; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992), I detail the conditions under which presidents are likely to use force abroad. The use of force can be treated as an additional expansionary fiscal policy tool, which stimulates aggregate demand, reducing unemployment and contributing to inflation. Because Republicans are more averse to inflation than Democrats and Democrats more averse to unemployment than Republicans, I expect Republican presidents to reject force alternatives when the expect the use of force to “overheat” the economy – especially during periods in which Republican presidents enjoy a partisan majority in Congress. On the other hand, I expect Democratic presidents to reject passive alternatives when they expect the use of force to reverse unemployment – especially under Democratic unified control of government. Poisson Autoregressive (PAR) estimates of the impact of partisanship and the economy on U.S. uses of force, 1890-2001, support the hypotheses, suggesting that Republicans use force less often as unemployment increases and Democrats use force more often as unemployment increases. These findings are consistent with the explanation that, unlike Democratic presidents, Republicans lack the domestic economic incentives to use force abroad. I conclude that while Democratic presidents may be tempted to use force when it is not warranted, Republican presidents may refrain from using force when it is necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many differing theories have been advanced regarding potential divisions of American foreign policy, including that of Frank L. Klingberg, who argues a regular cyclical trend in American foreign policy mood. This paper analyzes American history from 1824 to 1870 to determine whether a dichotomy in American foreign policy exists and what indicators are most indicative of this split. Using this information, the Mood/Interest Theory and corporatist theory are comparatively analyzed to see which best characterizes the nature of American foreign policy in the era. Making use of statistical testing, it is noted that economic prosperity, the generational background of the President and naval power are important indicators of the nature of American foreign policy mood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The president enjoys tremendous access to the public in order to advance his foreign political agenda. However, the literature has paid little attention to the means by which the president addresses the public as part of his effort to carry out his roles as both chief public administrator and foreign policy actor. In these roles, the president is responsible for creating, advocating, and implementing policy, despite the fact that the policy agenda is largely the realm of Congress. Borrowing elements from Kingdon?s multiple streams approach and Baumgartner and Jones? theory of punctuated equilibrium, this paper examines the relationship between the State of the Union address and congressional attention to the president?s foreign policy proposals, specifically international trade. Presidential attention to international economic issues in State of the Union addresses from 1975-2002 are examined with respect to influences on congressional attention mitigated by the role of the media, utilizing a VAR empirical model. The results indicate that presidents are able to use the State of the Union address to increase the level of congressional attention to international economic policy proposals. The results also indicate the media plays an important role in the politics of attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the attacks of 9/11, US policy towards the Middle East was transformed, at least ostensibly, from supporting ‘friendly’ countries (no matter how authoritarian) to helping spread democracy and economic freedoms. However, despite this change, current US Middle Eastern policy seems no closer to achieving its goals of defeating global terrorism, of ensuring a stable oil supply to world markets and helping to reduce the existential threat to Israel. This is because the achievement of all these goals will require the cooperation of Iran, the level of which appears not to have changed since 1979. It is therefore the intention of this paper to argue that a new US foreign policy is required, one that includes a rapprochement with Iran. This paper will thus provide a guide to how such a rapprochement might be achieved and will discuss the principle economic, political and military components it should include. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With so much discussion of the powerful pro-Israel lobby's impacts on American foreign policy in the Middle East, little attention is paid to the pro-Arab groups in Washington, DC. While appreciating the strength of the former, this paper attempts to outline how the latter try to shape American policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. From research conducted with assistance from the American Political Science Association's Centennial Center, I look at pro-Arab political action in three overlapping settings. First, I contrast pro-Arab efforts with those of the pro-Israel lobby, particularly the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. I ask, why are pro-Arab groups weak compared to the pro-Israel lobby? Second, I look at pro-Palestinian efforts within the larger pro-Arab lobbying background. In particular, I am interested in contrasting similarities and differences between the pro-Palestinian and pro-Arab organizational missions. Third, I examine the interaction between the pro-Arab networks and American policy. From interviews conducted with leaders of pro-Arab organizations in Washington DC, this paper inspects the efforts to influence American foreign policy toward the two-state solution in the post-Cold War world and during the war on terrorism. I find that while pro-Arab lobbying pales in comparison to those of the pro-Israel lobby, the end of the Cold-War, the current war on terrorism, and clear American and international support for the two-state solution as manifested by public opinion polls, policymakers' statements, and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1397 and 1515, provide the pro-Arab lobby with a crucial opportunity to realize its vision of Palestinian statehood. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the rhetorical relationship between Washington and Pyongyang since 1994, and focuses on specific cases in which North Korea has reacted, and not reacted to American vocal stimuli. Many political analysts have compared how the Clinton Administration and the Bush Administration have both dealt with North Korea, and the difficulties encountered by the Bush Administration in interacting with North Korea after the infamous Axis of Evil speech has led to the birth of a urban legend: the Bush Administration's vehement language regarding North Korea has played an extremely important role in North Korea's foreign policy, and might have even pushed North Korea to jump into the pool of declared nuclear power by going ahead with its first nuclear test last October. Is this a myth or the reality? In other words, did negative words used by the Bush Administration create an entrenched relationship with North Korea that led to that fateful nuclear test? Or has negative rhetoric always been used by American administrations and especially by the Clinton administration? There is an interesting conundrum lying here: on one hand, the Clinton Administration was able to negotiate the 1994 Agreed Framework and sustain some primitive relationship with North Korea and on the other hand, the Bush Administration has had a very tense and unsuccessful record of negotiation with North Korea. If only the Bush Administration used negative language, then such choice of rhetoric could potentially be strong variable in derailing the relationship between North Korea and the United States. The aim of this paper is to determine whether of not negative rhetoric has affected North Korea from the signature of the 1994 Agreed Framework providing for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula to the October 2006 North Korea nuclear weapons' test. Such a study is important in order to learn more about North Korea's behavior and evaluate potential strategy options for the United States in light of finding out how North Korea is being engaged in the international system as well as when it is being alienated. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

U.S. foreign policy to Asia will not independently focus on the Korean Peninsula in a heavily highlighted taskforce, which has, as a matter of fact, used to be a part of the branches in Asia policy. Comparing to Japan, China, and Russia, the Korean Peninsula is not likely to outstrip any policy to those countries. Nonetheless, in the name of Korea-U.S. FTA, economic issue and foreign policy in denuclearization of North Korea have stuck U.S. Asia strategy. The U.S. has to cope with such geopolitical as well as geo-economic environment of the Korean Peninsula which is able to manipulate the power structure and security of Northeast Asia. The Korean Peninsula can venture out on overall U.S. foreign policy to establish its new standard in Asia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

U.S. foreign policy oscillates between neo-realism and liberal realism. By examining the policies behind the Spanish American War, the Atlantic Charter, and the legal devices that the United States has set up for itself in the international community, the tendency for the United States to challenge its foundational doctrines can be illustrated. While attitudes of domestic actors may change toward neo-realism from time to time, the United States also experiences greater turbulence during these instances. The U.S. has been transitioning toward neo-realist policy since 1989 and is now fully entrenched in these policies. Once the U.S. begins to reaffirm its liberal realist foundation it can begin to restore its international credibility and this period of decline will reverse itself. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the relationship between the U.S. foreign policy and the emergence of authoritarian regimes in South Korea (by Park Chung Hee) and the Philippines (by Ferdinand E. Marcos) which commonly underwent the "authoritarian regression" in the 1970s. Focusing on the internal variables such as economic conditions or leader's idiosyncrasy, previous works neglected the U.S. foreign policy which affected the occurrence of these regimes from without. Based on this perspective, I raise two questions: (1) What aspects of the U.S. foreign policy had an impact on the recurrence of authoritarianism in South Korea and the Philippines? (2) How did South Korea and the Philippines differently take their authoritarian steps in response to American foreign policy? This research hypothesizes that American foreign policy and external environment in the 1970s (Nixon Doctrine and détente) played pivotal roles in the transition to authoritarianism in both states. Moreover, I observe that South Korea and the Philippines followed different courses of authoritarian regression, depending on the combination of international situation and domestic one. I label "security-dominated authoritarianism" in South Korea and "socioeconomic authoritarianism" in the Philippines, and compare different pathways of authoritarianism. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The often unnoticed practice of military aid in the name of ensuring stability and building alliances remains significant, especially given the chaotic international climate of the past few years. Military aid in particular, is almost equivalent to a bribe, for it is given under the assumption that the recipient nation will assume or maintain a political course of action that is approved by the providing nation (Morgenthau 1962). In order to get an overall assessment of the success and importance of U.S. military transfers to developing nations, it is crucial to look beyond the obvious effects transfers may have on bilateral relationships. If the U.S. represents the hope of democracy and success for the entire world, then U.S. foreign policy should reflect it when it comes to all forms of aid, particularly military aid. Utilizing data from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and Unified Democracy Scores, we suggest that U.S. foreign policy with regard to military transfers is misguided because democratization often takes a back seat to the more immediate goal of fostering more positive bilateral relationships. This project fits well on panels that address issues related to security, foreign policy, and democratization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last three years, U. S. influence in Central Asia seems to have significantly waned. Decreasing U.S. influence appears to have been accompanied by a concomitant increase in Russian and Chinese influence in the region. While some have described the competition for influence in the region a “new great game,” others claim that such a description is overstated. It is clear, however, that the United States, Russia, and China all have interests in the region. It is important, then, for the United States to clearly define its interests and understand whether its interests conflict or complement those of Russia and China. In some cases, U.S. interests may in fact coincide with Russian and Chinese interests, and it should seek ways to cooperate with Russia and China to achieve them. Regardless of whether its interests conflict or coincide with other major players in the region, it is imperative that the United States understand the interests and challenges of the Central Asian countries themselves. Without such an understanding, it risks pursuing policies that diverge from the goals of Central Asian countries and the United States will find it difficult if not impossible to achieve its own interests in the region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Saddam did not share with the US an understanding of the political or military implications of the 1991 Gulf War. He believed he won. His perceptionsâ€"many of them publicly stated but not believedâ€"influenced his stance in the run-up to the 2003 war ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

James Madison protected a liberal freedom when he drafted the Free Exercise Clause. This is based on Madison’s belief in a realistic human nature and on his adherence to natural rights which would provide secondary benefits to society. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is now the twenty-fifth anniversary of Michael Doyle's two-part essay that popularized the democratic peace theory in academic and foreign policy circles. The theory holds that liberal (democratic) regimes, while equally as, if not more, likely to go to war with non-liberal regimes, are pacific in their relations with other liberal democracies. The democratic peace has since become a guiding principle in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. It has also been used to justify current U.S. military operations in Iraq and elsewhere. In this article, we examine recent U.S. torture policy, and argue that the condoning of torture imperils the second key pillar of Doyle's thesis, which is that liberal regimes must have a "fundamental commitment to basic human rights." Because all three of the constituent components of the democratic peaceâ??regimes must be republics, they must have a commitment to human rights, and they must be interconnectedâ??are required to be functioning simultaneously for the theory to hold, weakening one pillar affects the entirety of the democratic peace. A policy that condones torture, or participation in torture, may therefore be more pernicious to the safety and security of the Unites States than other, more tangential issues related to such a policy, such as moral authority or policy legitimacy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1943-45 the CED's Keynesian domestic recipe for high postwar employment clashed with the Administration's vision for the liberalisation and expansion of world trade. The CED was challenged from within to accept there was a crucial relationship between foreign trade and domestic high employment. The CED resisted these challenges and not only survived the clash but prospered and became more influential in government. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A framework detailing the structural causes of uncertainty is developed to explain why debates over nuclear proliferation and climate change are dominated by belief-oriented thinking. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does a ?foreign policy establishment? exist in the United States? If so, how do the print and broadcast journalists who cover foreign affairs relate to it? Are they independent watchdogs, or members of the establishment, or something else? We address these questions by using 1974-2002 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) general public and ?foreign policy leader? survey data to explore how the foreign policy preferences of journalists have related to the preferences of foreign policy decision makers, experts on international affairs, business leaders, labor leaders, religious leaders, and the general public. Correlational and factor analytic evidence indicates that the foreign policy preferences of all six leadership groups and (to a lesser extent) the general public tend to hang together. But certain groups are more closely linked than others. The policy preferences of journalists, along with those of experts, policymakers, and business leaders, all load heavily on a ?foreign policy establishment? factor. The preferences of labor leaders, religious leaders, and especially the general public, however, load more heavily on an ?outsider? factor. The establishment tends to disagree markedly with the outsiders concerning number of important economic, military and diplomatic issues. Our analyses of other groups? influence upon journalists? foreign policy preferences are not conclusive, but they suggest that journalists are moved toward conformity with establishment views by foreign policy experts and perhaps also by policymakers. Taken as a whole, the evidence tends to support the existence of a foreign policy establishment with shared policy preferences. It locates foreign affairs journalists as members of that establishment, standing considerably closer to the views of policymakers and other establishment groups than to the views of the general public. This casts doubt upon the capacity or willingness of the media to perform a ?watchdog? function with respect to foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, many Americans sought the answer to the question, Why do they hate us? While opinion surveys at the time found that many Americans realized the people in other countries were critical of America’s foreign policy, they did not investigate Americans’ perceptions of the root causes of the terrorist attacks. And few surveys asked whether American foreign policy may have indirectly motivated the attacks. On the basis of a national survey conducted shortly after the 9/11 attacks, this study finds that 55 percent of Americans attributed responsibility to the U.S. for the hatred that led to the attacks; even among political conservatives, 40 percent saw the U.S. as at least somewhat responsible. The analysis tries to account for this surprising finding by examining the effects of demographic characteristics, political orientations (partisan ID and liberalism-conservatism), and orientations toward the American political system (national pride and political trust). Very substantial majorities of African Americans and Latinos attribute responsibility to the U.S. Liberals and Democrats are much more likely to say that the U.S. bears some responsibility. Those who profess less than the maximum level of pride in the country are also likely to view the U.S. as responsible. Americans also have a clear hierarchy of perceived “root causes” of the terrorist attacks. U.S. policy toward Israel is the leading factor; the Islamic religion, one of the least salient. The overall findings suggest that while Americans do not think the terrorist attacks were justified, they have a realistic view of the relationship between America’s foreign policy behavior and the motivations by terrorist extremists for attacking America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

American Public Opinion Toward China ----Policy Gaps between Leaders and Citizens Numerous studies have documented the persistent existence of foreign policy gaps between leaders and citizens (Almond 1960; Hinckley 1992; Holsti and Rosenau 1988, 1990; Kull and Destler 1999, 2001; Page and Barabas, 2000; Riely 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999; Wittkopf 1987). Moreover, scholars have identified the various factors that may be responsible for the opinion gaps (Herbst1998; Jacobs and Shapiro 2002; Kull, Destler, and Ramsy 1997; Kull and Destler 2002). These studies focus almost exclusively on broad foreign policy issues such as foreign policy orientation, foreign aid, UN peacekeeping, and defense spending. However, few studies examine American public opinion about a foreign country (Kusnitz 1984; Eytan 1987). This study fills up this research blind spot by examining policy gaps between American leaders and citizens in their opinions about China. Two conditions must be met before we can study public opinion about a foreign country. First, this country should be salient enough to the American people so that they have meaningful attitudes on issues related to this country. Second, there should be regular surveys that tap public opinion about this country. China meets the two conditions more than satisfactorily, if not perfectly. A few of the more recent examples will show the salience of China to most Americans: close cooperation during the Second World War, post-1949 hostility, the Korean War, China’s admission to the U.N., Nixon’s landmark visit to China, Tian’anmen Square incident, dispute over growing U.S. trade deficit, U.S. bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and airplane collision over the South China Sea. Moreover, my own research shows that on average China gets a front-page story in the New York Times every five days (Xie 2003). Meanwhile, the major survey organizations in this country have asked hundreds of questions about China. A LexisNexis search of “China” under “Survey Question” shows that the Gallup Organization has asked its respondents 749 China-related questions from 1937 to 2003 and Harris 300 questions from 1963 to 2003. In its quadrennial survey starting from 1974, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) has asked a sample of political leaders and a sample of the general public dozens of questions pertaining to China. These surveys provide us with excellent data to study public opinion about China. In our study, we use the CCFR data for two reasons. First, it is regularly conducted every four years. Second, the same questions are repeated across surveys. We first look at the aggregate trend of elite and citizen opinion about China, particularly the size and direction of gaps between them. Then we choose a single year (1998) for individual-level analysis of elite and citizen opinion. We try to pin down the determinants of individual opinion about China. Due to the limitations of the data, we can only test our hypotheses on the causal influence of age, education, partisanship, and ideology Finally we will discuss our findings and their policy implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although explaining U.S. foreign policy continues to be an important task for the scholar, efforts to link theory with the actual practice of foreign policy have not generated a consensus about what best explains foreign policy decisions. I propose a theory of presidential foreign policy decision-making that provides a linkage between the domestic and international decision-making contexts, based on the goal-maximizing behavior of presidents. Personal goals and incentives are an important factor because presidents have domestic policy goals, and sometimes re-election goals, that extend beyond a particular foreign policy crisis. The president that hopes to successfully navigate his domestic agenda must be cognizant of how foreign policy actions and the resulting increase or decrease in political resources affect future opportunities for success. Research on the domestic determinants of foreign policy has not provided adequate explanations. Most of the work in this area has centered around the diversionary theory, which suggests that leaders faced with poor domestic political conditions will use aggressive foreign policy behavior to divert attention from domestic issues. More recently, theories such as “strategic interaction” and “rational expectations” have questioned the usefulness of seeking answers using domestic variables. This study attempts to clarify the debate by specifying and testing the conditions under which one would expect domestic influence on foreign policy decisions and proposing new guidelines for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When analyzing US global security policy from a geopolitics perspective, it is interesting to note that some “rogue states” function, in part, via an institutionalized cult of personality (COP) to resist US power. This paper will explore COP in North Korea, Cuba, and Libya to illuminate the relationships between sovereignty, culture, history, ideology, and politics. Considerable, unsolicited intervention, a hallmark of US security policy, is not in line with a geopolitics traditionally based on a states system that allocates a modicum of sovereignty to its constituent parts, (individual states). A polity forms attachments to COP via socialization processes that disseminate particular modalities of being based on protection from external aggression and threat. By binding experience, memory, celebration and glorification of a great leader to the weal of the state and the people, a distinct form of governance emerges. By producing constructed points of reference, passed off as organic and in line with the integrity of COP, leaders are able to wield and perpetuate power. COP reflects political being, producing a distinct geopolitical configuration and modality of sociopolitical power. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reexamines diversionary war theory using case-wise cluster analysis, a research method that is under-utilized and has never been applied to the study of U.S. foreign policy in this way before. Cluster analysis groups cases together based on their similarity across a wide number of variables. Grouping cases in this manner allows interactions that would otherwise go unnoticed to manifest themselves. The results of this analysis show a specific cluster of conflicts that resemble our theoretical expectations for diversionary conflicts. Namely, the diversionary cluster consists of conflicts that were preceded by poor economic performance and slumping approval ratings, and a closer look at the specific circumstances surrounding these conflicts reveals that the president was beset by a scandal in the majority of cases. These findings would be nearly impossible to find in a large-N analysis because diversionary conflicts are very rare events. This analysis shows that although domestic indicators like unemployment, inflation, and presidential approval ratings do not exert a uniform effect on the likelihood of conflict across all cases, we need not discard the theory of diversionary use of force. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The next American president will inherit a poorly performing economy, shaky military campaigns, and rising anti-American sentiment and must work in an efficient manner to reverse these trends to successfully achieve its foreign policy goals. With this in mind, many scholars claim that coercive instruments are becoming less useful resources in the modern world. Nye has pointed to soft power as an increasingly important way of advancing national goals. While initial advocates of soft power have promoted cultural agendas to garner international support, others have noted the impact economic size and military scope can play in attracting other states to foreign policy causes. This paper offers a critical assessment of the concept of soft power by investigating constructivist, neoliberal, and classical realist interpretations of the source of attraction in international relations today. More specifically, I investigate what the source of soft power is, under what conditions it can secure national objectives, and what limits its effective use? Using a qualitative case-study approach, I investigate the dynamic foreign policy strategy of the Clinton Administration during the Bosnian War. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Islamic Republic of Iran often dominates international news headlines and US foreign policy discussions. Yet, the regime is typically viewed among scholars as one that defies categorization. In this paper, we place Iran in a comparative perspective. We argue that fundamentalist Islam plays the same role for the theocratic regime in Iran as party ideology does for many single-party dictatorships. We show that leaders and elites in Iran engage in the same key strategies for survival as their counterparts do in single-party dictatorships, particularly the co-optation of potential opposition voices. We support this argument using qualitative evidence drawn from the one-party states of Mexico, the former Soviet Union, and China. Our research indicates that the Iranian regime in many ways functions like a single-party dictatorship and is less anomalous than typically thought. This finding has important implications for US assessments of the Iranian regime and for the formulation of US foreign policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How have leaders historically thought about the security dimension of United States immigration policy? How has security affected U.S. immigration decisions? After discussing existing frameworks of this policy area, this paper will identify the security components of U.S. immigration policy, which are related to border control, disease, material wealth, espionage, ethnic assimilation, domestic uprisings, foreign policy considerations, population, and terrorism. It will then propose a structured, focused comparison method to identify casual variables and study how security has factored into four major immigration policy events in American history: the “open door” policy set by the founders during the early Republic, the National Quota Act of 1924, the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Immigration Act of 1990. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will analyze japanese nationalism by using the opinion polls that have been poorly utilized. It will indicate the nature of the nationalism. Then it will comperhend how such a nationalism will affect japanese alliance with the US ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks to see if there is a new type of “two presidencies” in the Bush administration. The two presidencies would include one presidency for policies dealing with terrorism and another for all other policies both domestic and foreign. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on explaining how alliance security dilemma created in Turkish-American relations with the war in Iraq and the factors that further complicated the situation and Turkey's responses to mitigate the security dilemma. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that Indian-American citizens' groups in the United States, and the efforts of an increasingly professionalized and well-funded "India lobby" on Capitol Hill, were critical in rallying congressional support around a significant and controversial bilateral nuclear trade and cooperation agreement between India and the United States in 2006. This episode may represent the consolidation of the "India lobby" and portend its emergence as of the most important ethnic communities seeking influence over US foreign policy in the 21st Century. Existing scholarly literature on ethnic lobbies and American foreign policy typically focuses on communities such as Jewish and Cuban Americans (the "Israel lobby," in particular has been the subject of recent contentious academic and policy debates ), and argues that wealth, geographic concentration, and group cohesion are important factors explaining ethnic lobby influence in the US foreign policy process. Indian-Americans as a community broadly fit the first two criteria, but until very recently were highly segmented into particular professional and Indian language/regional associations, and received scant attention in the ethnic lobby literature. Recently, though, the community has become more unified and politically mobilized, with potentially important implications for US policy in South Asia, the broader Asian region, and the world. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the Bush administration's vocal and aggressive opposition to the InternationalCriminal Court, why did the U.S. Representative to the United Nations abstain on aSecurity Council resolution referring the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the Court forinvestigation and prosecution? This paper examines the sources of this decision as a testcase for a socialization explanation of foreign policy change. It focuses on onemechanism of socialization - social influence - and elaborates the conditions underwhich the strategic calculation of costs and benefits associated with a policy change mayor may not be limited by the social environment within which a country articulates itsforeign policy. I argue that U.S. abstention can best be understood by taking into accounthow its foreign policy image limited the options state officials considered feasible. Isupport this argument with interviews and a discourse analysis of the U.S. StateDepartment's policy practices involving the ICC, accountability for mass atrocities, andDarfur. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research on strategic conflict avoidance and targeting in the American case shows that states avoid militarily targeting presidents whose domestic situations might be improved by diversionary conflict, and that congressional opposition to presidential foreign policy invites increased targeting by decreasing other states' perceptions of likely American resolve. This paper seeks to reassess these processes by considering the intervening effects of partisan ideology. Based on the likelihood that military ventures are viewed more favorably by conservative constituencies than their liberal counterparts, I contend that diversion is a more viable option for Republican than for Democratic presidents, resulting in greater incentives for strategic avoidance of Republicans. Conversely, the relative liberal aversion to military ventures means that the resolve-undermining effects of congressional opposition are likely more pronounced for Democrats. Analyses of the American foreign policy experience from 1949 to 2001 provide support for these hypotheses, as increases in the misery index are related to substantial decreases in the targeting of Republican administrations and congressional foreign policy opposition acts are related to substantial increases in the militarized targeting of Democratic administrations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is an examination of the effect of partisan control of domestic political institutions on U.S. participation in the United Nations system. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Various IR "realists" have criticized parts of Bush 43's foreign policy; these criticisms have not gone without rebuttal. The paper summarizes the state of the debate, and critiques both sides. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes the structure and sources of anti-American attitudes cross-nationally, in particular whether it is US foreign policy, aspects of US society, or individual frustration that motivates such antipathy. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]