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The goal of this paper is to contribute to filling in the gaps on the knowledge of public opinion on the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and on the facets of support of European citizens for the ESDP. From a logt estimation based on the Eurobarometer survey 54.1, we test three sets of hypotheses to identify the determinants for support the ESDP. We find evidence that some threats, European decision-making architecture, amry percpetions are good estimates for ESDP's public support. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper purports to offer a formal model that unifies deterrence and the security dilemma (or the spiral model) in a way different from the current literature’s. The two models, deterrence and the security dilemma, have been regarded as an alternative to each other. There are some formal works to unify the two, but even in such models, deterrence and the security dilemma are still treated as different worlds in the sense that actors do not know which world they are in and therefore act based on the probability for each. In my model, the world actors are in can change from one to the other as a crisis proceeds. More precisely, in one’s efforts to deter its adversary by building arms or mobilizing its force, one may well succeed in dissuading the other until some point. However, once its deterrent act exceeds that point (without recognizing it), the world is transformed to that of the security dilemma in which its deterrence backfires by (unnecessarily) provoking its opponent. This is the security dilemma in the sense that even if one’s opponent is greedy, its deterrence failure is not due to the adversary’s greed but rather because of the latter’s fear, aroused by one’s excessive deterrence, that the latter may be attacked in any event by the former. The logic behind it pertains to two types of credibility in deterrence, namely, the credibility of one’s threats and that of one’s assurances. As Schelling and others argue, a deterrent threat needs to be accompanied by the assurance that as long as the opponent stays there, one will not, the opponent believes, intend to hurt the other. This point has been argued by non-formal works. The existing formal models, however, are mainly concerned with how to make sure of the credibility of one’s threat without modeling to what extent it undermines the other type of credibility of an assurance. My model, by showing the inherent interconnectedness of deterrence and the security dilemma, illuminates the delicateness of deterrence. With the United States being at present the only superpower in the international system, policy implications of the model would be of vital significance. Jervis argues that state leaders tend to think that their benign intention is known to others even though it is not the case in actuality. If neorealists are right, the unmatched power of this country is ineluctably a threat to the others. Hence, unawareness of the security-dilemma side of deterrence could engender unintended consequences, ultimately undermining the US power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nearly five years after coming out the nuclear closet and openly declaring itself as a nuclear weapons state, India finalized its nuclear command structure and formalized its nuclear doctrine last year. The broad framework of India’s nuclear doctrine was drafted by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) that was established by the government of India after the nuclear tests of May 1998. This draft nuclear doctrine of the NSAB had been in the public domain since August 1999. However, till January 2003, India’s nuclear weapons doctrine remained just that, a draft. This ambivalence was removed by an official announcement from the Indian government on January 2003 that not only adopted the essence of that draft as official policy but also announced a formal nuclear command structure under civilian control. This is a significant development as India’s nuclear doctrine is a product of much debate and discussion within the country and abroad and holds important lessons for the established nuclear weapon states as well as the emerging nuclear states. This paper will examine the Indian nuclear doctrine in the context of the strategic environment that India faces and will assess its utility in India’s attempt to re-define its strategic position in the regional and global power hierarchy. Drawing from the Indian experience, this paper will also explore the parameters that might define the nuclear postures and doctrines of the emerging nuclear states and the possible responses of the established nuclear weapons states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the levels of military force implemented by the United States when initiating a militarized interstate dispute. The militarized record shows variation in the initial level of force and this level of force directly affects the outcome of the dispute. In light of the relationship between the initial level of force and the dispute outcome, the issue is why the United States would choose to substitute levels of force in a dispute. Based on the previous research, the United States acts differently than other states when initiating a dispute in the sense that domestic factors are expected to have the greatest influence on the level of force; however, this has not been tested on the initial level of military force (Meernik 2000; Mitchell and Moore 2002). Using a model that consists of state level variables and a combined model that incorporates system level variables, the empirical results provide some evidence for this theory as well as the effect that system level variables have on the initial level of military force used by the United States when initiating a dispute. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a new methodology for characterizing political regime types, and suggests an approach for using it to analyze how the institutional structure of governments shapes their behavior regarding threats and war. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What accounts for congressional assertion or lack thereof in national security policy after World War II? The author argues assertion is a function of the degree of congressional access to critical intelligence. Two case studies have been chosen to illuminate this poorly theorized issue area: The covert CIA operation in Angola which Congress shut down in 1975 and the 2002 Resolution authorizing President Bush to use force against Iraq. Furthermore, this paper seeks to test the waters for a more encompassing theory of Congress and national security policy that looks at presidential prestige and its consequences for the legislative-executive power-ratio in foreign and defense policy. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyzes the Bush Administration's 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States as a means of highlighting the crucial ideas behind such innovations as "preemption" and "regime change." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine the incentives or motives for India to adopt new practices associated with the latest RMA and its implications the Indian regional security environment and for the ability of India to tackle its security threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I analyze how biological weapons exist in an ambivalent conceptual state: although viewed as potential threats, they resist full incorporation into discourse on warfare and national security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bush 43's foreign policy views have evolved over time, from the "humble" realism of Governor Bush to the assertive idealism of President Bush's Second Inaugural. Arguably, the Bush Doctrine has evolved through three phases, from September 2001 through the 2006 National Security Strategy. That evolution is reconstructed through an examination of Bush's speeches and writings. A brief speculation is then offered on whether the Bush Doctrine will survive the Bush Presidency. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Post-9/11, women are viewed as disadvantaged in an electoral environment that emphasizes national security. I analyze bill sponsorship of defense policy proposals to test popular assumptions about women's policy expertise. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate on antimilitarist norms in Japanese security policy has focused on whether they have prevented Japan from acquiring military capabilities. In fact, the norms have been counterproductive when their advocates overreached. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using Arendtian thought to critique the American government's detention of citizens under 'enemy combatant' status provides an arena to understand US domestic policies as an foundation for global action in the War on Terror. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]